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EARL JELLICOE



Alice Hughes

ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELlicoe, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., IN 1917

THE LIFE
OF
JOHN RUSHWORTH
EARL JELLICOE

G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., LL.D., D.C.L.

By

ADMIRAL SIR R. H. BACON

K.C.B., K.C.V.O., D.S.O.

WITH FOREWORD BY

THE RT. HON. REGINALD McKENNA, P.C.

*With 40 plates, 6 folding maps
and charts*



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FOREWORD

By the RT. HON. REGINALD McKENNA, P.C.

IT is fitting that this biography should be written by a lifelong friend and brother officer of Lord Jellicoe. The author was one of the earliest to perceive that the immense development in power of modern warships necessitated vital changes in naval strategy and tactics, and he has succeeded in making these changes clearly intelligible to his lay readers.

John Rushworth Jellicoe was through and through a sailor. Descent, family tradition, early associations and training, all combined to concentrate his mind upon the Navy. He had few interests in his young days outside those with which his profession brought him in contact—the sports that kept him physically fit must be included in these—and he devoted his whole energies to the acquisition of technical efficiency. When I first became closely associated with him in 1909 he excelled in the work of his profession both at sea and on shore. The opening years of the present century gave us two Admirals of genius : John Fisher, who foresaw all the changes that the advance in science and mechanics had rendered necessary in the design of our ships, their equipment, and the training of the personnel ; and A. K. Wilson, who had an unrivalled knowledge and prescience how best to use a Fleet entrusted to him. Jellicoe combined the excellence of both his great predecessors. He had the imagination to foresee with precision the essential needs for maintaining our naval supremacy under the changed conditions of naval warfare ; he had the diligence to prepare for victory by ceaseless training and practice. His loyalty to the Service was a constant influence which inspired in those around him, as in himself, an unremitting devotion to duty. He was never ruffled or disturbed by accident or misfortune and in consequence retained in all emergencies the complete confidence of his subordinates. Naval genius and character alike qualified him for supreme command.

Although Lord Jellicoe's interests were chiefly confined to his profession, the range of his human sympathy was boundless.

FOREWORD

Humility and patience, courage and fortitude, tranquillity of mind, were his in an extraordinary degree. As he had perfect sympathy with others, so in his relations with men of all ranks his tact was perfect. No one associated with him failed to love him. Himself the least controversial of men, he became for a time the subject of violent controversy, but no attack, however unjust, ever moved him to utter a bitter word in self-defence. His friends might rage at the rancorous absurdity of some of his critics, but nothing could move him to a harsh reply. Generous in all his thoughts and dealings, he never imputed ungenerous motives to others. Through good and ill fortune he maintained complete magnanimity and serenity. "Thy Will be done" was the inspiration of his life.

Happily for himself and our own sense of justice his fame was well established in his lifetime, and as the years go by is enhanced by every new fact which the research of the historian brings to light. When he passed to his last rest he was already a national hero.

August, 1936.

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To use at 6.15 and 6.35 p.m. Place the protractor over the chart with the base of the triangle cut in the straight edge over the ship from which the visibility is required. The area visible is that inside the semicircle.

To use at 7.20 p.m., when the visibility was about 2,000 yards greater. Place the apex of the triangle over the ship, and the area inside the semicircle gives the visibility from the ship. The visibility at times was greater than that given by the protractor in the case of certain ships, owing to spaces between the fog banks. But the protractor is approximately correct for the ships of the battlefleet.

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PREFACE

IN this biography I have followed my previous practice of adding to the various chapters postscripts containing details and explanations which, although important, would, if included in the text, break the thread of the narrative. A good deal of the postscript matter is technical ; this can conveniently be skipped by the general reader. The marginal numbers after the letter G refer to Appendix IV, which contains a glossary explaining certain naval terms.

No replies have been made to the criticisms that were passed on Lord Jellicoe soon after the Battle of Jutland, since these have now been almost universally acknowledged to have been written in ignorance and haste. To these Lord Jellicoe never paid serious attention. The criticisms passed by Mr. Churchill he treated seriously, and to these he has left a full reply—the essence of which has been included in the text, although not actually in the form of answers to such criticisms.

It was fortunate that the biography was commenced during the life of Lord Jellicoe, for I was able to obtain from him opinions and criticisms of the Boxer, Grand Fleet, and Jutland chapters.

I have to thank the Countess Jellicoe and the Literary Trustees of the late Earl Jellicoe for the kind assistance they rendered me.

Admiral Sir Frederick Dreyer's knowledge of the whole of Lord Jellicoe's service in the higher ranks of the Navy, and as his Chief-of-the-Staff both on the World Cruise and also as Captain of the *Iron Duke* in the Grand Fleet, has been most useful. He, Admiral Sir Lionel Halsey and Mr. Phosphor Mallam read all the manuscripts, and to all of them I am indebted for many valuable suggestions.

I have also to thank Mr. Francis McMurtrie for passing his eagle eye over the proofs.

To Sir Archibald Hurd I owe the first chapter and the genealogical pedigree, as well as for reading much of the script.

In addition I have to thank for their kind assistance His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury for supplying a very sympathetic appreciation of Lord Jellicoe.

PREFACE

Admiral Sir Alister Beal, First Naval Member New Zealand Navy Board, 1923-6.

Miss Anne Bennett, who nursed Lord Jellicoe through his serious illness, 1931.

Mr. Ian Colvin, Biographer to Lord Carson.

Lord Cottesloe, for information regarding Bisley.

Captain Sir Arthur Curtis, K.C.M.G., Private Secretary to Lord Jellicoe in New Zealand.

Sir Cecil Day, Official Secretary to Lord Jellicoe in New Zealand, for much information regarding Lord Jellicoe's period as Governor-General.

Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair, K.C.B.

Commander R. K. Dickenson, R.N.

Lady Duff, for the loan of papers left by the late Admiral Sir Alexander Duff, K.C.B.

Colonel C. E. Eccles, Secretary to the National Rifle Association.

Admiral R. B. Farquhar.

Admiral Sir Percy Grant, K.C.V.O.

Admiral J. E. T. Harper, C.B., author of several books on Jutland.

Colonel E. C. Heath, C.V.O., D.S.O., Secretary to the British Legion.

Miss Alice Hughes for the excellent frontispiece photograph of Lord Jellicoe.

Mr. Hope Gibbon, New Zealand.

Vice-Admiral Oliver Leggett, C.B.

Paymaster Rear-Admiral Sir Eldon Manisty, for information concerning Convoy System.

Sergeant A. McLennon of the Royal Ordnance Survey, for work in connection with the plans and charts.

Lieutenant-Commander J. Pollen, for the diagrams, and especially those of the Battle of Jutland.

To Colonel Patton I am indebted for the miniature of Colonel Philip Patton.

Commander William Ross, whose diary as a midshipman during the Boxer Campaign deserves separate publication.

Paymaster Rear-Admiral Sir Hamnet Share, K.C.B., who for many years was secretary to Lord Jellicoe.

Colonel Simmons, R.A., whose correspondence with Lord Jellicoe was most illuminating.

PREFACE

Mr. D. B. Smith, Librarian to the Admiralty, was, as ever, most useful in supplying information.

Mr. Arthur Spry, British Sailors' Society.

Lastly, but not least, I have to thank the ninety-four kind people who in answer to my appeal sent me, either from Great Britain or New Zealand, information and photographs, a good deal of which has been worked into the text while a certain amount had to be omitted for want of space; I hope the senders of the latter will appreciate this necessity and forgive the omission.

Further, I have to acknowledge the courtesy of Messrs. Skeffington & Co. for permitting extracts to be published from their book *Kiel and Jutland*, by Commander von Hase, a book that should be read by all interested in the Battle of Jutland. Mr. John Murray has kindly permitted quotations from Admiral Ronald Hopwood, *The Old Way*; Admiral Sir E. H. Seymour, *My Naval Career and Travels*; Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, *Some Recollections*. My thanks are due also to the Editors of the *Daily Express*, *Engineering*, and the *British Legion Journal*, for permission to quote from articles in their respective papers, and the Editor of the *Morning Post* for allowing me to publish an interview with Lord Carson.

The Librairie Plon of Paris for permitting reproduction of two prints from *La Colonne Seymour*, by Jean de Ruffi Pontenes.

R. H. BACON.

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Some Account of Philip Patton. Gen. W. Walker.
Jellicoe. R. Applin.

CHAPTER I

1859 to 1872

Boyhood and School-time

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET EARL JELLICOE the greatest admiral of modern times, was born at Southampton on December 5, 1859.

Little Jack, for little in size he was, and his family at once called him Jack, was the second son of Captain John Henry Jellicoe by his marriage with Lucy Henrietta Keele. Captain Jellicoe throughout his life was associated with the Royal Mail Line and rose to the top of that service. Jack was related through his mother to the Keeles, a seafaring family, long connected with Hampshire, which in three successive generations produced a captain for the Royal Navy. Jack also through his mother traced descent from the Gardiner and Brocas families. A more detailed account of these relationships will be found in Appendices I and II. Here it will be sufficient to state that Jack's great-great-grandfather, Philip Patton, was a captain in the Navy who fought in the battle of La Hogue, where his life was saved by a silver tobacco box. Jack's great-grandfather, also named Philip Patton, was a distinguished admiral who fought in nine general actions under Boscawen, Hawke, Pocock, Rodney, Digby, and Hyde Parker, and was Second Sea Lord of the Board of Admiralty at the time of Trafalgar. The Keele family's association with the Navy included Charles and Edward, brothers to Jack's grandfather, who were both Naval officers. Charles, rising to the rank of admiral, gained considerable credit in the Burmese war of 1824; while Edward was unfortunately killed at the age of thirteen in the historic engagement between H.M.S. *Java* and the United States Frigate *Constitution* on December 29, 1812.

At the time of Jack's birth, his father was a captain in the service of the Royal Mail Line, and when a youth of seventeen was involved in an incident, now long forgotten, but which at the time caused a considerable stir and led to questions in the House of Commons

EARL JELlicOE

and to the issue of two White Papers—March and July, 1843—containing “Correspondence relative to the conduct of the Lieutenant Governor of St. Kitt’s.” Since there is much truth in the old saying “Like father, like son,” the incident is worth recording.

On July 9, 1842, the steamship *Clyde*, in which young John Henry Jellicoe was serving as a midshipman, arrived at the West Indian Island of St. Kitt’s. At 7.30 p.m. a boat was sent ashore to land the mails and it returned about 10 p.m., having on board a Mrs. Osborne, the wife of the Governor’s secretary, and her daughter who were about to embark in the *Clyde* for England. In addition, the boat also brought off the Governor of St. Kitt’s, Mrs. Osborne’s husband, and two other men. The visitors all proceeded to the saloon and the Captain of the *Clyde*, unaware, as he afterwards said, that anyone other than his passengers was on board, proceeded to weigh anchor and had almost cleared the harbour when the Governor and his three companions appeared and asked to be put ashore. What then ensued will never be definitely ascertained but there can be no doubt that considerable feeling was aroused on both sides. The Captain was obviously annoyed at having his sailing delayed. He complained, not unnaturally, that the visitors had no business aboard a mail-steamer, about to sail, unless they had a boat alongside ready to take them ashore. The Governor evidently resented what he considered an insult to his dignity. A captain of a “mere merchant steamer” should have been ready to put his ship about at once, to land the Lieutenant-Governor of St. Kitt’s. Besides, he maintained that he had told the Customs boat to wait for him and that the Captain had most inconsiderately sent it away. Eventually, after a heated discussion, a boat was lowered and placed in charge of Midshipman Jellicoe, who was given instructions to land the Governor at the nearest available landing-place. What followed is best told in young Jellicoe’s own words in a Report which he later sent to his employers, although, in fairness to the Governor, it must be added, in passing, that the latter produced a somewhat different story.

“SIR,

About 10 o’clock p.m. on the 9th July, 1842, I was sent in the boat to go on shore with the Governor of St. Kitt’s, his aide-de-camp, and two other gentlemen. The Captain (Ewing) told me, in the hearing of all the gentlemen, to pull for the nearest landing-place, and land the gentlemen, and to hasten back to the ship. After we had got away from the ship about half a mile, the Governor



ADMIRAL PHILIP PATTON
Lord Jellicoe's great-grandfather.

said 'There is the town,' pointing in one direction ; and another gentleman said 'There is the town,' pointing in another. I said I should pull in for the nearest landing-place, and land them if possible ; upon which the Governor said 'I must go to the town ; and if you do not do as I tell you, I shall take the helm from you and heave you overboard.' I replied, that I was not at all afraid. We pulled in for where the Captain had directed me, and I found that we could not land there, because there was nothing but rocks, which would break the boat to pieces.

The ship's lights were now shut in by the land, and I was very anxious to make haste and go on board. I pulled up about half a mile farther, and saw a little sandy bay, where was very little surf ; I said, 'Gentlemen, I must land you here' ; upon which the Governor said 'You shall not' ; and seized the tiller and endeavoured to take the boat to the town, then about one mile distant. I said, 'It is of no use trying to go there, because you shall not' ; and I told the men to pull round in-shore. The Governor then laid hold of me and pushed me overboard ; I laid hold of the rudder and got on board again, and seized the tiller, when a second and similar attempt was made, and then, and not till then, did the crew interfere. The man pulling the after-oar jumped up and laid hold of the Governor, and said, 'If you touch him again, I will shove my oar down your throat.'

There was then a regular scuffle in the boat, the aide-de-camp supporting the Governor. The boat was by this time aground and the two other gentlemen got out, and if I had not interfered I do not know what would have been the consequence. The men said to the Governor, 'If you do not get out, we will heave you out.' The Governor and his aide-de-camp then got out, and as soon as ever the Governor got on shore, he sang out 'Police !' and two or three men came running down to the boat and one took hold of her. I now thought it was high time to be off, and desired the policeman to desist. He then let go, and we shoved the boat off, and hoisted our sail to return to the *Clyde*, whose light was just visible. In a short time, however, it disappeared ; but we could still see the smoke ; that soon became fainter, and at last we could see nothing.

I then thought the steamer had gone away and left us, but I did not say anything for fear of alarming the men. In a few minutes the man looking out forward said, 'I think, Sir, she has gone away and left us.' I replied, that I thought so too ; 'but we will stand out a little farther and see if we can distinguish her.' We saw nothing ; and I said 'We will now haul in for land, and get under the lee of it and anchor.' It came on to blow pretty fresh ; and

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we took in two reefs, and in about an hour I saw a little headland stretching out, and I thought it would be a good plan to lay under it for the night.

We accordingly anchored. At daybreak we found ourselves close to a small village. We pulled in, landed, and hauled the boat up ; and we went in quest of something to eat, and to obtain a compass, which we could not get. We applied to the magistrate, and told him we had been left by the *Clyde*, after having brought the Governor, etc., on shore. I did not mention all that had occurred in the boat. He refused any assistance, and desired us to apply to the Governor, which we of course declined. We then left him, and bought some bread and a bottle of water, launched the boat, and bade adieu to the hospitable island of St. Kitt's.

I then consulted with the men (four in number) what was best to do, and whether they would attempt to follow the *Clyde*, knowing she was gone to St. Thomas. They replied they were perfectly willing if I would go. In about three hours we reached St. Eustatius, and steered about the same course four more hours, when we passed Saba. We then steered by the sun till that went down, and afterwards by the wind till the north star showed himself. We got on very well through the night save a few squalls, and the next morning about four o'clock made the Virgin Isles.

We ran along the land till about 10 o'clock, when we were opposite the harbour of St. Thomas. We ran in and found the *Clyde* there, the crew of which gave us three hearty cheers."

The publicity which this incident excited and the questions asked by Sir Charles Napier in the House of Commons did young Jellicoe more good than harm. No one could have had anything but sympathy and admiration for him. Moreover, the attention of his employers was directed to his merits. Henceforth he was a marked man. On March 17 of the following year the Secretary of the Royal Mail wrote to the Colonial Secretary :

"The statements of the people concerned in the incident appeared so contradictory, that the Directors, after full consideration, decided upon not troubling Her Majesty's Government upon the subject ; but as the conduct of Mr. Jellicoe, since he entered the Company's service, had been generally approved, particularly for the able and spirited way in which he rejoined his ship at St. Thomas, the Directors deemed it their duty to grant him a small promotion, with the intention of advancing him further so soon as his age may admit, should he continue to conduct himself in an equally satisfactory manner."

1859 TO 1872—BOYHOOD AND SCHOOL-TIME

In his early days Jellicoe's father lived, as has been stated, at Southampton which was then the base of the Royal Mail Line, whose service he had entered when only twelve years old. Later in his career Captain Jellicoe was stationed at this port as Marine Superintendent. As may well be imagined, the future Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, along with his two brothers (respectively two years older and two years younger than himself), spent much of his time in the docks, aboard ships, and on the waterfront. At a very youthful age he began to gain experience of small craft and was often taken out yachting by friends. In the circumstances, remembering the strong nautical strain in his ancestry, it is not surprising that from his earliest days he set his heart on a sea career and, indeed, never thought of any other. In fact, his two sisters Grace and Edith Jellicoe, who have survived him, treasure wonderful tales of his desire for a sea life and naval renown. His father feared that the family finances would not permit of his entering the Navy ; but his mother, a lady of great strength of will and personal charm, insisted on his doing so and fortunately carried the day.

At the age of six and a half he was sent to a dame-school kept by the Misses Shapcott, at Southampton, where he remained till he was ten years old. From there, after a year in a larger school, he passed on to a school at the little seaside village of Rottingdean, a few miles east of the Kemp Town end of Brighton. The place had been a great resort of smugglers, and there still survived more than one old inhabitant who could tell first-hand stories of these pertinacious folk and of the no-less pertinacious gangers, of casks broached, and of good red wine running freely down the gutter of the steep village-street. Lewes was not far distant, and the "No Popery" enthusiasm of its staunch Protestantism still infected the neighbourhood ; at Rottingdean the cry was really fierce when, on Guy Fawkes's Day, effigies of this miscreant and even of an august but entirely innocent personage were borne in procession and ultimately burned upon the neighbouring Downs.

The school was called Field House. It was kept—the tradition was that it had been founded—by two brothers, Jimmy and Billy Hewitt. The domestic arrangements were in charge of their sister Sophy. In the background, and seen only occasionally when a few of the older boys were asked in to dessert on Sunday afternoon, was "Mother Hewitt," a lady credited with a bad digestion and a keen enjoyment of a glass of port. The scholars were well grounded both in classics and in mathematics ; Jimmy did the

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former and Billy the latter. Jimmy was also responsible for the Bible lessons. Of these much was made. It was believed—and the belief was founded largely upon the presence of not a few boys of Norfolk stock—that one or other of the brothers had been tutor in some distinguished family of that county. Further, there were, in the school, sons of the celebrated physician Dr. Joseph Kidd, eclectic in his treatment and comprehensive in his clientèle, who ministered physical comfort alike to Lord Beaconsfield and to the great Baptist divine, Charles Haddon Spurgeon. From these combined sources, the Norfolk clans and what—without any disparagement, for it was effective of much good—may be called the pietistic therapeutic of Dr. Kidd, there flowed a stream of religious influence of a quite definite kind. It was quite uncritical in itself; somewhat exclusively Pauline in its doctrine and Johannine in its devotion.

Billy Hewitt was musical; indeed, a little uproariously so, in particular when he played the *Marche aux Flambeaux* as a voluntary in church, where he regularly officiated at the organ. He had managed to introduce into the school *Hymns Ancient and Modern* and Bramley's *Carols*, which, to his accompaniment on the piano and to that of the flute played by an assistant-master, by name Oldfield, the boys used to sing on Sunday evenings in the winter, there being no evening service in church. In the church, which the school attended twice on Sunday, the older boys sat on the north side of the chancel; opposite to them usually sat, solitary, the vicar's daughter, Miss Thomas. Sometimes in the summer she was accompanied by her brother Cecil, an Old Etonian and a cricketer of some note, faultlessly attired and invariably decorated with a picotee in his buttonhole; on at least one occasion he was accompanied by such a demigod as A. W. Ridley, the lob-bowler, the sight of whom, of course, thrilled the boys. One of the heroes of the school was Pooley, the Sussex wicket-keeper; others, less famous, were Steyning and Charles Beard, who lived in the village and were generous friends to the boys, sometimes giving them a day with their foot-beagles and regaling them on the Downs at luncheon-time with cold plum-pudding and beer. No less agreeable was "Aunt Matilda," an aged dame of the Early Victorian school, who, if a message were brought to her from either of the Hewitts, would never allow a lad to go away without a glass of sherry and a sponge-cake. Not every old lady of the place was quite like that. "Old Mother Forty Cats," who lived opposite

Aunt Matilda in a great gloomy house surrounded by high walls, was a witch whose very shadow was to be shunned. Down near the shore, on the left of the descent, was a short terrace of lofty houses in one of which for a time lodged the St. Vincent family. Of course, the bigger boys were in love with the Jervis girls, one of whom, Ada, eventually married Lord Harris, the cricketer.

Thus there was an abundance of interest but, for all that, the régime seems to have been Spartan. The school had a good bill of health. Sophy, a little severely, concerned herself with the minor ills of the pupils. Once a week there was a hot bath, taken in a kind of wash-house furnished with a copper, which Jimmy supervised. In winter, about a quart of hot water was provided for each boy's morning ablutions at half-past six. Hands and nails had to be scrupulously clean; they were from time to time inspected, and on Sunday morning, before putting on their gloves to go to church, the boys were lined up for this purpose, an occasion upon which the standard was most exacting, and correction was sometimes rather painfully applied. A ukase of Dr. Kidd was probably responsible for the liberal supply of green vegetables at meals and also, probably, for the cold underdone roast beef which more often than not was served at breakfast, the complete consumption of which, fat and all, was absolutely *de rigueur*. It may be that Dr. Kidd would not altogether have approved of the disciplinary methods sometimes adopted by the authorities—doubtless with the best intentions. There was, however, nothing approaching bullying among the boys themselves; they were singularly considerate to one another. It was, on the whole, an enjoyable life. There was no restriction as to hampers from home; from pigeon-pies to anchovy paste, everything came in free; and then there was the village sweetstuff shop, and Mutton's, with its chocolate buns "with pink inside"—well did the boys know *them*!—which Jimmy would get for any boy, if he liked to commission him, together with agate taws, moist colours—illuminating texts was a great wet Sunday pursuit—and the like, when he made his bi-weekly expedition to Brighton in the village fly.

This, then, was the environment in which the future Admiral of the Fleet lived. It cannot be left out of account, if only because it was so emphatically unlike that of to-day; yet it existed only sixty-five years or so ago! What of the little boy who cannot have failed, at his impressionable age and with his impressionable temperament, to have been in some measure moulded by it into the

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great man? John Jellicoe was small, almost diminutively built, and at the time not very robust ; but on the air of sea and Downs he plainly throve. Alert as a watchdog, he had the keen and speaking, but kindly, eyes which denoted at once brain power and evenness of temper. His companions felt instinctively that he had a future. There was something about him irresistibly suggestive of the "right little, tight little island." One of the boys, knowing that he was destined for the Navy, made some doggerel verses about him, the first line of the refrain of which, with singular prophetic vision, ran :

"I'm John Jellicoe, Commander of the Fleet."

His transparent sincerity, his unobtrusive religious spirit, his high moral standard—all these impressed his schoolfellows and won their respect. Many of them grumbled at the food ; many reviled the masters. But not so he ; he was there to do the job, and he did it. His proficiency at mathematics was, fortunately, first-rate, but he had not the aptitude for games of his brother Freddy, the well-known left-handed slow bowler who gained his cricket Blue at Oxford. This skill must have developed later, and that it lasted long is revealed by a letter, written to one of his companions at Field House from New Zealand in 1922, in which he said : "I still play cricket. The standard of the game is not very high, so that even in my old age I can put up a fair score."

As a foreshadowing of his gift of identifying himself with the interests, however seemingly unimportant, of his neighbours, reference may be made to a document in his handwriting of a school society, a kind of small boys' "Pop" called "The Cabal," of which he was the secretary, bearing in addition to his own signature those of Hugh and Russell Macnaghten, H. L. Stephen, Harry Farrer, Hereward Wake and others. Among his other schoolfellows may be named Charley and Willy Cunliffe, Walter and Harry Wolrige-Gordon, Watkin Williams, Sydney Rathbone, Henry Howard-Vyse, Sidney Roberts, Johnny Blencowe and Salisbury Price.

In 1872 a nomination for the Navy was given Jack, as he was known to his family, by Captain Robert Hall, a friend of his father's who at that time was Naval Secretary to the Admiralty. His young imagination fired by this good news Jellicoe wrote in one of his books : "This book is the property of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe !" How seldom do such dreams come true ! In the summer of 1872 Jellicoe passed second into the *Britannia*, at the

Names of the members of the Cabal.
Signed.

W. W. Williams. (Director.)

J. Wobrige (President); R. Macnaghten (for pres)

J. C. Rathbone (chairman)

J. N. Fellicca (secretary)

Members.

J. S. Hogg

H. L. Farnen

H. L. S. tophren. R. Macnaghten.

A. G. Buckle. C. S. Wake.

J. Roberts.

F. A. Jones

M. R. S. S. S. S.

THE AUTOGRAPH LIST OF THE CABAL

1859 to 1872—BOYHOOD AND SCHOOL-TIME

age of twelve and a half. At this time his mother did not realize what a clever son she had ; and, not thinking him sufficiently advanced in mathematics, she arranged for a village schoolmaster to come and coach him in the holidays. After giving young Jellicoe a lesson or two the man came to Mrs. Jellicoe and said, "Madam, I don't think you quite realize what a clever son you have. He has just solved a problem in half an hour which took a friend of mine over a week to do. Your boy doesn't need any extra coaching."

His father was at sea when his son's first cadet's uniform was ordered. It was supplied by naval outfitters, except for the cap, which his mother bought at a tailor's shop in Ryde. It was guaranteed to be of the naval pattern, but when it arrived Jack was not at all pleased with it. He said it was not "Service" and flatly refused to wear it. His mother declared severely that he *should* wear it, whether he liked it or not. He then quietly took the cap up to his room, where he stamped, and rolled on it, until he made it unwearable. A new cap had eventually to be ordered at the naval outfitter's. Though small he had a will of his own.

CHAPTER II

1872 to 1874

H.M.S. *BRITANNIA*.
H.M.S. *NEWCASTLE*.

NAVAL CADET
MIDSHIPMAN

The Service is a rough but good school, where everybody finds his level—not the level of equality, but the level which his natural talent and acquirements will rise or sink down to.

Midshipman Easy.

IN the autumn of 1872 Jack joined H.M.S. *Britannia* as a Naval Cadet. It was only a few years earlier that the Admiralty had begun seriously to take in hand the education of young Naval officers. Previous to this, all youngsters on entering the Navy were sent to a receiving ship moored in one of the Naval ports ; there they remained, with every opportunity to learn idleness and bad habits, until drafted to a sea-going ship. At sea they learned seamanship in a very practical school and picked up a little of the elements of navigation ; but there what may be called their official education ended.

The division of duties between the officers on board a sea-going ship had from time immemorial been peculiar.

In the days of the trireme, and for centuries afterwards, the soldiers did the fighting at sea, while the seamen handled and worked the ships. There was no marked division between the Naval and the Military officer. Blake was a soldier with a slight sea experience ; Raleigh and Grenville were as much soldiers as sailors. Gradually, however, fighting officers became specialized into two distinct professions, some fighting ashore, and some at sea in command of ships. Thus a definite service of Naval officers arose ; but for nearly two centuries the old distinction between fighting and navigation persisted. The men of war continued to carry a special class of "masters" and "mates," a somewhat inferior grade of fighting officer. Their duties were to navigate the ship and look after the state of repair of the rigging, while the com-



JOHN JELlicOE
Naval Cadet, aged 12.

mand of the ship and the fighting developed on what came to be called the "executive branch."¹

At the time that Jack entered the Navy, and for a good many years afterwards, the art of navigation was still mainly the province of a special branch of officers on whom the Captain relied to set the course for the ship to steer and conduct the general work of navigating the vessel. The knowledge of the executive officers in these matters was scant, but the growth of education ashore was bound to find an echo in the Navy, with the result that, in the fifties of the nineteenth century, the Admiralty wisely came to appreciate the advantage of training young officers in all branches of their profession. Hence the Training Ship *Britannia* came into being, and a two years' course in seamanship, navigation, and general knowledge was given to the youngsters before they were launched on their careers on the high seas. But My Lords were still a bit behindhand, for a knowledge of steam and the steam engine formed no part of the curriculum, in spite of the fact that steam had, by this time, become a serious rival to sail power. Speaking generally, all men-of-war were designed for both forms of propulsion; but steam was gradually gaining the predominance. However, the conservative instincts of the older Naval officers favoured the principle of teaching the youngsters the intricacies of masts and sails to the total exclusion of even a rudimentary course of instruction in the working of the steam engine. In fact, the preface to the 1870 edition of Nares's *Seamanship*, the standard work for the instruction of young Naval officers, stated that steam was so unreliable that sails must still be looked on as an important means of navigating a ship on long voyages.

In 1872, therefore, Jack spent approximately half his time in learning elementary mathematics and how to navigate a ship from place to place, while the other half was devoted to seamanship, that is, the art of sailing and handling a ship, and to instruction in a few miscellaneous subjects such as drawing and French; but all knowledge of engineering was denied to him and the other cadets.

The *Britannia* was an old three-decker with all her guns and her two after-masts removed. The foremast with its topmast, and above that again the topgallant and royal-masts, remained, as did

¹ The masters and mates and, later, the staff commanders were actually of executive rank and could take command of a ship.

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the bowsprit with its prolongation of jib-boom and flying jib-boom. These formed a happy gymnasium for the Naval cadets. The extreme top of the royal-mast, perhaps as much as 125 feet above the deck, looked a terrible height to the youngster when first he began to climb the rigging: probably the branches of an apple tree had previously been the limit of his ambitions. But up he had to go, with nothing but a very uncomfortable and by no means reassuring-looking net to catch him should he fall. From the official point of view climbing, except on special occasions, was not obligatory; but the unwritten law of the Naval cadet laid down that each boy in his first term should climb up into the platform at the foremast head, called the top (it was not by any means the top of the three masts) by the "futtock rigging," a rope ladder contrivance which sloped outwards as well as up, so that, during the climb, the back of the climber was more horizontal than vertical.

Again, an unwritten law demanded that in his second term a cadet should climb right up to the highest point and touch the truck, that is the round piece of wood which sat like a crown on the top of the mast. In order to do this, the last fifteen feet had to be negotiated by shinning up the bare pole, some 120 feet above the deck. Most of the cadets were ordinary mortals, with average boyish heads for heights, and were reasonably careful of their bones; but some were cat-like without any sense of height or danger. Jack records that one of his "term," Wingfield by name, not only climbed up and sat on the truck, but slid down the rope which led from that dizzy spot to the extreme end of the flying boom, which spar stuck out in front of the ship, some 150 feet away from the royal truck. A gallant fellow this Wingfield, of whom we shall hear more later on.

On joining the *Britannia* Jack was but four foot six in height, and only four foot eight and a half on leaving, some two years later. This smallness of stature was a considerable handicap to him when competing with taller boys both in games and while aloft; he, however, played cricket and football with all the success that his height permitted. One incident associated with his diminutive proportions remained all his life vividly impressed on his mind. This was on the occasion when the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Ward Hunt, came to Dartmouth, to inspect the *Britannia*. The inspection, of course, included the cadets, who were marshalled in two ranks for the ordeal. He was very tall,

so much so that he had to stoop while walking about the ship, to avoid knocking his head against the beams. Naturally the boys were on the tiptoe of excitement at seeing and being inspected by so great a person as the Head of the Admiralty ; Jack's mortification can, therefore, easily be imagined when the giant of six foot three stopped opposite little four foot six and remarked to the Captain : " What a puny lot of cadets you have here." Little did he think that the puny cadet opposite to him would one day command the greatest fleet that in the whole history of the world had been marshalled in battle on the wide sea. Anyhow, it certainly would have been more tactful to reserve his criticism until out of hearing of the cadets ; boys are sensitive mortals.

Small though he was in stature Jack had plenty of brains. Captain Foley, who was Jack's Captain when in the *Britannia*, was having tea with a lady at Ryde, where he met Mrs. Jellicoe. After she had left he remarked, " I wonder if Mrs. Jellicoe realizes that her son John is one of the cleverest cadets we have ever had."

Although a great advance on the previous *laissez-aller* system, the *Britannia* in Jack's day was a very different establishment from the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth that was subsequently created by Lord Fisher. This ultimate change from a ship to a shore building was necessitated by the large increase in the number of cadets, and also by hygienic considerations. The cadets undoubtedly lost a certain amount of boat work ; for in Jack's day the only method of reaching the shore, for sport or recreation, was in one of the ship's boats pulled by seamen or marines, the cadets themselves often taking an oar. The mere fact of being in a boat in a tideway several times in each day was, in itself, good training. The change, however, brought one great gain ; for in the *Britannia* the discipline of the cadets was supervised by the master-at-arms and several ship's corporals, promoted seamen or marines, while in the R.N. College this supervision is carried out entirely by officers.

The cadets in the *Britannia* were divided into two watches, each nominally under a lieutenant who generally knew the names only of the more turbulent of his charges and of those most prominent in the cricket field. Under the later system, each lieutenant was expected to study the character of each cadet placed under his charge, and act more or less as a sea-daddy to these youngsters. This, it must be acknowledged, was a very superior system to that

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which existed before ; and in after years Jack cordially supported the innovation.

The period of time spent by a cadet in the *Britannia* was divided into four terms, two in each year. The latest arrivals were the "First Terms" or "News" ; they were fagged by both the third and fourth term ; an uncomfortable life, but good discipline for a boy. The second term were fagged by the fourth term only. Though term fights between the first and second terms not infrequently took place in the *Britannia*, there was none in Jack's time ; he had, however, his share of individual encounters. The whole training was rough but excellent. Learning how to pull an oar was part of the routine ; but boat sailing was the sport Jack revelled in, and it was on the waters of the Dart, in a small sailing cutter, that he spent most of his spare time. Drill aloft gave him the necessary contempt for the hazards of sail drill, and the draughts that swept along the breezy decks of the old *Britannia* and her consort the *Hindustan* hardened him and prepared him for a life at sea.

But perhaps the chief of the lessons that were learned at that period of his career was that life was a succession of ups and downs, of alternating successes and failures. The "New" was a nobody, a slave ; a second-termers was merely a superior helot ; a third-termers was the ruler of a province exercising partial sway over the "News" ; but the fourth-termers was a king, a dictator, over all except his own compeers. Then came the day when these monarchs put their small feet on the quarter deck of a sea-going man-of-war. Down they tumbled at once and became mere insignificant atoms, being looked upon as small nuisances until they had learnt their multitudinous duties, when once more they began to climb slowly up the competitive ladder of life.

The only punishment Jack received while in the *Britannia* was four days No. 7, and this was for participating in a raid on an apple orchard, a trait evidently inherited by boys from Mother Eve. The punishment was unpleasant and included an hour's drill with a heavy Brown Bess rifle (which must have made the arms of young 4 feet 8 ache badly) and an hour standing facing the ship's side after all the other cadets not under punishment had gone to bed. That he escaped so lightly was due, as his Captain remarked, to his previous good conduct.

In the summer of 1874 Jack finished his *Britannia* course in a triumphant manner by passing out first of all the cadets and gain-



CADETS OF JOHN JELICOE'S TERM, H.M.S. *BRITANNIA*, JULY, 1872-74

Back row (left to right) : W. G. Stewart, J. R. Jellicoe, L. S. Stansfeld, E. J. Carus-Wilson, F. A. Garforth,
C. E. Rushworth, A. E. Tizard, A. Dodgson, J. Honner, B. R. Daly.
Front row : C. E. Anson, A. Barry, W. F. Knox.

ing a first-class certificate in each subject, with consequent immediate promotion to midshipman. In addition, he gained prizes for being first in theoretical study, first in seamanship, and two minor ones ; but of these he was allowed to keep only three. A silver inkstand, the prize for being first in study, was afterwards lost in the *Victoria*, but My Lords graciously replaced it. Two other cadets, Stewart and Wingfield, also passed out midshipmen. Jack certainly showed that, although only some 4 feet 8½ inches in height, he had the best brain of the thirty-nine boys in his term. He was immediately appointed to the *Duke of Wellington*, the Flagship of the Port Admiral at Portsmouth, and shortly afterwards to the *Newcastle*.

September 22, 1874, was a great day in Jack's life, for it was on that day that he proudly joined H.M.S. *Newcastle*, a fine sailing frigate with auxiliary steam propulsion. He must have fairly swelled with pride as he mounted the side of what could, with truth, be called a "stately" ship. For stately indeed she was, with her spick-and-span paint, her masts towering up a hundred and fifty feet, and her great yards lying across them squared to an inch, with their sails in smooth and unwrinkled "skins" of canvas. But his pride must have been somewhat diluted with trepidation as he stepped down on to her upper deck, feeling, as he certainly was, a mere uniformed microbe in this new and rather formidable world. His trepidation would have been greater still had he appreciated the fact he was at once to learn, that he would, for a short time, be looked upon by the ruling authorities as a grain of grit introduced into the smooth workings of a highly technical and complicated machine ; and that it would be some months before he would be sufficiently instructed to assist usefully in the work of the ship.

The Navy in 1874, when Jack joined, was altogether a different service from what it was when Lord Jellicoe retired in December, 1924. The change of sea life between A.D. 100 and A.D. 1850 was no greater than that which took place during his period of service. Ships and their method of propulsion, guns and gun ranges, methods and weapons of warfare, battle tactics, and the habits, training and education of the officers and men, all were to be subjected to radical alteration.

To begin with, Jack's seamen shipmates were a totally different breed from those of the post-war era. Their training had been, and was, almost entirely devoted to creating a capacity for work

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aloft. The value of a man was assessed purely from the point of view of his ability as a seaman. Gunnery was not then a science ; battle ranges of one thousand yards made no demand on the brains of the captains of the guns. Looking along the sights and pulling the firing lanyard at approximately the right moment needed no great skill and but little training. Aloft, however, their work demanded knowledge, muscle and nerve. There, indeed, they seemed to be monkeys rather than men. "To hang on by your eyebrows" was a common expression, and not inaptly described what, when aloft, these prehensile mortals were frequently forced to do. Woe betide the man on a yard, who, while standing on the swaying foot-rope that swung about to and fro as the ship pitched and rolled, was seen to use a hand with which to hang on and steady himself. "Both hands on the sail," when furling, was obligatory, and in order to hang on and steady himself he had to use his elbows and perhaps even his chin as best he might. Broad-shouldered, bearded men they were, whose feet, when on board, were seldom imprisoned in boots except on Sundays at Divisions, when the men were inspected by the Captain. The upper yardmen, that is, the men who worked on the highest of the spars that crossed the masts, with whom Jack had to work as midshipman of the cross trees (the highest little platform placed at the topmast head), were the pick of the ship's company so far as agility and daring were concerned. If they beat the other ships at drilling aloft they were accorded special privileges, and consequently thought a good deal of themselves, and swaggered a bit when on shore. Indeed, they were looked up to with envy by the younger men, who had yet to prove their worth, and regarded with a critical toleration by those who once had held a similar post, but who were too old and set to carry out any longer such active duties.

Of education, the seamen of that day had little. Their oaths were both forcible and picturesque, although not much more so, it must be confessed, than those of some of their officers. Ashore on leave the majority applied themselves too freely to the bottle. In fact, probably seventy-five per cent of the liberty men invariably returned on board in varying degrees of drunkenness ; but next day they were up the rigging again, and ready to jump, and land on impossible places, with the agility of a cat, and resigned to having to wait probably for another three months for a chance of again visiting the shore for another carousal. What those men lacked

in education they made up in pluck ; their very roughness seemed a guarantee of hardihood and endurance ; they were true descendants of the Elizabethan seamen whose deeds are still the admiration and wonder of all who go down to the sea in ships.

The midshipmen, after some experience, became of great value to the Commander, and to the Lieutenants who took charge of the working of the various masts ; for although usually they had not the muscular development and the practical experience and aptitude of the younger seamen, they had most useful and responsible work to perform in seeing that discipline was maintained in the drill aloft.

It was while working with these men that Jack learned the details of his profession. True it is that, after a lapse of twenty years, he found that the old sea-going lore of the sailing ship was largely useless to him in the steel steam-driven vessels in which he served. But the education, the fight with sea and weather, which his duties aloft entailed, together with the example and the pluck shown by these seamen of the old school, provided lessons which throughout his life he never forgot, and which left their mark on his character and his proficiency as a Naval officer.

Such were the seamen of the eighteen-seventies in whose company Jack was launched on joining his first sea-going ship.

The *Newcastle*, commanded by Captain Robert Gordon Douglas, was one of the six ships which formed the Flying Squadron under the command of Rear-Admiral Randolph. The other ships were the *Narcissus* (flagship), *Topaze*, *Doris*, *Immortalité*, all wooden frigates, and the *Raleigh*, a more modern composite vessel. "Flying Squadron" was the name given to a fleet of sailing frigates which at that time it was usual to commission periodically to visit off stations and, incidentally, to afford more continuous sea training to the younger men than service with the larger fleets was capable of giving.

The *Newcastle* sailed from Sheerness on October 18, 1874, and called at Portsmouth, where Jack's mother came over to the ship from Ryde, to bid him farewell, bringing with her what he called "a very welcome" gift of fruit. Plymouth was the next port of call, but no stay was made, for the ship left immediately to join the remainder of the fleet at Gibraltar.

Once at sea there was ample opportunity for shaking down, and for Jack to get to know his shipmates. The Commander, Seymour H. P. Dacres, was the son of the distinguished admiral

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of that name. Among the lieutenants was Edmund S. Poë,¹ Another lieutenant was H. J. May,² afterwards the first President of the War College at Greenwich. As a matter of interest it may be mentioned that this appointment was offered to Captain Jellicoe when he was captain of the *Centurion* in China, after the 1900 Boxer trouble had been settled. But, as further outbreaks were feared, he naturally did not wish to leave his command; and as his admiral, Sir Edward Seymour, was most desirous that he should stay, he did not accept what was a very complimentary offer. Among the midshipmen of the *Newcastle* was Herbert Paris, who sported a beard and was twenty years old! This was very old for a midshipman; but certain misfortunes in his career had delayed his promotion. Physically he was phenomenally powerful; but, like most strong men, remarkably good tempered. Then there was Doveton Sturdee, who afterwards commanded at the Battle of the Falkland Islands and subsequently a division of the Grand Fleet at Jutland; Herbert Cust, afterwards Hydrographer of the Navy; Wingfield, already mentioned, a daredevil aloft and in the water; and Harry Rivers. A good selection of youngsters.

The passage down south to the entrance of the Straits of Gibraltar was made under sail. In the Bay, a moderate gale necessitated three reefs on the topsails; a good tonic to break the youngsters of their sea-sickness. Gibraltar was reached on November 6, after a ten-day passage, which was about the average for a sailing ship in those days.

The human memory plays queer tricks! Its selection of what to remember and what to discard is apparently governed, in youth, more by the stomach than by reason. The fruit at Portsmouth, the confectionery of Esmeralda's at Gibraltar, and the custard apples shortly to be tasted at Madeira, were three memories of the first month at sea that had pride of place in Lord Jellicoe's mind after a lapse of some sixty years! Undoubtedly the gun-room fare in those days was monotonous and not very satisfying to the youngsters. Salt beef one day, salt pork and pea soup the next, with hard weevily ship's biscuits, left a good deal to be desired by the midshipmen; for the standard Admiralty fare at sea in those days, although probably better in quality, was much the same as that served out to the officers and men in Nelson's time. The lime-juice served out after a week at sea to counteract

¹ Afterwards Admiral Sir Edmund S. Poë, G.C.V.O., K.C.B.

² Afterwards Rear-Admiral H. J. May, C.B.

the tendency to scurvy was looked on by all as a luxury. No wonder, then, that the boys were profoundly gratified when they found themselves in the lands of fruit, or seated in the shop of the far-famed Esmeralda, at Gibraltar.

The Government ration was, of course, supplemented by the gunroom officers themselves. They formed a mess, and subscribed thirty shillings each a month towards the betterment of their living. Tea, potatoes, tinned meat, and vegetables were supplied by the messman ; and, in addition, the youngsters were allowed to run up a bill of ten shillings a month with the steward for extras. Jam, cocoa, condensed milk and sardines were the principal items of this youthful extravagance, if extravagance it can be called. In fact, for six weeks Jack is said to have fed almost entirely on sardines ; and, strange to say, instead of wearying of them, he continued to retain for the whole of his life a penchant for this peculiarly oleaginous form of food. A wine bill of ten shillings a month was allowed to midshipmen under eighteen, and an additional five shillings to those over that age. The living in the gunroom was, therefore, distinctly frugal, though not absolutely Spartan.

There is no doubt that one of the most critical periods in the career of an officer in the Navy is the time spent by him in his first sea-going ship. He is then at a most impressionable age—still a boy, and yet not a boy. He has all the immature characteristics of youth, yet he has to take his place among men and to exercise authority over subordinates much older than himself. The example of his seniors is, from the close propinquity of life in a ship, bound to exercise an influence on his character, strengthening or weakening the various biases formed in his earlier years. In this period of education hero worship is sure to play a prominent part ; but the heroic traits which may attract a boy form probably only a part of the character of the hero ; and there is a danger that undesirable traits in the hero may also become attractive to his worshippers. Over-drinking was, unfortunately, too prevalent at the time. The habits of the gentry in the Georgian and early Victorian days had not died out in the Navy to the same degree that they had on shore ; so that at times, in certain ships, the lieutenants and even the more senior officers afforded a bad example in this respect to the youngsters. Some of the lads followed it and came to grief ; in others, like Jack, drunkenness created a feeling of revulsion and acted as a strong deterrent to over-indulgence in wine and spirits. Both types of seniors were usually

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represented in the cooped-up space of a man-of-war. The temptations and opportunities were to hand ; heredity and home influences determined their effect on the youngsters.

Most of the executive officers of a ship, both by precept and also example, imparted education to the lads ; but the nature of that teaching varied according to the rank of the officer. The senior midshipmen were the instructors of those lately joined. While on the watch or aloft, they taught them their duties and imparted " wrinkles " which were nowhere written in books of instruction but handed down by word of mouth—and the better remembered for that. Similarly with boat work, much was learnt from an older midshipman when he took a youngster away with him in off hours to practise the art of managing a boat under sail. In the gunroom mess, the sub-lieutenants and officers of similar rank saw to the general behaviour of the lads, and administered summary punishment when necessary. The discipline in the gunroom of the *Newcastle* was good.

A midshipman might pick up a lot from the officer of his watch, who was usually a lieutenant. The actual orders given for working a sailing ship were easily acquired, but the eye had to be well trained so that in tacking, wearing, setting or shortening sail the orders might be given at the exact and proper moment. Even on a pitch-dark night an experienced officer would, almost by instinct, diagnose any cause of trouble aloft, even though the men on the yards were totally invisible. Another accomplishment that a midshipman might learn was what may, for want of a better name, be called " deportment " as officer of the watch. A youngster would be quick to note and appreciate the difference between a calm and collected, or a fussy and anxious officer. Some officers were loud and boisterous ; others got the work done equally efficiently in a quieter manner ; some officers of the watch were unnecessarily strict, some woefully slack ; some sailed along a middle course, much to the benefit of all under them. Examples of all these types were to be seen by the youngsters, especially in sailing-ship days, and those who had the gift of observation and were endowed with brains which could analyse and appreciate what they saw, were quick to adopt the deportment of those seniors whose behaviour appealed to them.

One lesson of supreme importance that a boy had to master early was how to treat the men under him. Undoubtedly the art of handling men is largely a natural gift, a matter of temperament

and disposition. Some officers are particularly gifted in this direction ; and, for no apparent reason, are loved by the men. While no amount of copying can *create* such a temperament, yet a wise youngster soon learns that he can be popular and respected if he is absolutely fair, if he is consistent, if he never nags or irritates the men, and if he cultivates a sense of humour. He is present when the Captain and Commander deal with defaulters, and afterwards he learns how the men view the dealings of these demi-gods ; for, when aloft with the men or at other times, he is bound to hear their outspoken views expressed. He soon discovers how very human are the men of a ship's company, and how shrewdly they read and appreciate character.

Edmund Poë was Jack's officer of the watch for one year ; afterwards he kept watch under J. Field ¹ and H. J. May. From Poë's example Jack learned how to handle men. All three were good officers of the watch. Both Field and May were keen on taking sights, that is the altitude of the sun and stars, to find the position of the ship. Naturally Jack also had to do a good deal of sight-taking under their watchful eyes, which was good training for him.

Such were the elements of the education through which he passed in his first ship at sea, and it was, without doubt, the actions, virtues and failings of his seniors which went far to mould his character as a Naval officer.

There was one other instructor who had a hand in teaching the midshipmen, namely, the Naval Instructor. But the education he imparted was more mathematical and theoretical than temperamental. Every day, in the forenoon at all events, and sometimes in the afternoon, all the boys who were not on watch or away in their boats had to attend school. And cordially they hated it. As Jack records, they made use of every possible excuse to be absent. The sum total of the learning imbibed by a midshipman from the Naval Instructor at sea in the old days was very small. Perhaps it kept alive the elementary mathematics which had been learned in the *Britannia*, and improved his knowledge of sight-taking and navigation. But the examination at the end of the sub-lieutenant course at Greenwich usually showed that the general form of a cadet when he left the *Britannia* had been but little affected by his theoretical work as a midshipman whether he had, or had not, spent a considerable time under the ministra-

¹ Afterwards Rear-Admiral J. G. M. Field.

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tions of a naval instructor. The fact of the matter is that it was impossible in a sea-going ship to get daily the concentration of thought necessary for theoretical studies. With Jack it was the same ; he had an excellent naval instructor (E. M. Tims) in the *Newcastle*, but subsequently when serving in the *Cruiser* he had none ; he headed his class at Greenwich in spite of the fact that during his later period as a midshipman he had been several months without a naval instructor.

CHAPTER III

1874 to 1878

H.M.S. *NEWCASTLE* (cont.)
H.M.S. *AGINCOURT*

MIDSHIPMAN

I did not feel at all nervous. I am surprised at you asking such a question of the future Admiral Sir J. R. Jellicoe, K.C.B., etc., etc.

Extract from a letter to his mother, March 10, 1878.

SOON after leaving Madeira the ships had the first of their sailing races, or "trials of rate of sailing," as they were technically called. These were not only events of considerable interest but were also useful, since they led the various captains to experiment and improve the rates of sailing of their ships by altering the staying of their masts and the trim of the vessel. In the old days, and especially in war time, the rate of sailing was of the greatest importance. In chasing an enemy all sorts of devices were resorted to. Water was played on the sails; the wedges round the masts, where they passed through the decks, were loosened to give the masts "play"; the hammocks even were piped down and the men sent to bed with a round shot apiece to give a swinging weight to help the ship as she surged and pitched in her passage through the water. A ship, in reality, required a different trim according to whether she was on a wind or running before it, so in times of dire necessity movable weights and the position of the crew were altered to obtain the best results.

The sailing races proved that the *Immortalité* was the best sailer of the squadron, both when on a wind and when running free. On a wind the *Raleigh* would run her very close and on occasions would beat her: but the latter was the slowest ship of the squadron when running before a wind. The *Newcastle* in a strong wind was able more or less to compete with the *Immortalité*. The *Topaze* and *Doris* were the slowest and not up to the form of the other ships.

On the occasion of this first sailing race an accident occurred on board the *Newcastle*. The fore-topgallant mast, that is the

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loftiest mast on the foremast, carried away, and with it down came five of the upper-yard men. Four fell overboard and were picked up, and one hit the forebowline bridle and was uninjured. It is extraordinary how, at times, men falling from aloft escaped without injury. Any rope or sail that a man might hit during a fall would "give" with his weight, lessen the speed of the fall, and often prove to be his salvation. Men have fallen 120 feet and been unhurt owing to some such seemingly slight interference, while men falling 6 feet have been known to break their necks. Falling overboard from a height cannot have been pleasant, but it was a thousand times better than falling on an unyielding deck. The salvage of the men who fell overboard was, on occasions, a simple matter, but more often it was not so. It was in connection with a man overboard that Jack had the opportunity of seeing vividly a variety of methods of saving life at sea. He subsequently recalled that during this particular commission no fewer than twenty-four men went overboard from the *Newcastle*, of whom only rather more than half were saved. Later, on March 28, 1876, to be exact, during the voyage from Singapore to Hong Kong, the adventurous Wingfield went overboard while heaving the log. Unfortunately for the youngster, while Jack was away in the lifeboat picking him up, Wingfield's boots were discovered in the mizzen chains. The authorities therefore inferred, and in all probability inferred correctly, that the lad had purposely gone overboard to gain experience. It was generally known that he had a great desire to win the Humane Society's Medal for life-saving and, apparently, considered that on this particular day the conditions were suitable for a little practice. However, a midshipman gains no *kudos* for putting his ship to inconvenience and for delaying the whole squadron; so a month's stoppage of leave was the practical outcome of this adventure. Later in the cruise his adventurous nature led, as will be seen, to a very tragic sequel.

An amusing incident occurred when, on one occasion, a man fell overboard from the *Doris*, the ship immediately ahead of the *Newcastle* in the line. Somewhere between 8 and 9 a.m. the Captain of the *Doris* was having his bath when he heard the cry of "Man overboard." A very gallant fellow, this captain,¹ and an excellent swimmer, who possessed the Humane Society's Medal. Without an instant's pause he jumped out of his stern port to rescue the man. However, as luck would have it the man had caught

¹ Afterwards Admiral the Hon. Sir Edmund Fremantle, G.C.B.

hold of a rope's end which had been thrown to him and had climbed on board again, so the Captain was left swimming about the ocean with nobody to save but himself. The *Doris* had hoisted the Church Pendant, which was the usual warning signal to the squadron that the ship had dropped a man ; the *Newcastle*, therefore, immediately hove to and succeeded in retrieving the Captain of her next ahead. He came up the side in a state of nature and was greeted by an astonished seaman with the remark, " Why, it's our skipper's bloody chum ! "

A particularly brilliant piece of seamanship, which left a lasting impression on Jack's mind, took place when the squadron was on a passage from Gibraltar to the Cape of Good Hope. While running down the westerly winds towards the Cape, an able seaman named Walter Gatfield fell overboard from the forecastle hammock netting of the *Raleigh*. The ship was running at the rate of 11 knots, under double-reefed topsails, with the wind on the starboard quarter, and a very heavy sea. The serious question at once arose whether a boat could possibly live in such a sea, and, therefore, whether the lives of thirteen men should be risked in an attempt to save a single man ; but as the man was seen to be swimming strongly as he passed the stern, her Captain, George Tryon,¹ determined to take the risk of trying to save him. The lifeboat was manned instantly, and the helm put down to heave the ship to. Lieutenant Kingscote went into her, for the handling of a boat in so heavy a sea required experience. While the ship was coming to the wind, the crew of the boat were ordered to put on their cork jackets, and rope ends from the ship's deck were thrown over the quarter for them to get hold of in case the boat was swamped before she got clear of the ship. As the *Raleigh* came to the wind with speed on, in a very strong wind and with the main topsail aback for heaving to, it seemed almost as if the topmast stays must go and with them the mast.² But they held. When hove to, the ship fortunately was remarkably steady and the boat was lowered and slipped without difficulty ; but, as she dropped astern, she was sucked under the counter and was bound hard against the ship's side. Then, for a few seconds, it looked as if she must inevitably be capsized. The efforts of the men,

¹ Afterwards Vice-Admiral Sir George Tryon, K.C.B., who lost his life in the *Victoria* collision in the Mediterranean.

² *Life of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson, V.C., etc.,* by Admiral Sir E. Bradford, K.C.B.

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however, and the lift of the sea on the ship enabled the crew to throw her clear before any harm had been done.¹ She then had little difficulty in pulling up to and saving the man, who had succeeded in reaching the lifebuoy. In the meanwhile, however, the ship had drifted much more to leeward than the boat and lifebuoy had done. It would have been extremely dangerous for the boat to turn round and pull down to the ship with so heavy a sea astern ; so, in order to fetch to windward, the sails of the ship were filled, the yards braced sharp up and top-gallant sails and jib set, although it was doubtful whether they could possibly stand the force of the wind. Stand, however, they did. But in such a heavy sea, it was impossible to tack the ship. Wearing was the only other expedient, and this meant the loss of a good deal of the precious ground to windward that had been gained on the tack ; especially as, under normal conditions, the *Raleigh* was a bad ship to wear. However, after making two boards, and soon after the second time of wearing, the *Raleigh* fetched just to windward of her boat, which was then hoisted without difficulty. The whole episode showed a bold decision on the part of the Captain, gallantly carried out by Commander A. K. Wilson and all concerned.

But these life-saving adventures did not always end so happily, and a few months afterwards Jack had to witness a very different, and, to him, a very sad sequel to a somewhat similar attempt. On December 16, only two months before the ship paid off, she was running at 8 or 9 knots between Hong Kong and Singapore when the captain of the mizzen top fell overboard while heaving the log. The gallant Wingfield and two equally gallant able seamen, G. Reid and R. Hesk, went after him. The ship was brought to the wind with the headyards squared and the lee (starboard) lifeboat lowered. The boat was not fitted with patent disengagement gear whereby both of the tackles by which the boat was lowered could be simultaneously disconnected, and further, the ship was still moving at a considerable speed ; so that when the boat touched the water, the result was that it nearly capsized. Fortunately, the tackles unrove and the boat got clear. Two men of her crew, however, were left clinging to the life-lines and although these men were eventually got on board the boat pulled off with two men short of its proper complement. There was a considerable sea running, which made it difficult for the boat, shorthanded

¹ Description given to the author by a petty officer shortly afterwards.

as she was, to be rowed to windward. The distance which the men in the boat would have had to pull would have been over a mile, owing to the time lost in getting the boat clear of the ship, so she was recalled by the Captain before she reached the lifebuoy or the men who were seen to be near the buoy.

Jack had gone into the port boat when the alarm was given, expecting that that boat would be lowered, since it had disengaging gear. He was, therefore, perforce, a passive spectator of all that happened. The Chief Engineer came on to the bridge and said that he could raise steam in an hour, if permitted to do so. The offer, however, was not accepted. Considerable feeling was aroused in the ship at the loss of four lives ; and, on the return of the ship to England, a court of enquiry was held at Sheerness. It was a painful scene, as Mrs. Wingfield, the mother of the midshipman, was present throughout the enquiry. In the end Captain Douglas was exonerated from all blame.

Jack must have learned much from this untoward affair. A little less hurry, a slightly longer wait to get way off the ship before dropping the boat, a little more coolness in lowering the boat, these might have led to a very different result. He also could not have failed to appreciate the difficulty of the decision that the Captain was forced to make, when he had to balance the possible loss of the boat's crew against leaving four of his hands to perish without succour from the ship.


To return to Jack's life during the cruise. The midshipmen were divided into four watches, the lads of one of the four sections being always on deck on watch at sea, or in harbour, when not at school or away in a boat. In harbour, at night, a kindly lieutenant would usually be satisfied if one midshipman only was on deck ; the others he would allow to divide the time between their hammocks and relieving their watchmates. But this was not a universal practice. Deeply ingrained in the memory of many of those who were midshipmen at that period is the seeming length of those dreary hours from midnight to 4 a.m., called the middle watch, with nothing to do except to walk up and down the quarter deck and go round below deck once every hour to see that all was well and that there was no indication of the ship's being on fire. At sea, the senior midshipman of the watch kept his watch on the forecastle. He took charge of any work aloft on the foremast and the working of the head sails. This was excellent training for the time when he would have complete charge of the whole

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ship as officer of the watch. The midshipmen also were frequently drilled aloft, usually on the mizzen mast and yards, for they and their sails were the smallest and lightest and therefore the most suitable for the youngsters to handle. They had to carry out exactly the same work that was done by the seamen in the various evolutions of reefing, furling, and shifting sails, masts, and yards. In the *Newcastle* this practice was continued until nearly the end of the commission, when one of the midshipmen, Harry Rivers, fell from aloft. By good luck he partially broke his fall by catching hold of a rope in his descent from the mizzen topmast cross-trees, a height of some eighty feet or so. Even so he was seriously hurt. This led to the exercises being somewhat curtailed.

A midshipman was assigned to each boat, and had to go away in charge whenever she left the ship. This was an important item in the instruction of the lad, for it formed his first command, and that by no means an easy one. He soon learned to sail her and bring her alongside to the satisfaction of the Commander, which august person was apt to mete out punishment for damage to the paintwork of the boat or ship through awkwardness in handling. In fact, as early as the middle of January, after the *Newcastle* had rejoined the squadron off Monte Video, we find Jack very pleased with himself for having successfully brought his cutter, to which he had only shortly before been promoted, alongside the ship in a stiff breeze and strong tide, a matter that required both eye and judgment in a youngster.

Although handling a boat was soon learned, handling a boat's crew was a different matter. At the time when Jack had charge of his cutter the men were given but little leave ashore, and the bad characters had hardly any at all. The only alcoholic drink the men were allowed was half a gill of rum mixed with three parts of water. The result was that the men would adopt any and every ruse in order to smuggle liquor on board and to escape from the boat to indulge too freely on shore. A young officer of a boat, therefore, had to be very wide awake when his boat was lying alongside landing-places, in order to prevent liquor being smuggled into it, and to see that none of the men slipped away from the boat. For if they did steal away, they were almost sure to get drunk. He could generally, but not always, rely on the coxswain to help him in this matter, for at times a poor coxswain was tacitly on the side of the men and did not care to see things which he ought to have seen. Jack, however, was lucky, for he



H.M.S. NEWCASTLE
Screw frigate, launched in 1860.

By courtesy of John Abrahams

leaves on record that his coxswain was an excellent man. To bring off one of the crew drunk to the ship was a serious offence for which the midshipman was usually awarded a spell of "watch and watch," that is keeping twelve hours' watch, instead of six, out of each twenty-four.

After leaving Gibraltar on November 18, 1875, Jack's squadron touched first at Madeira, where the *Doris* joined up. The next port of call was St. Vincent, where several cricket matches were played. Two days before Christmas Day the squadron left and soon entered the doldrums, those calms which haunt the latitudes close to the equator. Here half the squadron raised steam and towed the other half; a divided effort that was resorted to in order to save coal. The *Raleigh* frequently towed two ships, as she was a far more powerful steamer than the wooden frigates. The *Newcastle* parted company with the squadron on December 22; the remainder of the ships went to Monte Video, while the *Newcastle* visited Rio de Janeiro where the general lay-out of the town impressed Jack greatly.

The Falkland Islands was the next place of call. Here the squadron received much hospitality. The garrison consisted only of one officer and twenty marines; rather a small one for a distant outpost of the Empire. Little did young Doveton Sturdee, then a midshipman on board, think that almost exactly forty years afterwards he would fight, within sight of the islands, the famous engagement when the gallant Admiral von Spee was defeated and almost all his squadron, including the cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, sunk.

The society on the island was somewhat restricted, for there were only seven ladies. These, however, acted the parts of hostesses in a truly noble manner. The officers had a good time with their guns with the result that they bagged 1,200 geese, 126 duck, 200 teal and 217 snipe.

Port Stanley, the principal harbour in the Falkland Islands, is only some 300 miles to the northward of Cape Horn, so the course of the ships to the Cape of Good Hope lay on the edge of that broad strip of ocean which is largely dominated by westerly winds, usually of gale force. The great seas raised by these gales run, unimpeded by land, completely round the globe, and are called by sailors "grey beards," from the masses of spume which are blown from the huge crests of broken water that are often a mile in length. Fortunately, it was summer in the southern hemi-

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sphere when Jack had his first introduction to these latitudes, so that the passage to the Cape was not so uncomfortable as it would have been in the winter months. Yet it was no mill-pond ; for, on leaving Port Stanley, on February 14, the squadron ran into bad weather with a wind of 7 to 9, which is of whole gale force, with a heavy sea running. The ships rolled heavily. In fact, one day the *Newcastle* was rolling 35° each way, and standing became so difficult that the hammocks were piped down to enable all the crew who were not required on deck to lie down. The best day's runs were 270, 250, and 242 miles, or an average speed of from 10 to $11\frac{1}{4}$ knots.

The squadron stayed at Simon's Bay from March 16 to April 3. While there, the youngsters had the choice of visiting either Wynberg or Cape Town ; since a midshipman's finances are apt to be somewhat restricted, and, as 23 miles had to be traversed either by riding or driving, a single trip to one of these places had to suffice.

The crude native methods of wine-making of that day did not appeal to Jack, who, from that time, harboured a dislike for Cape vintages. A farewell ball at Simonstown ended what had been a very pleasant stay.

At St. Helena Jack visited Napoleon's tomb, and was, he records, deeply interested, as any boy or man at that date was bound to be, for the memory of Napoleon was still vivid, fifty years only having elapsed since his death. The fear and anxiety he had caused to Europe had not yet faded from the minds of the parents of many of those on board the ship. The summit of Ladder Hill, 800 feet above the sea, saw a very blown and out-of-breath Jack, after the climb up the 699 steps had been negotiated.

At Ascension he visited the "Wide Awake Fair," the locality where the wide awakes, a species of gull, assemble for the breeding season. Here Jack collected a few eggs which he carried in his handkerchief. Unfortunately for him, some hatched out before he arrived on board the ship, so the remainder were, with wisdom, discarded.

On arrival at Gibraltar, on June 20, the somewhat exciting news was received that the squadron was to go to Bombay via the Cape of Good Hope, to meet H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, afterwards King Edward VII, during his visit to India, and to escort him while in the *Serapis*, which had been fitted up as his temporary yacht. While at Gibraltar, Rear-Admiral Randolph was relieved

by Rear-Admiral Lambert, who brought Lord Charles Scott as his Flag Captain. The stay at Gibraltar was a fairly long one, for the squadron did not leave until July 17. The *Newcastle* was refitted, some of the practical work of fitting new rigging falling to the lot of the midshipmen.

The passage to the Cape was made under sail. Of course it was rare that a straight course from place to place could be steered by sailing ships, since, for locomotion, they were entirely dependent on the direction of the wind. Seasonal winds had to be taken into account and the best use made of them. The S.E. Trade always blows up the coast of Africa from the Cape to the doldrums, so in order to take advantage of this wind the squadron stood right over nearly to South America until they picked up the Westerly winds, which Jack had already encountered a month or two before. Then with a fair wind they were able to steer for the Cape of Good Hope. The whole trip took fifty-three days instead of the sixteen or seventeen that a steamship, steering a straight course, would now take.

Between Gibraltar and Simonstown Jack started to grow. It was a sudden sprout. He had so far been abnormally short for his age ; now his physique began to make amends for previous delays ; with woeful results so far as the fit of his uniform was concerned. And his boots ! He outgrew those he had, and the "half-boots," as those were called which were issued to the ship's company, proved to be too large ; so he was reduced to a single pair of white canvas shoes blacked over so as not to be unduly noticeable. In fact, during the year 1875 he grew no less than five inches, which from one point of view was highly satisfactory ; but not from another, for throughout the year he found it continually difficult to get his uniform to keep pace with his increasing stature, even with the spasmodic assistance afforded by tailors at the various ports of call.

After leaving Simon's Bay, the squadron became separated during a N.E. gale ; but all rejoined the flag the following evening. At Bombay, the *Undaunted* and the East Indies Squadron were met and the two squadrons anchored to receive the Prince of Wales, who arrived on November 8. Festivities followed, and among these there was a dinner ashore given to two thousand men of the fleet. The Prince was again received by the fleet at Colombo. Three of the Flying Squadron left to escort the *Serapis* to Calcutta, but the *Newcastle* returned to Bombay.

As usual, Jack played cricket whenever there was an oppor-

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tunity ; and here when batting with a leading hand of the foretop-gallant yard this hefty young batsman hit a ball which they ran for eight runs, there being no boundary. This sort of cricket in a hot sun was distinctly strenuous.

Singapore was to be the next port of call, and the passage there was uneventful. After ten days, that is on March 31, the squadron left for Hong Kong, so Jack on his first cruise was indeed having a world-wide education. Years later he was to visit China again, there to undergo an anxious time and nearly to lose his life.

At Hong Kong they met the *Audacious*, flying the flag of Admiral Ryder, and on April 26 left for Woosung, meeting a strong N.E. monsoon on the way. These old frigates, built really for sailing, were not only poor performers and uneconomical under steam, but they had a very limited bunker capacity ; so that on this trip they had frequently to put into harbours to refuel. They took fifteen days to cover some seven hundred miles ; rather slow travelling.

Troubles were anticipated in China, so the squadron remained at Woosung at the mouth of the Yangtse for a couple of months. The stay was not a very enjoyable one. The place was difficult so far as games were concerned. There were no open spaces on which football or cricket could be played ; rounders was the only game possible, and this became very popular. Shooting there was, but at too great a distance to be indulged in by a humble midshipman ; so, perforce, Jack had to content himself with rounders and training for the athletic sports. The *Newcastle's* tug-of-war team beat all the other ships, much to Master Jack's delight.

The only incident of mark which took place during the visit was the opening of the railway between Woosung and Shanghai, which was the first to be built in China. Prior to the opening, the natives had looked on the line of rails with much suspicion ; but, as soon as the train service began, they crowded into the carriages, often refusing to pay any fare, much to the inconvenience of the legitimate passengers.

At last the squadron left the rather inhospitable Woosung for Nagasaki, in Japan, which was a very different place. Leave was given to the men, and Jack looked forward to a pleasant time ; but as bad luck would have it, a day in the hot sun in his cutter bringing off liberty men gave him a sunstroke, and for three weeks he was completely bowled over. Captain Douglas was very kind and had a cot slung in his fore-cabin for the lad. Fortunately, indeed, it was that he did so, for the sentry on duty at the cabin

door only just managed to stop him from trying to jump overboard when delirious.

Talienwan Bay, near Port Arthur, afterwards made famous in the Russo-Japanese war, was a poor place, and Jack remarked in a letter that he was not greatly chagrined when, on account of some trouble aloft during sail drill, his leave was stopped for a fortnight shortly after arriving there. On these occasions, the midshipman of the top or mast-head was always held responsible and was punished for any delay in the drill, whether it was his personal fault or not.

On September 3 the gunboat *Thistle* arrived with orders for two ships to go at once to Woosung, as the Chinese had started to break up the railway on which they had been trying to ride without payment. So back at full speed went the *Newcastle* and *Topaze*, the former outpacing the latter. On arrival at Woosung, all was found to be quiet. The troubles that had given rise to these frequent alarms were settled in September, when Li Hung Chang visited Chefoo and conferred with the representatives of the foreign Powers. Four new Treaty Ports were opened and the safety of foreigners was guaranteed. Hong Kong and then Singapore were visited next.

The homeward cruise was then begun, for on December 27 the squadron left for Mauritius. From that port on the way to Simons Bay bad weather was encountered, and Jack had his first experience of being under close-reefed topsails, the ship passing through the centre of a severe storm. After Simon's Bay they called at St. Helena and Ascension, and, finally, dropped anchor at Plymouth.

In looking back on this world-wide cruise under sail, Lord Jellicoe in his latter years remarked : "I went on leave after a most interesting and enjoyable two and a half years' cruise during which I necessarily became much attached to life in a sailing ship. The sight of a squadron of frigates under full sail, and indeed the sight and movement of one's own ship, gave a sense of pleasure I have never experienced in steamships. It is not too much to say that I preferred in those days being at sea to being in harbour, merely as a result of the exhilarating effect of working a ship under sail. In after life I experienced the same feeling in racing boats under sail, and have never been able to understand the pleasure felt by many people by racing in speed boats or indeed by anything mechanically propelled."

These views will be endorsed by all who have experienced the

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daily incidents and joys of life in a sailing ship, compared with the more monotonous life in a ship under steam.

Anyone who has not experienced life in a sailing ship may well ask, of what use was such a training for the future Commander-in-Chief at Jutland? The answer is that it was of the greatest value. The training Jack received in the *Newcastle* helped to endow him with a readiness to act in any emergency that might at any moment occur. In the old days of sailing ships, unexpected things were continually happening—a stranded rope, an approaching squall, a man overboard, a shift of wind, and a dozen other incidents might occur without any warning. Then a good officer had instantly to issue the correct orders and take appropriate action. *To be prepared for the unexpected* was the lesson learned by Jack during his time of training in the *Newcastle*, and it was invaluable in his after-life. It bred in him an appreciation of the fact that his profession, even in the days of steam, was one which required prepared thought and incessant study. To be a really efficient officer, and to succeed as an admiral, it was necessary intuitively to know the action that any eventuality might demand; constant study and cogitation alone could provide this. Hence we shall see, later on, that at the two moments of his life which were verily moments of supreme national importance, he intuitively gave the correct orders and took the right action. It is for this quality of quick decision that his early training must be accorded a fair meed of credit.

Having been paid off from the *Newcastle*, Jack enjoyed a short spell of foreign-service leave.

On July 10, 1877, he joined H.M.S. *Agincourt* at Devonport, Captain R. Wells,¹ the flagship of Admiral Sir J. E. Commerell, V.C. Shortly afterwards, as a result of the Russo-Turkish war, the Channel Squadron was sent to reinforce the Mediterranean Fleet, under Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby, who flew his flag in the *Alexandra*. The commander was T. S. Jackson.²

The advance of the Russian Army and the determination of Lord Beaconsfield not to allow Russia to take Constantinople, which would allow her to control the Dardanelles and become a Mediterranean power, led to the British ships being concentrated in Near Eastern waters; so the *Agincourt*, with Jack on board, in August joined the Mediterranean Fleet at Besika Bay. There was little in the way of recreation for a midshipman at that outlandish spot. As has

¹ Afterwards Admiral Sir Richard Wells, K.C.B.

² Afterwards Admiral Sir Sturgess Jackson, K.C.V.O.

been the case for the last century, wherever a ship might stay for a few weeks, the officers at once began to make a cricket pitch. But the fleet was large, so that unless he were specially proficient with bat or ball a midshipman had but a rare chance of a game. A pack of beagles was imported, which gave the boys a chance of a run on foot, but the happy owners of horses saw most of the fun. The boys, therefore, had to put up with that never-ending joy to a midshipman, bathing and seining picnics ; splashing and swimming about in the water all the late afternoon, then hauling in the net, making a fire on the beach, perhaps grilling some fish over cinders, and ending up with a singsong and a late return on board. After one of these picnics, Master Jack got caught by bad weather, and sailing back with a heavy sea on the bow, he and his party only just managed to fetch up alongside one of the small vessels that lay well to leeward ; and here they were obliged to stay for the night. A novel adventure and therefore an additional joy to a youngster.

Here is a sad occurrence told in Lord Jellicoe's own words :

“ During our stay at Besika Bay a cousin of mine and a fellow-midshipman in the *Agincourt*, Charles E. Rushworth, who was in charge of one of the cutters, was bringing his boat off from the shore late one evening under sail. Just before he got alongside the ship, one of his crew fell into the water. Rushworth immediately went overboard in an attempt to save him. In the heavy sea prevailing both were unfortunately drowned, and it fell to my lot to break the news by letter to his mother, who had herself just lost her husband, then Colonial Secretary in Jamaica, from yellow fever, the news of whose death I had, only a short time before, had to break to Rushworth himself.”

In December, 1877, Plevna fell. The Turks had practically lost the war and there was little now between Russia and Constantinople. But the war had cost Russia 120 million pounds, a large sum in those days ; she had lost nearly 90,000 men and a considerable amount of war material, and was in no condition to incur the enmity of one or more of the Great Powers.

On January 23, 1878, the Admiralty telegraphed to Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby, at Vourlah Bay, to proceed to Constantinople. The fleet left on the 24th and the *Salamis* was sent ahead to Chanak with a letter to the Commandant of the Forts, informing him that the fleet had orders to pass through and requesting his permission to do so. This was given ; but, as the fleet arrived at the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles a telegram was received from the

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Admiralty cancelling the order to proceed. The fleet, therefore, returned to Besika Bay. On February 12, orders were again received to pass through the Dardanelles, and anchor in the Sea of Marmora in the vicinity of Constantinople. So, on the 13th, the fleet, composed of the *Alexandra*, *Agincourt*, *Swiftsure*, *Temeraire*, *Sultan*, *Achilles* and *Salamis*, left in a heavy snowstorm to pass the Narrows. On the way Jack saw his old squadron-mate, the *Raleigh*, ashore on Rabbit Island. A bad business ; but she was got off shortly afterwards without serious damage. The *Salamis* was again sent ahead to ask permission to pass. The Commandant was informed that in any case Sir Geoffrey intended to go through, but the Admiral urged that in the cause of humanity the ships should not be fired on. There was great excitement as the fleet came within range of the forts, for no answer had been received. The ships went to action stations and every preparation was made for a fight. However, none of the shore forts opened fire. The weather was very thick and it was snowing hard as the ships approached Chanak. Then to the general consternation, the *Alexandra* ran aground close to a fort armed with a 50-ton Krupp gun. It was, therefore, just as well that the Sultan had given orders to allow the fleet to pass unattacked, or she would have had a very bad time. Jack was signal midshipman on watch and reported to the Admiral that the *Alexandra* had grounded. The Admiral thought at first he was mistaken but he proved to be correct.

The reason for the *Alexandra* grounding was a peculiar one. As it was considered quite possible that the forts might open fire, the ships, as has been stated, were cleared for action before entering the Straits. In the *Alexandra*, the boats that overhung the after glacis of the main battery had to be turned inboard. This brought some of the davits closer than usual to the standard compass, with the result that the compass was affected, and an inaccurate course was steered. The thick weather prevented this being discovered until it was too late to avoid grounding. The *Sultan* was left to assist to refloat her, while the other ships proceeded and anchored off Nagara Point until the morning. The *Agincourt* and *Swiftsure* then proceeded to Gallipoli and the remainder, including the refloated *Alexandra*, went on to Prinkipo.

It was at this time in answer to a query from his mother that he wrote rather indignantly, "Of course I was not nervous, I am surprised at you asking such a question of the future Admiral Sir J. R. Jellicoe, K.C.B., &c., &c."

Naturally everyone, Jack included, was on the tiptoe of excitement due to the anticipation of hostilities ; for the Russians, at the time, were within 12 miles of the Turkish lines at Bulair, and Admiral Commerell had authority to take any steps he considered necessary to prevent the lines from being captured and the Turks turned out.

Jack was frequently sent with letters to the General in the lines, and occasionally had to ride right across the Peninsula with letters to the senior officers of our ships anchored in the Gulf of Xeros. On March 10 he wrote :

“The Admiral sent for me and asked if I would like to ride over to the Gulf of Xeros with despatches. I said ‘yes’ promptly. He then offered me his horse. The horse was fresh, but I am acquiring skill in horsemanship and managed him all right.”

He was at the moment rather full of work owing to the fact that he and Cecil Burney¹ were the only two midshipmen in the ship. In addition to this spasmodic despatch-riding, he had charge of two steamboats and four cutters, was acting A.D.C. to the Admiral, and one of the three signal officers. Needless to say he had no time for other schooling. Subsequently four junior midshipmen joined the ship ; but, even then, the senior midshipmen were too busy to attend school, and Jack found great difficulty in finding time to take and work out the necessary observations of the sun, moon, and stars which had to be produced at the time of his passing his seamanship examination. However, just before his examination the Naval Instructor most kindly worked out backwards an omitted lunar observation for him, and thus he was helped over this rather stiff fence.

While at Gallipoli, Jack was lent to the *Cruiser*, a sailing sloop attached to the Mediterranean Fleet for the instruction of ordinary seamen and midshipmen in practical seamanship. Of course, after two years and a half in a frigate he was well grounded in the lore of sails and sailing a ship ; but now, instead of being an underling, he had to take charge of a watch and actually carry on with the men, giving the necessary orders for tacking and wearing, making and shortening sail, and for coping with any adventitious conditions that might suddenly arise. Towards the end of his time in the *Cruiser* she was ordered up to meet the fleet at Prinkipo. On the way she had rather a heavy task beating up the Dardanelles against

¹ Afterwards Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, Bart., G.C.B.

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the constant southerly current. It took just sixteen hours to get from the entrance to the anchorage off Chanak ; a distance, as the crow flies, of only fifteen miles.

On arrival off Prinkipo, Admiral Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby inspected the *Cruiser*. He was at the time *the* rising admiral of the British Navy ; a strict disciplinarian and the father of fleet tactics under steam. He kept a roving and piercing eye on the midshipmen of the fleet, both as regards boat-sailing and management, and also on the result of their six-monthly examinations. The *Cruiser*, therefore, was likely to have a fairly tough inspection. Sir Geoffrey was usually known in the fleet as "Uncle Geoff." It may be remarked that the title "Uncle," given to a senior officer in the Navy, is usually a danger signal that the holder is more critical than fatherly. Jack was called on to handle the *Cruiser* under sail. With Sir Geoffrey at his elbow they stood close hauled over towards the flagship. When she had approached as near the battleship as Jack thought to be wise, he asked the Admiral if he should "put her about" ; but No ! Sir Geoffrey held on ; his experienced and more trained eye caused him to hang on till the last safe moment, then he told Jack to "put her about." It was a good test, for the nearness of the battleship would be apt to rattle a lad and make him hurry unduly, which would have been a sin ; for tacking should be a deliberate matter. The first order should be to "ease" the helm down, not "put" the helm down, for the helm should be put over gradually so as not to stop the way of the ship, and the next order, "helm's a lee," should not be given too soon. This early part of tacking should be deliberate and not hurried. Then should come the order, "Raise the fore tack, up mainsail." By this time Jack would have seen that they would clear the battleship all right if they did not miss stays ; so all the remaining orders must have gone merrily enough :—"Main topsail haul" : "Of all haul" : "Board the fore tack" : "Set mainsail" : "Brace up the main yard" : "Fore and main sheets." Lifts and trusses would then be hauled well taut and belayed, topsail and upper yards trimmed, and ropes hauled taut and coiled down.

Jack's comments on the episode are typical of the English boy who hates "swank."

"The Admiral complimented me afterwards on the way I did it, which was rather an honour. He also told me that Captain Hext [the Captain of the *Cruiser*] had given a very good report of

me and told him that I was a very good officer of the watch. He finished up by wishing me a first class in Seamanship [examination]. I thought you would like to know this, though it seems rather conceited to talk about it."

Of course his mother loved to hear of it. What mother would not ?

September 29th.

"You will be glad to hear that I did well in the examination [mathematical]. The results have come out and I am third in the Channel and Mediterranean fleets out of 106 midshipmen. Admiral Hornby was very pleased about it, as I had been in the *Cruiser* for four months before the examination and had done no school. He has sent a memorandum to the Captain about it, saying that he was very glad that learning seamanship does not interfere with mathematics."

The Channel Fleet were taken to Prinkipo in order that the officers might see Constantinople before leaving. While there Jack had to run Admiral Commerell up to that town in the steam pinnace, a ten-mile run, which took an hour and a quarter. This was repeated next day and then :

"On Thursday I made two trips up, going up for the Swedish Ambassador to bring him down to lunch with the Admiral. I brought his two daughters down with him and nearly fell in love with one of them. They were very nice girls about 17 years old and spoke English perfectly. I took them up again in the evening and by the time we parted we had become quite friends. They asked me to come up and see them, but as we sailed on Saturday there was no time."

So this early romance was cut short ! Jack was always a susceptible youngster, but this is the first time that he owned to an affair of the heart. He was just nineteen years old.

At Gallipoli.

"The *Temeraire* has gone to Malta. I am very sorry as it was rather fun going over to Xeros (the opposite side of the Peninsula) to see the fellows on board her. I went over twice when she was there : walked once and rode over once. It is about eleven miles there and eleven miles back, so it is a good walk."

The *Cruiser* episode rather makes one doubt the following depre-

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catory remark made by Lord Jellicoe regarding his examinations in seamanship for the rank of Sub-Lieutenant :

“ I was examined in Seamanship on my birthday in 1877 at Malta and obtained a first-class certificate, as I then thought because the mail came in during the exam and the Captains were more interested in their letters.”

The more probable explanation is that it did not take the Captains very long to find out that Jack knew his work thoroughly, and therefore that a lengthy examination was unnecessary and would only keep them from their home correspondence.

So, having received the commendations of his commander-in-chief and his captain and with a first-class certificate in seamanship to his credit, he left the *Agincourt* for a period of study at the R.N. College at Greenwich.

CHAPTER IV

1879 to 1889

Sub-Lieutenant and Lieutenant

R.N. COLLEGE.		5.12.78 TO 12.3.80
H.M.S. <i>ALEXANDRA</i> .	SUB-LIEUTENANT.	12.3.80 TO 5.9.80
H.M.S. <i>AGINCOURT</i> .	LIEUTENANT.	3.2.81 TO 25.9.82
H.M.S. <i>EXCELLENT</i> .	LIEUTENANT.	30.9.82 TO 18.5.84
H.M.S. <i>EXCELLENT</i> .	GUNNERY LIEUTENANT.	19.5.84 TO 3.9.85
H.M.S. <i>MONARCH</i> .		4.9.85 TO 15.4.86
H.M.S. <i>COLOSSUS</i> .		16.4.86 TO 9.12.86
H.M.S. <i>EXCELLENT</i> (for <i>Handy</i>).		10.12.86 TO 4.7.87
H.M.S. <i>MERCURY</i> (for Jubilee Review).		5.7.87 TO 25.8.87
H.M.S. <i>EXCELLENT</i> (for <i>Handy</i>).		28.8.87 TO 13.5.88
H.M.S. <i>EXCELLENT</i> (Staff Officer).		14.5.88 TO 14.9.89

AFTER passing his Seamanship examination Jack left the Mediterranean for England to undergo a course of study at the Royal Naval College at Greenwich, and subsequently to take the gunnery and torpedo courses at Portsmouth. In those days the certificate gained by a sub-lieutenant in the three subjects, seamanship, study at Greenwich, and gunnery, indicated his brain capacity. If he obtained a first class in each, he was marked for early promotion and was looked on as a young officer of intelligence. He would therefore stand well in the good books of the authorities at the Admiralty and also with the more able of the senior officers afloat. But there were at that time so many Naval officers in all ranks whose brain power had not been developed to a remarkable extent that, naturally, those who succeeded in passing through the fine-mesh sieve of severe examinations were regarded with jealousy; this led to the phrase "three one-er" being often used as a term of mild contempt. In other words, it was apt to be assumed that if a man was proficient in elementary mathematics he was bound to be a duffer as a practical seaman. In fact, at that time there was a song which expressed this peculiar

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doctrine rather well. In it the "three one-er" was by his captain thought to be :

"the maddest of all mad characters
when he tried to split the starboard watch and Idlers into
factors."

Again :

"he shouted when the ship was flat aback,
'Let go the starboard alpha cosine theta stunsail tack.'"

Needless to say that Jack, after his time in the Flying Squadron and the *Cruiser*, knew all about stunsail tacks ; but, speaking generally, any young officer who obtained three "ones" had to pass under searching review when he next went to sea, until he had proved himself just as good a seaman as his less-gifted brethren.

Young Jellicoe of course obtained the requisite three first classes, but fortune did not favour him ; for, although under ordinary conditions this would have entitled him to immediate promotion, four other sub-lieutenants in his class were equally successful. The Admiralty for some occult reason decided not to promote them all at once, but in succession, at intervals starting with the seniors. As Jellicoe was the junior, he had to wait eight months before he got his due reward. It was probably on account of this anomaly that the Admiralty afterwards introduced a special grade of first class in the Greenwich Examination, called the First Class with Promotion Marks, to attain which 100 marks over those necessary for first class were required ; and it was only those who gained the extra distinction who were entitled to promotion after nine months' seniority from the date of passing their Seamanship examination.

Although he worked very hard while at Greenwich Jellicoe found time for games as well as for work. Football, rackets, and cricket were his favourite pastimes. After completing his gunnery course and passing the necessary examination at Portsmouth, he was appointed to the *Alexandra*, the flagship of the Mediterranean Squadron. Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour, commonly known as the "swell of the ocean," was Commander-in-Chief, and Lord Walter Kerr was Captain. There is little to record of his time in the *Alexandra*, his duties being those of Signal Mate. He found Malta pleasant, however, and improved his play at rackets ; also he enjoyed the dances, for on April 5, 1880, he wrote to his mother from Malta :

"I went to a large dance at the Club here on Tuesday given by the Xth. I was afraid I shouldn't get any partners as I did not know a soul, but I danced all except the square dances, and did not come away until it was all over. I did not get on board till 4 a.m. It was a very jolly dance and I liked it very much but of course as *she* was not there my thoughts were far away the whole time."

Nothing in particular is known of this absent *She*, who had made so great an impression on Jack, then twenty-one years of age. There was, in later years, some family chaff, kept alive of course by his mischievous daughters, to the effect that there had been several *shes* before he became permanently moored to Miss Gwendoline Cayzer, but he always ignored such attacks, adopted the defence of a passive silence, and never gave himself or the ladies away.

After eight months' service he was promoted to Lieutenant and left for England, travelling home by the overland route through Italy. He took the opportunity of visiting Rome, Florence, and other places on the way. Unfortunately he contracted dysentery at Florence and for the remainder of the journey to England he suffered great pain. On arrival at Surbiton, where his family were then living, he was put to bed, and for three months he was totally unfit for service. It is with pride that he recalls the fact that those months were the only time, during the whole of his 52 years in the Navy, that he spent on half-pay. It is true that subsequently on two occasions he tried, when a Lieutenant, to obtain six months' half-pay to study foreign languages, but his applications were refused on account of the shortage of officers of lieutenant's rank, a shortage that continued for many years from that time. In the meantime he had applied to specialize as a gunnery lieutenant, and, as soon as he was fit, he joined the *Agincourt* to complete the one year of watch-keeping at sea which was obligatory on all lieutenants before qualifying in any specialist branch. This was a very wise regulation, since it ensured an officer being given practical sea-going experience as an officer of the watch before going ashore for the two years or two years and a half required by the specialist course.

Vice-Admiral Arthur Hood ¹ had his flag flying in the *Agincourt*; Elibank Murray ² was Captain, and the Commander was John

¹ Afterwards Admiral Lord Hood of Avalon, G.C.B.

² Afterwards Vice-Admiral Elibank H. Murray.

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Coke Burnell,¹ a smart officer whose very name struck terror to the hearts of offending midshipmen. He was, however, an excellent officer for lieutenants to serve under, for he always made every ship of which he was Commander a smart ship, and had her in first-class order. The *Agincourt* was to the fore in her drills aloft, which in those days was the sole criterion of efficiency. And small wonder, too, for who could take real interest in gunnery at a period when guns had advanced but little since Trafalgar days, and gun ranges were practically the same as then? Moreover, the men were essentially seamen, the officers sailors—whose one real accomplishment was the art of sailing a ship and handling her, and her yards and sails, in the many evolutions necessary for a craft under sail.

The *Agincourt* was attached to the Channel Squadron, which then, and for several years afterwards, consisted of only four ships. The fleet cruised mainly between England and Gibraltar, calling at Lisbon, Vigo, and Arosa Bay. The cruising speed of the fleet was an economical one, usually about four knots—and their full speed had they been pressed, which they very rarely were, would have been a little less than 12 knots. Rear-Admiral the Hon. H. Carr Glyn² succeeded to the command in December, 1881.

In May, 1882, by which time Vice-Admiral Sir William Dowell had taken over the command, the Channel Squadron was ordered to Malta because of the trouble that had arisen in Egypt owing to the revolt of Arabi Pasha, who, backed by the leaders of the Nationalist Party and the army, had practically assumed control of the country in opposition to the Khedive.

On July 4, 1882, the *Agincourt* left Malta for the East, carrying on board a battalion of the 60th Rifles. She called at Cyprus, to embark General Sir Archibald Alison, as well as a considerable cargo of horse-boats, horses and mules. The ship was therefore pretty well filled up both above and below decks. The upper deck was almost impassable, and there were practically double the regulation number of men on board. The ship's company, therefore, had to double-bank the forward messes, and the 60th Rifles had to shake down as best they could on the after mess tables.

On July 9 an ultimatum was issued by Sir Beauchamp Seymour, the Commander-in-Chief of the combined fleet, to the effect that the mounting of guns in the forts at Alexandria should cease. This

¹ Afterwards Admiral John Coke Burnell.

² Afterwards Vice-Admiral the Honble. Henry Carr Glyn, C.B., C.S.I.

order was not complied with, so on the 11th the fleet bombarded the forts. Immediately after they had been silenced, seamen and marines were landed to keep order in the town and to prevent the massacre that usually takes place in an Oriental town as soon as authority is relaxed. This action precipitated war against Arabi Pasha. France and Italy were invited to assist in an armed occupation of the country to suppress the revolution and support the Khedive, but both those countries refused, so the work fell on British troops.

The *Agincourt's* orders originally had been to proceed from Cyprus to Port Said, but after the bombardment she was ordered to go with the greatest despatch to Alexandria, since the 60th were urgently required to help to hold the fortified lines outside that town against Arabi's army. She arrived a day and a half after the bombardment—quite a record passage for the old ship. Everyone in the fleet expected that the advance of our troops would be made from Alexandria, but Sir Garnet Wolseley¹ secretly and cleverly changed the direction of the attack, and the troops were eventually landed at Ismailia, on the west bank of the Suez Canal. In anticipation of this diversion the *Agincourt* proceeded to Port Said. On arrival, Jellicoe was sent with his company of blue-jackets to the *Orion*—Captain R. Fitzroy²—then anchored off Ismailia, on board of which ship he witnessed a very heated interview between M. de Lesseps and Captain Fitzroy. Actually the heat was supplied by the Frenchman, for Captain Fitzroy was a man whose manner invariably had the frigidity of an iceberg. M. de Lesseps was most indignant that the Canal had been made use of for warlike purposes. In fact, a story at the time which was generally believed was that on the English occupying Ismailia, M. de Lesseps had telegraphed to Arabi that the English were in small numbers, and suggested that he should come and drive them into the sea. The message was said to have been found by our men in the telegraph office at Ismailia. At a time subsequent to his interview with Captain Fitzroy, M. de Lesseps repaired on board the *Salamis* to lodge a similar complaint with Sir Beauchamp Seymour, who, after allowing full scope to his bluster, handed him a telegraph form on which was the fatal message. This produced an instant collapse and he left the ship without uttering another word.

It was there that Jellicoe saw his first shot fired in anger. It

¹ Afterwards Field-Marshal Viscount Wolseley, K.G.

² Afterwards Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Fitzroy, K.C.B.

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was directed at, and hit, a train carrying some of Arabi's troops. The firing was controlled from aloft, since the train was invisible from the deck of the ship—a shadowy forecast of the director firing that was used at the Battle of Jutland.

After three weeks on board the *Orion* Jellicoe was sent to Port Said by Captain Fitzroy with a despatch for the Commander-in-Chief. He was instructed to go at night by one of the Canal launches that was carrying refugees from Ismailia to Port Said; Captain Fitzroy did not consider that it was desirable for it to be known by Arabi that he was communicating with the Commander-in-Chief, for the proposed change of base from Alexandria to Ismailia was still a secret, and he feared that if Jellicoe were sent in the daytime in a service boat he might be stopped by Arabi's men, who held the west bank of the Canal. Jack had a most uncomfortable passage. Disguised as a refugee, he was herded into close contact with an evil-smelling horde of verminous and unclean natives. It was with much relief that he arrived on board the *Penelope*, delivered his despatch and had a bath. He remained on board until his seaman's company arrived from Ismailia a few days later, when he and they landed to help hold Port Said, in conjunction with other Naval contingents. This ended his first small piece of war service.

It is interesting to note that only a few miles to the westward a young post-Captain, John Fisher, was laying the foundation of what afterwards proved to be a great reputation. Fisher and Jellicoe had not met, but soon after they were to become firm friends. Little, indeed, did the young lieutenant foresee that it would be to Fisher's keen insight and firm insistence that he would owe his appointment to command the greatest fleet that had ever fought for England on the sea.

On the completion of his year in the *Agincourt* Jellicoe, with eight other lieutenants, went to the Royal Naval College at Greenwich for a nine months' course. The curriculum was fairly extensive for the time allotted to it, with the result that those who were anxious to do well had literally to burn midnight oil. It was only by so doing that a few of the daylight hours could be devoted to games. Thus by working late Jellicoe was again able to take up and improve his tennis, rackets and football. He was always keen on Rugby football and at this period played as wing forward, having a fair turn of speed. But in after life he criticized the policy of having a wing forward, on the ground that he ran a constant

risk of being offside. Watching the All Black New Zealand team further confirmed this view. The Royal Naval College team was at that time a strong one, and they played against many good fifteens including Richmond, Blackheath, and Oxford University in the days when Rotherman and Wade were in the Oxford team.

In connection with his theoretical studies he seems to have retained a great regard for Professor Carlton Lambert, who was responsible for the Mathematical section, and who was not only a first-class mathematician but a most able lecturer, a man who could explain with a marvellous clarity of exposition and simile what, to the class, were most difficult points. At the end of the course Jellicoe passed out head of the class. The marks necessary for a first class were 2,700. Jack obtained 2,911 or about 10 per cent more than were necessary. The next man below him obtained 2,824. By heading the list he was awarded the Admiralty prize of £80 less income tax—why income tax was deducted from what was purely a gratuitous payment can only be explained by assuming that the Admiralty never took the trouble to fight the point on behalf of the prize-winners. Fortunately, in those days the income tax was small compared to post-war inflictions. At Portsmouth he passed through the gunnery and torpedo courses and the subsequent examinations with flying colours, obtaining a first class in each and consequently became a full-blown gunnery lieutenant first-class.

In May, 1884, George Warrender,¹ Hugh Williams² and Jellicoe were appointed to the junior staff of the *Excellent* gunnery school, the three senior staff officers being Randolph Foote,³ Meryon⁴ and Percy Scott.⁵ In those days the *Excellent* consisted of an old three-decker of that name joined to another called the *Calcutta*. John Fisher was the Captain, he having lately recovered from a bad attack of dysentery contracted during his service ashore in Alexandria. Needless to say, there had been considerable changes since that iconoclastic officer had taken over command. What was called the "Old forty-year routine," that is the routine that had been going on for the previous forty years, was abolished and a modern routine initiated, all the old pensioners were removed, and active service ratings taken on in lieu. In short, a new and modern atmosphere had been created. Just about this time Whale

¹ Afterwards Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.

² Afterwards Admiral H. P. Williams.

³ Afterwards Admiral Sir R. Foote, K.C.B., C.M.G.

⁴ Afterwards Captain J. E. Meryon.

⁵ Afterwards Admiral Sir Percy Scott, Bart., K.C.B., K.C.V.O., LL.D.

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Island was being developed from the mud excavated in making the new docks in what was called the extension works in Portsmouth Dockyard. One day Percy Scott, always a man of long vision, sketched roughly on a sheet of paper the use that should be made of the island, when completed, for gunnery purposes. He in fact sketched the rudiments of what Whale Island gunnery school is to-day. Captain Fisher saw the plan and at once recognized the advantages that would be conferred on the gunnery instruction in the Navy if the design were carried out. He therefore threw himself heart and soul into the materialization of the scheme. Thus Jellicoe saw the inception of this great gunnery school and undoubtedly helped in elaborating its final design.

In 1885 came the Penjdeh incident with Russia and its attendant war scare. Admiral Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby hoisted his flag in the *Minotaur* and took a hastily-assembled fleet to Berehaven. Captain Fisher went as his Chief of the Staff and he took Jellicoe as his Staff officer. This selection was a most interesting one, since it clearly shows the reputation Jellicoe had already acquired. Fisher had, presumably, a very large number of officers from whom to select; among these were the three senior and the three junior Staff officers, yet, with his uncanny eye for merit, he selected, after only one year's acquaintance, the junior lieutenant of the junior Staff.

The war scare did not last long, but during the time an interesting experiment was carried out by sending H.M.S. *Polyphemus*, commanded by Captain W. H. May,¹ to charge a boom built up of wooden baulks and wire hawsers—which was intended to protect the entrance of a harbour in which ships were at anchor from the attack of torpedo boats. It is worth remembering that at that date the Whitehead torpedo had only lately developed into a serious weapon of war, and that torpedo boats built to carry that type of torpedo were of very elementary design—the largest being only 84 feet long. Destroyers were not yet thought of; but even so it was appreciated that the large harbours on our south coast—Portsmouth, Plymouth and Portland—were, from their closeness to the harbours on the north coast of France, extremely vulnerable to torpedo attack. Hence great importance was attached to the design of some form of obstruction that could be used to close the entrance of our otherwise open harbours. The *Polyphemus* acquitted herself well and broke through the boom, though, as Jellicoe

¹ Afterwards Admiral of the Fleet Sir W. May, G.C.B., G.C.V.O.



Hughes and Mullins

CAPTAIN AND MRS. JELlicoe
Lord Jellicoe's parents.



Hughes and Mullins

remarked: "It looked at one time as though a 6½-inch wire hawser would sweep her upper works."

A year or two later another boom was charged by a 125-foot torpedo boat. This boom had spikes on the baulks which perforated the hull and the boat sank. Again, one year later another obstruction was charged by a boat of the same tonnage and the hawser was cut; moreover, this class of obstruction became of decreasing value as the size of torpedo craft increased.

After this the fleet moved on to Blacksod Bay, at which place a torpedo night attack was carried out with second-class torpedo boats. Then the fleet went north, divided into two parts, and strategical manœuvres were attempted; but the long hours of daylight (up to 10 p.m.) vitiated the results. Subsequently a fleet action was fought in the Channel between two halves of the fleet, after which it dispersed and the ships returned to their normal duties. The whole cruise, though short, must have been very instructive to Jellicoe, who saw the first torpedo attack on a fleet, the first strategical manœuvres, and the first attempt at a tactical fleet action that were ever attempted by the British Navy.

In September, 1885, Jellicoe was appointed Gunnery Lieutenant of H.M.S. *Monarch*. He was, of course, very proud of his ship, although she was rather a back number. She was of peculiar build, had been laid down in 1862 and completed in 1869; she had, therefore, taken about seven years to build and was already sixteen years old. She had two turrets, each mounting two 25-ton muzzle-loading rifled guns; in addition there were two 12-ton and one 6½-ton muzzle-loading guns. At the time of her building there had been two schools of thought—one advocated a broadside armament, of which the *Warrior*, the first iron ship built, and the *Agincourt* class were examples; and the other preferred masted turret ships, of which the *Captain* and *Monarch* were specimens. Unfortunately in the case of the *Captain* sufficient attention had not been paid to providing a reserve of stability when the ship heeled over. When broadside ships heeled over they still had the ship's side and bulwarks for the water to press against to assist in uprighting them; but, with a turret ship, the upper deck was only a short height above the water and above this there was no berthing so that a very moderate heel caused the ship's side to be totally submerged, and then the trouble began. Masts and yards aggravated the danger, since, in a squall, the ship might heel suddenly to a dangerous angle and capsize. In the case of

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the *Captain* the angle to which she could heel with safety was very small, with the result that in a squall she heeled over, exceeded this angle and capsized about midnight on a black, evil night while in company with the fleet in the Bay of Biscay, and unfortunately there were very few survivors. Jellicoe notes that in the case of the *Monarch*, the ship's book¹ gave the safe angle of heel as a little over 20°—but that one night off Lisbon, with the fleet under sail in heavy weather where the *Achilles*, one of the *Agincourt* class, was rolling 40°, which for them was quite safe, the *Monarch* rolled 25° and shipped a lot of water which flooded a magazine. At such an angle she must have been very near to her danger limit.

One of Jellicoe's duties was that of cable officer ; that is, he looked after the working of the chain cable while anchoring or weighing, an interesting job and a pleasant one, provided that the cable gear was in good order. The *Monarch*, however, had been laid up in a home port for some time before commissioning and her anchor gear was in a poor condition. One day, when anchoring in 40 fathoms off Gibraltar, both bower chains and the sheet cable took charge and ran out to a clinch, the speed and weight of the chain snapping a link of each cable. In his endeavour to get one of the cables bowsed to, Jellicoe was hit on the head by a compressor block and was *hors de combat* for two days. It was a great piece of luck that he was not killed. The cables were recovered after a day or two of grappling for them, which was creditable work considering the depth of the water.

Then came an adventure in which Jellicoe was all but drowned. One day, the ship weighed and left the anchorage at Gibraltar to carry out target practice. Owing to the damage done by the blast of her guns when they were fired, all the boats with the exception of the Captain's galley were left behind in the dockyard. This boat, hanging at the stern davits, was well shielded from blast, and as it was necessary to have some boat in case of a man falling overboard, the galley was the one selected. A single-banked gig of this description was rather lightly built and not by any means an ideal boat for work in a rough sea. As the ship came to the eastward of the Rock, a vessel was seen to be aground to the northward of the neutral ground. Since a stiff south-easter was blowing she was on a lee shore, and in a dangerous position, for, under such conditions, iron ships and most small merchant ships

¹ A book carried in every ship giving information regarding the details of her construction.

were then built of iron and not steel, were apt to break up with but little warning. It appeared that a rocket apparatus was in use, but that communication between the shore and the ship had not been established by this means, and that therefore there was a grave danger of loss of life to those on board the steamer.

A discussion as to whether the *Monarch* could assist resulted in Jellicoe asking the Captain to be allowed to take a volunteer crew in his galley and make an attempt to get the crew ashore. Permission was given and the boat lowered and manned, the chief gunner's mate acting as coxswain. They pulled in and eventually got under the lee of the ship, that is between her and the shore, and under the rope that had at last been sent aboard by means of the rocket apparatus ; but the crew of the ship seemed to be ignorant of how to make use of it and the breeches buoy. This is how Jellicoe describes what followed :

“ The bowman got hold of the rope and we started hauling the boat close to the ship—I hailed those on board to take the opportunity of jumping into the boat as we got close to the ship. There was however, unknown to me at the time, a very strong current running along the shore which began to turn the boat broadside to the sea. Seeing this I ordered the bowman to let go of the rope, and the crew to turn the boat head to sea again (with the oars). At that moment, however, a huge wave broke on the ship and caught us partially broadside on, capsizing the boat and throwing the crew clear of her into the water. They all started to strike out for the shore. I feared that they would not be able to reach it in the heavy surf, and hailed them to hang on to the boat. They were however all too far off to get back to her, and only the coxswain and I stuck to the boat which was bottom up. The strain of holding on was considerable, but we gradually drifted towards the shore and when close in were rescued by the rocket apparatus party throwing us lines with sandbags attached. The whole crew got on shore safely, but we were all pretty well done up, and the coxswain, who had swallowed a good deal of sand by getting under the boat, never fully recovered his health. The military party which worked the rocket apparatus treated us most kindly ; the Governor, Sir John Adye, being especially good to us. The sea went down in the evening and boats from the shore rescued all the ship's company except one man who was drowned in jumping for the boats. We were awarded the Board of Trade Life-saving Medal for our attempt at rescue.”¹

¹ The Humane Society medal could not be given, as no life was actually saved in the attempt.

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Gibraltar is a tricky place for currents when gales are blowing. A current, which in calm weather may merely be classed as a "set," in a gale will, at times, reach a velocity of 4 knots or more, and there is but little indication of such a change until a boat actually finds herself being set by the stream.

This was Jellicoe's last experience of any moment in the *Monarch*; for in April, 1886, he joined the *Colossus*, again, of course, as Gunnery Lieutenant. She was at the time the most modern and up-to-date ship afloat, with hydraulic machinery for working her heavy gun mountings—a very great innovation. A controversy was at this time started on the subject of whether men-of-war should be equipped with masts or not. One school of thought advocated their retention as a gymnasium, a training for rapidity of thought and to strengthen nerve. Their opponents pointed out that they were practically useless as a means of propulsion and that the danger was very great if in an action a mast went overboard, and the rigging fouled the propeller and stopped the ship. Another great objection was the fact that the efficiency of a ship would continue to be judged rather by the smartness of her crew aloft than by her gunnery efficiency. Jellicoe naturally sided with the abolitionists. It was owing to this controversy that in the summer of 1886 the *Colossus* was ordered to convoy the masted ship *Imperieuse* to Gibraltar and back. Jellicoe notes rather with surprise the difference in behaviour of the *Imperieuse* and *Colossus* in varying weather. On one occasion, when the *Colossus* was rolling 17° each way, and water was washing into her gun port, the *Imperieuse* was rolling only 2° ; and yet, on another, when the *Imperieuse* was rolling 25° each way the *Colossus* was rolling a small matter of 5° . Such was the difference in effect that the length of the waves had on the two ships.

The problem, therefore, presented to the Naval constructor was to construct battleships as free from rolling as possible in the average sea. The problem was no easy one. It was desirable to construct our battleships with as small a tendency to roll as possible and yet they had to be safe. Hitherto a stiff ship, that is one which did not roll, was known to be a dangerous ship and liable under adverse conditions to capsize. Turrets were desirable, yet a low free board, again, tended towards small stability. In the end the problem was solved and the present-day battleships combine most of the good qualities. But in those days, while groping for a solution, the *Colossus* had been fitted with a water

ballast chamber that was intended to check the rolling of the ship. The tank extended right across the ship, so that when the ship heeled over the water in it followed the roll ; and, on the ship trying to roll back, the dead weight of the water, being all on the depressed side, checked the ship righting and therefore exercised a steadying influence. The device was only partially successful, and the noise of the rushing water at sea was most objectionable, especially to the Warrant Officers whose mess was immediately above the tank.

A little-known incident, which has been recorded by Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge,¹ occurred while the ship was lying at Spithead :

“An unusually heavy gale was blowing and a very strong tide was running, the weather at the same time being rather cold. One of our bluejackets fell overboard from a boat and was being quickly swept away by the tide, whilst the waves seemed big enough to overwhelm him. Lieutenant Jellicoe promptly jumped overboard and swam to his assistance. I did not see the man fall overboard as I was on the other side of the deck ; but I ran across in time to see Lieutenant Jellicoe jumping into the water. He swam with extraordinary vigour, breasted the waves continuously, and succeeded in reaching the man before the latter sank, and in keeping him afloat until a boat which I had despatched, picked them both up. The bluejacket was brought on board insensible, but soon recovered. Lieutenant Jellicoe smilingly received my congratulations and commendation and walked quickly to his cabin to put on dry clothes.”²

A spell as guard ship at Cowes during the regatta week followed the return to England. Her Majesty Queen Victoria expressed her intention of visiting the ship, and arrangements were made to lift the roof off one of the turrets so that she could see in comfort the working of the guns under their hydraulic power. Disappointment, however, was in store, for at the last moment Her Majesty was unable to come. However, the Princess of Wales, afterwards Queen Alexandra came and as usual won the hearts of all on board.

It was while at Cowes that Jellicoe landed two field guns from the *Colossus* and started a competition between the two crews. This subsequently became so popular that the practice continued

¹ *Some Recollections*, by Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, K.C.B.

² It is difficult to see why the Royal Humane Society's Medal was not awarded to Jellicoe for this.

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at all the depots, and in all the fleets, and, after considerable improvement, is now the great Naval annual event at the Royal Tournament.

On leaving Cowes, Jellicoe attended the gun trials of the *Collingwood*, during which one of the 12-inch guns burst. As a result, the *Colossus* was detained at Spithead and not allowed to fire her guns until the cause of the accident had been ascertained.

In December, Jellicoe joined the *Excellent* as Experimental officer, which appointment carried with it the command of the gunboat *Handy*. His work was of great interest and also importance, because all the sea-going experiments with new ideas in Naval mountings and guns were carried out in the *Handy*. He further had to attend the gunnery trials of all ships commissioning. The first important trials were those of the Elswick breech-loading 30 and 70 pounders—that is, guns that fired projectiles of 30 and 70 lb. weight. Mr. Vavasseur was responsible for the design of the mountings. The results of the trials were such that it was found possible to increase the weight of the projectiles to 45 lb. and 90 lb., and the guns became known afterwards as 4·7-inch and 6-inch. What a vast improvement this was on the older mountings is shown by the fact that the rate of fire of the old 5-inch gun was not more than two rounds a minute, while the new 4·7 fired ten rounds comfortably. The old 6-inch could barely fire one round per minute, whereas the new one could easily accomplish 7 to 8 rounds. Needless to say, Captain Fisher moved heaven and earth to have these guns adopted as quickly as possible. The first 13·5-inch gun (short calibre) was tried in the *Handy* at Shoeburyness, Jellicoe having taken his command to Woolwich to ship the huge gun.

He still indulged in football ; but one match led to the conclusion of his career in this sport. A memorable game, perhaps contest is a better word, against the Portsmouth Corinthians led to such severe casualties that the teams ended up with 9 and 11 players instead of the regulation 15 ! Jellicoe received a severe blow on his Adam's apple, and most of the survivors of the team had injuries of sorts, Lieutenant Eustace¹ nearly losing an ear. The following day Captain Fisher interviewed the *Excellent* portion of the team, and told them that he did not intend to have his gunnery staff laid up unfit for work, and made them promise to abjure football for the future, which they did. It must have been

¹ Afterwards Admiral J. B. Eustace.

1879 to 1889—SUB-LIEUTENANT AND LIEUTENANT

an extraordinary game and makes one wonder what became of the referee!! Jellicoe lost his voice completely for six weeks as a result of this accident and had to undergo a course of Turkish baths at Bournemouth, and to conduct all gun trials in a whisper.

After eighteen months as Experimental officer he was appointed to the Senior Staff, with Percy Scott as Senior Staff officer. He found the duties rather tame and decidedly uninteresting after his work as Experimental officer. The appointment, however, assured him of promotion in three years' time. He was therefore well started on his road towards the top of the tree.

CHAPTER V

1889 to 1896

H.M.S. <i>EXCELLENT</i> for service at Admiralty as a LIEUTENANT, ASSISTANT		
	to D.N.O.	15.9.89 to 11.2.90
H.M.S. <i>PRESIDENT</i> .	SAME RANK AND DUTIES.	12.2.90 to 27.6.91
H.M.S. <i>PRESIDENT</i> .	COMMANDER (SAME DUTY).	30.6.91 to 8.2.92
H.M.S. <i>SANS PAREIL</i> .	COMMANDER.	9.2.92 to 1.3.93
H.M.S. <i>ACHILLES</i> .	COMMANDER.	2.3.93 to 31.3.93
H.M.S. <i>VICTORIA</i> .	COMMANDER.	1.4.93 to 2.8.93
H.M.S. <i>VICTORY</i> .	(and for <i>Ramillies</i>).	13.8.93 to 6.10.93
H.M.S. <i>RAMILLIES</i> .		17.10.93 to 15.12.96

AFTER Jellicoe had been serving on the Senior Staff of the *Excellent* for one year and four months Captain John Fisher, then the Director of Naval Ordnance, asked him to go to the Admiralty as his assistant. This Jellicoe consented to do provided that his promotion to Commander would not be delayed thereby. He was morally certain of being promoted after having served for three years on the Senior Staff of the *Excellent*, but no such certainty attached to a newly-created post at the Admiralty. Captain Fisher put forward a minute to the Board of Admiralty pointing out how desirable it was to have the best brains available for work at Whitehall, and the Board passed a special minute practically promising that Jellicoe would be promoted as early as if he had remained a Staff officer in the *Excellent*. So to the Admiralty he went as Assistant to the Director of Naval Ordnance.

At the time he went to the Admiralty the agitation for an increased Navy was well under way, for the Russian Penjdeh war scare had caused genuine alarm. There is little doubt that Captain Fisher played a considerable part behind the scenes in waking up the British public to a true understanding of the functions of a Navy in war, and the lamentable state of weakness into which the British Royal Navy had sunk. It is only necessary here to call to mind that as late as 1888 our Channel fleet, which was our second largest fleet, consisted only of four battleships—the *Northumberland*, flagship, completed 1868 ; the *Agincourt*, completed

1868 ; the *Monarch*, completed 1869 ; the *Iron Duke*, completed 1871 ; and one gunboat, the *Curlew*, 950 tons, completed in 1885, with a maximum speed of 14·5 knots, mounting one 6-inch and three 5-inch guns. All the battleships were armed with old muzzle-loading guns. The whole fleet was hopelessly out of date except for the *Curlew*, which ship was too small to maintain a reasonable speed in any but fine weather. The "Admiral" class ships became available for commission in 1888. These were a genuine improvement having an armament of four 67-ton breech-loading guns mounted in barbettes, and a broadside armament of three 6-inch breech-loading guns on each side; but their low freeboard forward made it impossible for them to steam at any speed except in quite moderate weather, and their unarmoured ends rendered them useless in a fleet action.

It was at this time that Mr. Stead, a courageous reformer, published a series of articles on "The Needs of the Navy." They were evidently inspired, and it was whispered that the inspiration came from Captain Fisher. Lord Charles Beresford resigned his post as 4th Sea Lord, and public meetings were held in the City and elsewhere. The result was that the Government were driven into passing the Navy Defence Act of 1889, which appropriated to the Navy the sum of £21,000,000, to be spread over seven years. Of this an amount of £10,000,000 was to be provided from the Consolidated fund, and £11,000,000 to be spread over the Navy Estimates up till 1895. The programme allowed for the construction of eight first-class battleships of 14,150 tons, and two, the *Centurion* and *Barfleur*, of 10,500 tons ; nine first-class cruisers, two of 7,700 tons and seven of 7,350 tons ; thirty-three second-class cruisers, varying in displacement from 3,400 to 4,360 tons. This was a programme of unprecedented magnitude ; and, as can well be imagined, brought a vast quantity of work to Fisher and his department, for all the armaments were, of course, to be of the latest design. His staff consisted of himself and three assistants. The two senior officers, who were of Commander's rank, were chiefly employed on routine work, that is overlooking the returns of the firing exercises, personnel, and generally the work done by ships in commission and the gunnery schools. So to Jellicoe fell the task of dealing with all questions relating to new ideas and improvements in guns, ammunition, mountings and projectiles, and their installation on board the new ships. The development of hydraulic machinery for working the heavy turrets

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and guns was making gigantic strides, and for this very reason such designs required most careful watching to make certain that all recommendations and innovations proposed by the designers were practicable for work on board ship under sea-going conditions. One important and somewhat novel class of armament, which at that time required special attention, was the Maxim and other quick-firing machine guns, and especially the larger pattern such as the 1-inch Nordenfelt.

It is interesting to compare Captain Fisher's staff of three officers, when D.N.O. in 1889, with Captain Jellicoe's staff as D.N.O. in 1907, when he had to help him one post-captain and five assistants. It is true that the Navy was then much larger than in 1889 ; but, even so, if the Naval Defence Act is taken into consideration, the work in Fisher's time must have been far too heavy for so small a staff. In fact, Lord Jellicoe, in looking back, records that he frequently was at work until 11 p.m. in his effort to keep pace with the tremendous daily influx of work. It was a hard time, but a good apprenticeship. If, as we should, we look on all periods of Jellicoe's service as training for higher steps and eventually for his command of the Grand Fleet, we see no reason for him to have regretted this period of exceptional labour, nor did he do so. He was working with Fisher, who never spared himself ; and he was learning from that arch-master of departmental management how to get both the best and, at the same time, the maximum amount of work out of his assistants. He learned how deftly to press points on a reluctant Board of Admiralty, and how insistently to get his way by smoothing down dissentients and disarming criticism. Some of Fisher's methods may have savoured, perhaps, too much of finesse, but his subsequent explanations of his minor artifices were always plausible, disarming, and most amusing. Jellicoe's period of service between the end of 1889 and the middle of 1891 was of great value to him afterwards, both in his subsequent work at the Admiralty and also in his management of the various services of the Grand Fleet. His tribute to Fisher is a just one :

“ Captain Fisher was a very great worker himself and he expected his subordinates to follow his example. His enthusiasm was passed on to us and it made the work pleasant in spite of the long hours.”

Jellicoe's work by no means kept him entirely within the walls of the Admiralty building. He constantly visited the large arma-

ment factories, especially those of Armstrong at Elswick, Newcastle-on-Tyne ; for the firm of Vickers was only just getting fairly into its stride, and the Coventry Ordnance Co. was non-existent. At Elswick he made the acquaintance of Sir Andrew Noble, a most—in fact, we might almost say the most—notable personality in the armament world. Jellicoe always looked back with gratitude to Sir Andrew's kindness and the pleasant time that in after years he spent with him at his home in Argyllshire. The first occasion he dined with Sir Andrew became well fixed in his mind. This armament magnate was most hospitable, and it was ever a matter of uncertainty how many people might be dining at his board on any particular night. Jellicoe had been invited to dine one evening prior to leaving for London by the night train. Sir Andrew had casually said that there would only be a few people to dinner, so he accepted, though he had no dress clothes with him. To his astonished concern he found that over twenty sat down to dinner. He apologized to Miss Noble for his morning attire, saying that he had no idea that the dinner was likely to be a formal one. In reply she said that Sir Andrew never informed Lady Noble till the last moment that he had asked a lot of people to dine and that she always had to be prepared for surprises of that sort. Lady Noble must have had a very long-suffering and adaptable household.

In June, 1891, Jellicoe was promoted to Commander through Captain Fisher's good offices, and richly he deserved the step. At the end of the year Captain A. K. Wilson asked him to go as his Commander in H.M.S. *Sans Pareil*—an offer gladly accepted. It was not always easy to find a captain willing to take as his executive officer a newly-promoted commander, who had been for three years away from a sea-going ship. Most captains preferred, as a rule, taking for their second-in-command a man who had newly come ashore and had lately been first-lieutenant of a sea-going ship. It was therefore a compliment to Jellicoe because it proved that he had achieved a reputation for sea-efficiency.

On March 6 the *Sans Pareil* left for the Mediterranean, the Chief Constructor of the Navy taking passage on board. On arrival at Malta, Sir George Tryon, the Commander-in-Chief, gave Captain Wilson permission to take his ship to the Levant in order to shake down her ship's company. This was a great boon to the Commander, for these independent cruises were most beneficial to newly-commissioned ships. While with the fleet, and

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in company with the Commander-in-Chief, a ship had to follow the daily routine of the flagship ; thus slow, steady repeated drill, so essential to a newly-commissioned ship's company, was an impossibility. It is therefore needless to say that Jellicoe warmly welcomed this Eastern trip.

Later on, at Genoa, the ship, together with a cruiser, anchored off the outer mole, which was considerably shorter, and therefore more exposed in bad weather than was afterwards the case. After mooring, her stern was hauled in and secured to the mole. A gale sprang up and all the hawsers parted except one $3\frac{1}{2}$ -inch steel wire rope. Had this also parted, fouling the cruiser must have resulted, so Jellicoe, seeing this heaven-sent opportunity, lowered two of the pulling cutters, which were constructed as lifeboats with air casings and therefore far too heavy to stand a chance of winning any race in the regatta, and used them as fenders between the two ships, in the hope that they would be hopelessly smashed up, for then Malta Dockyard would be certain to supply a couple of lightly-built mahogany boats. This may seem rather a drastic waste of Government stores ; but human nature should receive some attention from a supply department. It was mere stupidity on the part of the authorities to palm off ancient and unwieldy patterns of boats to some ships and light racing boats to others. In order to keep a ship's company happy, keen, and smart, it is necessary for the men to have a fair chance of winning competitions against other ships, and naturally it was up to the Commander to see that they were given that chance.

In those days of the 'eighties and 'nineties the whole of the routine work of the ship fell on the Commander ; all drills, the award of minor punishments, responsibility for the cleanliness of the ship, and the discipline of the men, all were part of the Commander's functions. The Lieutenants were either specialists or watch-keepers ; and, beyond having charge of a division of the men and being responsible for the state of their clothing and bedding, had little to do except to keep regular watch. The Commander usually rose at 4 a.m. in summer, or 4.30 a.m. in winter, so as to be on deck when the hands turned out, and from that time until 9.15 p.m. had little rest for five and a half days of the week. It was a time that afforded valuable experience of the best methods in dealing with a ship's company and an opportunity for learning all the intimate details of the life of all classes of men on board ship.

The Admiralty introduced at that time the innovation of entering lieutenants for temporary service from the Merchant Service. This had been forced on them by the increase in the number of ships of the Navy due to the Naval Defence Act. The ships were being gradually delivered, and it was found that there were insufficient lieutenants to complete their complements. It was easy enough to provide commanders and captains by promoting more junior officers; but eight years, counting from the time a Naval cadet entered the *Britannia*, were necessary to train a lad sufficiently for him to become a lieutenant. Therefore the procedure adopted was essentially a sensible one—for the mates on board the larger ocean liners were perfectly competent to keep watch on board any man-of-war, after they had received some training in the duties of an officer-of-the-watch when steaming in company with other ships in a fleet.

The Navy was at that time a very exclusive service and some officers did not view this innovation as broadmindedly as they might have done. This is how Captain Colin Nicholson, R.N.R., recalls these now far-off days and his estimate of Commander Jellicoe.

“As you know there was a certain amount of prejudice against R.N.R. men. Natural perhaps because to a certain extent we were interlopers. . . .

I now come to the then Commander Jellicoe. His attitude towards R.N.R. men soon became evident; it is one of my most pleasant sea memories. His treatment of the single R.N.R. officer on board was exactly the same as if I had originally come from H.M.S. *Britannia*.

He honoured me, too, in 1895 by accepting an invitation to lunch on board R.M.S. *Ophir* at Naples, when I was but third officer. My invitation was made in fear and trembling, but to accept was just like him.”

Indeed, it is easy to imagine the mild trepidation of the young third officer in asking his late Commander to lunch, but Jellicoe was ever kind-hearted and had none of what in those days were called “frills”—and undoubtedly was only too pleased to meet again and have a yarn with his late shipmate.

The *Sans Pareil*, not being a masted ship, was fitted with power gear for hoisting the large boats in and out. This was a great convenience and was looked on almost as a necessity in unmasted ships. However, when this broke down, Jellicoe and his men

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improvised hand lifting gear to do the work. This extempore gear pleased Captain Wilson, who, seeing an opportunity for muscular exercise on the part of the men, used it frequently in preference to the power. The success of the innovation was such that other ships had the alternative gear fitted to them.

Now came a considerable lift for Jellicoe in his career. Early in 1893 Admiral Sir George Tryon asked Captain Wilson to spare Jellicoe to become Commander of his flagship, the *Victoria*, which was due to re-commission at Malta. It was so good an appointment for a commander that Captain Wilson consented—in fact, it meant that Jellicoe's promotion was assured in two, or at the outside three years' time. There was, of course, the usual hard work of commissioning and the independent cruise to shake down the men. After this the *Victoria* rejoined the fleet, which left for a cruise in the Levant. On June 22, 1893, the fleet left Beyrout for Tripoli ; but, sad to relate, during that afternoon the *Victoria* was sunk in collision with the *Camperdown*.

In order to understand, even partially, the cause of this very untoward event it is necessary to appreciate the outstanding personality of Sir George Tryon. He was a big man of rather formidable presence, with a great reputation as a Naval officer and tactician, having been educated in these matters under Admiral Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby. Tryon was a man who, when differences of opinion as regards tactics arose, was more likely to be right than wrong, and who did not suffer criticism of his orders gladly. Such was the Commander-in-Chief. The fleet was due to anchor that afternoon, and while steaming in two lines 6 cables apart, the Admiral, wishing to turn the whole fleet round, signalled to the leading ship of each column to turn completely round in a semi-circle and to steer in the opposite direction to that in which they had been steaming. Then naturally the other ships in each of the columns would follow the ship next ahead of them. This was all right and a simple manœuvre, if each of the leading ships had been told to turn *outwards*, or even if both had been told to turn either to port or both to starboard, for the lines were quite far enough apart to allow the ships of the opposite line to turn comfortably round and down in between the lines. But for some reason which has never been satisfactorily explained, Sir George insisted on turning both of the leading ships *inwards* towards each other. For this there was insufficient room ; the ships collided and the *Victoria* sank ; and he paid for his mistake with his life.




Diagram showing the assumed positions of H.M.S.S. *Victoria* and *Camperdown* from the time the helms were put over until the collision took place.

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
The only possible explanation of Sir George's error is that he confused the measurement of the diameter of the circle, which the ship required for the turn, with its radius. But this is not really an explanation, for a man of the calibre of Sir George did not normally make mistakes of that nature. His brain must have failed him, or as a sailor would say he must temporarily have had a "kink" in his brain—*errare est humanum*. It is, indeed, true that the human brain is apt to fail at critical moments, but the most extraordinary point as regards the accident lies not so much in Sir George's mistake as in the fact that no one of the senior officers implicated, the Rear-Admiral, the Captain of the *Camperdown*, or the Captain of the *Victoria* took steps to avoid the collision. All three stated at the Court Martial that they knew the evolution was an impossible one; all thought that Sir George was going to do something to avert the collision; but no one took any useful action. Speaking generally, it was the duty of the Rear-Admiral's flagship to repeat all signals made by the Commander-in-Chief, but a repetition so hoisted was never hoisted *right up* to the mast-head until the manœuvre was fully understood. If the feasibility of the manœuvre was doubted, the signal should not have been hoisted right up until a satisfactory explanation from the Commander-in-Chief had been received as to how the manœuvre was to be performed.

The finding of the Court Martial deals with this point :

"The Court feels strongly that although it is much to be regretted that Rear-Admiral Hastings Markham did not carry out his first intention of semaphoring to the Commander-in-Chief his doubts as regards the signal, it would be fatal to the best interests of the service to say that he was to blame for carrying out the direction of his Commander-in-Chief present in person."

In other words the Court supported the old time-honoured belief in implicit obedience and the complete subordination of all brains to that of the man in chief command.

At the time of the collision Jellicoe was in bed suffering from Malta fever, with a temperature of 103°. On feeling the shock and hearing from his servant the facts, he got up, hastily put on a pair of trousers and a coat over his pyjamas, and went on deck to his station on the after-bridge to superintend hoisting out the boats in readiness should the ship have to be abandoned, which was the duty he had assigned himself in case of collision. On his arrival on the bridge Lieutenant Leveson, the Gunnery Lieutenant,



R. Ellis, Malta

H.M.S. VICTORIA FOUNDERING AFTER COLLISION WITH THE CAMPERDOWN, JUNE 22, 1893

From a photograph by Staff Surgeon Collot, of H.M.S. Collingwood.

informed him that the lifting power had failed and the boat-hoist therefore was out of action. This is how Jellicoe described what subsequently happened.

"Immediately afterwards the ship, which had been heeling to starboard, took a very violent heel in that direction and it was obvious that she was on the point of capsizing. I said to Lieutenant Leveson¹ 'We had better go down the side of the ship as she turns over,' and we started to walk down the port side, which by that time was horizontal. I had just reached the jackstay of the torpedo nets in line with the upper deck when the ship turned bottom up. I held on to the jackstay as the hull turned over and when I found myself under water let go and started to rise to the surface. I was conscious of bodies passing me as I came to the surface and then started to swim away from the ship to avoid being sucked down as she sank. I felt the suction of her sinking but was not drawn down. I noticed one of our steamboats near me bottom up with some officers and men holding on to her. I managed to get rid of my clothes in the water as they hampered me in my rather weak state; and, just as I was feeling very tired, Roberts-West, one of the midshipmen, swam up to me and asked if I needed any help. I said I would be glad if I might put a hand on his shoulder, which I did, and a little time afterwards I was picked up by a boat from the *Nile* and taken on board that ship, where I spent the night, being transferred to the *Sans Pareil* at Captain Wilson's request the next day; he was most kind to me in every way and fitted me out with some clothes for the passage to Malta."

It was unfortunate that for some reason which is not apparent,² Sir George Tryon had, immediately after the collision, hoisted a general signal for the ships of the fleet not to send boats—this undoubtedly led to a greater loss of life than would have been the case had all the ships present sent them immediately after the collision.

Jellicoe was at the time none the worse for his immersion; in fact, the next day his temperature was normal, but he was to pay for it after arriving in England. Complications then set in, including severe rheumatism, and he was laid up for a time.

A Court-Martial was, as is usual, held on all the survivors, 29 officers and 262 men. (Those drowned numbered 22 officers and 336 men.) All the survivors were acquitted from blame. Lieutenant-Colonel Christie, who travelled home in the same ship as Jellicoe, records that he was not, like some officers, inclined to

¹ Afterwards Admiral Sir Arthur C. Leveson, K.C.B.

² It has been suggested that Sir George hoped to beach the ship before she sank.

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mope and be down in the mouth, but that he was all over the ship doing physical jerks with a party of midshipmen who were taking passage to England. Jellicoe was blessed with great recuperative power and was able to throw into the background of his mind even the greatest of troubles. He never worried about things that had happened or which could not be avoided.

The Mediterranean had lost its Commander-in-Chief and its flagship. Admiral Sir Michael Culme-Seymour was at once appointed to take over the command—a man indicated by every consideration for the post. He was without doubt at that time the ablest of the senior Admirals.

The *Ramillies* was selected as his flagship, and Jellicoe was nominated as her Commander and appointed to superintend her fitting out at Portsmouth. It was particularly fortunate for him to have this opportunity of being able to have many of the ship's fittings improved and rendered more adapted to sea work. The design of the minor fittings of ships that are being built rarely keeps pace with the latest improvements and ideas in sea-going ships, therefore it is of considerable value to a ship while fitting out to obtain the views and help of officers lately from sea. This was far more the case in 1893 than now ; since, at that particular time, the ships of the Navy were undergoing radical alteration in design, and the ancient ideas associated with the old Navy of masted ships were slowly giving way to more modern ideas. Steel had asserted its pre-eminence over iron, wood was fast disappearing and metal taking its place. Moreover, the old system of messing and berthing had been designed for masted ships when instant call on the men by day and night to work the sails was a matter of primary importance. This, again, was slowly undergoing modification and improvement, as the employment of the crew became radically altered.

During this period Jellicoe lived at Ryde with his parents, which was to him a great pleasure, and at the same time a convenience, as he was within easy reach of his work in Portsmouth dockyard. The Captain of the *Ramillies* was Francis Bridgeman, who had lately been Flag-Captain to Sir Michael Culme-Seymour in the *Camperdown*, when the latter commanded the Channel Fleet. Of him Jellicoe wrote :

“He had been Commander of the *Excellent* during my service in her while on the Junior Staff. I knew him well. His great experience both in command and as second-in-command was very helpful to me.”

Among the Lieutenants were E. F. Inglefield¹ First Lieutenant ; H. L. Heath² Torpedo Lieutenant ; Arthur Leveson³ Gunnery officer, succeeded later on by O. de B. Brock.⁴ The other lieutenant watch-keepers were Alexander-Sinclair,⁵ Lionel Halsey,⁶ G. M. Paine⁷ and H. G. Sandeman.⁸ It is interesting to note that the great majority of these Lieutenants were later on Admirals in important commands during the Great War.

He continues :

“ We had indeed in the *Ramillies* a complement of officers second to none in the Service—all most delightful companions and most excellent officers. The Warrant officers also were of the highest class. I am sure that any old *Ramillies* will agree that Mr. Trice the Boatswain (who retired later on as Lieutenant Trice) was a splendid Warrant officer and a delightful personality. In my later years (on the retired list) whenever I visited Portsmouth, where Lieutenant Trice was living, whether on British Legion or other work, he was always present at any meeting I attended and his presence ever afforded me the greatest possible pleasure. The gunner, Mr. Joy, was equally fine as a Warrant officer, and the same may be said of the Carpenter, Mr. Attrill, an officer with a quiet manner but very capable at his work. With so fine a set of officers it was an easy matter to get the ship's company to attain a very high standard, and I have no hesitation in saying that the ship was most efficient in every way. . . . A great feeling of loyalty was apparent, and after three years of a most happy commission I found it a real pleasure to meet men who had served in the *Ramillies*, as we all shared the pride with which we remembered our time on board.

In all sports the ship took a high place, whether rowing, sailing in regattas, shooting at the rifle range at Malta, competing in athletic sports, &c., &c. The field guns' crews, especially a marine gun's crew, did particularly well in competitions, which were frequent. The officers shone at polo and other games and sports ; at drill or in coaling ship the *Ramillies* always did well. The ship had as a keen competitor the *Trafalgar*, second flagship, with the Honble. Stanley Cecil Colville,⁹ a great personal friend of mine, as

¹ Afterwards Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Inglefield, K.B.E.

² Afterwards Admiral Sir Herbert Heath, K.C.B.

³ Afterwards Admiral Sir Arthur Leveson, K.C.B.

⁴ Afterwards Admiral of the Fleet Sir Osmond de B. Brock, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O.

⁵ Afterwards Admiral Sir Edwyn Alexander-Sinclair, G.C.B.

⁶ Afterwards Admiral Sir Lionel Halsey, G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.

⁷ Afterwards Rear-Admiral Sir Godfrey Paine, K.C.B., M.V.O.

⁸ Afterwards Rear-Admiral H. G. Sandeman, C.M.G.

⁹ Afterwards Admiral the Hon. Sir Stanley Cecil Colville, G.C.B. G.C.V.O.

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commander. The *Hawke* with Cecil Burney¹ as commander, another great friend, was also a ship that required a very high standard to beat at drill or sport. It is pleasant to recall those days when keen competition served to cement friendships. In rowing races in the Mediterranean during this period English-built service boats were owing to their weight and build handicapped when competing against boats built at Malta. Most ships managed to get some Maltese boats. The *Ramillies* was no exception. I did not rest until I had succeeded in obtaining one cutter and one whaler of this type. Both did very well in all regattas."

The battleships of the *Ramillies* class, designed by Sir William White, F.R.S., were a very great improvement on any hitherto built for our Navy. A high freeboard forward enabled them to steam well in a moderate sea, and their armament was lifted well above the water ; but they had one great defect in that they rolled excessively. Captain W. H. Hall was the first captain to command one of this class, the *Revenge*. On his first trip to sea, when on the way to Gibraltar, the rolling was found to be so bad that the bridge shifted and jammed the steering gear. Without any hesitation Captain Hall turned round and steamed back to England and reported this grave defect. His report did not bring him popularity with the authorities, but that did not trouble him. His action was vindicated, as it had the effect of the cause of the rolling being thoroughly investigated and corrected. The remedy was a simple one so far as the ship was concerned, namely to fit bilge keels, or projections which stuck out for the greater part of the length of a ship from her bilge, but these keels increased the size of the ship, and trouble was experienced with some of the smaller docks ; but this was surmounted. The stability of the ships was really considerably improved by the fitting of these keels, for Jellicoe remarks that on the passage out to Malta the ship rolled very badly, but when fitted with bilge keels at Malta this evil was corrected.

On arrival on the Mediterranean station the *Ramillies* went to Corfu to shake down the ship's company. There she had a busy time and plenty of work, for the ship had to be brought up to a high standard of training, since the flagship should lead all the other ships, or at least equal any other, in drills, sports and coaling. And most certainly this the *Ramillies* did. Any officer who served in the Mediterranean Fleet during the first commission of the

¹ Afterwards Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, Bart., G.C.B.

Ramillies will bear willing testimony to her almost super-excellence in all the many requisites that the word "smartness" implies.

In those days a Commander had not only to be a fine seaman and a good disciplinarian, but he had to be a first class head house-maid. A thoroughly spick-and-span ship is a happy well-disciplined ship ; while a slovenly ship is bound to have a grumbling and troublesome crew. One of the secrets of Jellicoe's success as Commander in the *Ramillies* lay in his minute attention to detail, and his steady insistence on detail being attended to by others. In this he excelled.

On arrival of the *Ramillies* at Malta from Corfu, Sir Michael Culme-Seymour hoisted his flag in her, bringing with him Lieutenant Hugh Evan Thomas as his Flag Lieutenant.¹

"Sir Michael," wrote Jellicoe "was a great sportsman, a keen game shot, a good fisherman, fond of boat-sailing and a good rackets player. He and I spent many hours playing rackets at Malta while the fleet lay in the Grand Harbour, and one year, playing as partners, we won the Fleet Rackets Cup. I recollect, too, Sir Michael winning easily the veteran officers handicap race in the Fleet Athletic Sports."

As a matter of fact the racket-playing for a time shook up his feet, and on the Fleet Surgeon being consulted he, a Scotchman and no diplomatist, said "Sir Michael, when a man gets old he begins to go either in the head or the feet—you're going in the feet." "What!" shouted the Commander-in-Chief—he always had a penetrating voice. "Do you mean to say I'm getting old?" and it took quite a little time to quiet him down.

"Golf was almost in its infancy in the Fleet but Sir Michael took up the game, and one year, while the Fleet was lying off Salonika, we constructed a golf course a few miles out of the town. I often wondered later, during the Great War, if the course was still in existence."

During the commission of the *Ramillies*, which lasted from the end of 1893 until the end of 1896, the fleet kept very much together on its cruises and constantly carried out tactical exercises while at sea. The cruising was largely in the Levant, varied with the more coveted region of the coast of Italy and the French Riviera.

¹ Who greatly distinguished himself later in the Great War as Rear-Admiral commanding the 5th Battle Squadron, a highly efficient squadron with a very fine record for accurate shooting.

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Gunnery was still, so to speak, in its infancy. In the six hundred years of its existence it had progressed comparatively little. Men still looked over or through sights and fired at targets—or in action at an enemy—generally not further off than 1,500 to 2,000 yards. But a period of gunnery activity was shortly to come when individual intensive training was given to gun-layers and sight-setters, and a high premium was set on the efficiency of the men. Then, more or less suddenly, all this was again to be swept away, and the aiming taken from the gun-layers and placed with one or two officers. This, although anticipating events, takes off a little of the sting of Jellicoe's lament that "Gunnery efficiency in the modern sense was I fear non-existent. An annual competition prize firing was carried out off Malta at a range of some 1,600 yards . . . and gunnery took rather a back seat in considering the smartness and efficiency of a ship's company."

During this commission Jellicoe suffered a good deal from Malta fever. The cause of this scourge had not then been discovered. The Maltese goats were the sinners, and their milk was almost entirely the cause of the trouble. A patient sent to Malta hospital with a broken arm, or leg, or other fracture, was put on a milk diet, and was almost certain shortly to contract Malta fever. As late as 1901 the hospital was full of fever patients and the ships had, in addition, many men on board in cots and hammocks all suffering from the same complaint. Then the goat came under suspicion, the cause was discovered, steps were taken and in a short time the fever disappeared almost completely. When the ship was lying off Venice Jellicoe had a particularly bad attack and had to be sent to Malta in the Admiral's yacht the *Surprise*. After a stay in hospital, of course drinking infected milk, he was sent to England by P. & O. steamer, having to be carried on board, since he was too weak to walk. It is good evidence of the great esteem in which he was held that his appointment in the *Ramillies* was kept vacant until he was fit enough to return to the Mediterranean and fill it once again. Most commanders would have been merely "invalided" and the vacant billet at once filled by a new man.

It was because of this unfortunate liability to Malta fever that Jellicoe lost the chance of joining the 1896 expedition.

"Lord Kitchener telegraphed to Sir Michael Seymour asking if he would spare me to go with him in command of a Nile gun-boat. When the telegram arrived, I was at sea in the *Ramillies* carrying out target practice; and Sir Michael without consulting me tele-

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graphed a reply to the effect that he could not spare me. On return to harbour Sir Michael told me of what had passed, and when I protested, said that he felt sure that had he allowed me to go I should have been down with fever. I need hardly say that I was deeply disappointed. The result was that my old friend Cecil Colville went in my place and did splendid service on the Nile, was severely wounded and promoted to Captain."

Cecil Colville by the appointment became senior to Jellicoe on the Admirals' list, but with a true spirit of devotion to his country, sank his seniority, and served under Jellicoe as Senior Naval Officer in the Orkneys during the Great War.

During the *Ramillies* commission, towards the middle of 1896, the Special Service Squadron, consisting of two battleships, two first-class and two second-class cruisers, under Admiral Alfred Dale, joined the station. They had been commissioned as a reply to international friction which threatened to become acute ; but soon they were absorbed into the Mediterranean Fleet and Admiral Dale gave up his command. At the end of the commission of the *Ramillies* Jellicoe returned to England and was promoted to Captain on 1st January, 1897.

CHAPTER VI

1897 to 1900

China up to the Boxer Expedition

ORDNANCE COMMITTEE.
H.M.S. *CENTURION*.

CAPTAIN. 9.1.97 TO 30.12.97
CAPTAIN. 31.12.97 TO 5.6.1900

Quo Fas et Gloria Ducunt.

IN January, 1897, Captain Jellicoe was appointed a member of the Ordnance Committee, a body whose functions were solely consultative and experimental. To them were referred all questions relating to experimental trial of guns and ammunition for the Army and Navy. Originally the Board was created with the object of keeping armaments in both the Army and the Navy of a uniform standard and design. A very sensible project up to 1880. But after this date the requirements of the two Services began to diverge. The conditions of shore and sea fighting gradually altered so greatly that uniformity, especially in the mounting of guns, could no longer be maintained. Still, certain portions of armament supply, such as shore defence guns, some of the fuses, high explosives, and propellants, remained of common design in both Services. The committee was composed of a chairman, who at that time was an Artillery officer of high rank, Naval and Military members, and two Secretaries. Their Board-room was in Woolwich Arsenal, at which factory they were in close touch with the manufacturing shops, experimental laboratories and the firing ground at Shoeburyness. Captain Jellicoe at first lived in rooms in London; then he was invited by Major Aston, R.M.A., to share his rooms at the Royal Naval College at Greenwich, which he had been allotted as Professor of Fortification. Major Aston¹ had been a shipmate of Captain Jellicoe in both the *Victoria* and the *Ramillies*. Both men were clever and up-to-date and were congenial companions.

Captain Jellicoe retained the appointment for a year; and very useful the insight into the work of the Committee was to him

¹ Afterwards Major-General Sir George Aston, K.C.B.



Hughes and Mullins

JOHN JELlicOE
Captain R.N., 1897.

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in after times, when he became Director of Naval Ordnance. The most important of the trials undertaken during this time was that of the Vickers 6-inch breech-loading gun, which superseded the Elswick 6-inch quick-firing gun. Lieutenant Trevor Dawson¹ (Retired) of the Firm of Vickers Sons & Maxim, was in charge of the gun during the trial. In those days the railway transport from Barrow-in-Furness to Shoburyness of so special an article as a 6-inch gun was apt to be subject to delays in transference from one railway company to another. Captain Jellicoe records that, with true Naval devotion, Commander Dawson travelled the whole of that journey in the railway truck with the gun so as to secure the minimum of delay.

During a period of leave, in 1897, the two friends visited the Orkney and Shetland Islands, where they had some excellent sea-trout fishing. Little did either think what Scapa would mean to one of them and to the British Fleet some seventeen years later. This trip was destined to be happy and memorable beyond all others for Captain Jellicoe, since it was during this holiday that he stayed with Sir Charles and Lady Cayzer at Delguise, in Perthshire, and there met their second daughter Gwendoline, who was destined some three years afterwards to become his wife. He records that "the visit was one of the greatest pleasure, and I left with the happiest recollection of the whole family," and he might with truth have added "and of one daughter in particular!"

Towards the end of 1897, Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Seymour was nominated to the command of the China Station and invited Jellicoe to go with him as Flag-Captain, an offer which he accepted with great pleasure. It was at that time usual for one of the most promising of the junior Captains to be selected by an Admiral to become his Flag-Captain. The appointment was nearly always held by a junior Captain, since a senior preferred the freedom of a command of his own without having to give up the best accommodation and to play second fiddle to the Admiral. The junior Captain liked it because not only did it provide him with the command of a far larger ship than that to which his seniority entitled him, but he acted as deputy to the Admiral in all routine matters affecting the fleet. In this duty he was shielded by an ample fold of the cloak of authority of the Commander-in-Chief.

The chief requisites for the appointment were ability, popularity and tact. In fact, in the year 1897 a Flag-Captain combined the

¹ Afterwards Commander Sir A. Trevor Dawson, Bart.

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two offices of Chief of the Staff and Captain of the ship. Soon after this date the increase in dimensions of our major fleets necessitated the separation of these two functions, and an officer was appointed to fill each post, but in a fleet of the size of the China Squadron the appointment meant a full measure of work.

Sir Edward Seymour was an admiral of considerable reputation ; he had held several important commands and was a member of the naval family of Seymour, three of whom had risen to hold appointments as commanders-in-chief. He was very precise in his writing and conversation, and possessed a suave and courteous manner. Although on first acquaintance his closely clipped, dark beard, and his type of countenance gave him rather a saturnine expression, he was in reality the kindest of men.

The Admiral and his Flag-Captain left England early in 1898, transhipped at Colombo into a steamer for Hong Kong, where they joined the *Alacrity*, the Admiral's yacht, and from there proceeded to Chusan, where they met their Flagship, the *Centurion*. She was a peculiar type of ship, she and her sister ship the *Barfleur* having been built for duty as Flagships in hot climates. In reality she was a small battleship with a good coal endurance. She carried four 10-inch, and ten 4.7-inch guns, had a speed of 18½ knots and a complement of some 650 men.

China had, two years before Captain Jellicoe's appointment, ended her war with Japan ; beaten, humiliated and hopelessly weak, she became the easy prey of the European Powers, who greedily saw their opportunity to acquire concessions. In this they were aided by the weakness of Japan, the aftermath of her exertions in the war. Russia led the way and used her strength to deprive Japan of the legitimate fruits of her naval successes.

By a treaty made between China and Japan at the conclusion of the War, China had ceded the Liao-Tung peninsula to Japan. This territory formed the north-eastern boundary of the Gulf of Pe-chi-li and had at its extreme south the important harbour of Port Arthur. Russia, wishing to possess an ice-free port in the East, objected to this clause in the treaty, and obtained the help of Germany and France in the support of her objection. These two countries based their compliance on the ground of "maintaining the balance of power in the East." They cannot, however, be acquitted of a desire both to curry favour with China and to spite the British, who were the allies of Japan. Great Britain stood entirely aloof from the dispute, with the result that Japan was

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obliged to give way, and the three objecting Powers earned temporarily the gratitude of China. Poor China, however, soon found that she had only been delivered from the hands of a single robber to fall into the hands of three bandits who were not long in requesting a substantial ransom. Russia, in a secret clause in a treaty with China, obtained what was euphemistically called a "lease" of Kiaochow for fifteen years and a promise that China would fortify Port Arthur and Talienwan. Germany came next, and on the pretext of obtaining compensation for the murder by bandits of two missionaries (although the Chinese authorities promptly took the matter of punishment in hand) she, in 1897, in a high-handed manner expelled the Chinese garrison from Tsingtau, occupied the whole of the land bordering on Kiaochow Bay, and demanded the sole right to construct railways and open up mines in the Province of Shantung. Russia countered this by "leasing" Port Arthur for twenty-five years; and France, not to be behindhand, "leased" Kwang-chow-wan as a naval station. The French flag was hoisted in April, 1898, though the lease was not ratified till 1900, the excuse then being reparation for the murder of two French Naval officers in 1898. Next, Russia, taking advantage of the political isolation of Great Britain, arranged with China for the complete cession to her of Port Arthur. As a result of this, and in order to maintain a semblance of a balance of power in the Gulf of Pe-chi-li (the sea front of Peking) Great Britain "leased" Wei-hai-wei for so long as Russia should hold Port Arthur. In addition, as a set off against the French acquisition, she obtained a lease for ninety-nine years of the whole of the peninsula of Kowloon and of the adjoining waters at Hong Kong.

Our having Wei-hai-wei was as much an advantage to China as to Great Britain.

The Chinese were very bitter indeed against the Russians when they took Port Arthur, which was not to be wondered at. When Sir Claude Macdonald at the Tsung-li-Yamen asked for Wei-hai-wei, Li-Hung-Chang turned to him and said: "You are as bad as the rest."

Sir Claude replied: "No. The case is this: you have given one of two men who stand opposite each other a gun. Now you must give a gun to the other. Directly Russia gives up Port Arthur we will evacuate Wei-hai-wei. We can't go so far as to go to war with Russia on your account, but giving us Wei-hai-wei will neutralize her action, which is the next best thing."

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Whereupon the Chinese consented to Sir Claude's proposal.

Then came a scramble for concessions in the different areas, in which Russia, Germany, France and Belgium all joined. Italy came along a little late and asked for Senmen Bay. Regarding this, the other nations, except Japan, were apathetic. Japan, however, urged that the territory suggested could not be ceded to Italy owing to previous treaties. Thereupon, to placate Japan, Italy agreed not to use force. China immediately seized on this promise and organized resistance ; the project therefore fell through and Italy was left out in the cold.

It was into this seething cauldron of international intrigue that Sir E. Seymour and his Flag-Captain entered. All the great Powers, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United States and Austria, besides England, had squadrons or ships in the various Chinese ports to show their national flags, so that their senior officers might take part in disputes and conferences. For the moment matters seemed quiet as far as the poor beaten Chinese were concerned ; yet trouble was simmering below a peaceful surface, as events were to show two years later.

In 1898 China, although apparently quiescent, was beginning to wake up after her four thousand years of sleep ; but the awakening process after so long a rest was bound to be proportionately slow. The strip of land near the coast, which had experienced the full rigour of the war with Japan, was the first to feel the change ; the rest of that unwieldy country slept on.

Chinese scholars, after being educated in Europe, were returning saturated with the principles of socialism, and naturally in speeches and propaganda attacked the Manchu dynasty and the existing system of government. Like most reformers they were in a hurry ; and instead of singling out certain abuses and concentrating on them they attempted suddenly to change the whole system that had been in vogue for many centuries, with the result that there was much unrest and but little reform. They soon, however, converted a considerable number of the younger generation to their seductive gospel ; so that the ardour of a new patriotism was awakened. This naturally showed itself in resentment against the foreigners, who had created the treaty-ports and extorted concessions that were felt to be derogatory to the dignity of a Great Power. Then, while this feeling was simmering, came the general scramble of the European powers for Chinese territory, which has been outlined above. This greatly augmented the discontent of

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the patriots and, indeed, of all the educated classes in China, who foresaw in it the first stage of the disintegration of their native land. In this fertile soil of discontent were sown the seeds of the Boxer trouble, which two years later was to cause so much misery and loss of life. But, for the present, discontent was merely simmering, though at the same time growing in intensity.

The first trip made by the squadron under the new Commander-in-Chief was to Chifu, a good harbour at the entrance of the Gulf of Pe-chi-li. On the shore of this gulf lay Taku, marking the entrance to the Pei-ho River—the waterway to Tientsin and Peking. The visit was partly because of our strained relations with Russia—which relations remained strained for some months—and partly owing to the negotiations which were in progress for our occupying Wei-hai-wei. Here the flagship met Rear-Admiral C. C. Penrose Fitzgerald, the Second-in-Command, flying his flag in the *Barfleur*, the other ships present being the *Victorious*, *Undaunted*, *Narcissus*, *Grafton*, *Iphigenia* and *Pigmy*. Here, perhaps, it may be permitted with apologies, to recall an atrocious pun, or rather spoonerism, perpetrated on the name of the Second Flagship. She arrived on the station painted white, but with a very strong bluish tinge, and was promptly dubbed the Far-bluer instead of the Bar-fleur !

In May, 1898, the Fleet Athletic Sports were held, when Admiral Fitzgerald—commonly known as “Rough” Fitzgerald—won the veteran officers’ race, at the age of fifty-seven. Here, as in all ports where the squadron stayed for any length of time, the ships were periodically taken to sea for gunnery, torpedo, and tactical exercises.

Staying at Chifu at that time were Sir Claude Macdonald, the British Minister at Peking, Lady Macdonald, and Captain Jellicoe’s cousin, Emmie Scott, and her husband, Bishop Scott. Jellicoe took this opportunity of learning from Sir Claude a general résumé of the international relations of China with the European countries, and the details of the negotiations for the leasing of Wei-hai-wei. This information was very useful to him afterwards in his varied dealings with the senior officers of the foreign ships, and particularly at the time of the Boxer trouble.

On May 2, 1898, Wei-hai-wei was taken over from the Chinese by the Commander-in-Chief. It was not, nominally, taken over from the Japanese, who had been holding it since the war, in order to salve their *amour propre* ; so instead of yielding it to Great Britain, they returned it to China the day before its cession to us by the

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Chinese. Captain King-Hall of the *Narcissus* and Mr. Hopkins, British Consul at Chifu, proceeded there as the British Commissioners, and met the two Chinese Commissioners who had been appointed to carry out the transfer.

The following is Captain Jellicoe's description of his work at Wei-hai-wei, subsequent to it having been taken over.

"On May 25th we proceeded in the *Centurion* to Wei-hai-wei. Captain King-Hall had placed Lieutenant Ernest Gaunt of the *Narcissus*, afterwards Admiral Sir Ernest Gaunt, in charge of the Island of Liu Kungtao as Town Mayor, and had landed a marine guard on the mainland and a bluejacket guard on the island. I relieved the latter with marines from the *Centurion*. Later on Gaunt was appointed Administrator of Liu Kungtao and Commissioner of Wei-hai-wei. The early days of our occupation were very busy. I arranged to institute a wet canteen on the island, to survey the harbour and lay out buoys and erect beacons. Also to get the sanitary conditions on shore put right. They were especially bad on the mainland, where the Japanese troops had been in occupation.

The first English visitors, Colonel The O'Gorman (Chief Staff Officer at Hong Kong) and Mrs. O'Gorman, arrived from Chifu on May 28th in the destroyer *Fame*, which had been sent for them by the Commander-in-Chief.

I visited the Eastern Chinese forts on May 28th, and found them in good repair, but the gunpits had been destroyed by the Japanese and the guns and mountings removed.

On the 30th Prince Henry of Prussia arrived in his flagship the *Deutschland*, with the *Kaiserin Augusta*. The Commander-in-Chief and I showed him round the island. In conversation with Captain Müller (his Flag-Captain, afterwards Chief of the Kaiser's Naval Cabinet), he told me the Russians at Port Arthur were behaving very badly to the Chinese. The German officers were all very bitter against the Russians."

Among other multifarious duties Captain Jellicoe had to make contracts with the Chinese for placing in order and repairing some of the buildings on the island, for use as a canteen for the men, a pavilion for the recreation ground, an officers' club, a residence for the Town Warden, a hospital, etc., and on the mainland, barracks for the marine guard.

Early in June there was considerable difficulty in preventing Chinese bandits from looting the outlying camps on the mainland. Chinese soldiers had been quartered in them to protect them prior to demolition, but this they entirely failed to do. At one time some

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2,000 bandits attacked one of the outer camps and pulled down the houses, in the process of which, however, several of their own men were killed and injured. The Chinese soldiers, instead of interfering, actually helped the thieves.

Finally, Captain Jellicoe occupied and protected what was left of the camps with men from the fleet, and to create an impression of strength landed a strong force of bluejackets in route-marching order.

During the stay of the fleet at Wei-hai-wei large parties were landed on the island, making a parade and recreation ground, repairing Queen's House (the official Headquarters on shore) and fitting out the canteen. Jellicoe did all he could to encourage boat-sailing, and weekly sailing races for all classes of boats were instituted. Although the work was considerable, time was found for cricket on the parade ground, which was played on a coconut-matting pitch. The ground encouraged heavy scoring, and Jellicoe recalls making his first century (120 in an hour) in a match on June 21; *Centurion* and *Handy* v. *Victorious* and *Narcissus*.

It is curious that so keen a cricketer should have scored his one and only century on June 21, which was the eve of his unlucky day; which day, we shall see later, he came to look on with almost superstitious dislike. This appears to have been the only redeeming incident in his life associated with that date.

As an architect he achieved only moderate success, for he thus describes an unfortunate oversight:

“In July I made a contract with a Chinese builder to erect new stone barracks on the mainland for our guards, in readiness for the winter, the existing quarters being so thinly built as to be very cold. The designs were got out under my supervision, and I made one bad mistake, the contractor arranging for the front doors to open *outwards*, an error which I failed to notice and which was the cause of a good deal of chaff when the barracks were completed!

In August the squadron visited Japan, going to Kobe, Yokohama, and Nagasaki. From Kobe I visited Kyoto, and from Yokohama went to Kowakidana, to an hotel some 700 feet above Myanoshita, where the hotel was full; here I spent four days in company with some of the officers from the *Centurion*. It was delightfully cool after Yokohama, and we went for many interesting walks to Hakona, Kiga, and other places. I found life in a somewhat primitive Japanese hotel very pleasant and was greatly struck by the politeness and delicacy in manner of the Japanese fair sex.

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We returned to Wei-hai-wei at the end of August, carrying out practices en route. It had been the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to visit Port Hamilton, but a telegram from the Admiralty indicated that our presence in Chinese waters was needed."

On August 31 sailing races took place, Captain Jellicoe, sailing his gig, coming in second for the Admiral's Cup, and fourth in the race for the Rear-Admiral's Cup.

"In September we visited Chifu, and then went on to Pei-ta-ho, which was then a summer resort for Europeans from Peking. From there we went to Shan-hai-Kwan which is the *sea* end of the Great Wall of China. It was an interesting place to visit. There are many powerful Chinese forts there, which later on at the time of the Boxer trouble we found it necessary to occupy.

From Shan-hai-Kwan we went to Newchwang, leaving the ship at an outer anchorage and going into the harbour in a destroyer. Newchwang itself was a deadly looking place ; some 60 English families were then resident there.

Returning to Wei-hai-wei we found a telegram from Sir Claude Macdonald telling the Commander-in-Chief that he was most anxious to meet him at Taku at once with ships. We raised steam in two hours and sailed for Taku. As we passed Chifu at 10 miles distance we signalled by mast-head flashing lamp to the senior officer, ordering *Victorious*, *Narcissus*, *Hermione* and *Fame* to proceed to join us at Taku as soon as possible.

On arrival at Taku, I accompanied the Commander-in-Chief to Tong-Ku in the *Fame* to meet Sir Claude Macdonald, but found he had left for Tientsin in the morning. Later the Commander-in-Chief received a telegram from him to say that all was quiet ; so we left for Wei-hai-wei with the squadron."

The scare had been due to a revolution in the Palace. The Empress, fearing the radical views of the Emperor and his advisers, deposed him and took over the reins of Government.

But hardly had the excitement subsided before another came along. At the end of October, 1898, Captain Marchand hoisted the French flag in territory claimed by us as belonging to the Sudan, and therefore under our protection. General Sir H. Kitchener met him and requested him to lower it, which was done under protest. For a time matters looked extremely grave and war seemed imminent. On October 29, the Commander-in-Chief received a telegram from the Admiralty saying that the position was critical and that in all probability Russia would side with France if war broke out. Captain Jellicoe strongly advised the

Commander-in-Chief to concentrate all the British ships at Hong Kong, as it was only by so doing that a fleet could be assembled which would be superior (but even so, only slightly superior) to the combined French and Russian squadrons. The counter-objection raised was that Wei-hai-wei would be taken by the enemy. This however was a very inconsiderable matter compared with that of beating the Allied fleet. When this had been done, Wei-hai-wei could be retaken, whereas if the British Fleet in Chinese waters were beaten piecemeal, then Wei-hai-wei and our other possessions would be lost to us for the duration of the war.

Another point that indicated the southern waters as those best suited for concentration was that the chief portion of our trade was in the south, and it was vital to protect this as much as possible, so as to prevent our sea trade falling into the clutches of some neutral country. Of course, by relinquishing Wei-hai-wei our prestige might temporarily suffer, but this would again rise and be considerably enhanced after a sea victory. So to Hong Kong went all the ships. About mid-November the crisis passed and the ships returned to their normal routine, and the *Centurion* went back to Wei-hai-wei.

The danger of departing from the proper strategic use of a fleet in order to safeguard, or to try to safeguard, territory has always been present in past wars. The function of a fleet is to beat the enemy's fleet and to pay only secondary attention to islands or other possessions. Of course, in the Fashoda crisis the determination of the war lay with the major fleet, thousands of miles away. It was for the China Squadron to defeat the local allied French and Russian Fleets if possible, and so protect our trade. The same danger, that of diverting the fleet from its proper functions, would have faced us in the Great War had we held Heligoland. In fact, Wei-hai-wei and Heligoland form a most instructive parallel.

During the stay some two hundred marines arrived from England to relieve the men of the squadron who had been landed as guards on the mainland and island, and they found comfortable quarters in the barracks that had been prepared for them.

The ships were as usual kept pretty busy with drills afloat, while the landing parties were frequently exercised in attacking positions on the island of Liu-Kung-tao ; every Saturday there were sailing races. The ships also made frequent trips to sea for gunnery and torpedo exercises.

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Captain Jellicoe's time as Commander had taught him not only the great value of inter-ship drill competitions, but the desirability of supplementing these with recreations. It is true that work keeps the devil away, but the distance that he is kept away is largely increased by recreations. Undoubtedly it was the beneficial effect that well-organized games had on the men and on the discipline of the ships at Wei-hai-wei that made Lord Jellicoe so insistent on organizing recreation for the officers and men of the Grand Fleet during the Great War. Constant inter-ship cricket matches were got up for both officers and men, a little shooting also was arranged on the mainland for the former, while the canteen being then in full swing added greatly to the enjoyment of the latter; an officers' club was started, where the extraordinary aptitude of midshipmen for the consumption of innumerable eggs at tea was soon brought home to the caterer. The ships, however, frequently had to go to sea for gunnery and other exercises.

"Towards the end of November," Jellicoe wrote, "the Commander-in-Chief shifted over to the *Alacrity*, and left for Shanghai, and I took the *Centurion* on a cruise during which we visited Port Hamilton where prize firing was carried out at a rock on which a target was white-washed. This was the usual place at that time for this practice. After Port Hamilton we visited Nagasaki, where I was very glad to meet Cecil Colville who arrived in the *Barfleur* with the Rear-Admiral. I spent three days on shore with Colville, visiting various places on our bicycles, or hiring ponies to see places which were inaccessible to bicycles. We went to Moji, Obama and Unsen. At Obama we were interested to see mixed bathing, the two sexes in one mineral bath, the only bath in which mixed bathing was then permitted in Japan. On return to Nagasaki we saw a very good geisha dance. On leaving Nagasaki I took the ship to Hong Kong. Prince Henry of Prussia was there in his flagship and the Commander-in-Chief arrived in the *Alacrity* and rejoined the *Centurion* two days after our arrival. Whilst at Hong Kong I saw a good deal of Prince Henry, principally at the house of Colonel The O'Gorman, then Chief Staff officer, with whom the Prince was very friendly. Princess Henry was also at Hong Kong during this visit, and a very pleasant dance was given by them on board the *Deutschland* at the end of December."

It is difficult for anyone who has never seen the decks when the men's messes are decorated for Christmas day to imagine the scene

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when a popular Admiral or Captain walks round to inspect the men's efforts and to wish each mess a Merry Christmas. In a ship like the *Centurion*, where the decks were less subdivided than now, the scene was even more effective—coloured paper, streamers, chains and garlands galore, a load of good cheer on each mess table and paper notices of good will and good wishes to the Captain and officers, bore witness to the festive occasion. Even a competition between the wits of the ship's company shown by such quaint conceits as a loaf on a bayonet, with the superscription "The staff of life upon the point of death," was not lacking. The procession was invariably headed by the band playing "The Roast Beef of Old England." A mess deck feebly decorated, when decorations were available, was a sure indication of poor discipline and ill feeling on board. The *Centurion*, naturally, was not one of such unhappy ships.

Of this occasion Jellicoe writes : "Christmas Day, 1898, passed off very quietly. The Commander-in-Chief and I went round the mess decks, which were beautifully decorated ; and many placards were hung about expressing good wishes. On New Year's Eve, Lord Charles Beresford (who was out in China on a mission) Dr. Morrison, *The Times* Correspondent, and others, dined with the Commander-in-Chief to see the New Year, 1899, in, for which the ships of the German Squadron had illuminations, rocket-firing and much cheering and singing."

One midshipman records in his diary that at Hong Kong the Admiral and the Captain gave ten of the midshipmen tickets for the theatre. He also remarked "Captain Jellicoe seems to please everybody because he is so polite, even to a humble midshipman."

"On January 10th, 1899, I attended a picnic party given by Commodore and Mrs. Holland on Stonecutters Island, where one of our rifle ranges was situated. Prince and Princess Henry were there, and the Prince challenged me to a shoot on the range. He wished to shoot standing at 200 yards and sitting at 300 yards range. At the former range I beat him with a score of 50 out of a possible 60, to his score of 36. At 300 yards we tied with 35 each.

At Hong Kong we gave a ball on board the *Centurion* which was a great success, although at one time difficulty was threatened on the question of precedence between His Royal Highness and the Governor. Captain Müller (Flag-Captain to His Royal Highness), came off to see me in the afternoon on the subject, and a compromise was arrived at.

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Before leaving Hong Kong I visited Macao for two days and ate frog for the first time in my life. I went also to Canton with Sir Edward Seymour in the *Alacrity* and we spent three very interesting days there. A curious sight was the lining of the streets by Chinese soldiers in readiness for the Commander-in-Chief's visit to the Viceroy of Canton. They did not look in the least like soldiers, and I counted at least four different patterns of rifles. During a visit to the City of the Dead, where the wealthy citizens send the coffins with their dead to wait for a period, varying from months to years before burial, I saw the coffin of the second wife of the Viceroy which had been there for six years. The lady had died ten years before my visit, but the operation of lacquering the coffin at Foochow had occupied three years. The lacquer was very beautiful and was stated to be two inches thick.

On the way back to Hong Kong I visited the forts on Dane's Island and the Naval School, where I met a gunnery instructor who had been in the *Monarch* with me in 1885 as a seaman gunner. The school, which contained 70 boys, was in great want of repair. I visited also the Bogue Forts, lower down the river. These contained 24 and 21 cm. modern Krupp guns. The guns were well kept, but the crews were very slow at their drill.

Before we left Hong Kong there was a ball at Government House for Prince and Princess Henry and also one given by the German Community."

Anent this period an observant young rascal of a midshipman notes in his diary that "Captain Jellicoe has lately taken to bicycle rides with a select few of the fair sex, who afterwards come off to supper in his cabin."

Jellicoe continues :

"On leaving Hong Kong on January 16th, we proceeded to Manila and met there the U.S.S. *Olympia* with Admiral Dewey on board, in command of the U.S. Squadron, of which there were 5 ships present, also some captured and converted Spanish gunboats. At this time there was very considerable trouble between the Americans and Filipinos, and civil war was imminent.

The Americans held a line some 15 miles long round the town of Manila. After official visits had been exchanged, the U.S. Flag-Captain Lamberton took me to see the wrecks of the Spanish men-of-war.

From conversation with leading English residents and U.S. officers, I gathered that the Spanish Naval Forces were in no sense ready to meet the U.S. ships in action, when they arrived at Manila. The shooting on both sides was poor, worst of course in the

Spanish ships. The American ships ran short of ammunition also. Admiral Dewey stated this.

In order to see the state of the country, Sir Edward Seymour, accompanied by the British Consul, the Manager of the Railway, myself and staff, left Manila by train two days after our arrival, and went to San Fernando, stopping at various places en route. The dislike of the Filipinos for the Americans was indicated very clearly at Calurnpit, where we visited the market. Some 7,000 people were present, and taking us for Americans shouted at intervals 'Americanos Male.' On discovering that we were British the cry changed to 'Inglese Bono.' We saw many Filipino soldiers of all ages from 14 upwards.

During the return journey we stopped at Malalos, the headquarters of Aguinaldo the Filipino leader, and had an interview with him. The Commander-in-Chief impressed upon him the hopelessness of fighting the United States, and how little there was to gain by fighting and how much by a peaceful solution. Aguinaldo replied that he quite agreed. Sir Edward then said that he had come in a private capacity to see the country and was much impressed by the order that prevailed at the places we had visited. Aguinaldo replied that he wanted everyone to see that they were quite capable of self-government and that he hoped the Commander-in-Chief would use his influence with Admiral Dewey to get a peaceful solution. The interview terminated with compliments on both sides.

The *Centurion* was at Manila for four days and our relations with the U.S. ships were of a very friendly nature. The *Centurion* returned to Hong Kong and remained there until the end of March, when we left for Nagasaki; the Commander-in-Chief having previously gone to Formosa in the *Alacrity*.

From Nagasaki we went to Port Hamilton for prize firing and torpedo work, and thence to Wei-hai-wei, arriving there on April 19th, when the Commander-in-Chief rejoined the *Centurion*.

A Chinese Battalion, officered by British officers, had been started in a camp on the mainland and this regiment eventually reached full strength, and, as is so generally the case when under British leadership, proved to be very smart and efficient and fought well later on at Tientsin during the Boxer rising.

Matters of interest during this visit to Wei-hai-wei, included the institution of a rifle range on the island and the landing of distilling apparatus and boilers for the provision of fresh water for Liu Kungtao Island. These were sent out from England and hoisted out of the ship by our derrick in the *Centurion* and erected on shore. The boilers weighed over 21 tons each.

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In June I won the squadron lawn tennis tournament. In June also a cricket XI from Shanghai visited Wei-hai-wei to play the squadron. I was pressed to captain the Squadron XI but refused, as I felt I should be too busy. I played, however, in the tennis match against Shanghai. The squadron won both cricket and tennis matches. A cricket match between the *Victorious* and *Barfleur* in June showed the rate at which runs could be made on the parade ground and our matting wicket. 600 runs were scored in just over four hours, the *Barfleur's* XI putting up 300 for 2 wickets in 2 hours, of which my brother Edmund¹ made 84 not out.

The squadron left for Port Hamilton on June 20th, and on the 21st the weather became thick. We had to pass several islands during the night and none of them with any lighthouses. At dinner the Commander-in-Chief said that Bishop Corfe of Corea had asked him to get up a subscription in the squadron for the Corean Mission. I remarked that I would sooner subscribe to lighthouses on one of the islands !”

This remark was to gain much in point by the occurrences later on that night.

The weather thickened, and as a precautionary measure, on Captain Jellicoe's advice, a destroyer was stationed away on each bow so as to give timely warning of any danger, and the ships of the squadron were formed into line ahead as being the most flexible formation for navigating purposes.

At 2.15 a.m. the destroyer *Fame*, away on the port bow of the *Centurion*, signalled land in sight of her port bow. Course was, therefore, altered three points, from east to south-east by east. Captain Jellicoe then himself sighted the land faintly on the port bow, so altered another two points to south-east by south. Soon afterwards the *Whiting*, on the starboard bow, reported land ahead of her, and immediately afterwards land on her starboard bow. From these reports there was no doubt that the squadron was steaming straight on to the shore. At once Captain Jellicoe asked the Admiral for permission to alter course 16 points. So the squadron turned round and threaded its way back over the same water that it had previously traversed. The ships had had a very lucky escape for, in the morning, it was found that the squadron had met with a northerly set which had put them ten miles ahead of their reckoning, for the sailing directions (i.e. the book which contains detailed information of tides, currents, leading marks, etc.)

¹ This refers to Lieutenant Edmund H. Jellicoe, R.N. He died early in 1905 when in command of the Destroyer *Whiting* on the China Station.

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stated that the current, if any, was always in a southerly direction. Such a seamanlike precaution as that adopted in stationing the destroyers as vedettes helps a man to the top of the tree, whereas less careful men are apt to come to grief. Imagine the difference to the country if those destroyers had not been sent ahead to scout, and Jellicoe had shared with the Commander-in-Chief the blame for putting half the China Squadron ashore !

He continues :

“ As this affair occurred on June 22nd the day on which, in 1893, H.M.S. *Victoria* was sunk in collision with the *Camperdown*, I began to look upon that day in the year as an unlucky one for me. Later, during the Boxer trouble in 1900, I was wounded at Peitsang on June 21st, and this rather confirmed my idea of this particular period in June as being unlucky. For this reason I was not very anxious to take the Grand Fleet to sea about June 22nd during the War unless some real necessity arose for so doing. Such is superstition ! !

Nothing further occurred during our trip to Port Arthur. After a few days there the fleet visited various anchorages in Korea, experiencing a great deal of fog whilst on passage. Whilst entering Korniloff Bay the *Bonaventure* (Captain R. A. J. Montgomerie), which ship had been ordered to go in separately, struck some uncharted rocks 6 cables outside the 5-fathom line, being at the time 2 cables on our starboard beam.

The fleet was anchored at once, hoisted out boats and sent anchors to be laid out ahead and astern and on bows and quarters. A somewhat heavy swell was running. I went aboard the *Bonaventure* at once to render assistance and remained on board for 36 hours. Cecil Colville came too, and we relieved each other, helping Montgomerie over the salvage operations. The *Bonaventure* was on shore for 4 days and eventually towed off after we had ‘ tipped ’ her by placing as much weight aft as possible so as to get her stern down and bow up.

After this experience we carried out a survey of Korniloff Bay and found a great many uncharted rocks. It seems extraordinary that no accident had occurred before.

From Korniloff Bay the *Centurion* went to Vladivostock, where we found the Russian Squadron assembled, with Admiral Dubasoff the Commander-in-Chief’s flag in the *Rossia*. Vladivostock seemed to be a queerly neglected place. There were some very fine houses there and some terribly tumbledown old places. A good deal of building was going on, but the roads were quite impossible and municipal affairs generally appeared to be neglected. The dock-

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yard was poor but with a good dock ; the Naval Barracks were good. We were treated very civilly by the Russian Navy and by the Governor. We left after a stay of three days, and rejoined the fleet, which was then sent in detachments to visit various Russian ports. We in the *Centurion* went first to St. Vladimir Bay, then to Barracouta Bay where we had some very fine fishing. In the five days that I was there I caught 186 lb. weight of salmon and sea-trout, my heaviest fish being a 33-lb. salmon, which I played for one hour. I was fishing with a 13-foot rod and using mostly spoon bait. Other officers were equally successful in their catch and altogether we landed a great weight of fish. The men (seining) also did very well and everyone in the ship thoroughly enjoyed the time at Barracouta Bay. Our total catch was 1,072 lb. with rod and 491 lb. with seine.

On leaving Barracouta Bay on August 1st, 1899, we picked up the squadron at a rendezvous and proceeded to Hakodate in Japan, where we found the German cruiser *Kaiserin Augusta* with an old friend of mine, Captain Gulich, in command, with whom I foregathered.

We visited various Japanese ports on our way to Yokohama with the squadron where we arrived on August 31st, 1899. At most of the ports which we visited I went ashore with Colville to visit places of interest, the most beautiful of all Japanese harbours being, I think, that in the Matsushima Archipelago, where there are some 800 odd islands. Colville and I went there from our ships in the destroyer *Whiting*.

Soon after our arrival at Yokohama the *Powerful* left for England to pay off, much to our sorrow. From the Captain (Hedworth Lambton)¹ down, the officers were an exceedingly nice lot and we parted from her with great regret.

On September 4, Sir Edward Seymour and staff, Sir E. Satow (our Minister), Colville and I were received in audience by the Mikado at the Palace. The proceedings were very formal and included much bowing and backing to leave the chamber at the end of the audience. The Mikado was supported on each side by officials.

We were shown round the palace after the audience, and saw some most beautiful bronzes and tapestry.

After leaving the palace, Colville and I shifted into plain clothes and went to Myanoshita from which place we visited various villages in the neighbourhood, finally arriving at Atami on September 7th where we spent the night, returning to Yokohama on the 8th via

¹ Hedworth Lambton had been Flag-Lieut. when Jellicoe was Signal Mate in the *Alexandra*. Afterwards Admiral of the Fleet the Hon. Sir H. Meux, G.C.B.

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Odawara, to find a typhoon threatening. We got on board our ships just in time and spent a somewhat anxious night. We left for Kobe on September 15th with Sir Ernest Satow on board. During our stay at Kobe I visited Kyoto with the Rear-Admiral and Colville and saw many things of great interest there.

Shortly after leaving Kobe at 10 a.m. on September 21st for Wei-hai-wei the weather became very threatening and by 10 p.m. the wind was blowing with a force of 9 to 11 from the eastward with very thick weather. As we got clear of the land the sea became very heavy and we battened down fore and aft. (The word was passed that anyone who fell overboard would not be picked up.) I spent the night on the bridge and was wet to the skin. In the morning, being not too sure of our position, I tried to sound with deep-sea lead, but the ship was pitching so heavily that the men attending were nearly washed overboard from the fore shelter deck. The wind and sea moderated during the afternoon of the 22nd and we arrived at Wei-hai-wei on the 26th, finding the *Alacrity* there with the Commander-in-Chief on board. He had left the *Centurion* to go through the Inland Sea with Sir E. Satow in the *Alacrity*.

On September 29th I left Wei-hai-wei in the *Alacrity* with Mr. Bax Ironside, our chargé d'affaires in Peking, who had invited me to stay with him there. I spent three very interesting days in Peking, visiting all places of interest in the city and seeing something of Bishop Scott (of the China missions) and my cousin, Emmie Scott, his wife, who had a very nice little house outside the Legation quarter. The Observatory with its various instruments perhaps interested me more than anything else I saw in Peking, except the Temple of Confucius. The large bell over 20 feet high in the Bell Temple was also a wonderful sight.

I returned to Chifu by steamer from Tongku after spending a night *en route* at Tientsin, and found the destroyer *Whiting* waiting to take me to Wei-hai-wei, where I arrived on October 6th. During my absence Colonel Dorward had arrived and taken over as Commissioner from Gaunt, whose term of service as such had been very successful.

On October 9th a Naval Brigade of 500 seamen and 150 marines was landed to carry out manoeuvres against the Chinese Regiment (300 strong) and shore marines (80 strong). This was the first occasion of our working in co-operation, or rather against, the Chinese Regiment and was of interest mainly for that reason. I took charge of the landing party as Brigadier (mounted for the occasion).

On October 11th I left Wei-hai-wei in the *Centurion*, called at Chifu to coal, stayed there two days and then sailed for Douglas

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Inlet¹ in Korea. Arriving there after a very bad passage (first misty weather and then a gale of wind), I anchored the ship near the entrance, and for the next couple of days carried out gunnery and torpedo practices, then moved up-harbour for an anchorage, finding there a Russian man-of-war. We got some duck and snipe shooting in a marsh at the head of the harbour, when I, in company with three officers, camped out for the morning and evening flights of the duck. We were not very successful, our best day only giving us seven couple of snipe, three couple of quail and eighteen duck. We also got some fair pheasant shooting on the hills surrounding the harbour, and on one day I landed 21 guns (including most of the midshipmen) and 20 beaters for this purpose. I felt pretty anxious until it was over, as some of the shooting was very wild, but no accident occurred, nor was there much result, the total bag being only 18 head!! However, the youngsters enjoyed the day's outing. On our best pheasant day we got 9 brace of pheasant with a few quail and rabbits.

On one evening I dined with the Governor in a small hut, eight Russian officers being also present. It was a curious function, consisting first of some dancing by Corean girls, and then a stand-up meal of cold meat (I was told it was dog so did not partake), hard-boiled eggs, raw chestnuts and some chicken, with champagne and Kirin beer to drink. I was glad to get back to the ship.

After a very delightful stay of seven days in Douglas Inlet in the most perfect weather, we left for Nagasaki, arriving there on October 30th, and leaving for Amoy four days later. On arrival there I found the German Rear-Admiral Fritze in the *Hansa*. I went round the ship and was impressed by her look of cleanliness and efficiency. An afternoon dance was given on board the *Hansa* during our visit and I met the Japanese Consul's wife in her national dress, the first Japanese lady I had met at any entertainment. She looked very attractive.

Sir E. Seymour arrived in the *Alacrity* on November 10th and we left immediately for Hong Kong, as he was anxious to see Sir Claude Macdonald, our Minister at Peking, who was staying with the Governor. Prince Henry of Prussia was at Hong Kong in his flagship the *Deutschland*, and three Italian and one French man-of-war were present.

On November 18th the Navy played Hong Kong at cricket, and after an exciting finish were beaten by 217 runs to 193, my contribution being 19 not out.

After a short stay at Hong Kong we left towards the end of

¹ Famous as the anchorage from which, in 1905, Admiral Togo emerged to annihilate the Russian Baltic Fleet commanded by Admiral Rojestvensky.

November for a visit to Bangkok. On passing the *Deutschland* at 6 a.m. (daylight) the band of that ship played 'Rule Britannia,' a somewhat early, but nevertheless a graceful compliment. During the passage down I read Butler's life of Sir George Colley with much interest and recorded the impressions made upon me, viz., that Sir George was a very fine character and that the causes of our defeat at Laing's Nek and Majuba Hill were (a) bad shooting, (b) panic produced by the accuracy of the Boer shooting, (c) at Majuba the outlying Kopje held on the north face was badly run and that the Boers advancing up the slope of this hill were not hit at all, (d) the position, though apparently very strong, had so much dead ground down the north and north-east slopes, that the Boers could get to within 100 feet of the top with but little exposure.

On arrival off the bar of the Bangkok River, we found the *Linnet* gunboat there. We went up the river in her and on arrival off the British Legation I went to stay at the house of Admiral Richelieu¹ near the palace enclosure, a very comfortable place, the only trouble being the plague of insects of every sort at night as soon as lights were shining.

During our four days stay we had an audience with the King, who was exceedingly pleasant. We were subsequently shown round the palace, which was full of very interesting things, including the Green Buddha made of jade stone. On our last evening we dined with the King, all the royal princes being present. The waiting was done by young members of the nobility. We were informed that this was the usual custom. Certainly the waiting was well done, so they had evidently had lots of practice at it. The King drank wine with Sir E. Seymour, the Minister and myself, which I was told was a very great honour.

We dined also on one evening, my birthday December 5th, on board the Royal Yacht as guests of the Siamese Navy. An excellent dinner, the only trouble being caused by the flying insects. To avoid their getting into one's drinks we had to cover our glasses. A very fine exhibition of dancing was given after dinner by Siamese girls in really gorgeous dresses. By far the best dancing I saw in the East. Mr. Rivett Carnac, the Financial Adviser to the Siamese Government, attended most of the entertainments given to us. I was interested to find out that his mother was a Miss Jellicoe, a cousin of mine.

During our visit we were taken up the river one day to breakfast at Ayuthia at the house of Prince Damrong, and in the afternoon proceeded up-river to the King's Elephant Kraal. On arrival we rode on elephants to the house from which the King watches the

¹ A Danish subject who had become Commander-in-Chief of the Siamese Navy.

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annual drive of wild elephants into the Kraal. There is a narrow entrance through which the wild elephants are forced by tame elephants, a most interesting sight. After leaving the Kraal we went down-river by steam launch to the King's new river palace, a lovely place on European lines, where we had lunch.

The banks of the river were absolutely lined with house boats of every description in which the people live.

During our stay I was much impressed by the intelligence and knowledge of the higher-class Siamese. Prince Damrong, for instance, discussed every conceivable question with me, from Belleville boilers to Whitehead torpedoes, and he had real knowledge of all subjects. Official work was done largely at night. Admiral Richelieu told me that very often work went on till quite late in the morning up to 7 a.m.

The coolie work in Bangkok is done almost entirely by Chinese. All rickshaw men were Chinese, the Siamese considering such work as derogatory to their dignity.

The King had, we were told, some 60 children, and there were some 5,000 women and children in the Royal City.

We left Bangkok by train, joining the *Linnet* down-river and being taken in her to the *Centurion* outside the bar. We then left for Singapore, where we found H.M.S. *Hermione* and the U.S. ships *Brooklyn* and *New Orleans*.

We stayed at Singapore for eight days. I bicycled on the island one forenoon with Goodenough, on a visit to Johore, where we stayed for the day at the Johore rest-house, a place built by the Sultan. I visited also Pulo Brani Island with the Commander-in-Chief and the General, and inspected the forts, which were much stronger than those at Hong Kong.

From Singapore we went in the *Centurion* to Sarawak, taking with us Mr. Keyser our Consul at Brunei. We anchored outside the bar and the Commander-in-Chief went in the *Alacrity* to Sarawak, whilst I took the *Centurion* to Labuan, where I stayed with Keyser at Government House, and entertained Labuan society on board. Whilst at Labuan, I went with the Commander-in-Chief, who had rejoined, to Brunei in the *Alacrity*, where we had an interview with the Sultan, who was attended by all his chiefs. The object of this visit was to try and induce the Sultan (aged eighty) to improve his method of ruling, which was very bad, but we did not succeed in getting any satisfaction from him.

From Labuan I took the *Centurion* to Manila, the Commander-in-Chief going in the *Alacrity* to Sandakan. I spent an interesting few days at Manila and returned to Hong Kong early in the New Year 1900.

1897 TO 1900—CHINA UP TO THE BOXER EXPEDITION

We remained at Hong Kong until the beginning of April, a longer stay than usual, but it was usefully employed in putting the ship's company through a musketry course, and a good deal of exercise in landing operations was carried out on the mainland. In view of the work that lay before us in the Boxer trouble, the time spent at Hong Kong came in usefully later in the year.

In April we left for a visit to Nagasaki and Yokohama, and reached Wei-hai-wei early in May. After a short stay there I took the *Centurion* out for prize firing, and after coaling at Chifu and picking up the Commander-in-Chief, who had been to Peking, we went back to Wei-hai-wei.

Towards the end of May the position in North China became serious. Attacks on the missionaries became frequent and general unrest due to the reactionary influence prevailed.

Matters went from bad to worse, until on May 28th Sir Claude Macdonald telegraphed to Sir E. Seymour asking for a guard to be provided for the Legations at Peking, and on the 31st the Commander-in-Chief, not liking the turn of events, took all the ships to Taku so as to be prepared for any eventuality."

CHAPTER VII

1900

Boxer Campaign—Part I

It was most providential that we were able to fight our way back. We got within 25 miles of Peking. We had to give up there, and there is no doubt that if we had delayed a few hours before we turned back we should never have got through.

Letter from Captain Jellicoe to his mother.

IT is little to be wondered at that the wholesale pillaging of the territory of a great Power within the space of six months, from November, 1897, to May, 1898, should have caused a feeling of deep resentment and humiliation among the patriotic Chinese, who saw their Empire gradually crumbling before the rapacity of the European Powers. Since, as a nation, China was too weak to organize open opposition, the Chinese patriots had to resort to the augmentation of the power of secret societies, with the intention of carrying on a guerrilla warfare against foreigners and expelling them from the country. Rumours were started and widely spread to the effect that all misfortunes, droughts, floods, epidemics, etc., were due to the anger of the gods because foreigners had been allowed in the country, and it was soon universally believed that the invasion of the land by foreign trains and machinery had caused the spirits to deprive thousands of coolies of work and to create widespread unemployment. Moreover, the educated Chinaman hated the Christian religion, which he looked on as opposed to ancestor worship; and his religious conservatism very naturally rebelled against the graves of his ancestors being levelled to form a bed for the wooden sleepers of the railways, and objected to snorting iron horses being allowed to race over and disturb their hitherto peaceful remains; for the promiscuous scattering of graves over the plain of China made it impossible to avoid the desecration of many during railway construction.

While this unrest was simmering a great counter-project of reform was initiated by Kang-yu-wei, the chief adviser in this

matter to the Emperor. But the innovations were too sweeping. Reforms are bound to hit hard all those who profit by the system that needs reform. In China, the whole system of government from top to bottom was corrupt and antiquated. The result was that the majority of the upper classes, feeling that they would be injured by the proposed reforms, became dissatisfied. The Manchu dynasty lost prestige and the Empress, in fear of its being overthrown, and spurred on by her own hatred of reform of any sort, seized the reins of power and practically caused the Emperor to abdicate. The proposed reforms had added to the uneasiness of the upper classes ; but now the reactionary policy of the Empress caused an equal amount of dissatisfaction among the younger and middle classes, who had rejoiced in, and backed up, the reforms proposed by the socialists. Thus a feeling of general unrest was created throughout the whole length of the country and the secret societies began to flourish with renewed vigour. Each province had its own camarilla or camarillas. Among these were the Gun society, the Sword society, the Knife society, and, at Shantung, the Iochüan, or the "Fist of Patriotic Union." Ostensibly this society made gymnastics and boxing its chief aim ; its associates were therefore able to hide their revolutionary and bloodthirsty schemes under the sporting title of "Boxers." The original intention of this society was to oppose and overthrow the Manchu Government ; but the Empress, with Oriental cunning, diverted its purpose to that of expelling the foreigners from the country, with the result that the murder of "foreign devils," especially missionaries and their converts, became its chief business, and one that, *sub rosa*, received the support of the governors and other Manchus in authority. Thus the movement thrived ; the troops, generally speaking, had orders not to fire on the Boxers ; the people approved ; a reign of terror began. The crafty instigators spread the doctrine that in battle no true Boxer could be wounded or killed. This gave rise to a spirit of fanaticism. And so thoroughly was the doctrine believed that often a wounded Boxer would ask to be killed sooner than return home as a living proof that he was vulnerable and therefore wanting in patriotism. One notice issued to the Boxers read : "You are summoned to meet on the 7th day of the 9th moon. Cherish the dynasty, exterminate the foreigners. Whoever declines to obey this summons is in danger of his head." No wonder that an association with such a programme received the support of the Empress.

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In the middle of 1900 all the straws were pointing, even flying, in the same direction, and showed clearly that a vast attempt to root out all foreigners was on foot. Nevertheless, the Legations at Peking failed to notice the extreme gravity of the signs. Other people were more pessimistic. On May 16 the *North China Herald* published a letter from a high Chinese official, who had written to a friend warning him that there was a great scheme on foot to crush all foreigners ; that the Court was in its favour ; that the Manchu armies of Prince Ching (50,000), Prince Tuan (10,000), and Imperial Guard (12,000), together with the Boxers, were ready to act ; that all the upper classes of China knew of this ; that the Legations had had dust thrown in their eyes ; and that the Court was cunningly putting the revolutionary aspect of the Boxers in the forefront and denying all complicity, while all the time it was conniving with them and holding the Manchu troops ready to strike at the decisive moment.

Even in the face of this information the Legations took no action. Can it be wondered at, when the Legations were so deceived and so much in the dark, that the British Admiral, Sir Edward Seymour, should have been even more ignorant of what was going on behind the scenes ? In fact, the first information he had that affairs were likely to become at all serious was on May 28, 1900, when Sir Claude Macdonald telegraphed to him asking if a guard could be provided for the British Legation in case of attack. In answer, a body of marines was immediately despatched to Peking. On the 31st the Admiral received further telegrams showing that the position in Peking and the neighbourhood was becoming more and more serious. Sir Edward therefore decided to take all available ships to Taku, the nearest anchorage to Peking, in case of further assistance being required. The senior officers of the ships of other foreign navies had received similar warnings from their Legations ; so that an international squadron composed of British, French, German, Austrian, American, Italian and Japanese ships soon assembled outside the Taku Bar. At this anchorage the larger ships were forced to anchor about eight miles from the land, owing to the shallowness of the water. The vast mud bar across the entrance to the Pei-ho River prevented any vessels but those of small tonnage, drawing not more than 12 feet, getting near the land. In order to land from the ships and reach Tientsin it was necessary to steam for a couple of hours in a small vessel through the yellow muddy waters of the gulf of Pe-chi-li ; then to pass

the large forts at the entrance of the Pei-ho at Taku and near Tongku, and to steam up for some forty miles between the low, bare banks of the river—a long, and in case of hostility on the part of the Chinese, an extremely dangerous passage.

It devolved on Sir Edward Seymour, as the senior officer afloat, to take the lead in all naval matters in which China and the other nations were implicated ; although, of course, he had no semblance of authority over the senior officers of the other navies. Soon after his arrival, therefore, he called a conference on board the *Centurion*, at which the position was discussed. It was generally agreed that, should the situation suddenly develop and make action desirable, a naval force of all nationalities should be landed from the ships and be sent to Peking for the protection of the Legations and their compatriots. On June 5, so as to be prepared for the worst, Sir Edward Seymour sent Captain Jellicoe to Tientsin to ascertain the best route for a naval brigade to take in case of a march on the capital. Further, he was told to keep in touch with Sir Claude Macdonald during his stay, in order that the Admiral might be at once informed of any changes in the situation.

There were three possible routes to Peking : by rail, by river, or by road. Having conferred with Mr. Carles, the British Consul at Tientsin, and with the manager of the railway between Tongku and Peking, Captain Jellicoe came to the following conclusions : (1) The road route was quite impossible, since it was but a bad cart track. The time that would be taken, and the transport that would be required, put this method quite out of the question. (2) The river route would incur too great a delay, the water being shallow and the river winding. (3) The railway, accordingly, was the quickest and practically the only feasible route ; and this route he decided to recommend. He was further influenced and fortified in this decision by being informed by our Legation, as late as the afternoon of June 9 when, having completed his investigations, he left Tientsin for Tongku, that the railroad to Peking was intact. He arrived at Tongku on the evening of the 9th, and in order to obtain the latest information crossed over to a house on the right bank, where a telephone had been installed. Here he was told that he was urgently wanted on the telephone, and on getting into communication with Tientsin he was informed by Mr. Carles, the British Consul, that Sir Claude Macdonald had requested him to pass an urgent message through to Sir Edward Seymour to the effect that unless help was immediately sent to

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the Legations at Peking, it would arrive too late. This news came to Captain Jellicoe like a bolt from the blue, for early that same afternoon he had been informed from Peking that all was well. In order to understand why the telephone message was sent apparently so tardily, it is necessary to see what had been happening in Peking during the previous four days.

On Monday, June 4, at a meeting of the foreign representatives, it was decided that all those whose nations had fleets in Chinese waters should telegraph to their respective governments asking that, if Peking were cut off and, as seemed likely, the anti-foreign movement should get the upper hand, instructions should be given to the commanders of the united squadrons to take the necessary measures of relief.¹ This, it may be remarked, incidentally showed an unwarranted belief in the ability of the International Squadron to relieve the Peking legations. For the business of a navy lies on blue waters ; land operations, except local assistance at sea ports, are outside its province, owing to the fact that warships carry no transport equipment for distant shore operations. On the request being sent by Lord Salisbury, via the Admiralty, to Sir E. Seymour, the latter naturally replied that "in view of the gravity of the situation it was undesirable to distress ships for men," and suggested sending troops from Hong Kong, adding that the *Terrible* was available for transport.

On the same afternoon Sir Claude Macdonald called by appointment on the Chinese Ministers with the object of getting them to try and impress on their Government the gravity of the events at Yung Ching, where the Boxers had murdered two missionaries and destroyed the Church and Mission buildings. He found the attitude of the Ministers who were present at the interview indifferent and helpless ; in fact, one of the four present fell asleep while Sir Claude's protest was being interpreted to them. Sir Claude, therefore, ended the interview by leaving abruptly. At an interview the next day with Prince Ching, one of the Ministers present plainly declared that "the Chinese Government could not afford to disregard such an indication of the will of the people as was afforded by the unmistakable popularity of the Boxer movement. That the movement was in the first instance an expression of the deep-seated resentment caused by the proceedings of the native Christians and their Priests ; and although converts had suffered severely and Government property had been destroyed,

¹ China No. 4 (1900), Sir C. Macdonald to the Marquess of Salisbury.

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yet, since up to the present time the ordinary peaceful Chinese citizens had been in no way disturbed, the latter would regard it as unjust if the Boxers were punished indiscriminately for expressing the general feeling of the people." The same Minister, while discussing audibly with the Prince the growth of the Boxer feeling in the Imperial Troops, remarked that it would not be long before they were all Boxers. Apparently there was little doubt as to the direction in which the sympathies of the Ministers lay. Sir Claude Macdonald remarked in his despatch on Friday, June 8, that all hope of speedy restoration of railway communication was destroyed, for the news had been received that the Boxers had reached Yang Tsun, about 20 miles from Tientsin, and were burning the railway bridges there ; also that General Nieh's troops, who had been sent to protect the line, were retiring to their camp at Lu-tai beyond Tientsin. The Legation, therefore, knew on that day that the railway had been destroyed. Yet on the 9th Captain Jellicoe was informed by the Legation that it was intact. On this same day, on the 8th, a meeting of thirty American citizens had been held, at which they wrote and despatched the following telegram to President McKinley :

"Boxers destroy chapels, massacre hundreds Christians, threaten extermination of all foreigners, Tungchow abandoned, Paoting-fu, Tsunhwa, great danger, Chinese troops useless, attack Peking, Tientsin daily threatened, railways destroyed, telegraphs cut, Chinese Government paralysed. Imperial edicts double-faced favour Boxers. Universal peril. Unless situation promptly relieved thirty American citizens regard outlook practically hopeless."

It appears, therefore, that the foreign community was more alarmed than the Ministers at the Legations.

On Saturday, June 9, rioting occurred in Peking. The Boxers burned down the grand stand of the racecourse on the recreation ground, which place was largely used by foreigners, and roasted a native Christian in the ashes. A party of students attached to the British Legation were attacked and saved their lives only by firing on their assailants.

After a conversation with Lien Fang, a very level-headed Yamen emissary, Sir Claude was so impressed by the man's attitude towards the anti-foreign campaign that, without waiting to consult his colleagues, he determined to send a message to Sir Edward Seymour informing him that he considered the situation in Peking extremely

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grave, and that unless arrangements were made for an immediate advance of reinforcements on Peking they might come too late. But on informing his colleagues what he proposed to do, he found that the other Ministers took a more favourable view of the situation and it was decided not to telegraph to the admirals until the following day at 2 p.m. At 8 p.m. on the 9th, however, Sir Claude received reliable information that the Dowager Empress had openly expressed her desire to rid the capital of the presence of foreigners, and that Tungfu-Hsiang's troops were only waiting for the word to begin a general attack. He therefore telephoned to Mr. Carles the message that was passed on the same evening to Captain Jellicoe, at Tongku. On receipt of the telephone message, Captain Jellicoe took prompt action. He signalled by searchlight to Sir Edward Seymour :

“ Very serious news, submit landing party be prepared at once.”

He then interviewed the head of the Tug & Lighter Co., and arranged for all available tugs and lighters to be sent out to the fleet as soon as the tide served. He also sent Commander Granville to the Railway Company to tell them to have trains for 1,000 men ready by daylight. The Americans very kindly gave him the use of a steam launch that had just come ashore ; so, getting hold of a pilot, he left at 9 p.m., and passing the *Whiting*, ordered her and the *Fame* to raise steam immediately, and dropped the pilot on board the former. At eleven-thirty he arrived on board the *Centurion* and interviewed the Admiral, who ordered the British ships to prepare landing parties at once, and informed the senior naval officers of the other nations of the order he had given, intimating that he intended personally to accompany the landing party to Peking.

Captain Jellicoe was busy sending out necessary supplementary orders and had little time to make any arrangements on his own account ; for at 1 a.m. the landing party, together with two field guns and provisions, and water for two days, were in the tug which had arrived alongside. The men from the other ships, *Endymion* and *Aurora*, were accommodated partly in the *Fame* and partly in their own boats and were also ready to be towed in. Two tugs were sent to the German ships to help them land their men. By the promptitude with which these arrangements were made the British contingent saved the tide ; the other nationalities caught the following one. Tongku was reached at 4 a.m. on the 10th, no opposition being met with from the forts. A train was in readiness, and the men at once entrained.

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Sir Edward Seymour was fortunate in having as Chief of the Staff a man of so equable a temperament and charming a personality as Captain Jellicoe, whose courtesy and tact would enable him to smooth over the difficulties that were bound to arise in an international expedition of so complicated a kind—and, moreover, a man who, from his training as gunnery lieutenant, had studied and practised the handling of men in shore operations. In addition to his duties as Chief of the Staff, Captain Jellicoe was in command of the British Naval Contingent. Mr. Whittall, who accompanied the expedition as Press Correspondent, wrote many years afterwards¹ :

“It was to Captain Jellicoe that I was referred for permission to accompany the relieving force, and I can see him now as he put a few terse direct questions to me before granting the required permit. A man below the middle height, alert, with that in the calm brown eyes which spoke of decision and a serene confidence in himself, not the confidence of the oversure, but that of the real leader of men. A man whose features would have been unpleasantly hard but for the lurking humour of the eyes and for certain humorous lines about the mouth that on occasion could take the likeness of a steel trap. A man to trust instinctively and one to like from the beginning. Those were my first impressions of him as he stood that June morning watching the troop-trains discharge their freights on the dusty North China platform. Later, when I came to know him, he inspired me with the same feeling of affection with which he was regarded by everyone with whom he had occasion to come into close contact. There was, and is, a magnetism about the man which stamps the personality of him who is indeed a commander, rather than one who commands.”

At 5 a.m. the train left, and Tientsin was reached at 7 a.m. Here there was a difficulty with the Chinese about the trains, but this was settled, and No. 1 train left at 9 a.m. with, in addition to 480 British, a further 100 Americans, 40 Italians and 25 Austrians. No. 2 train, which followed a few hours after, had on board 350 British, 50 Japanese, 100 Russians and 100 French. In No. 1 train there were, in addition, Mr. Currie, a railway staff for repairing the line, and 100 coolies. As the supply of water both for the engine and also for the men was likely to become a serious problem, Tongku was requested to send a full 1,500 gallon tank by the next train.

¹ This appeared in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, and is here quoted by courtesy of the *Evening Standard*.

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There was no undue optimism on the part of Sir Edward Seymour and his Chief of the Staff, but rather a strain of anxiety, for the Legations had telegraphed that immediate assistance was required to save, not only the lives of the diplomatic corps, their women and children and dependents, but also the whole of the European population in Peking. It was an urgent S.O.S. that brooked no delay ; and the sudden need had to be met as far as was possible by the ships anchored off Taku. The assistance they could give was limited to some 2,000 men. The only chance of these arriving in Peking in time to meet the urgency of the demand, was by train transport. If the line was intact, or if any damage that might have been done to it was but slight, they might arrive in Peking at one o'clock that very day. But what if the line were seriously damaged? Supposing the Chinese troops to remain neutral, the Boxers alone would have to be reckoned with ; but if the Imperial troops were on the side of the Boxers, what could the small international force do against the vast number of men that could be brought against them? To wait for reinforcements from Russia, Hong Kong and Singapore, and to organize road transport would mean a considerable, and, according to the telegram, a fatal delay. If they delayed and in the meantime the Legations fell and the railway line was afterwards shown to have been intact, the blame would be laid at their door, and the honour of the British Navy besmirched. Again, if Peking were reached, entrance might be denied ; and a siege without siege artillery meant at least a long hold-up that might be fatal. All these considerations were in the mind of the High Command. The whole expedition was of the nature of a gamble ; but the urgency of the telegram left no option but to make the attempt, trust to the supineness of the Chinese authorities, and hope that only moderate damage had been done by the Boxers to the permanent way.

Up to Yangtsun the journey was uneventful. The heat was intense (104°), and the dust, the result of months of dry weather, penetrated everywhere and was most uncomfortable and parching. At Yangtsun the engine was watered. General Nieh's troops, which were encamped here, appeared to be friendly. But soon after leaving that place trouble began. The line was found to be damaged in several places, so that frequent stoppages had to be made for repairs. However, the dead bodies of Boxers, who evidently had been killed by the regular troops while attempting to damage the line, gave grounds for hope that further on it would

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be found intact. This hope, however, remained unfulfilled. A few miles from Lofa a halt was made for the night, since it was too dangerous to proceed over a possibly damaged line in the dark. Here No. 3 and No. 4 trains joined up ; the first bringing Captain von Usedom, 450 Germans, 60 British ; the other 60 French under Captain de Marolles, and 200 Russians. The total force then assembled was : British, 915 men, 3 field guns and 6 machine guns ; Germans (under Captain von Usedom), 512 men, 4 machine guns ; Russians (Kapitan I. Ranga Tschagin), 312 men, 2 field guns ; Japanese (under Lieut.-Commander Mozi), 54 men ; French (Capitaine de Vaisseau de Marolles), 157 men and 1 field gun ; Americans (Captain McCalla), 111 men, 1 field gun ; Italians (Tenente di Vascello Giovanni Giovannini), 42 men ; Austrians (Seekadett Prochaska), 26 men ; total, 103 officers, 2,026 men, 7 field guns, 10 machine guns.

Next day, June 11, the trains pushed on, repairing the line *en route*. A guard of thirty men was left at Lofa station, where a fort was constructed, which was christened Fort Endymion. At 6 p.m. came the first brush with the Boxers, but the attack was soon repelled.

By dint of constant repairs to the line the trains reached Lang Fang on the following day. Here the station was found to have been completely wrecked and the water tanks destroyed, so that the engines had to be watered by means of buckets, which proved a tedious and well-nigh interminable process. Long lines of men were formed from the wells to the engine, passing buckets from hand to hand in the intense heat. The temperature was torrid. The wind, starting cold and dry from the high mountains, had passed over the arid Gobi deserts and picked up additional heat and also sand. It parched the skin and the throats of the men, and even dried up the leaves on the trees in its keen absorption of moisture, as for hours the steady stream of buckets passed to and fro along the lines.

There was moderate cultivation of the vast area around, with large, well-built villages dotted about the plain, and a surprising amount of trees and shrubs, some of the former making quite respectable copses. But sand, sand was the predominating feature of the soil, and the refreshing, moist, cool green of proper pasture was absolutely wanting. Wells were usually to be found in the villages, but to the ordinary person, the idea of drinking the water, at any rate without boiling, would have been positively revolting. In the distance the blue hills showed up on the far side of Peking.

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The state of the line was anything but promising, for sleepers had been burnt, rails twisted, and some carried off to distant villages ; holes even had been dug to render repairs more difficult. What with watering, repairing, and providing pickets, the men were hard worked ; nor were their nights very restful, for the wooden benches of the carriages were hard and unaccommodating, so that many preferred a sandy bed on the ground outside.

A courier, in the shape of a coolie on a donkey, came through on Sunday, the 12th, with information that the Chinese Imperial Forces were preparing to resist the expeditionary force at the south-east gate of Peking. If this proved to be a fact, the outlook was bad ; but there was nothing for it but to push forward as quickly as possible in order to try and save the permanent way further ahead. Lieutenant Smith¹ of the *Aurora* was therefore sent with two days' provisions and 45 men, with orders to try and reach Antung, 13 miles farther on. That night he occupied a village 5 miles forward. The next morning he was attacked in a very determined manner by 450 Boxers, who were, however, repulsed with the loss of about 150 of their number. He then had to fall back to the trains, since most of his ammunition had been expended in the fight.

It was now evident from the state of the line that a protracted stay of at least three days at Lang Fang would be necessary. Measures were therefore taken for defence ; and, in view of further advance, and also from the necessity of preserving communication with Tientsin, a fort was constructed by the Germans, Americans and British. This was named Fort Gefion after the ship to which belonged the German contingent who were to be left to man it. It was becoming increasingly obvious that the whole line of communication with Tientsin could not be protected against raids from the Boxers ; the force was too small for this to be done, if a reasonable contingent was to reach Peking. The only thing possible was to protect the line as far back as Lofa and trust to General Nieh to keep the Boxers in check between that post and Tientsin. But was General Nieh a friend, or was he tacitly conniving at the destruction of the line by the Boxers ? Who could tell ? Meanwhile, repairs still went on, while the difficulty of water supply necessitated sending the locomotive engines back to Lofa for water. A contingent of British Marines, which was sent ahead to protect the line, had a brush with the Boxers and drove them off ; but,

¹ Afterwards Vice-Admiral A. Gordon Smith, C.M.G.



Fort Gefion, at Lanfang.



From drawings taken from "La Colonne Seymour," by courtesy of Librairie Plon, Paris

Fort Endymion, at Lofa.

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soon after, had to be recalled owing to shortage of water, a report having been received that the Boxers had contaminated all the wells in the vicinity of the railway. Matters were beginning to look serious.

The halting-place of the trains was not well suited to defence, since several woods came within 30 yards of the line and provided cover for the Boxers to approach unobserved. Of this they took advantage, and on June 14 they made a determined attack on the train. The first warning came from an Italian picket, which was surprised, losing five out of its nine men. The Boxers, hidden by the trees and favourable ground, very cleverly crept near to the pickets. A poor lookout must have been kept, for with pickets out it was expected that ample warning would be given of an attack. One officer¹ describes how he and another were having a wash at a well in a village 200 yards from the trains when the alarm sounded. Both were unarmed and it was "only by doing a record quarter of a mile" that they got in front of the Boxers. The men were having their dinners and were unarmed, and it was only by very smart work that Captain Jellicoe succeeded in getting a Maxim gun in place ahead of the train before the Boxers were able to charge. Then all was well. The Boxers displayed great bravery; but it was a case of fighting with antiquated arms against modern scientific weapons. Slowly they came on, shouting, with their swords and pikes flashing in the sun, merely to be mowed down whole ranks at a time by rifle and machine-gun fire. This fanatical contempt was due to the fact that, as has already been mentioned, they had been taught by their leaders that death and wounds could only ensue as punishment for want of courage and enthusiasm in the National cause. Moreover, the leaders themselves afforded a fine example of their teaching by dancing and singing in front of their men during the attack. Without any hesitation they charged a Maxim and were literally mowed down—coming on at a jog trot and collapsing when hit. They often stopped a few yards off and went through their gesticulations for rendering themselves immune from bullet wounds. Many were shot while kow-towing towards the trains, and remained dead in that position. It seemed to our men almost like wanton slaughter, this mowing down of human beings a few yards off. Their calm disregard of death was absurd. They never got past the first train; just ahead they lay in scores, and it took several rifle bullets to finish each one

¹ Lieut. J. L. Fownes Luttrell, R.N.

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unless he chanced to be killed at the first shot. The disadvantage of the "humane" bullet was much in evidence, since a Chinaman, absolutely perforated, would still stagger on in fanatical frenzy. Unless quite dead they were as dangerous as vipers, and they had an objectionable habit of shamming dead. Our men had many wonderful escapes—one midshipman was struck on the chest with a spear by a shamming-dead Boxer. When shot it was found that the man's spear had previously had its point broken off by a stone or bullet, leaving it quite blunt. Another was attacked by a six-foot seeming corpse with a long two-handed sword, and it took two quick revolver shots to stop the attack. They seemed as impassive to pain as animals, and tried to bite or injure those who proffered first aid.

The belief in the invulnerability of a properly initiated Boxer was universal among the Chinese—they believed themselves either to be immune from attack, or, if apparently dead, to have the power to get up and fly away in the night. Our burying the corpses encouraged this belief, so, in the end, they were left unburied. One story thoroughly believed by the Chinese was, that on observing a ship at Taku using a searchlight, several Boxers slid down the ray and sank the ship with all its Foreign Devil crew. At one place hundreds of bullets were found buried. They had been removed from the cartridges of the Chinese Imperial troops to prevent the Boxers from being wounded. The firing of blank cartridges naturally increased the belief of the Boxer in his invulnerability.

After the action, the bodies of the Italian picket were recovered shockingly mutilated. In the afternoon, at 3.30, news arrived from Lofa that Fort Endymion was being attacked by strong bands of Boxers and required help. Admiral Seymour left at once with the rear train, which had a British and a Russian contingent, and arrived just in time to repel what was a serious attack on the part of about 2,000 Boxers. When all was quiet, the Admiral returned to Lang Fang in the evening.

So far the daily progress had been in a seriously diminishing ratio. The first day, Sunday the 10th, 25 miles had been accomplished; on the 11th, about 5 miles; on the 12th, 2 miles; on the 13th and 14th, nil.

On June 15 a conference on the general situation was held between Captain Jellicoe and Captain von Usedom. It was evident that owing to the state of the line a further delay in the advance was bound to occur. An opportunity was therefore

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afforded to re-organize the whole expedition on a more stable basis. No longer was it merely a case of rushing men to Peking by rail, for now Peking could be reached only after longish delays and probably considerable fighting. They therefore put forward to the Admiral a proposal to consolidate the commands by a re-arrangement of the sub-division of the personnel in the trains, and to place the senior officer in each train in command of the whole of the men of all nationalities in his train. The proposed re-arrangement of the trains was : No. 1, British and American. No. 2, British and Japanese. No. 3, German, Russian and Austrian. No. 4, French and Italian. No. 5, Repair Staff. Sir Edward Seymour called a conference of the Commanding Officers and these proposals, as well as some other minor details, were generally approved.

The next day, however, June 16, decided the fate of the expedition. A train under Lieutenant zur See Hilmers, which had been sent back to obtain supplies, returned in the evening with the news that he had been unable to reach Tientsin ; for, not only had the line to Lofa been tampered with, but the permanent way had been completely destroyed on the far side of Lofa, which portion of the line should have been protected by the Chinese Imperial troops. The column was, therefore, at all events temporarily cut off from its base at Tientsin. Unless this communication could be restored and maintained, further advance was out of the question. For, with the line destroyed both ahead and behind, not only was progress impossible, but stores and ammunition could not be replenished. In fact, it had to be recognized that the expedition had failed. Its sole object, that of rushing a body of men to Peking post haste, had been frustrated. A far larger force would be required to carry forward the advance to Peking, and at the same time to maintain intact the line of communication with Tientsin.

On Sunday, the 17th, after repair to the line, No. 1 train steamed back through Lofa to near Yangtsun station, which was found to be completely destroyed. The inhabitants of the southern part of the town were friendly, but the Boxers in the northern part prevented them from furnishing the column with any supplies. The total number of inhabitants was estimated at 40,000. Water was getting short and the expedition was put on an allowance of two pints per man per day.

On Monday, the 18th, further urgent requests for help were received from the British and French Ministers in Peking. Admiral

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Seymour therefore refused to give up all hope of an advance, and requested the Germans with No. 2 train to hold Lang Fang and patrol the line. Unfortunately, the Germans on pushing further towards Peking found that a large bridge had been damaged so badly as to be beyond the capacity of the column to effect repairs.

It was an anxious time for the High Command. Advance was hopeless. The Legations and the Europeans in Peking could be afforded no help in their extremity. All that could be done was to acknowledge failure and save the expedition itself from disaster. Retreat by rail was impossible, the choice lay between the river and the road. No. 2 and No. 3 trains were recalled from Lang Fang, where Captain von Usedom, in No. 3 train, had had some sharpish fighting not only with the Boxers but also with detachments from the Imperial troops belonging to armies of General Yung-lu. It was thus proved beyond doubt that the regular army had at last openly joined with the Boxers. The enemy had numbered about 4,000 and those of the expeditionary force 800. The European casualties were seven killed and 57 wounded. Luckily No. 2 train, with 150 marines and a detachment of Russians, arrived in support of the Germans, and between them they drove off the enemy. On the way back to Yangtsun the party fortunately came across and seized four junks which subsequently proved to be invaluable for the transport of the wounded. Taken all round, it was an ill-omened day : for with the first step of retreat, the skies, which had hitherto been clear, clouded over, and the rain, much needed by the country but not by the column, descended in torrents. Well might the Boxer leaders play on the fanaticism of their men by pointing the moral : " See ! if you drive away the foreigners who anger the spirits the much-wanted rain is sent to bring you prosperity ! "

On June 19 a council of war was held and the situation discussed. It was useless to remain at Yangtsun ; ammunition and provisions were running short and further supplies could not be obtained from Tientsin. Nor could reinforcements be expected ; for, as the council sat and deliberated, they could hear firing in the direction of Tientsin, which showed that that place was being heavily attacked and would require every available man for its defence. A retreat was urgent. It was not possible to continue by train. The column had no road transport, without which it was impossible to transport the wounded. The river alone remained. Even this did not present a pleasant prospect ; for the shallow, yellow, winding



Yang-Tsun Bridge, with wounded parked on stretchers.



Loading the junks at Yang-Tsun Bridge.

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Pei-ho had its bed studded with sandbanks which the junks would have difficulty in avoiding ; groundings and delays were therefore bound to occur. A retreat along the river bank was also a far different proposition from the advance along the railway. Not only did the bends in the river nearly double the distance, but, as was natural, village after village had been built at the water's edge, every one of which would form natural cover enabling the enemy to hold up the advance. Moreover, in future regular troops would be encountered, not merely fanatics carrying swords and spears. True it was that the Chinese soldiers could not compare in training and discipline with the Europeans ; but the regular soldier carried a modern rifle, and he and his officers had been trained in elementary tactics and to a knowledge of how to take advantage of the ground. Several thousand of these were known to be in the vicinity and had with them guns, both field and machine, of the latest patterns.

Immediately after the conference, preparations for the retreat were begun. The wounded were put into junks and the column assembled on the left bank of the river and marched off at 3 p.m. The junks were towed by men on the bank ; but, owing to the delays caused by their grounding, only $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles were covered before dark. Everything belonging to the officers and men, except such articles as they could carry, was left behind in the trains and burned. A blanket and biscuits for two days, besides equipment, were a heavy enough load in the blazing heat of the June sun. The night was bitterly cold, a great change from the day temperature of 95° .

CHAPTER VIII
1900
Boxer Campaign—Part II

Wherein I spake of most disastrous chances . . . of hair breadth scapes.
Othello.

ON June 20 real opposition was encountered, and fighting was carried on all day. Each village was found to be occupied by the enemy, who fired on the column and had to be cleared with a bayonet charge, after which they merely fell back on the next village and the charge had to be repeated. A one-pounder quick-firing gun was brought into action against our men, and its fire proved harassing. At 6 p.m. the column bivouacked with its back to the river, a distance of $8\frac{1}{2}$ miles having been made good.

On the 21st, after a breakfast of a cup of cocoa and a biscuit, the camp broke up at 5.30 a.m. An alteration in the scheme of retreat had been decided on. On the previous day it had been found that the enemy occupied both sides of the river, which enabled those on the right bank to enfilade the advance of the men on the left bank by firing over the water. A column, therefore, composed of Germans, Russians and Austrians, under Captain von Usedom, took the right bank: the remainder stayed on the left. The idea was excellent, but considerable difficulty was experienced in keeping the heads of the two columns level. Each column was occupied with its own fighting, taking cover and firing and then charging with the bayonet. The result was the continual exposure of the flank of one column or the other. In addition, the slowness of the junks caused delays to the British columns, so that the Germans at times found themselves too much in advance on the right bank; while a hold-up of the Germans in clearing a village would allow the left column to forge too far ahead.

The days that followed are best described in the following extract from Captain Jellicoe's diary :

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"June 21st. Nothing occurred till about 10 a.m., when a large force of cavalry (about 150) were seen on our left flank. I could not make out for a long time whether they were Chinese or Russians, but finally made them out to be Chinese, and at the same time we were shelled from two field guns posted behind a village on our immediate front. Returned the fire with a few shells and then pushed guns on to get under cover of a village, leaving most of our infantry outside under shelter of the embankment. Captain von Usedom came across the river and discussed the situation and we agreed that the villages must be cleared at point of bayonet. There were really two villages on our side of the river with a space between them, and the enemy were now in the second.

The French were occupying the first village but not quite the outskirts. Got a 9-pounder up to shell the second village and ten of the *Centurion's* company to prolong the French line to the left. Captain de Marolles was told by the C.-in-C. what was intended.

Fired two rounds of common shell from the 9-pounder at the second village, Peitsang, and then charged with a cheer. Our men went on in good style and the enemy fell back behind second village to a bank behind which they poured a hot fire on us, and a party on the opposite bank also fired heavily. We at one time took these for Germans, but the latter did not advance till some time after we had.

I came along on the right near the river and at the end of the village where the open ground began again found the French and a few of our men remaining behind the houses. The fire at the corner was very hot. I tried to get the French to come on, and then went on with my own men following. As I cleared the corner I was hit in the left side of the chest, the shock turning me half round. I thought my left arm had gone. Sat down on a stone, and Cross, Gunnery Instructor, came and cut away the sleeve of tunic and shirt and helped me behind a house where I lay down. After a bit Dr. Sibbald came up and bandaged wound and told me that he thought I was finished. I made my will¹ on a bit of paper and gave it to my coxswain. I was spitting up a lot of blood, and thought the wound probably mortal, so asked Pickthorn,² who came after a short time to rebandage me, if this was so. He said it was very dangerous and injected morphia. This stopped the internal bleeding. Harrison Smith, our chaplain, came along afterwards.

Our men and the French went on and cleared out enemy but lost heavily. Lieutenant Bamber was shot in the leg just behind

¹ This will was returned to Lord Jellicoe in 1923.

² Surgeon, R.N.

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me, also Coyatt, Admiral's Coxswain, and others. After an hour or so I was put in the Admiral's sampan and we continued the advance but with heavy fighting all day. Hottest at about 5 p.m. ; after which we could get on no more. Enemy in strong force and good position. Cavalry threatening our left flank and rear all day, and repeatedly shelling. It was decided in the evening to continue the advance at 1 a.m., and for the column from the other bank to cross over to us. At midnight field guns and machine guns were put on board the lighters we had captured during the day."

As Captain Jellicoe was out of action Sir Edward Seymour requested Captain von Usedom to take over the duties of Chief of the Staff. Again the following account of the subsequent engagements of the Expedition is taken from Captain Jellicoe's diary.

"Advance continued slowly during 21st, and in the evening force bivouacked on the banks of river, being watched by enemy's cavalry, and shelled at times by Field Artillery. At a conference it was decided to push on during the night to try to reach Hsiku, the village at which we had decided to leave the river to march on Tientsin, as soon as a relief party could reach us. Distance made good 6 miles.

June 22nd (Friday). At midnight the field guns and Maxims were embarked in some junks we had captured ; and at 1 a.m. force moved on. There was some confusion and noise at starting, but things quieted down after a bit. We had to leave one 9-pounder (*Endymion*) and several Nordenfelt machine guns behind from lack of transport. They were all thrown into river.

All went well till about three o'clock, when we were fired on from a village on left bank, which the marines took in fine style, and there was much cheering ; so much so that we in the boats for some time thought that we had met the relief force. Shortly after this the junk with our two 9-pounders capsized and sank, the guns being lost. She had been leaking during the night.

At about 4.30 a.m. the Admiral and advance party were on ahead with Mr. Campbell, when, near Hsiku Arsenal, they saw two Chinese Imperial soldiers, who beckoned to them to come on, saying that it was all right. They (the Chinese) then got behind a bank, and immediately a hot fire was opened on the party from a force concealed on the right bank. The fire was so hot that it was a marvel that anyone escaped ; but no one was hit. They got under cover and returned the fire. The leading lighter with wounded in her came in for this fire and suffered badly, 3 men being killed. Two *Centurion* men got into a small boat and towed her up-stream out of the worst of the fire. I was astern of No. 2

I leave every thing to my
mother with my father & have
I hope she will give Almon-
brance to ~~see~~ my dear sister
and to my cousin & both other
I want to have send me so
fortally. Joseph Captain

WILL MADE BY CAPTAIN JELlicoe ON THE FIELD OF BATTLE, AFTER HE HAD
BEEN WOUNDED, IN THE BOXER RISING

lighter and we got under a hot fire. I landed and got into a small donga where a good many men were sheltering. Had the enemy waited a bit longer before opening fire, till more of the force had passed, it would have gone very hardly with us.

The Marines and B Company of *Centurion* were sent across the river higher up to clear the enemy out of this village and did so splendidly without loss. After passing through a village they crossed a bridge and then going on found themselves close to Hsiku Arsenal, which they at once occupied, clearing the enemy out and capturing six 3-pounder guns. (They had captured two at the first village in the morning.) We did not at first realise what this capture of the arsenal meant to us, but later in the day we began to understand it. We occupied the arsenal and forts, and the lighters were brought down-river and moored under the banks near. During the day we were shelled from forts down the river towards Tientsin, and in the afternoon a very determined attempt was made by 7,000 troops (according to prisoners) to retake the arsenal. There was some very hard fighting, and we lost a good many men. The enemy charged three times but never got within 500 yards and lost heavily. Before dark we had all moved into the fort and arsenal. The extent of our lines was 1,000 yards by 700, rectangular, the arsenal itself being occupied by the French. The Admiral found a room for himself and one for me in an inner camp where I was fairly comfortable, though the constant shelling was unpleasant, and we lost a few men by it."

That night Mr. Whittall came to see Captain Jellicoe, who at once asked him how things were progressing. Recounting the interview later, Mr. Whittall wrote :

"Foolishly, perhaps, I tried to make the best of affairs and said I thought we should cut our way back to Tientsin or even the coast if the foreign settlements had fallen.

I don't think I shall ever forget the contemptuous flash of the eyes he turned on me or the impatient remark—

'Tell me the truth : don't lie.'

I had thought to lessen the anxiety I knew he must have been feeling, but if I had known him as I learned to know him later on I should have told him the plain truth straight out. He thanked me and, indicating his wounded shoulder with his eyes, remarked : 'Hard luck just now.'"

It is difficult to imagine what Captain Jellicoe must have suffered during these days of retreat, carried from the field of battle in the sampan, hurried under fire to shelter on the bank, then lifted

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into the fort : all with his lung in a most dangerous condition. In fact, he and everyone else thought that he was bound to die. Nor had he the satisfaction of knowing that the expedition had been successful. Not only had it been a failure, but it was by no means certain that the column would be able to reach Tientsin. In spite of all this his pluck and good constitution pulled him through.

One of the officers¹ thus described the situation in the arsenal :

"We had now 200 wounded and 1,800 tired and hungry men ; the huge rabbit warren of Tientsin native city lay between us and safety, with several forts well around, the exact positions of which we did not know. In fact we did not know how formidable they were until we got back to Tientsin. If we had gone on, hardly a man would have survived : our wounded could not have been brought through. Guns and river transport alone could do this, which precluded making a detour round the native city, and what with being bombarded by heavy guns and sniped in the tortuous streets of the Chinese quarter by the large number of Chinese troops who held the houses, there would have been no hope that any but a handful could have broken through.

It is impossible to describe the nastiness of life in the arsenal : quarter rations, rice and sand-storms, rice puddings absolutely brown from the dirty water they were cooked in. The bones of a mule boiled into soup were greatly relished."

To continue with the diary :

"*Saturday, June 23rd.* We had not held the lines entirely over night, thinking the length was too great, and this mistake cost us dearly, as at daybreak there was a determined attack and a large number of the enemy got inside. Quite 50 were killed inside the lines. Poor Beyts R.M.A. was killed during this attack, being apparently cut off from his picket. After clearing the enemy out things were quieter for the day, though as late as 5 p.m. four of them were found concealed in some of the long rushes inside the lines. We now began to find out what a godsend the arsenal was to us. Millions of rounds of ammunition and thousands of rifles of all sorts. Mausers, old and new, Mannlicher, etc., also a large number of .303 Maxims, the ammunition for which fitted our rifles. The rifles were served out to those nationalities who were short of ammunition unless ammunition was found to fit their own rifles. We of course annexed the .303 ammunition. The next find was a number of 9 cm. Krupp guns and mountings. Four of these were mounted during Saturday and Sunday and were most useful

¹ Commander William Ross, then a midshipman.

in keeping down the shell fire from the forts down the river. Finally we came across stores of rice, about 10 tons. This was most needed as we were down to the very end of our rations, having one-quarter rations only left up to Monday, 25th. Also found a large supply of medical stores which were much needed. The arsenal in fact contained millions of dollars' worth of stores of all sorts, and its capture must have been a most serious blow to the Chinese. They shelled us and sniped us all day, but made no determined attacks. We burnt the villages near and spent the day getting the rice into the inner camp and improving our defences.

A native courier sent out to-day managed to get into Tientsin and give an account of our condition, the first news they had received of us. He was captured by Boxers but had the presence of mind to eat his despatch, and after being tied to a tree and threatened a good deal was released.

Sunday, June 24th. More guns were mounted to-day by us and the Chinese forts down the river bombarded. We had a comparatively quiet day, though shelled and sniped a little.

Monday, June 25th. Early in the morning the fort below us was observed to be firing towards Tientsin, so we bombarded it, with the result of drawing its fire on to us.

At 6 a.m. European troops were reported in sight and at 7 a.m. the relief column under the Russian Colonel Shirinsky composed of forces of the different nations arrived outside the armoury.

Preparations were made to evacuate our position and destroy the warlike stores of the arsenal, said by people in Tientsin in a position to know to be worth £3,000,000. The whole force crossed the river before dark and bivouacked on the left bank ready for an early start, the Marines holding the small camp inside our old lines, and Lieutenant Lowther-Crofton¹ and Mr. Davidge (*Centurion*) staying in the arsenal, round which large bonfires had been built during the day ready for lighting as soon as the force left.

Tuesday, June 26th. At 3 a.m. the force marched off carrying the 230 wounded, the relief force acting as advance and rear guards. (For every sound man of the expeditionary column was required for the purpose of carrying the large number of their wounded.) Tientsin, 8½ miles off, was reached without incident. Lieut. Lowther-Crofton fired the arsenal in five places, and then crossed the river, mounted a pony, kept in readiness, and galloped after the force. The fires were evidently effective, numerous explosions with clouds of white smoke occurring all day."

Tientsin was reached at 9.30 a.m. and the wounded placed in various hospitals.

¹ Afterwards Vice-Admiral E. G. Lowther-Crofton, D.S.O.

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A couple of extracts from the letters written home by a cousin of Captain Jellicoe, Mrs. Scott, the wife of Bishop Scott, give a realistic account of the arrival of the column at Tientsin, and show the stage of exhaustion that the men were in from hunger and the constant fighting of the last few days of the retreat :

“Admiral Seymour’s company just come in, failed to reach Peking, had tremendous fighting, and a good chance of being annihilated, but we sent out a relieving force and got them in to-day. Never-to-be-forgotten sight, that long line of wounded men. 200 were carried to the hospital, Jack among them. I was there to receive him, and he is all right I hope. Shot through the lung, but healing up. We have just heard the Legation people never left Peking, so conclude they are still safe ; it was their one chance, as that pig of an Empress is still responsible for them.”

And again :

“I shall never forget to my dying day, the long string of dusty, travel-worn soldiers, who for a fortnight had been living on quarter rations, and fighting every day ; officers almost unrecognizable with a fortnight’s beard and layers of dust, but so glad to get back and have a handshake ; while the men were met by kind ladies with *pails* of tea which the poor fellows drank as they had never drunk before—some bursting into tears—like children. Alas, the saddest part was the long line of stretchers with their poor motionless figures inside, which turned into the Hospital gate. I was there, waiting for Jack Jellicoe. The Admiral, with his never forgotten courtesy, had sent a special message to prepare me for his arrival ; had we a house, he would have come to it ; as we are still camping in Gordon Hall, in the very acme of discomfort, we could only let him go to the hospital. He was shot through the lung five days ago, and at first thought to be killed ; but most mercifully he took a turn for the better, and was quite on the mend when they brought him in. I soon washed him and got some clean clothes and made him comfortable, and then I did the same for half a dozen other officers, all his company, who had wounds, but the whole expedition had cost 203 wounded and 59 killed ! It was a very exciting day, but I was mostly in the hospital, hearing and telling all the events of the past fortnight. There was a conference of all the commanding officers in the afternoon, when they came to the conclusion, which has not yet transpired, as to what was to be done next about Peking. We had proved that an army of 2,500 men was not large enough to meet the occasion, though had there

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been transport and some way of keeping in touch with their base, it might have been done.

As it was, they were crippled with 60 wounded after the first engagement, and the line was destroyed behind them. This morning it has been thought safe to move back to our various homes ; so we have just got away from Gordon Hall, and found peace and quiet and order once more. Jack is to be moved over this afternoon. This house and Church have escaped almost entirely from the bombardment.

We cannot, as you see, start home on the 29th of this month, but we are taking places in the July C.P.R. and hope to get off then. I feel as if I would give *anything* to be in a nice big ocean steamer homeward bound !

I am afraid we have lost all we possessed, as we hear all the mission compounds in Peking were burnt. It is a curious sensation to start the world again at 47. I wish just now I had a few more clothes. It is awfully hot and we can get nothing washed as all the washerwomen have fled."

The total casualties of the column were :—Killed, 2 officers and 63 men ; Wounded, 20 officers and 210 men.

Let us now see what happened at the rear after the departure of the relief force. After the Seymour column left on June 10, Tientsin became increasingly threatened by the Boxers ; and though an attempt was made to keep the rail communication with Yangtsun open, the repair train returned on June 14 reporting that the line was too hopelessly damaged to be repaired. This was two days before the commencement of the retreat of the Seymour column. Meanwhile, communication had been kept up with Taku at the mouth of the Pei-ho. Naturally the commanders of the naval forces off Taku were determined to keep the line of water communication with Tientsin intact. But the position was a difficult one. The ships were anchored too far from Taku for their guns to bring any direct pressure to bear on the Chinese forts. If the Chinese remained neutral all would be well ; but if, as was possible at any moment, the Chinese Army joined the Boxers, both water and land communications with Tientsin would inevitably be cut off. On the other hand, to take the forts meant practically a declaration of war. On the same day, June 14, that communication with Yangtsun was found to be cut, great activity was seen to be taking place in the Taku forts. Troops from the army of General Nieh arrived, and news was received of preparations being made by the General for sending considerable reinforcements.

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The Naval authorities, with the exception of the American admiral, who stood aloof during all the subsequent operations, therefore decided to seize the forts at the entrance of the Pei-ho ; and a notice was accordingly served on the Chinese authorities requesting them to hand over the forts temporarily to the international forces. This decision was arrived at after thoroughly weighing the probable effect that such a course might have in precipitating overt hostile action on the part of the Empress against the Legations at Peking, against Tientsin, and against the Seymour column. From the evidence available it was clear that the Empress, if not openly hostile, was secretly encouraging the Boxers. Moreover, hesitation and procrastination would most surely give time for the forts to be strengthened, and thus made more difficult to take. In fact, unless the forts were promptly seized, Tientsin, in a day or two, might be completely cut off from all help and not improbably taken and sacked, a contingency too awful to contemplate.

Between midnight and 7.30 a.m. on the night of June 17 the forts were taken. It may be noted that on June 18 the Chinese army openly joined the Boxers in the fight against Captain von Usedom's detachment, so that it may be argued that open hostilities were the direct outcome of the taking of the forts. There is little doubt, however, that their seizure was fully warranted and that thereby Tientsin was in all probability saved ; and, of course, on Tientsin depended the safety of the Seymour column. The open hostilities of the Chinese doubtless led to more casualties in the Seymour column, but its ultimate safety was ensured and not compromised as, in all probability, would have been the case had the taking of the forts been delayed.

Tientsin was besieged up to June 23, when it was relieved, just in time, by 250 men from H.M.S. *Terrible*, 300 Welsh Fusiliers, and 40 Sappers, 153 Americans, 23 Italians, and a Russian-German column of 1,650 men. Thanks to our possession of the forts, the wounded from the Seymour column were safely evacuated to Wei-hei-wei ; and thither Captain Jellicoe was sent to recover from his wound.

Before closing this chapter a few further extracts from the letters of Mrs. Scott written during the bombardment of Tientsin may be added, which show the peril to which the inhabitants were subjected :

"18th June. You know we took the Taku forts yesterday between 1 and 4 a.m. We only suggested to the Chinese that it was better

we should hold them for the present, and then they began to fire. So it will always be an open question which began the war. However, it was quite time we held those forts, and we took them easily in the rear, all nations ; so it is not a British victory ! It was no use playing with the Boxers any longer and we had to come to the real root of the mischief somehow. But that fact meant *war*. So it was not really surprising, when yesterday afternoon at three o'clock shells began whizzing about our heads in Tientsin. We were in rather a hot corner as it happened, and three shells struck the place we were in ; so it was thought high time to move on to the Gordon Hall, where there are extensive cellars, and thither we flocked, and it was not a nice walk we can assure you, as shells were flying pretty fast just then. There was a horrid crowd of women and children ; the people were excited, till our troops had silenced a few guns, and had driven the most troublesome ones off. Then by degrees we crept upstairs to more spacious regions : and we got some tea and when the firing had quite ceased with the daylight Charlie¹ and Mr. Illiff went back to the Mission House for mattresses and bed-gear, and we all slept in the Great Hall here, which was convenient but noisy. Then, this morning, after a few early hours of peace, the bombardment began again in good earnest. We had only 3,000 troops and had our hands pretty full ; for we were defending the whole settlement. Only two shells actually hit this place, but these were a little alarming for the moment. No one but Chinese would fire on a place which contains women and children ; but they have been aiming at these towers for a long time. I was making shot bags nearly all the morning, and had quite a nice time. But when I was ordered below again to the cellars it was horrid. Charlie meanwhile had to take a funeral of two of our fellows who had been hit. It was very comical for such a lover of peace as he is to have to go out under fire and be told by a marine guard to dodge behind the hearse when they were in a very exposed place, and then double ! Captain Burke of the *Orlando* and eight bluejackets attended. It was so like Charlie to do it all so quietly. The bombardment ceased about one o'clock and since then I have been enjoying a quiet read in this library, and am now scribbling to you on library paper, having no other. I hope we shall get back to our homes to-morrow. The Chinese cannot go on because the game is up, and we have burnt all their cover so to speak.


June 21st. We go on from day to day much the same. It is curious how one sinks to the level of endurance and expectancy. I could never have thought how quietly one would live in the midst

¹ Bishop Scott.

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of war's alarms. This is the 4th day since we fled here for refuge. Whenever they begin shelling, we go down to the cellars. I have found a quieter one now ; at first the descent below meant simple pandemonium ; children screaming, women getting hysterical, and a general sense of confusion and clamour. The other cellar which I have frequented more lately and where I sleep now is more select, and has pleasant people in it. At other times Charlie and I sit mostly up in the reading-room, which people think is a dangerous place, because it is up aloft, but it is safe enough really except when we are being actually shelled, though the rifle bullets whistle past like hail. For meals we go to the big hall, and generally just as we begin a crash comes of a shell exploding, and down we are sent to the cellar again.

Well, a week's bombardment has not done much harm, except to nerves and a few houses. I confess it is not a pleasant sensation to have those horrid things flying about in all directions and bursting a few yards off you, but you get used to it except the noise. We have all of us had our squeaks. My nearest one, I think, was in the hospital where I was giving breakfast to the wounded, and a shell came slick through a ward full of beds, covering everyone with glass and splinters, but hurting no one. I just managed not to spill the cup of tea I was handling ! The discomforts of a sudden attack like this are great ; all the community rushed here at three o'clock last Sunday bringing nothing but themselves. When the shelling ceased for the moment the women and children were allowed to emerge from the cellars, and a few of our menkind went back to their homes to pick up a few necessities of life. But we have slept in our clothes for a week, and the luxury of a bath and a change seems still a very long way off. Till we have captured some of their big guns we are not safe from fresh shelling. Directly we have enough men the guns *will* be captured, hitherto we have had only enough to defend our very extensive line, but reinforcements are coming in fast. 'Terribles' galore and some regiments from Hong Kong and a 'Terrible' gun marked 'Ladysmith to Peking.' A lot of Japs are on their way, whose blood is up, because the soldiers in Peking ruthlessly massacred one of their Legation Secretaries in cold blood before war was declared. Russians have behaved splendidly ; indeed we owe our lives to them. This week the Cossacks fought like demons, and it will very much hinder the future political animosities when we remember what we all owe them here in our time of stress. I must say everyone has behaved splendidly, with very few exceptions, but it has been horribly trying to be thrown all day and night with a most promiscuous collection of humanity with no privacy and no order, multitudes of children



TWO VIEWS OF THE RAILWAY STATION AT TIENTSIN
AFTER BOMBARDMENT

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who are not quiet exactly, and every imaginable rumour flying around. Food was difficult at first, but that has got into a system by degrees, though how we are going on except on famine rations, I can't imagine, with so many fresh troops coming in, and the whole Peking community also arriving, unless indeed the worst has happened to them.¹

July 27th.

Jack is still here recovering : the doctors don't want him to join his ship again if she is going into action, she passed through on Tuesday on her way to the Yangtse and we had just a glimpse of the Admiral. Yesterday I went with Jack to the funeral of two of his men, who after a long fight succumbed to their wounds. *You* know the scene well enough, the flag over the coffins ; the quiet lovely service ; the three volleys fired by the sailors, the bugle call and then the return to the ship. How pathetic it all is ! The little cemetery here is on the quiet hill-side where so many *Centurions* already lie. Well, they died for their Queen and country, and *that* remains, all through the ugly struggle with pain and death in the hospitals ; truly if you are to die let it be fighting ! How one does realize that sentiment now. Though I suppose for the relations at home it is better to have news of the days of suffering and dying, it is pathetic to have to sit down by their beds and write the last letters home.

Though we have lost everything you must not think we grieve about that, we always felt our home was almost too perfect, and have tried to keep ready to let it all go. We shall build a sufficient nest again some day somewhere."

Alas ! It was not to be. This gallant lady died on September 7, of dysentery contracted amid her trials and privations. A note to the letters in another hand adds :

"She was always ready to 'let it go.' Her 'perfect home,' her 'sufficient nest' was not to be on earth."

POSTSCRIPT I

GENERAL ORDER issued to the Fleet by Sir Edward Seymour :

I desire to express to the officers, seamen, and marines comprising the late expeditionary force towards Peking my high sense of satisfaction with their general conduct there during a time which comprised much discomfort, hard work and want of food and water

¹ The Peking Legations were relieved by a military force on 17th July, 1900.

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with little rest and decided anxiety in addition to the dangers of war.

The above was encountered with a zeal, patience, courage and cheerfulness worthy of the noble service to which they belong. Similar trials may be before us, but will I know be borne as the above were. At the same time I wish to express to the officers and men lately employed in the defence of Tientsin, and to those engaged in the operations about Taku, including the capture of those forts, my thorough satisfaction with all concerned.

The defence of Tientsin has been carried out with much risk and fatigue constantly harassing those employed, but met with true Naval spirit.

The capture of the Taku forts was a brilliant affair, well planned, and well carried out ; success crowned very gallant and daring efforts. I congratulate all concerned therein.

It is my pleasing duty, and was that of the Rear-Admiral ¹ in my absence, to convey the above to Their Lordships at the Admiralty, and it will be generally known in England.

To me personally the fine conduct of those belonging to the British China Squadron is a matter of special pride and pleasure, and I have no misgivings but that whatever is before us we shall if possible do well rather than otherwise and uphold the tradition of the British Navy.

E. SEYMOUR.
V.A.

POSTSCRIPT II

LORD JELlicoe, when in after years commenting on the Expedition, laid particular stress on how the personality of Sir Edward Seymour kept the Allied force together, which led to his advice and directions being accepted without question by the Allied commanders. He was a man whose language was precise, almost pedantic. Each word appeared to have been studied and weighed before utterance ; such colloquialisms as "shan't" and "can't" were never used. He was urbane and courteous ; and, during the expedition, careless of danger. In an exposed position he would lean on the alpenstock he invariably carried and watch the fighting without any regard to personal danger. His comments at a council were balanced, matured, and well reasoned. So that he was indeed well suited to undertake the control of an Allied force, that most difficult of all commands, where jealousies and susceptibilities are

¹ Afterwards Admiral Sir James Bruce, K.C.M.G.

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ever ready to break through the thin coating of veneer by which they are covered and kept in check.

When questioned as to the lessons he learned from the Expedition and in what particulars its efficiency could have been increased, Lord Jellicoe wrote that in view of the possibility of a landing he considered that during his absence at Tientsin more might have been done in the way of preparing the landing parties and arranging the commissariat and other details; but, with characteristic loyalty, he passed his pen through this statement in case it might in any way be read as a criticism on his Commander-in-Chief.

POSTSCRIPT III

EVEN after twenty years.

15.8.20

MY DEAR JELlicoe,

As you are so soon leaving England I fear I shall not see you before you go, and if not I write to say "Good-bye," and to wish you, your wife and family much happiness; and yourself that full measure of success in your Government¹ that my knowledge of you makes me feel you will have.

We have had so much of importance and great interest to do together that we know each other well, and I wish now to express to you my strong sense of the great help and value you were to me in China.

I am now 80 years old so cannot expect to see you again if you remain out 5 years; but I shall be glad if at some time you will write and let me know how you all are.

You know I wish you were at the Admiralty. After Lord Fisher, I consider you have the greatest general knowledge of the Service and grasp of affairs. Give my very kind regards to your wife, my love to Lucy, and I am,

Your sincere friend,

E. H. SEYMOUR.

¹ Governor-General of New Zealand.

CHAPTER IX

1900 to 1907

End of Service in China

H.M.S. <i>CENTURION</i> (<i>cont.</i>).	CAPTAIN 1.4.99 TO 19.9.01
ASSISTANT TO THE CONTROLLER OF THE NAVY	CAPTAIN 20.3.02 TO 11.8.03
H.M.S. <i>DRAKE</i>	CAPTAIN 12.8.03 TO 21.11.04
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL ORDNANCE	REAR-ADMIRAL 24.2.05 TO 24.8.07

Jellicoe dont ma mémoire retient un étonnant don d'ubiquité il paraissait être partout à la fois et où il fallait au moment qu'il fallait : c'était l'activité faite bonne.

A French officer's tribute to Jellicoe in China.

In other words "at the right moment he was always where he was wanted."

AS soon as Captain Jellicoe could be moved he was sent down to the ships off Taku, stayed two days, and from there was taken to Wei-hai-wei where he remained for three weeks to a month while convalescent and gaining strength. On rejoining the *Centurion* she sailed for Shanghai where a Japanese masseuse took him in hand. On October 7 he wrote : "The electricity and massage have done me a great deal of good. I can lift my arm up nearly half way to the horizontal now, and it is improving slowly. I can get a gun almost to the shoulder, which pleases me." This it may be remarked was three and a half months after he had been wounded. Gradually the complete use of the arm was restored, but all his life he suffered at times from rheumatism and cramp in the old wound. When X-rayed in 1934 the doctors discovered that the bullet was still in his lung.

Early in October, 1900, the Allied Admirals considered it necessary to occupy the Chinese forts at Shan-hai-kwan. At this place the great Wall of China, more than two thousand years old (in years past looked on as one of the Seven Wonders of the world), descends from the hills, and dipping almost into the sea, ends its romantic stretch of hundreds of miles in length. The old forts,

guarding the flank of the wall, were, in the days of bows and arrows, of vast importance, and the more modern-built and armed structures had a considerable value, forming as they did the key position to the approach to Peking from the north. In winter especially this was the case, since the sea approaches to Taku, and therefore Tientsin and Peking, were generally frozen over then, and Shan-hai-kwan was the nearest open water approach to the Peking road. It was, therefore, fairly obvious that during the then state of tension, which was, in fact, practically war with China, it was well to relieve the Chinese of the possession of the forts. International jealousies of course were, and still are, an important factor in international co-operation, every move must be approved of and shared by all the countries, so the Admirals arranged that the forts should be seized by the ships in a joint naval undertaking. Russia, however, had pretensions of her own, and it was known that she intended if possible to seize the forts and keep possession of them, but, as the following letter shows, she was completely out-manceuvred.

TAKU, *October 7th*, 1900.

“We are back here again from Shan-hai-kwan having arrived yesterday. After we had made all arrangements for the attack on the forts, and had drawn an elaborate scheme of sailing for the Allied Squadron of seventeen battleships last week (from Taku), the *Pigmy* (gunboat)¹ was sent off to Shan-hai-kwan to call on the forts to surrender. I hardly thought they would do so without firing a few rounds, if only to save their face ; but when the Captain of the *Pigmy* landed with Sir Walter Hillier and sent for the General, he came and at once said that he would evacuate them. The *Pigmy* left a guard of eighteen men to hold the forts and came back to report the surrender.

Everyone was then engaged preparing for battle, and the news was not received with unmixed joy. We knew however that the Russians were advancing by train on Shan-hai-kwan from Lutai, and that if they got there before the British flag was up we should not have the Russian flag down again for many a day ; so it was, on the whole, a good thing that the surrender was made to us alone, and that our flag was flying everywhere there for twenty-four hours before any other.

There was a conference of Admirals that day, Monday, and the Russians, Austrians, and Germans sent off ships with reinforcements at once. Watertube boilers enabled the ships to get away quickly.”

But we were not going to be robbed so easily of our prey.

¹ Lieutenant in command, John F. E. Green.

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Captain Jellicoe at once sent a strong party of men on board the gallant little *Pigmy*, of 755 tons, and speeded her off. Her full speed was only 13·5 knots, so the stokers must have nearly burst her boilers in pushing her along, but she steamed nobly and arrived off Shan-hai-kwan in time to get her men ashore before the Russians, who Jellicoe says, found

“on landing their party at 10 p.m. that we were in strong occupation. They wanted to enter the forts and hoist their flag, but were requested to wait till daylight, Tuesday, when the allied Admirals would decide on how the flags and forts were to be allocated. They did not like this at all, and lodged a formal complaint next day, saying also that we had threatened to fire on them. I was appointed, with the Russian and Austrian Chiefs of Staff, to enquire and report on this, and it took five and a half hours' sitting before I could induce the Russian Chief of Staff to agree to a report!! Of course the alleged threat of firing was entirely disproved. The whole country round the forts was extensively mined, and it was partly for their own safety that they were advised not to move about the country at night. We must have destroyed quite a hundred mines while we were there.”

In his book, *My Naval Career and Travels*, Sir Edward Seymour recounts the story with dry humour.

“Our Russian friends, with that liberal desire for occupation and civilisation of the Far East of Asia for which they are justly renowned, had contemplated saving their allies the trouble of occupying the Shan-hai-kwan forts by doing it themselves—unfortunately for the Russians this did not at all suit me or my other colleagues, and their troops arrived too late.”

It is true that our men did not threaten to fire on the Russians ; but, when the Russians arrived and thundered at the gates demanding admission, they were informed that strict orders had been given not to open the gates during the night, and to repel any attack made on them. The *Pigmy's* name was a source of difficulty to the Allies since the international signal code did not include the word “pigmy.” The *Centurion's* signalmen overcame the difficulty by using two hoists of flags “Pig” and “My.” The French officers were greatly intrigued at one of our ships being called “Mon cochon.”

Another letter continues the narrative :

“We left here on the Monday evening, arriving off Shan-hai-kwan at daylight on Tuesday, and the Allied Admirals held a

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conference at 7 a.m. in a pagoda on the wall of No. 1 fort near the sea on the Great Wall. I accompanied the Admiral."

It is of interest to note that at the Conference in the Pagoda Captain J. R. Jellicoe and Captain von Holtzendorff of the German Navy sat next to each other. Years passed by, and in 1917 Admiral von Holtzendorff, Chief of the German Naval Staff, conducted the unrestricted submarine warfare which was countered and defeated by Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, then Chief of the Naval Staff at the Admiralty in London.

"After the conference, we all walked round to inspect the forts and positions, arriving finally at the Railway Station at noon, where we found 3,000 Russian Troops had just arrived by train, having been fighting their way up from Pehtang. We were not much too soon you see! At all the conferences held on the subject of the occupation of Shan-hai-kwan the Russians objected strongly to our touching the place, as they said they considered it as the wing of their attack on Manchuria; and it was fortunate that the remainder of the Admirals voted with us; also the Germans insisted strongly on the necessity of our occupying the place as a means of winter communication with Tientsin and Peking when the Peiho is frozen. A second conference was held at the Station when the allocation of the forts was decided on. All nations have a guard in No. 1 fort near the sea, and the remainder are divided out. We took No. 4, with the Japanese; and I at once landed another sixty men to occupy it. All nationalities are also in possession of the Railway Station; I fully expect trouble with Russia over the line to Tientsin, which is really British, but which they refuse to give up. Count Waldersee will have to settle that question and many others, but the Russians practically refuse to obey his orders. We continued our tour of inspection, finally arriving on board for lunch at 4 p.m., somewhat hungry after breakfasting at 6 a.m., and I was a bit tired, having been on deck most of the night before as there were so many foreign ships round us. While we were ashore the Italian Bersaglieri, who were landing, had a small fight with some Chinese and killed several. I believe they were harmless peasants, as we saw no sign of any Boxers or troops, and we had been all over the place. I had about a hundred and twenty men ashore that night. The transports with the Third Brigade arrived from Wei-hai-wei during the night. I started to land them at daylight and they relieved my men during the day.

We went off to Ching-Wang-Tao, another place ten miles down the coast, with the Admirals in the *Alacrity* at 9 a.m. Troops are also being landed there, and we wanted to see which place was

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best for a winter Depot. There had been a small fight there the day before between Germans and Chinese, and one German was missing. I expect he has had a bad time. The *Dido* was there and had her men ashore as a guard. That afternoon the Russians mistook a regiment of Zouaves for Boxers. They wear red caps just like the Boxers. They fired on each other and three French were killed and several wounded on both sides. The mixture of nationalities is no doubt apt to lead to difficulties ! It was lucky it was Russians and French and not British, as then it would have required many explanations. We did not spend long at Ching-Wang-Tao and returned to Shan-hai-kwan in the afternoon. The best part of the next day was spent over my enquiry, but I think I managed to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion.

On Friday morning we had another conference on shore, the Tartar General in command of Shan-hai-kwan city coming to pay his respects to the Admirals, and to represent that some of the troops were behaving badly with the natives. It is a great pity, and it is a terrible thing that it seems to be impossible to prevent some nations' troops pillaging, etc. ; and all the more so when the Chinese look to us for protection ; but it is a very difficult matter for one Admiral to tell another that his men are behaving badly, and the matter is made worse by the refusal of the Russians to recognise our General as being in command there. If there were a recognised head he could put a stop to it."

Again :

"By the way I don't think I told you that I received a very nice letter some time ago from the daughter of the Russian Port Admiral at Vladivostock asking how I was, etc. I saw a good deal of his wife and daughter last year there ; and the daughter wrote when she heard I had been hit.

We got away from Shan-hai-kwan on Friday morning at 11 a.m. after a good deal of difficulty, as I dropped a man overboard at the start ; and, having picked him up and got away, I was chased by a French and German steamboat with letters."

During his stay in Chinese waters Captain Jellicoe acquired an admiration for the efficiency of the Germans as a race. He remarks that their ships were smart and efficient, and the men landed were very well drilled and officered. He made several firm friends among the German officers. He was not so enthusiastic in his remarks about some of the other nationalities, but it must be remembered that his standard was a high one. Moreover, it requires a strict discipline and constant careful supervision of the



VISIT OF ADMIRAL SIR EDWARD SEYMOUR, K.C.B., TO THE VICEROY OF THE TWO KIANGS

Back row (left to right) : Flag-Lieut. C. M. K. Fair, Consular official, Paymaster F. Alton (Admiral's secretary), N. Liao (Chinese interpreter).

Front row : Taotai Wang, Vice-Admiral Sir E. H. Seymour, K.C.B., Liu King (Viceroy of the Two Kiangs), Sir Pelham Warren (Consul General), Capt. Jellicoe.

men, when away on a distant station, to keep them and the ships on a high level of efficiency.

We next hear of Captain Jellicoe playing cricket at Hong Kong a month or two later, having recovered the use of his arm.

After this there is little to record of the remainder of the time spent in China. The usual visit to the ports, the usual drills, the weekly boat sailings, chiefly matters of routine. Captain Jellicoe lamented the change in the crew of the *Centurion*. Nearly one-third of the old crew had been either killed or invalidated as the result of the Boxer landing, so that she seemed almost like a newly commissioned ship, many old faces were missing and new men had to be taught to take the places of the old ones. At last the *Glory* arrived to relieve the *Centurion* and the time for leaving came. The usual farewells were said, and the *Centurion* steamed past her old station-mates playing "Home Sweet Home." It is a choky moment to the more susceptible of those left behind, whose ships perhaps have another year or two years of commission to run, to watch one of their number steaming away to England and to hear the band playing, almost mockingly it seems, "Home Sweet Home," every note of which seems replete with memories.

The homeward journey was thus started. A strong monsoon was met with in the Indian Ocean, and on one occasion the Captain was washed out of his upper deck cabin by a heavy sea shipped on board. Otherwise the voyage was uneventful. Malta was called at for coal, but the ship being placed in quarantine, having come from infected ports, no one was allowed to land. The Isle of Wight was passed on a fine August Sunday and, as Captain Jellicoe notes, the sound of the church bells and the sight of the wonderful vegetation which few places outside England can produce, brought back to the eyes what for four years had been month by month an increasingly fading memory. It was a wonderful sensation, that first sight of England to men who had been absent for four or even five years. It was moreover a sensation that sailors, in those old days of long commissions and inadequate drafting machinery, were not infrequently called on to experience. For little attention was then paid to alternating spells of home and foreign service. Once not so long ago an officer married a wife and after a fortnight left for a four-years' commission abroad. He then returned, had a couple of months' leave, and left again for another four years. Not much family life in those rather barbarous times—two months and a half at home in the first eight years of married life ! But in these days,

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thanks to Lord Fisher, who instituted and enforced commissions of two years only in length, and also to the modern thoroughly organized drafting arrangements, men arrive home again feeling, on sighting England, that they have been absent for what seems, by comparison, to be merely a long cruise.

A few days after the arrival of the *Centurion* at Portsmouth the Admiral, Captain, officers and men were invited by the Mayor and Corporation to a civic banquet in honour of the work done by them in China. Steps were also taken by the officers and crew to erect a memorial to the memory of those of their shipmates who fell during the Boxer rising. Then the ship was paid off and thus ended a memorable commission.

And what of Captain Jellicoe and of what value to him was the four-year commission? The experience that he gained was mainly in two directions. First, so far as his strictly Naval duties were concerned, the command of a battleship brought him a fund of practical knowledge, and for the first time, the sense of responsibility inherent in the command of a man-of-war and her handling. Then as Flag-Captain he learned in a very practical manner the details of the organization of a fleet, especially as regards its supplies of food, stores, coal, and ammunition, for it was his business to relieve the Commander-in-Chief of a mass of such detailed work, gathering experience all the time. For a fleet is a large floating town made up of a number of suburbs, the administration of which falls on the Admiral and under him on his Chief of the Staff, or in the old days his Flag-Captain, as his principal executive officer. He is also, to a considerable extent, a connecting link between the captains of the other ships and the Admiral. Many small matters, or complaints, or suggestions, which a captain may not wish to bring to the notice of the Admiral, can generally be entrusted to a diplomatic Flag-Captain to push forward at a propitious moment. The smooth working of a fleet depends largely on his tact. He is incessantly issuing orders in the name of the Admiral, acting as his deputy when he is absent; but, while doing so, he must be careful not to wound the susceptibilities of captains senior to himself, but always to foster and preserve harmony among the senior officers. As an example of tact an instance may be cited which is recorded in Jellicoe's diary, some years later it is true, but it emphasizes the point. At anchor one day in Lagos Bay, a fairly open anchorage, it came on to blow. Jellicoe commanded the battleships in the absence of the Commander-in-Chief, and there was an Admiral

commanding the Cruiser Squadron present, who was senior to him. As the weather became bad he *wrote* to the senior Admiral to say he would like the battleships to raise steam, putting it diplomatically as if he did not know if the cruisers had steam up or not. The Admiral at once made a signal to all ships to raise steam at half an hour's notice. If Admiral Jellicoe had asked permission by *signal* to raise steam, the message could have been read by all ships, and it might well have been looked on as a reminder to the other Admiral that he should have made the signal himself earlier without having to have his attention called to the advisability of so doing. A small matter? Perhaps, but there was a touch of delicacy about Jellicoe's action that the other Admiral was not likely to forget.

A wise provision in those days allowed an admiral to choose his own flag-captain, for the relations between the two were bound to be intimate. They lived together and knew each other's good and bad points; moreover, it was necessary for each to have complete confidence in the other. When this principle was temporarily departed from, the result, in one well-known instance at all events, was catastrophic.

But there was a second and completely different field in which Captain Jellicoe gained experience, and that was in diplomatic matters, and in his relations with the senior officers of foreign navies. His friendship with Sir Claude Macdonald and the insight he gained into current affairs, not merely Chinese affairs but the relations of other nations towards China, and also towards each other in the Far East, was an introduction for him into the regions of diplomacy. Then his intimate association with the officers of eight different nations during the Boxer campaign, and afterwards while the tension with China lasted, was a most valuable experience, especially to a man with a mind as receptive as that of Captain Jellicoe and one of so naturally courteous a bearing. Naval officers, at all events in those days, were apt to become too self-centred and too pre-occupied with their profession to the exclusion of wider and more liberal knowledge and experience. The world to them was often looked on merely through the blinkers of naval knowledge. The commission in China gave Captain Jellicoe a widened outlook on affairs which was to be of great advantage to him afterwards. He became more a man of the world, without becoming worldly-minded.

After the expiration of his leave Captain Jellicoe was asked by Sir William May, who was then the Controller of the Navy, to

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come to the Admiralty as his assistant, which appointment he readily accepted. The Controller of the Navy was also the Third Sea Lord, his duties as Controller being chiefly to superintend the departments which built, fitted out and repaired ships ; as Third Sea Lord he assumed joint responsibility for Admiralty policy with the other members of the Board. At that time the Board of Admiralty consisted of seven members, the First Lord and four Naval members, namely the First, Second, Third, Fourth Sea Lords, and the Civil Lord and Financial Secretary. The Secretary of the Admiralty attended all Board Meetings. The First Sea Lord had control of the disposition of the fleet and ships, and the more important matters of policy. No ships could move, or fire a gun, without an order from the First Sea Lord. But this important axiom did not imply that ships could move or fire guns independent of the consent of the First Lord who represented the Cabinet. Foreign policy naturally dictated the distribution of the fleet and any offensive necessary ; but the First Sea Lord arranged the necessary ships for carrying out that policy. The Second Sea Lord was responsible for the discipline and manning of the fleet and for all questions regarding personnel. He had a free hand within the policy laid down by the Board. In the larger questions of discipline he consulted the First Sea Lord. The Controller had under him the Director of Naval Construction, the Engineer-in-Chief, and the Director of Dockyards and their respective Departments, as well as the Director of Naval Ordnance as far as guns, mountings, and equipment of ships were concerned. All gunnery personnel questions were under the Second Sea Lord. The Fourth Sea Lord dealt with stores of all sorts, including fuel, store houses, etc. The Civil Lord of the Admiralty and the Financial Secretary, that is the two civilian members, were jointly responsible with the other Lords for policy ; but the former dealt especially with all permanent work, bricks and mortar, civil engineering and real estate, whereas the Financial Secretary was responsible for all financial matters. These two were always Members of Parliament. The First Lord, if in the House of Commons, represented the Navy in debates ; if a Peer, these duties devolved on the Financial Secretary, and, in his absence, on the Civil Lord. The First Lord presided over the Board and represented the Navy in the Cabinet. The desiderata in the way of qualifications for these different posts briefly were that all the Sea Lords had to be men of sea experience and common sense ; the First Sea Lord should have been a commander-

in-chief on one or more stations. The Civil Lords were entirely political appointments, and it was not necessary for either of them to have any knowledge of the Navy ; in fact, it was preferable that they should not have any ; they then came to their work with unbiassed minds ; a knowledge of the working of a public Department was of course an advantage to them. The Secretary was the head of the Secretariat at the Admiralty. The position of First Lord was one of great importance. The main qualities necessary were first that he should be a gentleman—(this of course in the ethical interpretation of the word)—and that he should carry weight in the Cabinet and with the Chancellor of the Exchequer. A practical knowledge on his part of the inner working of the Treasury was of great advantage to the Admiralty and the Navy as a whole. The above explanation is necessary because when Mr. Churchill came to the Admiralty the constitution of the Board was altered, and other changes have taken place since ; but, at the time that Captain Jellicoe undertook the duties of Assistant to the Controller, such was the system of ruling that governed the Admiralty and it continued to do so for the time that he himself occupied the position of Controller.

The post of Assistant to the Controller was a new one ; the chief duties were to visit the ships under construction at the private yards, inspect their fittings, make suggestions for their improvement from a practical seafaring and naval point of view. At the Admiralty, also, Captain Jellicoe inspected plans for new ships with the same objects. He travelled a good deal, and Glasgow, with the large shipbuilding yards on the Clyde, was a place that had frequently to be visited. While in that part of Scotland, he often stayed with Sir Charles and Lady Cayzer at Ralston and became intimately acquainted with the whole family. These visits were destined to have a most important effect on the whole of his future life. It will be remembered that shortly before going to China he had made the acquaintance of the Cayzer family, and had been much attracted by the second daughter Gwendoline, who then had just come out. His stay in China had not lessened the attraction, and in 1901 and 1902 this happy companionship was renewed. It was a fateful day, indeed, early in the latter year, when he accompanied the family on board a Clan Line ship for her acceptance trials. Fate arranged that while skylarking with the boys of the party he should sprain his knee rather badly, and naturally he had to stay at Ralston to be nursed.

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“During this week I came to the conclusion that my future happiness depended on my persuading Gwendoline to marry me. I proposed on February 9th and to my joy was accepted. We were married at Holy Trinity, Sloane Street, on July 1st and my married life was one of the most perfect happiness. My dear wife was ever a most helpful companion in whatever appointment I found myself. Our love grew if possible stronger and stronger as the years passed by and she was besides a most loving mother to our dear children. I do not think many men could have been so fortunate in their married life as I was.”

The Navy and the nation owe gratitude to Miss Gwendoline Cayzer for having converted the bachelor Captain to a benedict—for, whatever cynics may say, no Naval officer has so good and complete an understanding of the married portion of his crew as has one who is himself married. It is true that the Admiralty never recognized the wife and family of an officer, or man, until he died, and then not over generously, but an admiral should be rather more considerate. It is an arguable point whether it is a good, or bad thing, to act like the bachelor Sir Arthur (or as the men called him “Old 'Ard 'Eart”) Wilson, who always took his fleet to spend Christmas at Vigo or Arosa Bay. Whether it was really doing good to the Navy by inculcating a Spartan régime is a matter of opinion. But, in these modern days, when men are looked on from a more humane standpoint, much more consideration is shown for wives and families; and it is doubtful if Sir John Jellicoe would have been quite as successful a Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet if he had not married, and most certainly the families of the men would have missed all the many kindnesses that were done for them by Lady Jellicoe as wife of the Commander-in-Chief.

After a short stay at Taplow the newly-married couple moved to London, which was more convenient for work at the Admiralty. A flat was taken over Harrods' stores and in connection with this Lord Jellicoe in after-days pointed out how prices have risen of late years. In 1902 the rent of a flat, with two sitting-rooms and five bedrooms, besides servants' rooms, was £400 a year, whereas twelve years later the rent had risen to £800 a year. It was during the occupancy of this flat that their eldest daughter, Gwendoline Lucy, was born.

Captain Jellicoe remained at the Admiralty till August, 1903, when he was appointed to command the armoured cruiser *Drake*,

in the Cruiser Squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Sir Wilmot Fawkes. The other ships in the squadron were the *Berwick*, *Kent*, *Monmouth* and *Donegal*, with the *Good Hope* as flagship. It was commonly said that Sir William White, the eminent Naval architect, could design a thoroughly good battleship but that he was not so successful with his design of armoured cruisers—certainly those launched in 1902 were sadly deficient in gun power. It is not easy to make a direct comparison, but the *Drake* was of 14,100 tons displacement and carried two 9·2-inch and sixteen 6-inch guns, whereas the German cruiser *Gneisenau*, launched, it is true, five years after the *Drake*, carried eight 8·2-inch and six 6-inch guns on 11,600 tons with practically the same armour protection. The *Drake* and *Good Hope* were sister ships. It will be remembered that the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* sank the *Good Hope* and *Monmouth* at the Battle of Coronel. Of course our ships were hopelessly outmatched. They were only newly commissioned, without real opportunity for sustained gunnery practice, but, even had they been well practised, the eight 8·2-inch guns of the German ships were more than a match for two 9·2 inch which, owing to there being only two of them, could only fire two-gun salvos.

Captain Jellicoe was the senior Captain and therefore led the 2nd Division of the squadron and the second column when in cruising formation, which he remarks was a useful experience for him. Shortly after he joined the ship trouble was experienced owing to leakage of water through the armoured deck, due largely to rivets having been omitted during construction, which did not speak well for Pembroke Dockyard, where she had been built. This necessitated repairs being undertaken at Portsmouth, with the result that the squadron sailed for the West Indies without the *Drake*. She picked up the squadron, however, at Las Palmas in time for the remainder of the cruise. During the passage across the Atlantic, when in the latitude of the Trade Winds, where only moderate winds are as a rule met with, it was found that neither the *Drake* nor the *Good Hope* nor any of the other cruisers could keep their 6-inch gun-ports open without flooding the decks. This, of course, from the fighting point of view, was a serious defect. Captain Jellicoe naturally reported the matter as far as the *Drake* was concerned, to the Rear-Admiral; and, as the other ships confirmed what the *Drake* had experienced, Sir Wilmot wrote to the Admiralty and suggested that the design of the ships as far as the position of the gun-ports was concerned was faulty.

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The result was that when the squadron arrived in England a conference was held at the Admiralty at which Sir Wilmot Fawkes, his Flag-Captain, Captain Madden, Captain Jellicoe, the First Lord, Controller and Director of Naval Construction attended. The sea-going officers stated that, in their opinion, in future designs the whole of the gun armament of cruisers should be placed on the upper deck, even if this involved a reduction in armament. Their recommendations were carried out in the *Defence* class which were the next to be constructed.

The cruise in the West Indies was pleasant and also interesting. The squadron spent three weeks in Bermuda, during which time target practice was carried out. Needless to say, Captain Jellicoe was keen on increasing the accuracy of gunfire of his ship. Long-range gun-firing was just appearing on the gunnery horizon. The trials carried out in the Mediterranean and elsewhere had shown that hitting at ranges quadruple those ordinarily assumed until then for a general action, could easily be attained. This opened up a wonderful vista and a field for vast improvement in the training of the crews and the sighting and fire-control of the guns. It was, of course, immediately apparent that the side that could hit at the greatest range had a fair chance of winning an action before any of its ships were hit by the enemy, so a tremendous spurt was given to the training of the crews. Captain Percy Scott, always ahead of the times, had devised new methods of testing the accuracy of aiming without firing ammunition. These instruments were being supplied to the ships so that many hours a day could be devoted to the instruction of gun-layers and sight-setters without any cost to the Government. He also devised apparatus for practising the crews in rapid loading. Captain Jellicoe was a faithful backer-up of Captain Scott and his instruments, though there was a considerable opposition to them in the Navy; partly because the Navy was a conservative body and disliked innovations, and partly because being electrical devices they were looked on rather as toys. In addition Captain Scott was no diplomatist and never sought out, nor followed, the line of least resistance. He criticized the existing gunnery instructional methods with a tartness that gave considerable offence, the more so because his strictures were true. The result was that he was dubbed a self-advertiser and gained enemies and opposition in the Navy, even though he won popularity among civilians. Captain Jellicoe's well-balanced mind looked deeper than this surface trouble, and

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recognized the value of Scott's new systems. He wrote some years afterwards :

“The *Drake* did fairly well in gunnery competition but I found it necessary to take a pretty firm stand as regards insisting upon the use of Captain Percy Scott's aiming device for heavy gun instruction, the use of the devices being still opposed by many gunnery officers.”

The cruise to the West Indies was for him a very pleasant one. Mrs. Jellicoe and her sister Miss Constance Cayzer came out to Bermuda, where the squadron stayed for three weeks. One eventual result was the engagement of Miss Cayzer to Captain Charles Madden¹ which resulted in a most happy marriage. Charles Madden was an officer of exceeding merit, most level-headed and capable, who afterwards acted as Chief of the Staff to Sir John Jellicoe in the Grand Fleet. On the latter going to the Admiralty at the end of 1916 as First Sea Lord, to deal with the submarine menace, Madden was appointed to command the First Battle Squadron and Second-in-Command of the Grand Fleet. The whole of his wedded life was as happy and blessed as that of his brother-in-law, Lord Jellicoe.

Captain Jellicoe records with satisfaction that at Port Royal in Jamaica he managed to exchange his gig, which was a very poor sailing boat, for a gig that was in store and in such a poor condition that he felt certain that she would be condemned on arrival in England. This condemnation actually eventuated, so he was able to provide the *Drake* with a really good sailing boat in which he subsequently won several races. His methods for obtaining reasonably good boats seem to have become more correct with his rise in rank, and not so drastic as when in the *Sans Pareil*. Later on, manœuvres were carried out in the Mediterranean with the cruisers under the command of Admiral Sir Baldwin Walker, after which the *Drake* had to be docked at Malta owing to the propeller shaft casing working loose. Then followed manœuvres with the Channel and Reserve Fleets under Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson. Fog was experienced during these ; but it was characteristic of Sir Arthur not to pay attention to climatic deterrents. During one particular exercise the fog was very thick and there were one or two rather close shaves of collisions ; however, no harm

¹ Afterwards Admiral of the Fleet Sir Charles Madden, Bart., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O.

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ensued. On one occasion, when the Home Fleet arrived near the entrance to Arosa Bay in a thick fog, Sir Arthur sent a small ship in to make the land, and, on the report proving unsatisfactory, he went down the sea gangway of the *Exmouth*, the flagship, and navigated the fleet into harbour by looking under the fog, which was less dense near the surface of the water. He was a great, and at the same time a bold, Admiral of indomitable tenacity.

Captain Jellicoe was in the *Drake* only from August 12, 1903, till November 21, 1904, or a little over a year, when he was recalled to the Admiralty to serve on the committee that had been instituted by Sir John Fisher to consider the new designs of battleships and armoured cruisers. When Sir John Fisher was Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet he started his campaign for modernizing and bringing the Navy up to date. Long-range firing was in its infancy, but he was quick to see the possibilities held out by a vast increase in fighting range. Among other matters he saw that the design of battleships required radical alteration. At first he was convinced that such ships should carry an armament of the smallest heavy gun and the largest light gun ; but, yielding to the facts brought out by modern gun ranges, he changed his views completely to an armament of the heaviest large gun, and the lightest small gun, and this was the nucleus of the *Dreadnought* design. While Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth he had an informal committee to advise him on the design of his battleship and battle cruiser. So that by the time he went to the Admiralty as First Sea-Lord the designs of these two classes of ship were fairly well fixed. The armament was to be the greatest number of heavy guns that each could carry, with no other calibre of gun than that necessary for anti-torpedo boat defence. Actually, as worked out, the design for the battleship was to be ten 12-inch guns, and for the cruiser eight 12-inch guns, and a 12-pounder, anti-torpedo armament for both. Sir John Fisher foresaw that so radical a change in design would meet with great opposition both in the Navy and among a section of the community, who would look on it as an unnecessary increase in armaments. However, as the long-range gun trials had proved conclusively that a uniform gun armament was essential if the enemy were to be hit at long ranges, and that the then existing mixed armament of heavy and medium calibres was an anachronism, he was determined to see the new design through ; and, in order to overcome

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all opposition, he induced the First Lord to appoint a strong committee to investigate and report on the design.

The Naval members of the committee were :

Rear-Admiral H.S.H. Prince Louis of Battenberg, Director of Naval Intelligence.

Engineer Rear-Admiral Sir John Durston, Engineer-in-Chief of the Fleet.

Rear-Admiral Alfred L. Winsloe, Commanding Torpedo and Submarine Flotillas.

Captain Henry B. Jackson, F.R.S., about to assume the duties of Controller of the Navy.

Captain John R. Jellicoe, about to assume the duties of Director of Naval Ordnance.

Captain Reginald H. S. Bacon, Naval Assistant to the First Sea Lord.

Captain Charles E. Madden, about to assume the duties of Assistant to the Controller.

Civilian members :

Mr. (afterwards Sir) Philip Watts, LL.D., D.Sc., F.R.S., Director of Naval Construction.

The Right Honourable Lord Kelvin, F.R.S.

Professor J. H. Biles, LL.D., F.R.S.

Sir John Thornycroft, F.R.S., D.C.L.

Mr. (afterwards Sir) Alexander Gracie (Fairfield Shipbuilding & Engineering Co.).

Mr. R. E. Froude, F.R.S., Superintendent Admiralty experimental tank at Haslar, and Mr. W. H. Gard, Chief Constructor Portsmouth Dockyard.

After several meetings, and full discussion, during which several alternative designs of distribution of armament were reviewed, the original design which had been brought to the Admiralty by Sir John Fisher was accepted with but little alteration. The design was then turned over to the Director of Naval Construction and the Engineer-in-Chief to elaborate. Captain Jellicoe as Director of Naval Ordnance had to provide the heavy gun mountings. Sir John Fisher laid down one law, more inviolable than that of the Medes and Persians, which was that the *Dreadnought* was to be finished and ready for her trials in one year from the date that her keel was laid. In order to comply with this the 12-inch gun mountings intended for two ships already under construction had to be allocated to her. There was no great difficulty in building

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the ship and making and installing her engines, but it was far more difficult to complete the hydraulic gun mountings in the time laid down, in fact it took at least eighteen months to build a set for a single ship. This important point will again be referred to when discussing the programme of the construction of ships for the German Navy.

The secondary armament of so small a gun as the 12-pounder has been the subject of criticism ; but, at the date of the design of the *Dreadnought*, the range of the Whitehead torpedo was still moderate, although increasing, and the 12-pounder was looked on by Jellicoe, as well as by others, as sufficient in size to stop destroyer attack before the range at which torpedoes could then run had been reached. Eventually the 6-inch gun was installed in the later *Dreadnoughts*, mainly to deal with torpedo craft.

Other ships besides those of the two large classes were under consideration, and Captain Jellicoe tried hard to get the light cruisers, designed about this period, also fitted with a uniform armament instead of a mixture of 6-inch and 4-inch guns. For, from the point of view of fire-control and hitting, a uniform armament was as desirable in the light cruisers as in a battleship.

On coming to London as D.N.O. Captain and Mrs. Jellicoe took a house in Draycott Place, where their second daughter, Betty, was born. Their third daughter, Myrtle, was born at his father-in-law's house in Belgrave Square, in 1908.

Jellicoe's description of his work at the Admiralty is best given in his own words :

“ In those days the staff of the D.N.O. comprised an Assistant Director of Torpedoes, three officers of Commander's or Lieutenant's rank for gunnery work, three for torpedo work and a marine officer for general duties.

During the early part of my time as D.N.O. Captain Percy Scott was serving as Captain of the *Excellent* Gunnery School, to which he had been appointed in April, 1903, and had introduced into the school the numerous inventions which he had perfected for improving the shooting of heavy guns in the Navy. There was still considerable opposition to his ideas in many quarters and much difficulty was experienced in introducing them generally into the Fleet. There was a strong prejudice against competitive gunnery practices ; indeed, so great was this opposition, that efforts were made whilst I was D.N.O. to persuade me to abandon the Gun Layers' Test ; efforts which I resisted most strenuously and successfully, I am glad to say. I was convinced then, and remained

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convinced, that competition is the greatest possible incentive to efficiency.

Apart from the question of improvement in gunnery, a great deal of work fell to the lot of the D.N.O. in connection with the designs of guns and mountings for the new ships. There was at one time a suggestion to introduce a triple gun turret, but we could not succeed in getting a satisfactory design of mounting. Many years later the *Nelson* and *Rodney* were armed with triple gun turrets, but many difficulties were experienced in their use, in the early years of the ships' commissions."

Designs of ships fitted with triple gun turrets and also super-imposed turrets had been examined by the "Design Committee, but they were turned down for two reasons. First of all the design was a novel one, and extensive trial would probably be required before a satisfactory turret was evolved. In the second place it seemed, then, rather to savour of putting too many eggs into one basket, for damage to a single turret would put three, and not as heretofore two, guns out of action.

"During my term of office as D.N.O. I felt it was necessary for the Admiralty to obtain control of the designs of naval guns and naval ordnance generally. The practice hitherto had been for the War Office to be responsible entirely for the designs of naval as well as military guns, the War Office being advised by the Ordnance Committee at Woolwich. Any representations or proposals made by the Admiralty had to pass through the War Office ; delay was thereby caused, and it seemed to be against all reason that one department of State, the Admiralty, should be forced to place all its orders through another department, the War Office, not so conversant with naval needs as the Admiralty."

This question of Admiralty supply and, to some extent, design of guns being under the War Office was an old and vexed question. This procedure dated back to the reign of King Henry VIII, since which time, until after the Crimean War, ammunition and guns for both Army and Navy were supplied by the Master General of the Ordnance. After 1858 the Ordnance Department ceased to exist and the War Office took over the supply for both Army and Navy. In 1858 the Admiralty viewed the position with alarm, and year by year the position became worse until, in 1886, largely through the insistence of Captain Fisher, the Navy became responsible for the storage of their own ammunition and the Navy also became responsible for the design of their own

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guns. Manufacture, however, remained under the War Office. Trouble continually arose between the two departments as regards priority of work, and Captain Jellicoe tackled the problem.

“As the result of long correspondence with the War Office and the helpful assistance of the then Director of Artillery, I succeeded with the aid of Sir John Fisher, then First Sea Lord, in bringing the entire control of naval guns into the hands of the Admiralty. We were of course in close touch with the Ordnance Committee as our technical advisers, and the Naval Ordnance Store Department, then in charge of Admiral Eardley-Wilmot, was strengthened by the appointment of gunnery officers for technical work.”

This last sentence really contains the pith of the whole matter. The Navy could not efficiently take over the responsibility for the manufacture of its guns until it had a staff of trained inspectors. Jellicoe therefore started a small department of qualified inspectors under an “Inspector of Steel”; it was after these officers had become efficient that the transfer took place. The last step in this ladder of slow ascent to efficiency was taken by his successor, who was able to arrange for the Admiralty being responsible for the supply of its own ammunition and Ordnance stores and for all contracts in connection therewith.

“The question of fire control at long range was another matter which occupied my mind and time a good deal whilst D.N.O. The Garrison Artillery were considerably ahead of the Navy in this respect, using as they did the Watkins system of fire control. The Garrison Artillery task was of course a much easier one than that of the Navy, as they had not to contend with a moving platform. Several gunnery officers were at work upon the problem for naval guns, the conditions being, as stated above, very different from those faced by Shore Artillery. Lieutenant F. C. Dreyer was one of the officers who was working on the problem, and to his inventive genius and strenuous labours the system adopted and at present in use in the Navy is largely due. A clear knowledge of the difficulties of the problem as well as the requirements of sea-going gunnery was necessary. The inventive ability of various civilians was also of value and these received due recompense for their work and assistance.

Rear-Admiral Percy Scott, shortly after the termination of his command of H.M.S. *Excellent*, the gunnery school at Portsmouth, was appointed in March, 1905, as Inspector of Target Practice, a new post created with the idea that a senior officer of special gunnery attainments would be able by experience gained during attendance at the gunnery practices of the various fleets and squadrons, to put

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forward suggestions for improvements tending to promote efficiency. The appointment of Percy Scott to this post did result in a very marked increase of efficiency both in the Gun Layers' Test and in Battle Practice. I did all that I could as D.N.O. to back up his efforts."

The figures given in the Postscript to this chapter show the results obtained in the years 1901-6 in Gun Layers' Test and in 1905 and 1906 for Battle Practice; these are striking evidence of the vast improvement in gunnery which resulted, and show the need that existed for such improvement.

"Whilst at the Admiralty as D.N.O. I entered into correspondence with Captain W. S. Sims, of the United States Navy, on the subject of gunnery and particularly of long-range practice. I had known Captain Sims well in earlier days and he had, when serving in the United States Squadron in China, been a keen follower of Captain Percy Scott's methods for improving heavy gun shooting. In 1906 he was acting as Adviser in Gunnery to the United States Government and Director of Target Practice and I was anxious to ascertain something of United States methods and results. Our correspondence was entirely frank in character; we revealed no secrets to each other, but discussed results freely. I gathered then from Captain Sims that the results of Battle Practice compared quite favourably with our own. My friendship with Admiral Sims was of immense advantage to relations between the two navies when he came to England in 1917 as Admiral Commanding United States Naval Forces in Europe, a post which he filled with most conspicuous success. We owe him a very deep debt of gratitude for his great work in the War and for his keen sense of comradeship."

Captain Jellicoe was promoted to Rear-Admiral on February 8, 1907. Then came as a fitting ending to his time as D.N.O. this letter from the First Lord:

MY DEAR ADMIRAL,

15.4.07.

It is with very mixed feelings that I write to you asking whether you will accept the appointment of Rear-Admiral in the Atlantic Fleet in succession to Admiral Egerton.

Since you have been at the Admiralty you have done such admirable work and have been such a tower of strength in your department that I and all my colleagues look upon your absence with dismay.

I am sure however that you will make a great success of your command in the Atlantic and I most heartily wish you God Speed and Good Luck.

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Will you please in the meantime keep my letter to yourself in order that I may communicate to the King the news of your appointment before it appears in print.

Believe me,
Very Sincerely Yours,
TWEEDMOUTH.

The envelope of this letter was, with customary modesty, marked "To be shown to relatives only."

POSTSCRIPT

PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY

BATTLE PRACTICE, 1906

(with average points obtained in 1905)

Order of Merit.	Squadron.	No. of Ships.	No. of Guns.	Average Points.		First Ship in Squadron.	Points Scored.
				1905.	1906.		
1.	2nd Cruiser Squadron	6	92	54	264·7	<i>Drake</i>	478·3
2.	China Squadron . .	5	72	65·3	250·6	<i>King Alfred</i>	341·7
3.	Atlantic Fleet . . .	9	140	91·8	233·2	<i>Britannia</i>	410·0
4.	East Indies	3	29	37·6	203·6	<i>Fox</i>	221·4
5.	Mediterranean . . .	8	113	133·1	203·0	<i>Bulwark</i>	363·2
6.	C. of Good Hope Squadron	4	39	31·5	180·8	<i>Forte</i>	221·4
7.	Channel Fleet	20	306	157·0	146·0	<i>Exmouth</i>	351·5
8.	1st Cruiser Squadron	4	48	47·5	140·1	<i>Devonshire</i>	188·6
9.	3rd Cruiser Squadron	4	56	147·9	92·2	<i>Leviathan</i>	177·7
10.	Australia	4	50	46·8	78·7	<i>Challenger</i>	178·9

RESULTS OF GUN LAYERS' TEST

Year.	1901.	1902.	1903.	1904.	1905.	1906.
No. of ships that fired . .	127	139	134	108	100	89
No. of guns	1,137	1,241	1,296	1,171	1,096	1,073
No. of hits	3,562	4,789	5,996	5,748	4,374	5,733
No. of misses	6,244	6,863	7,028	7,664	3,357	2,328
Excess of hits over misses .	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	1,017	3,405
Excess of misses over hits .	2,682	2,074	1,032	1,916	Nil	Nil
Hits per gun per minute 12-in. and 10-in. Mark VI and VII	·33	·38	·53	·47	·58	·81
9·2-in.	·31	·35	·70	·73	1·40	2·84
6-in. Q.F. and B.L. . . .	1·93	2·02	2·47	2·28	3·73	4·96
4·7-in. and 4-in. O.F. . .	1·81	2·41	2·63	2·63	4·14	5·68

CHAPTER X

1907 to 1908

Rear-Admiral in the Atlantic Fleet

THE first step in Sir John Fisher's scheme, whereby Jellicoe was to command our fleet in the war with Germany (which he with his wonderful prophetic insight forecast for 1914), was his being knighted by the K.C.V.O. being conferred on him by King Edward VII in October, 1907, on the occasion of the review of the Home Fleet at Cowes. The second step was for him to be appointed Second-in-Command of the Atlantic Fleet in 1907. This was designed to make a break in his term of shore appointments. After a year at sea it was planned for him to succeed Rear-Admiral Jackson as Controller. Accordingly, on August 25, 1907, he hoisted his flag in the *Albemarle* as Second-in-Command to Vice-Admiral the Hon. Sir Assheton Curzon-Howe.

The Commander-in-Chief was one of the most polite men who ever served in the Navy. He had, moreover, the knack of communicating that most desirable virtue to officers who served under him. He commanded the *Cleopatra* in the years 1892-95, and for the rest of their lives the lieutenants of that ship were paragons of politeness. One example only need be quoted, namely, that of Sackville Carden, who died from the result of his labours as Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean during the early part of the Dardanelles campaign—a most charming and courteous officer.

Captain W. Goodenough was Sir John Jellicoe's Flag-Captain, Bernard Buxton his Flag-Lieutenant, and Walter Gask his secretary. Two days after hoisting his flag he left to join the Atlantic Fleet at Queenstown, arriving on August 3. The Commander-in-Chief left on the same day for England on account of the death of his brother, so Sir John temporarily assumed command of the fleet. The next day the Vicereine, Lady Aberdeen, cut the first sod and initiated the enlargement of the dock at Haulbowline Yard. Salutes, illuminations and official dinners marked the occasion. From there Sir John took the fleet to Berehaven, the Commander-

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in-Chief being still absent. The only incidents of note during his stay were attempts to save the crew of the ship *Leon XIII*, which went ashore off Seafeld Point in a heavy gale. The *Arrogant* was despatched to help but the sea prevented any salvage operations. The men eventually got ashore, partly on a raft and partly by means of a rocket apparatus. The French Consul conveyed the appreciation of his Government for the assistance given. The other item is conveyed in a note. "Service sailing race on the 11th for Rawson cup won by *Albion's* pinnace. My boat no good. Rig new—masts in wrong place—difficulty in staying."

The Fleet then left for manœuvres under Admiral Lord Charles Beresford. There was nothing much of special interest in these except to those taking part in them—the usual strategical exercises and dummy fleet actions, which of course were instructive to all concerned. The manœuvres ended on the 28th, after which the fleet coaled at Weymouth, and left on the 31st for Gibraltar, Sir John taking with him on board as guests his old Commander-in-Chief, Sir Edward Seymour, and Major-General Hadden, the Master-General of Ordnance. At Gibraltar the fleet had a gay time, punctuated with days at sea for various exercises. Sir John hunted with the Calpe hounds whenever possible. Battle practice was carried out at 8,000 yards range at the usual battle practice target. Ranges, it will be observed, were creeping up but were still far short of the 14,000 of Jutland.¹ Night-firing was also carried out, Sir John going on board each ship in turn to witness the firing. The first night the firing finished about 10.30 p.m., but on the next night, owing to a mishap with the target, the firing took place late in the night, and the last ship did not finish until 4.30 a.m. Sir John hunted twice a week and played in the rackets handicap; he reached the finals but was then beaten. On December 14, the fleet left for England, the *Albemarle* arriving at Sheerness on the 18th to give Christmas leave. His holiday was spent in the Isle of Wight, chiefly hunting.

The next cruise was to Arosa Bay on the north-west coast of Spain, an excellent harbour with a snipe marsh near the entrance that yielded up a good bag of snipe to the fleet. The following faint echo of a trivial happening comes from this visit to Arosa Bay :

"When Don Alfonso Ozores was a very small boy, he and his two sisters watched the English Fleet steam up the Bay and drop

¹ In fact firing up to 20,000 was carried out by some ships during that battle.



LADY JELlicOE
From a photograph taken in 1917.

Alice Hughes

anchor in the anchorage at Arosa Bay. He was most anxious to see these great vessels close at hand, and persuaded their Scottish governess to take them out on the Bay in a small rowing boat. Whilst very close under one of the biggest ships of the fleet, he saw a man leaning over and watching them. Before his governess could stop him, he called out in English, how much he would love to go on board. The man invited them to come up, and most kindly walked around with them. Before leaving the boy told him who he was and said if he would like to come out and see his home, he would come down and meet him in the family car. This the man said he would be very pleased to do.

As the boat conveying him came alongside the pier, the following afternoon, Don Alfonso Ozores told me he noticed all the sailors throw their oars up, and there appeared to be a lot of fuss. Feeling very impressed, he asked the man if he was some one of importance, to which he smilingly replied that he was the Admiral.

On the conclusion of his visit, he asked him if he would write his name in their visitor's book, and they then learnt that it was Jellicoe. Every year subsequently, they much appreciated a Christmas card, which he always sent them.

When the Great War broke out, the boy said to his father, 'Have you seen that our Admiral Jellicoe has been appointed to the command of the British Navy?'

From that moment he told me that despite the fact that the sympathies of many of his friends seemed to lean towards Germany, he was always for the Allies heart and soul, naively adding the reason being that he could not bear the idea of Jellicoe being beaten."¹

The fleet moved on to Vigo on January 31. On February 2 news was received of the assassination of the King of Portugal, so the Commander-in-Chief decided not to leave Vigo, pending communication with the Admiralty. The Admiralty wired that the fleet should be ready to go to Lisbon for the funeral, and, later, again wired that the fleet could go to Lagos and wait there; this was in accordance with their original programme. On the way down, the *Exmouth*, with the Commander-in-Chief, sailed for Lisbon to represent the British Navy at the funeral of King Carlos. The ceremonies in which our Navy took part at the funeral were interesting. The *Exmouth* fired guns every quarter of an hour for forty-eight hours continuously day and night, the ships of the other nations following suit. The Commander-in-Chief on

¹ Contributed by Colonel Cecil Allanson.

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board the *Exmouth* was the senior officer. The officers of the *Exmouth* and *Arrogant* mounted guard on the King's coffin for twenty-four hours in two-hour reliefs; the Commander-in-Chief taking his turn, which he was asked to do by the Portuguese Government, because the King had been a British Admiral. Detachments from the British regiments of which the King had been Colonel also took turn at mounting guard. Only the Commander-in-Chief and his Flag-Lieutenant attended the actual funeral.

On the return of the Commander-in-Chief the fleet left for Gibraltar. Bad weather was experienced and on arriving off Gibraltar the Admiral Superintendent wirelessly to the Commander-in-Chief advising that the fleet should not enter until the weather moderated. He decided to do so, however, but ordered the ships to go to swinging berths and not alongside the moles. In went the fleet, all the ships got into difficulties and eventually the *Albemarle* anchored outside. Battleships of this class with in-turning screws were very difficult to handle in a strong wind when steaming slowly. It was practically impossible to turn them head to wind under such conditions, and anyone who has entered Gibraltar in a gale will sympathize with the difficulty experienced by the ships when entering together. The officers who were on board a French man-of-war which happened to be lying inside the mole were full of praise at the way our battleships had been handled under such difficult conditions.

Then came a period of rest with hunting and rackets. Lady Jellicoe stayed at the Reina Cristina Hotel at Algeciras, and Sir John took the opportunity of giving a very successful dance on board the *Albemarle*. The Governor also made use of the occasion to practise the garrison of Gibraltar, so the fleet took part in an attack on the Rock. A good deal of night-firing also took place.

The stay at Gibraltar gave an opportunity to refit the *Albemarle*, so Sir John and Lady Jellicoe with some friends went for a week's trip to Seville and Ronda and later on to Granada. When the *Exmouth* took the majority of the ships to England, Sir John remained behind with the *Arrogant* and *Albion*, carrying out battle practice; then, after coaling (the *Albemarle* averaging 250 tons per hour from lighters, which was very good), this small command left for England.

It may be interesting to give a specimen of a typical day's work at sea, for be it remembered that, under a good admiral, a fleet when at sea is never idle.

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7.30 to 8.15 a.m., Officer of the Watch tactics. That is, the Lieutenants of the Watch took charge of the ships, with the Captains keeping a fatherly eye on them. 9.30 a.m. to 11.30 a.m., rate-of-change exercises. This was to exercise the fire control officers in forecasting the correct range to apply to the guns: the enemy in this case being one of the ships stationed at a distance and steaming on a course converging on, or diverging, from the other ships. The ships were then formed in quarter line, that is in échelon; this being a formation in which it was difficult for the ships to keep accurate station, and therefore afforded excellent practice in station-keeping to the Officers of the Watch. From 3.30 till 5.15, tactics with the Commanders (not Captains) of the ships in charge. Then quarter line again with a different ship leading, and finally at 7 p.m. the formation of single line for the night.

Torbay was duly reached and Sir John took the opportunity of visiting Dartmouth College, where he played in a cricket match of Masters *v.* Officers. Then to Chatham, where he took a fortnight's leave, spending it partly at his father-in-law's house in London, and partly at a house in Merrow which he and Lady Jellicoe had rented. For two days of his leave he sat as President of a committee at the Admiralty to revise the rules to be issued for the 1908 battle practice.

After the fleet had reassembled at Berehaven he sailed on July 5 for Quebec for the Tercentenary celebrations. H.R.H. the Prince of Wales proceeded to Canada independently at high speed in the battle cruiser *Indomitable*.

A good description is given in a letter to his mother.

At Sea. August 5th/08.

"I was too busy after the Prince [afterwards King George V] arrived at Quebec to do much letter-writing so put it off till the passage home. I daresay Gwennie [Lady Jellicoe] has told you some of my news, but I will tell you our deeds at Quebec as far as I can. We had a very strenuous week of festivities and official functions and sleep was rather difficult to get. No doubt the papers have told you of the actual programme carried out.

The Prince arrived on the afternoon of the 22nd and official visits to him were the first thing. We only just said 'How do you do,' as there were a great many people for him to receive. He landed at about 4 p.m. escorted by the Commander-in-Chief and myself in our respective barges, and of course with plenty of saluting and cheering. In the evening I had twenty-six to dine with me,

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mostly French. The French Admiral and his Captain and Commander, the Comte de Montcalm and Marquis de Levis Meripoux (representatives of the Montcalm and Levis families), the Mayor of Quebec, the Minister of Woods and Forests, the Premier of Quebec Province (all French Canadians), M. Herbette, a member of the French Commission, Captains Tarleton and Murray (representatives of the Tarleton and Murray families) and some more English people. The dinner went off very well and my French lasted out well; the French Admiral became and remained very friendly. The French Canadians, especially the Mayor, were charming, and he swore eternal friendship to me.

On the 23rd the Prince came afloat to return Naval visits. I met him on board the *Exmouth* and had a longish talk with him. He was very proud of the *Indomitable* and full of her doings. [This was the first ocean trip of one of the new Dreadnought Battle Cruisers, during which she acquitted herself well. The turbine machinery, as with the battleships, proved a great success and a full speed of over 24 knots was attained on her trials.]

Before the Prince came afloat at 10.30 I had ridden out with General Otter, who is commanding the soldiers at the Review, to see the place where the Review was to be held. The soldiers were having a rehearsal, so I could see how much room the Navy would have. In the afternoon we attended in full dress to hear addresses read and speeches made at the foot of Champlain's statue. Champlain (or rather his representative in the pageant) landed from the *Don de Dieu*, which arrived under sail at 3 p.m. She has been specially built for the occasion and was an exact copy of the original ship in which the Marquis de Champlain arrived in 1608. After the presentation of addresses and numerous speeches, the whole pageant marched past the Prince, and looked very fine in their pageant clothes. There are 3,500 performers and Wolfe's and Montcalm's soldiers looked really splendid. In the evening there was a state dinner at the Citadel. About 100 sat down and there was a reception afterwards. Full dress for dinner, and very hot it was. We did not get to bed till midnight and had to be ashore by 8 a.m. on the 24th to march out to the Review on the Plains of Abraham. So far as the Navy was concerned this was my particular job. The Commander-in-Chief had left it entirely to me, and I had all the arrangements to make and all the orders to give. We landed 1,685 men, 101 officers and ten guns.

The French had 100 men.

The Americans 250 men.

The Soldiers 12,500 men.

So there were plenty of us there. The Plains of Abraham are not

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large and there was hardly room for us all. We were drawn up in three lines. There were great questions as to where the foreigners should go and the matter was eventually decided by the Foreign Offices of England, France and the United States. We had about two miles to march out to the Plains and received a great ovation on the way out from the inhabitants. We were there in plenty of time and saw most of the troops arrive. One lot were late and did not get into position until after the Prince arrived at 10.30. We received him with a salute and then he rode round the lines. I met him as he approached the Naval Brigade and rode with him round our men. After he had been all round, the march past began. I led the Naval Brigade of course, and after passing him turned off to be with him while the men passed; the Commander-in-Chief was there too. Our men did really excellently and he said to me at the end: 'It was splendid.' I then left and saw the men on the way to the boats and then galloped back to see the soldiers pass. Considering they are Militia, with only twelve days' training a year, they were really very good. It was all over by 12.30. The day was very hot and I expected we should have some casualties from sunstroke, as we were in blue clothing and the officers in cocked hats, but there was a nice breeze and no one got knocked out. I had to hurry on board to change into a frock coat and tall hat for the Mayor's State lunch at 1.45, which the Prince attended. In the evening there was a State Ball, about 3,000 present; there was an awful crush. I got away as soon as I could and was in bed by 1.30 a.m. Our own Naval Ball, given on the 21st to 800 people, was a great success and everyone said they enjoyed it immensely.

On the 25th the Prince went on board the *Arrogant*, one of our cruisers, and steamed up and down the lines of the fleet. The ships were manned, of course, and cheered and saluted. I was ordered to go on board the *Arrogant* with him. The Citadel party were all there too, but I had to attend to H.R.H. on the bridge so did not see much of them. The Prince issued a most complimentary memo afterwards about the Review ashore and Review afloat. In the afternoon there was a State performance of the pageant which we all attended. It was a most magnificent show and full of interest, and the weather kept very fine. The prettiest sight was to see the court of Francis I coming across the valley on horseback through the trees; and perhaps the most interesting parts were those in which Indians took part. They had real Indians for the occasion who entered very much into the spirit of the thing. Fifty bluejackets did property men and were most popular whenever they appeared. I had to leave a little before the end to dress for

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a dinner to the Colonial representatives. As there were so many speeches we did not get up from the dinner table till 11.45 p.m. I did not get to bed till past 1 a.m.

On Sunday 26th we attended the State Service at the Cathedral, a very impressive Service. The Commander-in-Chief and I sat in the next pew to H.R.H. and the Governor-General. In the afternoon I had some people to lunch and then drove out to see their place near the Montmorency Falls. A very pretty property with a very large number of relics of the siege of Quebec in the grounds. Their name is Price. H.R.H. turned up there at tea time and went all round the house and grounds. He stayed till nearly 7, and I could not get away till he left. Luckily a cousin of Nancy Burrows motored me in.

Monday 27th. I managed to get ashore for an hour to make a few purchases. In the afternoon I attended a dance on board the French Flagship and dined again at the Citadel in the evening. This was a private dinner, and the only one at which the ladies appeared. The Citadel party is delightful, the Greys especially charming, and also a daughter of Lord Minto, Lady Violet Elliot. Lady Beatrice Pole-Carew is also very pretty and nice and I liked Lady Eileen Roberts. After dinner we saw the Fleet's fireworks and naval display from the terrace of the Citadel, and very pretty and effective it was. There was a reception after dinner so we did not get to bed till 1 a.m. again.

Sunday 28th was a day of farewell visits all the forenoon. My friend the French Admiral gave me his photo and souvenirs for Gwen and the children. In the evening at 7 p.m. I was ordered to the *Indomitable* and the Prince gave me his photo in a magnificent silver frame as a souvenir of what he called a 'strenuous time.' I had ten minutes with him and he was very nice indeed. In the afternoon I had attended athletic sports and a garden party at the Lieutenant Governor's.

At 8 p.m. we went to the Prince's dinner given on board the *Exmouth*. About 80 sat down. The dinner was plain and excellent and a very good wind-up to a most successful week. The Prince was full of energy and never seemed bored or tired and made an excellent impression all round. We got on board at midnight. At 2.15 a.m.!! unmoored and left at 3 a.m. on the 29th.

The *Indomitable* left an hour later and picked us up when we had got through the narrow part of the channel. We eased to let her pass and at 9 a.m. she passed the fleet. Each ship manned and cheered ship, and *Indomitable* cheered back. The Prince then signalled compliments, etc., and we followed the *Indomitable* at 16 knots till 8 p.m., when we eased and she went on. On the 31st

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we ran into a dense fog at 2 a.m. which continued all day. At 10 a.m. the Commander-in-Chief detached *Albemarle* to Hawke Bay on the coast of Labrador. We had been ordered there by the Admiralty to keep up wireless communication with the *Indomitable* for 48 hours after she passed it. The Commander-in-Chief asked me to pass up the line and ordered the ships to cheer us. The fog was so dense you could only see a hundred yards, so we had to pass them at that distance to see them at all. We had great cheerings and then he signalled by wireless his sorrow at parting and that sort of thing, and I replied in my best manner, and we went off to find the Bay, no easy matter in such a fog, especially as very strong currents run at the entrance and the soundings are not a good guide. However we managed to pick up the fog signal and worked our way in by that. Fortunately the *Brilliant* was anchored at the head of the Bay and I told her to fire guns which helped us in a lot. We were pretty glad to anchor!! The fog lasted as dense as ever till the 1st August at noon. I managed to find my way ashore by aid of a compass both days. On the 31st I made friends with a fisherman and the lighthouse people, and on the 1st had four hours' excellent fishing and got six trout. The largest weighed $2\frac{1}{4}$ lbs. and the rest averaged $1\frac{3}{8}$ lbs. I had to come off as it came on to blow, and I had rather a job to get off, but managed it. We left that night, blowing fresh, but nice and clear and got no fog till the next night, the 2nd, by which time we were pretty clear of icebergs. We had a very large number right in our track, so it was lucky it was clear. Nineteen in sight at one time, and we calculated the biggest weighed 2,500,000 tons. Not a nice thing to knock up against. We had a very narrow shave of hitting one at 10.30 p.m. on the 2nd. It was pitch dark and we sighted a large one only 400 yards off and right ahead, and had to put the helm hard over to clear it."

This bald account is supplemented in a version supplied by a young officer on board the *Albemarle* :

"I was junior officer of the watch for the first watch, with Lieutenant Marten¹ as officer of the watch. At about 10.30, the night being very dark, the lookout on my side of the bridge reported seeing something white ahead. I told him to report to the officer of the watch, who promptly put the helm over to clear it and told me to tell the Captain he had done so. I groped along the superstructure and reported to Captain Goodenough in his cabin. He said 'You had better tell the Admiral.' I knocked at Admiral Jellicoe's door. 'Come in.' The

¹ Afterwards Vice-Admiral F. A. Marten, C.B., C.M.G., C.V.O.

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Admiral was in his pyjamas and about to turn in. I told him my mission and was about to leave, when a searchlight was turned on from the bridge, showing a very large iceberg almost alongside on the port beam. I turned and said 'Here it is, sir, on the port beam.' The Admiral came to the door. 'By George, Goodhart,' said he, 'it's a beauty! I'll be up.' If I remember rightly, he and the Captain spent most of the remainder of the night on the bridge."

The narrator, afterwards Commander L. McCormick-Goodhart, R.N.V.R., never forgot what he called the serenity with which Admiral Jellicoe accepted what might easily have been a catastrophe.

Admiral Jellicoe continued :

"It was no wonder that after that experience I eased to six knots till daylight. We ran into a thick fog at 6 a.m. on the 3rd which lasted for nearly 48 hours. Just as thick as a hedge, but as I thought we were clear of ice I did not ease. I never saw a fog last so long. It was very wet all the time and one's clothes were always damp. However it has cleared at last and the weather is very fine now. We should get to Plymouth Sunday afternoon if the weather keeps fine. I fear we may have to coal there as we are running rather short and have to get over to Chatham. But I hope that we shall manage to get to Chatham on the Tuesday."

On arrival in England Sir Jolin had six weeks' leave and then joined the Board of Admiralty as Controller and Third Sea Lord. There is no doubt that the spell of sea service was most beneficial—once more he came into contact with the Navy at sea and with sea realities. He had for a short time command of the whole fleet, and at the Tercentenary celebrations came to be associated socially with the leading Colonial statesmen and also the French Admiral and other officials. All this and the ceremonies must have had a broadening effect on his mind ; moreover, his short stay in Canada was afterwards to be of great assistance to him when, eleven years later, he was to visit that Dominion to advise on its Naval co-operation with the Mother Country.

CHAPTER XI

1908 to 1910

Controller and Third Sea Lord

AFTER leaving the *Albemarle* in August, 1908, Admiral Jellicoe enjoyed a short period of leave and then joined the Board of Admiralty as Controller and Third Sea Lord. We have already sketched the duties of that post ; but in addition to these, other matters of importance demanded his attention, chief of which was the increasing disquiet in official circles at the growth of the German Fleet. Admiral Tirpitz was then at the height of his power and had great influence with the Kaiser, moreover his prestige throughout Germany was very great. There was little doubt that he intended to enforce the building of a fleet which would be able to meet, on equal terms, that which we could muster in the North Sea. It will be remembered that Sir John Fisher, with his indomitable energy, had caused the *Dreadnought* to be completed and ready for sea in one year from the laying of her keel. It must not be forgotten, however, that it took six months to complete the design and drawings necessary before construction could commence ; then sea-going and gunnery trials occupied three months. So it was not until February, 1907, that full sea-going experience regarding the *Dreadnought* was obtained. In the meantime, however, three more Dreadnought battleships and three Dreadnought cruisers had been laid down. Sir John Fisher's building strategy had gained us a lead of two years in construction over the German shipyards. He had strained every nerve to achieve this, as it was most necessary, in view of the tremendous importance to us of command of the North Sea, to maintain an ample margin of battleship strength. Incidentally, so much attention abroad had been attracted to the *Dreadnought* herself that little heed had been paid to the Dreadnought cruisers, with the result that we actually had one of these in commission before the Germans appreciated the value of this new design and had started to build one for themselves. There was no doubt in the minds of those best qualified

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to judge that a Dreadnought battleship would make mincemeat of any ship of pre-Dreadnought design. The actual range of the heavy guns carried by both classes of ships was the same, but a Dreadnought carried ten of the heaviest guns while the pre-Dreadnoughts carried only four. The extra number of guns was indeed valuable, not only because of the greater number of shells that could be hurled at an enemy, but also because double the number of 4-gun salvos could be fired by a Dreadnought than by a pre-Dreadnought in the same period of time ; since hitting, which is the all-important factor in shooting, depended on accurate ranging, which again depended on the rapid firing of salvos, the Dreadnoughts were doubly advantaged by their all one-calibre big gun armament.

It is obvious that there was bound to be a period, a sort of interregnum, during which the older pattern ships still maintained their importance until the new class arrived in sufficient numbers to furnish the main fleets of the two nations. Our Navy was well provided with pre-Dreadnoughts. In this class our superiority over the German Navy was decisive. But, since the new type which was coming along was bound in very few years to eclipse entirely the older patterns, the arrival of the Dreadnought design, in reality, impelled the building of an entirely new Navy, that is new so far as battleships and armoured cruisers were concerned. The Board of Admiralty, looking ahead, fully recognized the danger that would ensue if Germany built year by year the same number of these ships that we did ; they therefore put forward what was called the Cawdor programme of 1905, which was approved by the Unionist Government ; this allowed for four Dreadnought battleships or cruisers being built each year. The result had been that, in addition to the *Dreadnought* herself, three Dreadnought battleships and three Dreadnought cruisers would be launched by the end of 1907. When the Liberal Government came into office in December, 1905, the question of the necessity for adhering to the Cawdor programme was at once raised. It was impossible for the Admiralty, on mere figures, to defend the laying down of three Dreadnoughts in 1906, as Sir John Fisher's strategy had given us a wholesome start ; and it was equally impossible to get a Cabinet, bent on economy, to look ahead and see the enormous advantage which would accrue if we rapidly attained so great a superiority over Germany in Dreadnoughts as to make it practically impossible for that country to catch us up. No ! the Cabinet argued that, since in 1909 we should have in commission four Dreadnought battleships and three

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Dreadnought cruisers, and Germany would only have one such battleship, the best policy—from the economy point of view—was to mark time and let Germany pull up close to us, when we once more should start and try and keep our lead.

The chances are that if in 1906, 1907, 1908 and 1909 we had kept up a really big building programme, Germany would have seen the hopelessness of the race in armaments. But the cheaper method, and that which therefore met with favour in the Cabinet, was to attempt to negotiate with Germany a truce in what was called the “race of sea armaments.” This pleasant dream ended in a rude awakening; for, of course, Germany had no intention, if she could help it, of playing second fiddle to us in the North Sea. The negotiations led to our making a “gesture” by reducing our building programme; this gave Germany the chance of protracting the negotiations and of building battleships at her maximum rate; so the net result of this wretched philandering was that only two Dreadnought ships were laid down in 1906–7.

By the time that the 1907–8 programme came up for discussion the economists in the Cabinet had been reinforced by the arrival of Mr. Winston Churchill; and Mr. Lloyd George had become Chancellor of the Exchequer. These two with Mr. Lulu Harcourt banded together to maintain the policy of reducing armaments in order to carry out a programme of social reforms, believing—or persuading themselves to believe—that the assurances of the German Emperor regarding the augmentation of his fleet were to be accepted. A further cut therefore was aimed at the Cawdor programme.

Again, the Board of Admiralty could not, on figures, fight the economists, since in 1910 we should have had seven battleships and four cruisers completed while Germany would have had only three battleships and one cruiser ready for service. The Cabinet refused to look forward further than the immediate future, and would not take into account the fact that the rate of battleship building in Germany could be largely accelerated if necessary. The Sea Lords were alarmed and sent a written remonstrance to the First Lord (Lord Tweedmouth) dated December 3, 1907, which ended:

“We therefore consider it of the utmost importance that power be taken to lay down two more armoured ships in 1909–10, making eight in all; as unless there is an unexpected modification in Germany’s anticipated building programme, resulting in her not completing 17 ships by the spring of 1912, it will be necessary to

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provide eight new British ships to be completed by this date, the last two being laid down at the end of March, 1910."

The members of the Cabinet were obdurate.

By the end of 1908, that is at the time that Admiral Jellicoe became Controller, the situation had become positively alarming and the Sea Lords made a determined stand. Lord Jellicoe thus described the situation :

"As Controller of the Navy it was my duty to point out what was not generally realised, viz. that the governing factor in our rate of production of capital ships lay in the time required to construct the necessary turret gun mountings. From information, which I obtained privately, I had ascertained that the productive capacity of Krupp's works in Germany considerably exceeded that of our own gun-mounting firms. I pointed out that whilst our firms would no doubt say that they could improve on their rate of production, we could only judge by actual performances ; and, as a matter of fact, in the case of the last 17 large ships built which carried 9·2-inch and 12-inch mountings, the *average delay in delivery of the mountings beyond contract dates was 6 months*. We had, as a matter of fact, found it necessary to order the turret gun mountings of the later ships well in advance of the time for placing the contract for the ships themselves. It was true that the armament firms were prepared to increase their gun mounting plant if they were assured of the necessary orders ; but, obviously, they could not be expected to do this unless there was a reasonable prospect of the orders being given.

I pointed out also that another question needing consideration was the probable individual superiority of later German Dreadnoughts over their British rivals. An analysis of the German estimates for 1909-10 showed that the *three first instalments* for the 1906-07 and 1907-08 ships was £1,374,000, whilst the *two* first instalments for the 1908-09 ships was £1,283,000 ; the corresponding figure for the 1907-08 ships being £875,000. This could only be taken to indicate that the later ships were vastly more powerful than our later ships. A comparison of the sums taken for armaments went to support this view. Owing, however, to uncertainty as to what was included under the heading of armaments in the German estimates the figures could not be taken as conclusive."

Fortunately Mr. Reginald McKenna had become First Lord—a man of courage with a clear brain and an aptitude for figures. The position, sketched by the Sea Lords and presented by the First Sea Lord to Mr. McKenna, was that there was a *possibility* that

Germany would, by the spring of 1912, have completed 21 Dreadnoughts (including large Dreadnought cruisers) and that it was *practically* certain that she would have 17 by that date, whereas we should have only 18.¹

The alarm at the Admiralty was by no means confined to a forecast based on the figures actually published by the German Admiralty. There were a number of small indications that the Germans were secretly about to accelerate their programme of construction very considerably. Reliable information was received that Messrs. Krupps had ordered a number of certain machines of use only for the construction of turrets. The number indicated that preparation had been made to construct six sets of mountings simultaneously. Another private source gave information *re* the secret accumulation of nickel by Krupps ; the main use of nickel steel at that time being for the construction of guns, armour and gun mountings. Mr. McKenna, by a careful analysis of the German estimates, and a comparison with actual expenditure, came to the conclusion that Germany was laying down more ships than those acknowledged in her programme. Information given by one or two knowledgeable persons confirmed this surmise. All these matters were known to the Cabinet, and it must be acknowledged that they were very grave. Surely these facts, combined with the Admiralty forecasts, should have impressed any Cabinet. Not a bit of it ! The economy trio fought hard against the Admiralty, and won, temporarily. But they were up against a man of sterner stuff than the previous First Lord, and Mr. McKenna beat them in the end by sending in his resignation to the Prime Minister.² On Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, being informed of Mr. McKenna's resignation, he appreciated that the matter must have been of far greater importance than the Prime Minister and the Cabinet had realized. He examined again with Mr. McKenna the Admiralty documents and saw how very serious the position was. He at once visited Mr. Asquith and requested a reconsideration of the whole case. The Prime Minister called another Cabinet meeting and, since he himself had by that time been convinced by Sir Edward Grey, the Admiralty programme, with some unimportant provisos introduced to save the face of the

¹ It is interesting to note that the number of German Dreadnoughts and Dreadnought cruisers in commission in August, 1914, was 16 and in October, 1914, was 18.

² *Life of Lord Fisher of Kilverstone.*

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objectors, was accepted. Had Mr. McKenna's resignation taken effect the whole of the Sea Lords would have resigned also, although he had particularly requested that they should not do so. Eight Dreadnoughts were therefore approved for the 1909-10 programme. Had these ships not been approved at that date and had only two been built, we should in January, 1915, have had only fifteen Dreadnoughts available in the Grand Fleet fit to fight the sixteen possessed by Germany.

As a matter of some interest, this battle over the programme produced a temporary coolness between Sir John Fisher and Mr. Winston Churchill, who hitherto had been on terms of great friendship.

Sir John Fisher ended a valedictory letter written in his usual flamboyant style :

"The Apostle is right ! The tongue is the very devil ! (N.B.—Yours is slung amidships and wags at both ends.)

Yours till the angels smile on us.

P.S. . . . I think it would be too lovely to call the four extra Dreadnoughts—

- No. 1. Winston
2. Churchill
3. Lloyd
4. George

How they would fight !! Uncircumventible ! Read this out to the Cabinet !"

The estrangement fortunately was made up, but only to break out again, and once more be patched up, this time largely because Mr. Churchill carried out Lord Fisher's pet scheme whereby Sir John Jellicoe was to be given the command of the Grand Fleet in 1914.

The following is an account by Lord Jellicoe of his stewardship :

"My years of office as Controller were difficult. It was a period during which the size of capital ships themselves, and the calibre of the guns constituting their main armament, was steadily increasing. Whatever arguments may be used by some critics against the introduction of the Dreadnought type of ship by Lord Fisher, it was obviously essential that British ships of this type should be at least as powerful as those belonging to other nations, in the same way that British ships of earlier type were more powerful.

Hence, as Germany followed us in constructing Dreadnoughts, and her ships equalled, or in some cases exceeded our vessels of

similar date in displacement, so we were forced to design ships of a larger size.¹ It may be as well to state here that the only true criterion of power in a capital ship, or indeed in a ship of any class, is *size* or *displacement*, provided of course that one may conclude that the designers of ships in different countries are of more or less equal skill.

Some people (of whom Mr. Winston Churchill when First Lord of the Admiralty was one) were in the habit of stating that British ships were of greater power than German ships, because the calibre of the guns was larger, apart altogether from the size of the ships. But, of course, if in ships of equal displacement British guns were of greater calibre than German guns, more weight being thus expended in gun armament, it was obvious that in some other direction the German ships possessed advantages; and the advantage they did possess was that of far greater protection both in the way of armour above and below water, and in more complete watertight subdivision below water as protection against torpedo or mine attack. This more complete subdivision and under-water protection in German capital ships was facilitated by the greater beam of the ships as compared with that of our own, our vessels being limited in beam by the width of existing docks and the difficulty of persuading our Government to construct new and wider docks. Any naval officer who inspected the German ships salvaged from Scapa Flow, when in dock at Rosyth (as I did), could see clearly the immense under-water protection of these ships due to their great beam and wonderfully complete watertight subdivision. I certainly—as Second Sea Lord before the War—pointed out to Mr. Churchill the fallacy of his arguments.

It was difficult to ascertain the particulars of the German ships under construction during the years (1908–11) of my service as Controller. More especially did this apply to the German Battle Cruisers. Our vessels of this class already built or building consisted of the *Invincible* class with a displacement of 17,250 tons, and the *New Zealand* class displacing 18,800 tons. The design of the next ship came under discussion in 1909, and it was at first proposed to build vessels of much the same size as the *New Zealand*, such information as was obtainable from our Intelligence Department being to the effect that the Germans were not exceeding this size. But secret information reached me from another private source that the horse power of the projected German ships very largely exceeded that of our earlier Battle Cruisers, so the presumption was that the new German vessels must be far larger and more

¹ The Germans refused our suggestion to hold a Limitation of Armament Conference.

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powerful than was anticipated. I accordingly had the design of our new ship (the *Lion*) altered, her size, armament and horse power being greatly increased, with a displacement of 26,350 tons. It was fortunate that this was done, as it turned out that the corresponding German ship, the *Moltke*, displaced 22,640 tons, whilst the next ship to her, the *Seydlitz*, displaced 24,610 tons.

My efforts were then devoted to providing our new capital ships with better armour protection than that given to the ships of the *Dreadnought*, *Superb*, *St. Vincent* and *Hercules* classes, where the main armour belt was only 10 to 11 inches thick and the upper belt 8 inches thick, which was only carried up to the main deck, the protection to other parts of the ship being on a similar small scale. In the *Orion* and *King George V* classes the main belt was 12 inches thick and the upper belt 9 inches, the side armour being carried to the upper deck.

Our battle cruisers of the *Invincible* and *Australia* class were also very insufficiently protected, with the results seen at the Battle of Jutland. Whilst the loss of the *Indefatigable* and the explosion in the after turret of the *Lion* were probably due to flash conveyed to the magazines owing to exposure of charges in the ammunition hoists, that of the *Queen Mary* and *Invincible* was perhaps caused by the penetration of side or turret armour.

In the *Orion* class of Battleship and the *Lion* class of Battle Cruiser 13·5-inch guns were mounted. The guns were of considerably lower muzzle velocity than the 12-inch guns in the preceding capital ships. This enabled much greater accuracy to be obtained. The projectiles weighed 1,250 lbs. as compared with 850 lbs. for the 12 inch. In later capital ships mounting 13·5-inch guns the weight of the projectile was increased to 1,400 lbs.

In order to determine the effectiveness against armoured ships of the shell supplied for the various guns I arranged for extensive firing trials to be carried out in 1910 against the old battleship *Edinburgh*, which had been specially prepared by the addition of modern armour plates. As a result of these trials, before the end of my term of office as Controller, the Ordnance Board were asked on the 18th October, 1910, to endeavour to produce an armour-piercing shell which would perforate armour at oblique impact and go on in a fit state for bursting.

I left the Admiralty in December, 1910, to take command of the Atlantic Fleet; and, unfortunately, the production of such efficient armour-piercing shell was not sufficiently pressed and our shell continued to be proved only at normal impact to the plate. As a result, during the War, in the various actions in which the shell naturally struck at oblique impact, due *inter alia* to the angle of

descent, our armour-piercing shell did not achieve the results they ought to have against the well-armoured German capital ships. Our shell, though in many cases they knocked holes in the enemy's armour by their momentum, broke up at oblique impact instead of going on and bursting in the vitals of the enemy ships.

We thus lost the advantage we ought to have enjoyed in *offensive* power due to the greater weight of our projectiles, while suffering the accepted disadvantage in the protection of our ships due to the heavy weights of our guns and ammunition which reduced the total weight available for armour plating.¹

Efforts were made to improve the under-water protection of our capital ships while I was Controller, one notable result being the fitting of three engine-rooms abreast of each other in the *Hercules* and later types. With the centre engine-room alone intact ships thus fitted should still be able to steam at considerable speed.

In the *Hercules* and later types 21-inch torpedoes were introduced with much greater range and also much heavier bursting charges in the heads than with the 18-inch torpedoes of previous ships.

The progress in the development of the design of men-of-war at this period was very rapid, and all departments of the Admiralty in consequence were working at very high pressure. So also were officers and men afloat in order to get the maximum value out of their ships.

The introduction of turbines and oil fuel in the *Dreadnought* had proved to be a great advance, and the engine-room machinery and the boilers of succeeding classes continued to improve, due to the labours of our excellent engineer officers.

To give an example of the rate of progress : when in 1909 the battleships of the *St. Vincent* class were commissioned for trials, there were two later classes on the stocks and a third (the *Orions*) being designed. England in those days made prodigious efforts to maintain her security by building a sufficient Navy. It was not easy to obtain Cabinet approval for the extra cost involved in thus increasing the size of our newer ships, but with the help of Mr. McKenna, sanction was obtained for the new designs, which allowed them to have the increased armour protection.

A matter to which I devoted a good deal of attention whilst in office as Controller was that of dock accommodation for our ships.

¹ Sir John added this explanation of his action : " I have pointed out the fact of my calling for the design of an improved armour-piercing projectile in 1910 when Controller of the Navy, because Mr. Churchill in one of his books, *The World Crisis*, states that responsibility for the inefficiency of our projectiles at Jutland rests with me. The inaccuracy of this statement will be apparent to readers of the foregoing remarks."

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The establishment of Rosyth as a naval base, with a dockyard and necessary docks, had been approved by the late Conservative Government, but the Liberal Government then in power had decided to slow down work on this base. Although I felt it was very necessary to push on with the work, so as to provide us with adequate accommodation on the East coast, in view of the German menace, I could not get this decision altered. I feared that we should not get a dock ready until 1917 or later. I recollect that Mr. McKenna, when I mentioned this to him, bet me £5 that one dock would be ready by the end of 1916. I took him up and lost the bet, I am glad to say.

Still being anxious about dock accommodation for our battleships, I went into the question of floating docks, with the most helpful aid of Commander D. J. Munro, R.N., then serving at Sheerness Dockyard, and Admiral Nelson Ommanney, Admiral Superintendent at Chatham Yard, who were both great believers in docks of this nature. The Admiralty Civilian Departments were strongly opposed to the idea. Whilst the matter was being investigated, I happened to visit Germany to attend the Kiel regatta, and on my way passed through Hamburg, where there were several large floating docks in use. I visited the largest of these, discussed their use with such people as I met, and was strengthened in my conviction that docks of this nature were very desirable, particularly in war, since they could be taken to any suitable fleet base. As all our existing dock accommodation was in the vicinity of the English Channel, it was obvious that, with a fleet operating in the North Sea, the question of having dock accommodation on the East coast, pending the completion of the Rosyth dockyard, might be a matter of very great importance. I succeeded in obtaining approval for the construction of two such docks of a size capable of taking our largest battleships. They were moored respectively in the Medway and at Portsmouth. It was fortunate that this action was taken, as after the outbreak of war one of the docks was towed to Invergordon, and used continually for docking the battleships of the Grand Fleet, thus saving the long passage to and from Plymouth (the nearest base at which they could dock) with their increased necessary absence from the Fleet of several days, and also the absence of the escorting destroyers which could so ill be spared from the Fleet in the early part of the War. By the end of 1916 capital ships had been docked in the Invergordon Floating Dock on 70 occasions. Later a second and smaller dock suitable for light cruisers was obtained by Captain Munro at my request and moored at Invergordon.

I have mentioned above the visit to Kiel. I was anxious to see

something of the German Navy, which I knew would be present in strength during the regatta, and I wanted also to renew acquaintance with German Naval officers with whom I had been on friendly terms in past days. I knew that Admiral von Usedom, an old friend who commanded the German Naval contingent during the Boxer troubles in China, was in charge of Kiel dockyard, and that Admiral Koerper, at one time Naval Attaché in London, and whom I knew very well, was Commander-in-Chief at Kiel.

The Admiralty informed our Naval Attaché in Berlin, Captain H. L. Heath, of my intended visit and asked him to take the necessary steps in regard to obtaining permission. He replied to the effect that he had been informed by the Kaiser that if I came I must wear uniform and that I could not be allowed to visit any German men-of-war without first obtaining permission from the Commander-in-Chief at Kiel. I did not care to visit Kiel under these conditions, but Mr. McKenna said that he thought I should go, and so I went, accompanied by my wife. We had a pleasant journey, staying in Hamburg for one night *en route*.

On arrival at Kiel we put up at the principal hotel facing the harbour. We paid our respects to H.R.H. Prince Henry of Prussia, who was in residence at Kiel, and who was very kind to us, asking us to dinner more than once during our stay, and taking us out in his steam yacht.

We received much hospitality from Admiral von Usedom and Admiral Koerper as well as from the Kiel Yacht Squadron.

The royal yacht, *Hohenzollern*, with the Kaiser and Admiral von Tirpitz on board, arrived shortly after we reached Kiel. I paid my respects to His Majesty, who also shewed me much civility, including an invitation to race with him in his yacht, the *Meteor*, a race which I enjoyed. The Kaiser left the *Meteor* on the conclusion of the race but the yacht took me into Eckenförde to attend the annual 'Beer meeting' there, which was presided over by Prince Henry.

I saw something of the smaller yacht-racing, in which the Crown Prince and one of his brothers took part.

We met also Admiral von Lans, another friend of China days, when he commanded the *Illis*, and who showed much gallantry in the attack on the Taku Forts. I visited in his company Prince Henry's country house near Kiel. I did not meet Admiral von Holtzendorff, then commanding the High Sea Fleet, also an acquaintance of China days, as he was away; but I was asked to lunch on board Admiral Bachman's flagship, a cruiser. In accordance with the orders given to our Naval Attaché by the Kaiser, I went to Admiral Koerper to ask formal permission to accept the

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invitation. He had evidently not been told of the procedure I was to follow and was much amused at the occurrence. I had a very pleasant lunch on board with Admiral Bachman.

Whilst on board the *Meteor* with His Majesty the Kaiser our conversation turned to the question of the beam of battleships and the matter of dock accommodation for ships of considerable beam. I told His Majesty that I thought that the German Navy were lucky in that they could design ships of greater beam than we could, and thus get increased under-water protection against mines and torpedoes, whereas we were limited in this respect by the width of our docks and the reluctance of the Government to construct new ones. He remarked that he had adopted the wiser course of first constructing wide docks and afterwards building his ships."

The difficulty we experienced with regard to docks was one inherent in a Navy like ours, with a long history behind it. Every twenty years or so as our ships grew in size a cry arose for larger docking facilities. The latest pre-Dreadnought ships measured some 425 feet in length and 78 feet in beam. Docks that had been designed to hold their predecessors of smaller dimensions, even with the margin that had been allowed for increase in size of ships, were found only just capable of holding the *Dreadnought* of 490 feet length and 82 feet beam plus bilge keels. To increase length was not so serious a matter as to increase the breadth of a dock. Every attempt was therefore made in design to keep the beam of new designs down to a figure which our docks at Chatham, Portsmouth, Malta and Gibraltar could accommodate. With the German Navy it was different; the Kiel Canal had to be widened, but this was becoming necessary even before the Dreadnought design came along, and new docks at a couple of dockyards became part of the same undertaking. A good margin could be allowed in the original design of both these works. It was to these that the Kaiser referred when he said that he built docks to take the ships and not ships to fit the docks.

While Controller, Sir John Jellicoe rented a house between Harrow Weald and Stanmore, and here their fourth daughter, Norah, was born. They were close neighbours of W. S. Gilbert of *Bab Ballads* and "Gilbert and Sullivan" opera fame. Not far away was the private school kept by Mr. Royle at Stanmore, and they saw a good deal of Mr. Royle and his very charming wife and family of boys. For exercise Sir John walked daily to and from Harrow Weald station.

1908 to 1910—CONTROLLER AND THIRD SEA LORD

On leaving the Admiralty on December 20, 1910, to take up the Command of the Atlantic Fleet, he received a well-deserved tribute from the engineering press. It was pointed out in *Engineering* that during the two years in which he had been Controller some ninety vessels of all classes had been added to the Navy, comprising 12 battleships and armoured cruisers, 8 protected and unarmoured cruisers, 70 destroyers and torpedo boats and submarines. In addition there were building, or designs completed for laying down, 13 battleships and armoured cruisers, 10 protected and unarmoured cruisers and 59 smaller vessels.

The article concluded :

“ Sir John Jellicoe has been a strong Controller, and his severance from the Admiralty is a matter of personal regret which is not by any means confined to members of the Board and heads of Departments. No Controller has been more popular, none has commanded greater respect as an administrator. Sir John had the reputation of being a very hard worker, working for fifteen or sixteen hours a day when necessary. He never worried, fussed or drove his subordinates. His words were few but to the point. And he had never been known to make a request or give an order twice.”

CHAPTER XII

1910 to 1912

IN COMMAND OF THE ATLANTIC FLEET

20.12.10 TO 18.12.11

LORD JELLICOE thus describes these eventful years :

“On December 20th, 1910, I assumed command of the Atlantic Fleet (in succession to Prince Louis of Battenberg), with the rank of Acting Vice-Admiral. My flag was hoisted in H.M.S. *Prince of Wales*, with Captain Ronald Hopwood as my Flag-Captain, Commander F. C. Dreyer as Flag-Commander, Fleet Paymaster Hamnet Share as Secretary, and Lieutenant Bernard Buxton as Flag-Lieutenant. The fleet consisted of 6 Battleships of the *Prince of Wales* and *Formidable* classes, and a Cruiser Squadron of 4 armoured ships, commanded by Rear-Admiral F. T. Hamilton, with his flag in H.M.S. *Drake*. There were also 2 light cruisers. Rear-Admiral Carden was 2nd in Command of the Battle Squadron.

On leaving England the fleet proceeded to Vigo and carried out exercises with the Mediterranean and Home Fleets, commanded respectively by Sir Edmund Poë and Sir William May. They were of an interesting nature and included a night action between the two fleets in close contact with each other. The difficulty of distinguishing friend from foe, and the exceeding uncertainty of the result, confirmed the opinion I had long held that a night action between fleets was a pure lottery, more particularly if destroyers took part in it.

During these exercises I received a wireless message from the Admiralty informing me of the death of my dear little daughter Betty, five years of age, from mastoids. The news came as a great shock, as she had been quite well when she, with her elder sister Lucy and my wife, came to see me off from Portsmouth.

At the conclusion of the exercises the Atlantic Fleet proceeded to Gibraltar for gunnery practices, during which I soon realized the value of Commander Dreyer's services as a gunnery expert. He had served in H.M.S. *Exmouth*, flagship of the Channel Fleet, as Gunnery Lieutenant, and that ship during his term of service in her headed the list of the whole Navy in gunnery practices. He

had also been one of my assistants at the Admiralty when D.N.O. Whilst at Gibraltar my wife and I went to Tangier and spent a very pleasant four days in a pig-sticking camp 16 miles out from there.

On return to England I took the fleet to Berehaven for a short time, and from there proceeded to join the Home Fleet off Swanage, whence the Combined Fleets left to take part in the Coronation Review at Spithead.

His Majesty the King inspected the fleets on June 24th, 1911, there being present in addition to the British Fleet eighteen vessels, each representative of a foreign nation. Many entertainments took place during the time we were at Spithead. I attended the Coronation with my wife at Westminster Abbey on June 22nd."

It may be recalled that among many notable foreigners at the Abbey were the Crown Prince and Princess of Germany, also Prince and Princess Higashi Fushimi, Admiral Togo and General Nogi. The two last had played most conspicuous parts in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5.

The fleet dispersed on June 28, and the Atlantic Fleet carried out tactical exercises with a portion of the Home Fleet. At the conclusion of the exercises the fleet proceeded to Rosyth.

"It had been arranged that the German High Sea Fleet should meet the Atlantic Fleet in Norwegian waters. I had myself been anxious for such a meeting for two reasons. First that it would, I hoped, have a good effect on the relations between the two countries, which to my mind was very necessary, and secondly because it was desirable to know as much as possible about the German Navy and its personnel, if unfortunately we should ever have to meet each other in conflict. I had, ever since my experiences of the German Navy in China during the Boxer troubles, conceived a decided admiration and considerable liking for German Naval officers and men. I had taken every opportunity of meeting them, and knew personally a great many of the senior officers, including those obviously destined for high command. I felt, too, a great respect for the efficiency of the German Navy.

Unfortunately, shortly before we were due to start for Norway, the Agadir incident arose. Sir Arthur Wilson, the First Sea Lord at the time, wrote privately to me to say that, if the anticipated meeting took place, nothing but mere official courtesies were to pass between the two fleets, and that I was under no circumstances to offer or receive any private hospitality. I informed Sir Arthur that I felt it would be a great mistake for the meeting to take place

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with such restrictions in force and that it would be far better to cancel it.

This was done and I was ordered to a Southern Irish port with the fleet in readiness for any eventuality. After a short time there I was directed to go to Torbay, and finally, at the end of June, when the crisis had passed, was ordered to send the fleet to its home port to give leave.

On arrival at Portsmouth I spent a few days with Sir Charles and Lady Cayzer at St. Lawrence Hall, their Isle of Wight residence, my wife awaiting me there. It happened to be Cowes week and we went over to Cowes, and amongst other visits went on board the *Albion*, a steam yacht belonging to Mr. Loeffler, whom we knew well. I met Prince Henry of Prussia on board and he at once tackled me about the failure to meet the High Sea Fleet in Norway and said, amongst other things, that the Kaiser, who had worked so hard to bring about the meeting with a view to improving the relations between the two countries, was very angry and disappointed. I could not of course mention the Agadir Question, so merely said that the Admiralty had ordered my fleet to its home port to give leave, and I was not aware of the reason for the change, although I much regretted it. Prince Henry, however, was obviously of the opinion that the change of plan was intended to be a direct snub to the Germans.

During my stay at Portsmouth I raced at Cowes in the *Meteor*, the Kaiser's yacht, and in the *Germania*, another German yacht belonging to Herr Krupp von Bohlen. Both these yachts were successful during the Cowes week.

In September I took the Atlantic Fleet to Berhaven, where the annual fleet regatta was held, my flagship, the *Prince of Wales*, winning the Fleet Challenge Cup for the largest number of points gained during the regatta. I stroked our skiff in the Veteran Officers' Skiff Race, which we won after a close finish with the *Good Hope's* skiff, stroked by my old friend Rear-Admiral Cecil Burney, who had succeeded Admiral Hamilton in Command of the Fifth Cruiser Squadron in May, 1911."

This was all the more praiseworthy in that up to the last moment it was doubtful whether a severe attack of lumbago would allow Sir John to pull ; but before the race his back was ironed with a heater with successful results.

"After short visits to Queenstown and Torbay we proceeded to Portland.

In the autumn the Atlantic Fleet went to Gibraltar for gunnery and other practices and my wife and children came out to stay in a house, Villa Plata, which we had taken for some months. We

spent a very pleasant time there and the fleet did well at Battle Practice, which was a matter of considerable satisfaction to me. We held a Naval Rifle Meeting, at which I managed to win the Officers' Competition at 500 yards, and my Flag-Commander, Dreyer, won the 200 and 600 yards competitions.

In November Their Majesties the King and Queen visited Gibraltar for a few hours on their way to India. I had anchored the fleet outside the harbour and decided to try whether I could get all ships' companies to 'cheer ship' simultaneously by signal from the flagship. The result was fairly satisfactory.

In December I received a telegram from Mr. Churchill, who had succeeded Mr. McKenna as First Lord of the Admiralty, offering me the command of the 2nd Division Home Fleet in succession to Prince Louis of Battenberg, who was going to the Admiralty as First Sea Lord. I was not at all anxious to leave the Atlantic Fleet, as I preferred service away from England to service in Home Waters, and I replied that I would sooner retain my Command of the Atlantic Fleet. I then received a somewhat peremptory telegram to the effect that my Command of the Atlantic Fleet would in any case be terminated and that no other appointment was open to me except the one offered. Under the circumstances I had no option but to accept."

This change was, of course, part of Lord Fisher's plan for the education of Sir John Jellicoe and to fit him to command our main fleet in war. Hitherto Sir John had not served in a Dreadnought battleship or cruiser; and it was essential not only that he should actually serve in one but that he should have experience of a fleet of such battleships. So to the Home Fleet he had to go.

Shortly after this the wreck of the P. & O. steamer *Delhi* took place on the west coast of Morocco in very bad weather. The following extract from Sir John's diary shows the energetic steps he took, and the work done by the fleet and the French afloat and ashore. He was ever a man of action, and above all quick to act.

"*December 13th.* A very wet and windy night. At 3.15 a.m. an orderly came to the house with a wireless signal from the P. & O. Steamer *Delhi* (having Duke of Fife, Princess Royal, and Family on board) saying they were ashore two miles south of Cape Spartel and asking for help.

I went on board at once. Ordered *Duke of Edinburgh* to get up steam full speed, also *London* and *Weymouth*, told Rear-Admiral

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Cradock to shift his flag to *Duke of Edinburgh* and go on in her, leaving others to follow. Sent 6½-inch and 4½-inch wire hawsers from fleet to *Duke of Edinburgh* and *London*, and all the grass lines I could get hold of. *Duke of Edinburgh* got away at 6.30, *London* at 7.15, *Weymouth* at 8.30 [Turbine ship].

I wrote to the Governor asking that military rocket apparatus might go over in *Weymouth* to Tangier, thinking it would probably be very difficult to get at a ship on the Morocco coast from seaward. Wired to Minister at Tangier to ask him to have mules ready for transporting apparatus out and get permission to land it.

Telephoned to ask for life boat to be sent and ordered Dock-yard tugs to be ready to tow her.

Some delay in getting life boat's crew, so offered a volunteer crew from *Prince of Wales*, which the Captain of the Port, who volunteered to go as coxswain, gratefully accepted. Got her away 8 a.m. and *Weymouth* with rocket apparatus at 8.30, sending a lieutenant and signalman from the *Black Prince* with them. Ordered the *Implacable* and the *Formidable* to have steam by 9 a.m. and the *Prince of Wales* and *Good Hope* to be ready at one hour's notice.

The Governor, Sir Archibald Hunter, came on board at 9 a.m. to let me know what he was doing in the way of preparation to receive the passengers from the wreck and the Royal party, and told me that he had wired to the King at Delhi, giving him information of the wreck, so that he should not see it first in Reuter's telegram. He suggested I should wire to the King as to progress made in the rescue work.

Cradock in the *Duke of Edinburgh* arrived near the wreck and anchored at 9 a.m. and by intercepted wireless telegraph messages between *Duke of Edinburgh* and *Delhi*, I learnt that he was going on board the *Delhi* in a cutter either from the *London* or the *Duke of Edinburgh*. Later I learnt that the French cruiser *Friant* from Tangier, which had only arrived at Tangier from France at 1 a.m., was sent round by the Senior French officer in *Lavoisier* so as to arrive by daylight (at 6.45 a.m.). At that time the ship was further out than later, and not so much sea, so that the French boats got 39 women and children off the wreck, and on arrival of the *Duke of Edinburgh* took them to her. The *Friant* was rolling so heavily she could not get them inboard. The French boats were handled and behaved magnificently, the steam boats going into the surf where Kemp (Captain of the *Duke of Edinburgh*) informed me that he would have hesitated to send our steam boats. Later in the day one French steam boat unfortunately capsized in the breakers, (probably fires were first put out) and three men were drowned. At about noon Admiral Cradock got the Royal party and a few

others into one or two of our cutters and got ashore. They swamped close to the shore, but the party were all got safely on the beach, though wet through and only half-clad.

But the boats could not get off again, and no further boat operations were possible until the life boat arrived from Gibraltar at about 2 p.m. She then made five trips between the wreck and the shore, taking ten to twelve each time. She had five of the crew washed out of her on one trip and stove herself in against her own anchor the last trip but one. The last trip was made half full of water, and she broached to and was thrown up on to the beach badly damaged, but all got ashore. She was then unfit for further use.

Meanwhile some of the P. & O. boats got ashore with Lascars and some passengers, all being thrown up on to the beach and impossible to launch again. The *Delhi* gradually took a list to seaward (she was lying parallel to the beach) and was swept further inshore until she was well *inside* the first line of breakers.

As soon as I heard that Cradock was ashore (and I heard at the same time that he was taking the Royal party to Tangier; this however turned out to be incorrect) I ordered Admiral Burney in the *Good Hope* at 1.30 p.m. to go to the wreck and take charge of operations. I had previously sent the *Implacable* at noon to Tangier to push on with transport arrangements for getting food out to Spartel for those ashore, and transport for bringing people back, as, in spite of messages to the Minister, little seemed to be doing in that way.

Burney arrived off the *Delhi* just before dark, and sent me a full account by wireless telegraphy of the situation, the first I had received; all messages from the scene of the wreck pressed strongly for rocket apparatus, but transport difficulties had delayed their progress, though they got away from Tangier at noon. The only possible transport was by mules as there is no road fit for wheel traffic.

At dark all operations had to cease. The *Duke of Edinburgh* arrived at Gibraltar at 8.30 p.m. with 39 women and children. I went on board with Gwen. They were all well clad and fairly comfortable except one lady in rather a state of collapse whom Gwen took to Villa Plata. I parted from my dear wife at 10 p.m. and returned on board to sleep, giving orders to the ship to go to Tangier at 6 a.m. when I intended to see for myself conditions, hurry up transport and then go round to the wreck. I had kept the King and the Admiralty fully informed by wire of the progress of the rescue work. P. & O. Agents had wired for salvage plant, lighters, etc. The Royal party arrived at the Legation at Tangier

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at 7 p.m. wet to the skin, with very little clothing (Lister, the Minister, had to give his coat to the Princess Royal), but otherwise all right. The *Implacable* got 50 donkeys off to Spartel before dark.

December 14th. Arrived Tangier 9 a.m. Saluted country. Spanish cruiser *Reina Regente* saluted me. *Lavoisier* and *Friant* did not salute, sending to explain that it was because of the loss of the three men yesterday. I went at once to the *Friant* and thence to the *Lavoisier* to express my personal thanks for their assistance and my condolence for the loss of life. Then to the Legation. Saw Lister, also the French Chargé d'Affaires. The Royal party in bed, no clothes to get up, so said they were sorry they could not receive me!! Got hold of the P. & O. Agent and Vice-Consul and arranged to send any passengers ready by 3 p.m. to Gibraltar in the *London*. I made arrangements for sending provisions, etc., out to Spartel, and change of clothing, and then on board. Left for scene of the wreck at noon. Very difficult to arrange for transport. Residents at Tangier not playing up by lending their horses and mules as they might easily have done. Everything rather overshadowed at the Legation by the presence of the Royal party.

Arrived off the wreck at 1 p.m. Breeches buoy on rocket apparatus just started work at 1 p.m. The Master of the *Delhi* reported at 11 a.m. that bulkheads of the ship were giving way and he feared it would be necessary to abandon ship.

All passengers ashore by 2 p.m. except Dr. Thomas (who had a broken leg) and his son standing by him; 200 of the crew still on board. Breeches buoy worked at a rate of six or seven an hour secured to the foremast of the *Delhi*; but, owing to the low beach, the people coming ashore had to be hauled through the surf for the last part of the trip and were right in the water.

Large party of seamen working apparatus with R.G.A. from Gibraltar. French trained military police from Tangier had sent tents and provisions out to the beach and a nice camp had been formed opposite the wreck. I wired condition of affairs to the Admiralty at 4 p.m., stating facts about French naval and military assistance and casualties. The *Delhi* lying very high up, and though surf breaking against her starboard side and she had a heavy list there seemed no chance of her breaking up for some time. No possibility of assistance from seaward, the only use of a ship being for wireless work to Tangier and searchlights on wreck.

Very strong tide running along the shore. I went to the *Good Hope* in a cutter and had a hard pull to get back. Heavy swell running and ships rolling considerably; signal stations established ashore near camp and a signalman from the *London* on board the

wreck. Telephone from Tangier to Spartel lighthouse almost useless unfortunately.

At 4 p.m. I decided to leave with all ships except the *Good Hope* (remaining until to-morrow afternoon), *London* and *Weymouth* remaining until all ashore and no further good.

A box with confidential books from the Admiralty to East Indies was on board the wreck, and the Admiralty wired to have it recovered if possible ; I gave orders to Cradock accordingly. Tugs *Energetic* and *Crocodile* from Gibraltar, which I had sent out yesterday, were lying close to the wreck, and of use if boat work became possible. At 4.30 p.m. left, Burney and I exchanging complimentary signals, band playing, etc.

At 3 p.m. received telegram from the King of thanks to the fleet for assistance to Her Royal Highness and a very long one from Queen Alexandra couched in most grateful terms. Sent suitable replies and informed fleet."

The telegram from His Majesty read :

"Sincere thanks for all you and your Fleet have done regarding wreck of *Delhi*. Much relieved my sister and family have safely landed. GEORGE, R.I."

That from Queen Alexandra :

"Please accept and convey to the Officers and men of the British Battleships under your command my most heartfelt thanks for their noble and effective services on the occasion of the wreck of the *Delhi*. My heart is very full of gratitude to the gallant sailors who took so great a part in rescuing my dear daughter and her family from their great peril."

The *Delhi* became a total wreck, as can well be imagined would be the case by all who know the spot and the class of sea raised there in a gale of wind.

The doctor with the broken leg and all the passengers were saved. The three sailors from the *Friant* who were drowned were the only fatal casualties.

After the return to Gibraltar the normal fleet work was resumed.

Speaking at a temperance meeting at Gibraltar Sir John said :

"Any officer holding a command which carries with it any measure of responsibility for the defence of the Empire must recognise, as I do, the value of temperance in promoting fighting efficiency. In the Navy there are three qualities upon which efficiency

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mainly depends. They are discipline, straight shooting, and endurance, and temperance unquestionably tends to promote these qualities. In regard to discipline one has only to look at the punishment returns to realise how many of the disciplinary offences are due at the outset to intemperance.

As regards straight shooting, which is so largely a question of eye, it is everyone's experience that abstinence is necessary for the highest efficiency. If I am going to a rifle meeting in the afternoon, I don't drink a whisky and soda at lunch. If I did, I know I should have no chance of making a 'possible.' Most Captains also, if their ships are to fire at these practices in the afternoon, hold on to the grog issue until the evening.

In this connection I should like to refer to the experience of Captain Ogilvy, who I regret to say died some 18 months ago when in command of the *Natal*, which ship he placed at the top of the fleet in Gun Layers' Test. He went carefully into statistics and found that the shooting efficiency of men was 30 per cent better before than after the grog issue. He put his figures in the form of a curve, and it behoves an Admiral when chasing an enemy's fleet and manœuvring for position to consider the grog curve as well as the position of the sun and the direction of the wind.

These facts all show, I think, that Naval officers are fully alive to the advantage of temperance in promoting fighting efficiency."

His address, because of its straightforward common sense, created much favourable comment in the fleet from temperance advocates and also from those who were not teetotallers.

Soon after returning to Gibraltar from Tangier, he left for Portsmouth in the *Prince of Wales*, in accordance with Admiralty directions; and, on December 19, 1911, hoisted his flag in the *Hercules*, flagship of the Second Division Home Fleet. The Flag-Captain, Flag-Commander, Secretary, and Flag-Lieutenant transferred to the *Hercules* with him. Admiral Cecil Burney relieved him in command of the Atlantic Fleet, an appointment, he remarks, that gave him great pleasure.

Sir John spent his Christmas leave in Madrid, to which place Lady Jellicoe had come to join him from Gibraltar. It is interesting for a few minutes to draw back the veil with which forgetfulness hides the pomps and fine old vanities that attended the Spanish Royal House in the happy and spacious days before the *coup d'état* of 1931 at Madrid.

"During our stay at Madrid the Ambassador, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, was kindness itself. We dined at the Embassy on three

nights, Xmas Eve, Xmas Day, and on the 29th. He took us out for two riding picnics. The Councillor, Mr. E. A. Rennie, was very pleasant. We lunched with him one day. We rode in the King's Park, Campo di Santo, and on the 2nd day went 14 miles to a Royal hunting box. On Xmas Day we went to the de Bunsen's Xmas tree. All the English Colony there and Princess Henry of Battenberg, who was very gracious. She asked herself to tea with us at the Ritz and came with Colonel and Mrs. Cuthbertson, her Equerry and Lady-in-Waiting. Very nice people indeed. Princess not a bit stiff and on the following day she took us herself round the Palace and to the Artillery Museum, explaining everything. Palace splendid—one of the finest in Europe. Banqueting Hall magnificent. Tapestry priceless. We also went round the Royal stables. Very nicely kept. Crowds of State coaches and 12 motor-cars. The King has two racing cars, one of 200 h.p. going 90 miles per hour. Cuthbertson told me he himself had driven it 89 miles per hour."

He however did not state that when driving the King at this speed a tyre burst and the car nearly toppled over a precipice. The King did not turn a hair, but merely said, "Teddy, you sinner, you are a cool customer. I was watching your face to see if you were frightened."

"The Royal children were with us part of the time. We saw the ceremony of the halberdiers marching up the stairs of the Palace with their band, said to be one of the finest in Europe. I held up the Prince of Asturias, and Gwen did the same with the little Princess. On 29th at the Embassy dinner, Princess Henry, Don Carlos and his wife Princess Clementina of Bourbon (sister of the Queen Mother of Portugal), French, Italian and Austrian Ambassadors. Many Dukes and Duchesses present. A very smart dinner. The ambassador took in Princess Henry, and Don Carlos Lady de Bunsen. She had been delicate and did not appear much during our visit. She was very charming to us. We went round the Naval Museum one day with Sir Maurice ; very interesting Columbus relics there.

On Dec. 30 I left Madrid at 9 a.m. and have left my dear wife for 4 or 5 months. She returns to Gibraltar on the 2nd.

Jan. 1st. To Admiralty where I saw Winston Churchill for 5 or 10 minutes. He asked my views on the way of relieving Controller of work and asked if I did not think some of his work should be taken from him. I said emphatically 'no.' It is only necessary to give his Naval Assistant more power and it would be most unwise to let such work go out of Naval hands. He did not seem to agree. To Portsmouth in the evening."

CHAPTER XIII

1912 to 1914

SECOND-IN-COMMAND HOME FLEET	19.12.11 TO 9.12.12
SECOND SEA LORD AT THE ADMIRALTY	10.12.12 TO 3.7.13
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF RED FLEET IN MANŒUVRES	14.7.13 TO 7.8.13
SECOND SEA LORD	8.3.13 TO 30.7.14

LORD JELLICOE continues :

“On the expiration of Christmas leave the Home Fleet assembled at Portland, where I met my Commander-in-Chief, Sir George Callaghan, whose flag was flying in the *Neptune*.

In January, 1912, we, in the Home Fleet, left England for Arosa Bay, in company with the Atlantic Fleet. Exercises were carried out *en route*, the Home Fleet returning to Portland early in March, and going thence to Torbay, after a visit by the First Lord (Mr. Winston Churchill) in the Admiralty Yacht *Enchantress*. I recollect his discussing on that occasion, with me, the design of the proposed *Queen Elizabeth* class of battleship.

At Torbay gunnery practices were carried out and resumed at Portland in April. In May His Majesty visited the Fleet at Portland and saw some Fleet Exercises, after which the fleet left for Scottish waters. In the 2nd Division we spent a pleasant time off Colonsay, in beautiful weather, carrying out torpedo practice and night gunnery practices. Subsequently the Home Fleet concentrated off Rosyth for the annual naval manœuvres, which were not of a very interesting character.

We returned to Rosyth after the manœuvres and later left for Lamlash on the Firth of Clyde, where we worked up for, and carried out Battle Practice. Our stay at Lamlash was very pleasant. My wife took a cottage there and the children came up and had a very happy time. It was pleasing to me to note that, owing to the keenness in the Squadron and to Commander Dreyer's indefatigable work, the 2nd Battle Squadron headed the list in the Navy in both Battle Practice and Gun Layers' Test. Leaving Lamlash, I took the Squadron down the West Coast of Ireland, having a day's firing with lyddite shell at Bill Rock in Clear Bay *en route*. On arrival

at Portsmouth the *Hercules* went into dockyard hands, and I hoisted my flag in the *Colossus*, commanded by Captain Goodenough, who had been my Flag-Captain in the *Albemarle*. On rejoining the Home Fleet at Portland, we carried out some tactical exercises in the Channel.

On one occasion I recollect, when my Squadron, working under the Commander-in-Chief, was engaged with another portion of the fleet, I departed, without orders, from the single line ahead formation and took successful independent action with my Squadron on the enemy's rear. Sir George Callaghan subsequently approved of my action. Later, when in Command of the Grand Fleet, I gave, in my Battle Orders, authority to Squadron Leaders to act thus independently whilst conforming to the general line of action carried out by the Commander-in-Chief.

March 2nd. Attended the Navy and Army football match at Queen's Club and received the King and Prince of Wales, Lord Roberts representing the Army. The Navy won 16 pts. to 8, and the King was pleased. He had a great reception and send-off. I presented the Navy team to him.

In April I sat on a committee to regulate refit of ships, recommended annual refit and reduced time from 7 to 4 weeks.

Later in the Autumn I took my Squadron to Berehaven and whilst there superintended the trials of a system of firing by Director as proposed by Admiral Sir Percy Scott. The Director system had been fitted to the *Thunderer*, and competitive firings under similar conditions were carried out by the *Thunderer* and the *Orion*, working under ordinary service conditions. Lieutenant E. Altham,¹ the gunnery lieutenant of the *Thunderer*, was helping Sir Percy Scott and was of the greatest possible assistance to him. The trials proved most conclusively the superiority of the Director system, which I strenuously advocated for general adoption in the Navy. There was, however, very strong opposition to this system in the fleet and at the Admiralty, and in spite of all that I could do in urging its adoption, only a small proportion of the capital ships had been fitted with the Director system before the outbreak of war. As soon, however, as I assumed command of the Grand Fleet, I pressed the Admiralty at once to fit all ships with the system; and, by the time that the Battle of Jutland was fought, all capital ships had been so fitted for their main armament. I knew that the Germans had an elementary form of Director firing in use, as Sir Percy Scott had visited Kiel a few years earlier and had informed me of the result of his observations there."

¹ Afterwards Captain E. Altham, C.B., Secretary to the Royal United Service Institution.

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This director firing system, as it was called, placed the aiming and firing of all guns in the hands of a single officer who was stationed aloft at a special sight, which he laid on the enemy's ship. This position being above low-lying smoke and shell splashes gave the best view that could be obtained. Another officer (the spotter) was also stationed aloft and watched the salvoes fall, from which he judged whether the range on the director was too long, or too short, or correct, and whether the deflection required alteration. By electrical communication to the guns from the director sight through a transmitting station below the armoured deck, the elevations at which the guns were set were telegraphed to the gun positions, and also the training to the training stations at the guns. By this means the trainers were able to keep the guns pointing on the same bearing as the director sight aloft. The spotter was in direct voice-pipe communication with the officers in the transmitting station, who were forecasting the alteration in range and deflection, due to the time of flight of the projectile and the courses and speeds both of the enemy and their own ship. The director system was essentially a sound one, the chief objection to it being the chance of the electrical communication from aloft being damaged by shell-fire. This did not apply at the commencement of an action, and for that reason alone it was well worth the cost of installation. Furthermore, in armoured ships an alternative director sight was fitted in an armoured tower on deck for use in case of damage to the aloft position. Our battleships at the Battle of Jutland, thanks to Lord Jellicoe's clever tactics, which made his ships almost invisible to the enemy, were not sufficiently damaged by shell fire to test whether the system could or could not survive an intensive action, but the evidence of our damaged battle cruisers showed that the ships would be likely to be incapacitated before the director system was put out of action.

"I rehoisted my flag in the *Hercules* in November and took the Squadron to Portland, where some interesting long range firing at 14,000 yards was carried out by H.M.S. *Colossus* in the presence of the Board of Admiralty. This was by far the longest range at which Battle Practice had ever been tried and the results were very good."

It will be remembered that four years earlier, with the pre-Dreadnoughts, 8,000 yards had been the battle practice range. It was the advent of the Dreadnought uniform type of heavy armament

that had produced the miraculous jump in ranges at which hitting could be obtained.

"Whilst at Portland I was asked by the Admiralty to join the Royal Commission on Oil Fuel, which had been appointed to enquire into the whole question of the future supply of this fuel and the possibilities of home production from coal and other sources. Many eminent scientists sat on the Commission under the chairmanship of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher. I had frequently to attend meetings of the Commission in London, which was rather awkward whilst holding a command afloat."

It may seem to be scant courtesy to compress a whole year of Sir John's time as Second-in-Command of the Home Fleet into a couple or so of pages, but it must not be forgotten that the work of the Navy is in fact one succession of exercises and drills both at sea and in harbour, the repetition of which in writing would be wearisome in the extreme. The sharpening of a fleet to the fine edge of fighting efficiency is a work of infinite labour and daily practice, whereby officers and men alike, as also the Admirals in command, gain in efficiency. This must be accepted without vain repetition in the pages of a biography.

"In December, 1912, Mr. Churchill asked me to join the Board of Admiralty as Second Sea Lord in succession to Prince Louis of Battenberg, who was relieving Sir Francis Bridgeman as First Sea Lord. My old friend Sir George Warrender relieved me. [Lord Jellicoe's great-grandfather (on his mother's side), Vice-Admiral Philip Patton, had been Second Sea Lord during the Trafalgar campaign.]

On arrival in London my wife and I took a furnished house in Westbourne Terrace for a short time, and then bought one in Sussex Square, where we lived during my term of office as Second Sea Lord. I found this situation very convenient, as it gave me a walk of $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles to the Admiralty every morning and a walk back in the evening, and was so near Hyde Park for the children. We let the house in 1915 and sold it at the end of the war. It was during this period of service at the Admiralty that our daughter Prudence Patton was born.

After assuming office as Second Sea Lord, it did not take me long to find out that Mr. Churchill, the First Lord, was very apt to express strong opinions upon purely technical matters; moreover, not being satisfied with expressing opinions, he tried to force his views upon the Board. It is quite true that Mr. Churchill proved himself to be a very clever and able First Lord in some directions, but his fatal error was his entire inability to realize his

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own limitations as a civilian with, it is true, some early experience of military service but quite ignorant of naval affairs. I admired very much his wonderful argumentative powers when putting a case before the Cabinet or the Committee of Imperial Defence. He surpassed in this direction the ablest of lawyers and would make a weak case appear exceedingly strong. Whilst this gift was of great use to the Board, when we wanted the naval case well put to the Government, it became a positive danger when the First Lord started to exercise his powers of argument on his colleagues on the Board. Naval officers are not brought up to argue a case, and but few of them can make a good show in this direction. Moreover, if one is apt to be over-ridden in argument, as was certainly the case with one of the Sea Lords on the Board at that time, it made the position very difficult for the remainder of the Board.

One of the first anxieties which I felt in connection with Mr. Churchill was in regard to naval discipline, a matter which is largely in the province of the Second Sea Lord at the Admiralty."

Even to those who are unaccustomed to rigid naval and military discipline it must be fairly obvious that the maintenance of discipline is impossible if, at the instigation of a junior, seniors are snubbed by a super-senior. There is, and must be, a direct chain of responsibility, a form of hierarchy. Juniors must communicate on service matters with the higher officers only through their immediate senior. The intermediate steps must not be jumped, otherwise juniors come to disregard and look with disrespect on their seniors who, by such actions, are robbed of the authority necessary to their position, and a chaotic state of indiscipline results. For a person in the position of First Lord of the Admiralty to act on the advice of a lieutenant, and, on the spot, reverse the considered decision of the Captain of a ship, is to commit an outrage on discipline. However, we are anticipating.

"But he was at his worst in this respect in connection with the Naval Air Service, then in its infancy. He had asked me to be the Superintending Sea Lord in regard to this service, of which Captain Murray Sueter was the very efficient head, and in which the First Lord took a special interest. Undoubtedly his keenness, energy, and encouragement were largely responsible for the advance of the Naval Air Service during the years 1913 and 1914; but I was anxious that the force should be properly disciplined, and rather feared there was danger that the First Lord's methods might do harm in this connection. The climax came on the occasion of a visit paid to the Admiralty yacht *Enchantress* at Sheerness in 1913.

The parent ship of the Naval Air Service was H.M.S. *Hermes*, commanded by Captain Vivian,¹ and the *Hermes* was at anchor off Sheerness at the time. There was a question under discussion as to the use to be made of some ground on the bank of the Medway by the Air Service, and Captain Vivian had given his decision on the subject. One of the young Lieutenants held other views, which he quite improperly expressed to Mr. Churchill who listened to him and sent for Captain Vivian to tell him that he agreed with the Lieutenant, whose proposals were to be carried out. This procedure was of course entirely subversive to discipline, and Captain Vivian reported the matter to his Commander-in-Chief at the Nore, Admiral Sir Richard Poore, who naturally was disturbed that such a thing should have occurred in his Command."

After investigating the matter, Sir Richard Poore sent to Sir John, under private cover, a letter which he proposed to address to the Secretary of the Admiralty, subject to Sir John being of opinion that his remarks regarding the action of the First Lord were not too strong. In this letter Sir Richard Poore proposed to report what had happened, and to state in strong terms his view that such action was bound to undermine discipline. In Sir John's opinion, his remarks regarding the First Lord were too strong, and he wrote back to say so, at the same time returning to Sir Richard Poore his letter. Mr. Churchill learned that Sir Richard had sent this letter to Sir John, and became acquainted with its contents. He thereupon wished to dismiss Sir Richard Poore, upon which Sir John stated that if he took any such action he would resign and make his reasons for doing so public. Ultimately, after a good deal of discussion, it was left to the Sea Lords to come to an arrangement with Sir Richard, which was done, and the question dropped.

"A little later I told the First Lord that as I could not agree with his methods in connection with the Naval Air Service I wished to resign my control of it. The Fourth Sea Lord then became the Superintending Lord in my place.

Apart from the disciplinary question I was much interested in aerial matters, both as regards aeroplanes and airships, and had made flights in the naval aeroplanes and the military airships. I was impressed with the probable value of Zeppelins for naval scouting work and, as mentioned elsewhere, had obtained permission from Admiral von Tirpitz, whilst in Berlin in 1913, to make a flight in one of the Zeppelins. At that period the radius of action of

¹ The late Captain Gerald W. Vivian, C.M.G.

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aeroplanes was so small that I felt that they possessed then but little value for naval scouting work—hence my interest in airships.

As regards shipbuilding programmes whilst I was Second Sea Lord, the programme for 1913 was decided before I joined the Board, and it was the programme for 1914 with which we had to deal. There was general agreement amongst Members of the Board on the subject of including in the programme a number of light cruisers and destroyers, but I found what I feared was a tendency on the part of the First Lord to reduce the number of Battleships to be constructed from four to three. He produced papers giving the comparative strength of British and German Battleships, in which he gave only the number and calibre of the guns carried in each ship and argued from that basis alone. Now in ships of corresponding years up to those intended for construction after 1914, British ships nearly always carried guns of greater calibre than German ships. For instance, British vessels launched in 1908 were armed with 12-inch guns, whilst German ships of that year carried 11-inch (but two more than their British contemporaries). British ships launched in 1911 carried 13.5-inch guns, German ships 12-inch guns. British ships of 1913 and 1914 were armed with 15-inch guns, German ships with 12-inch guns.

Apart from the fact that the striking energy of the projectiles from the German 11-inch and 12-inch guns was not far short of that from the British 12-inch and 13.5-inch guns respectively, owing to their much higher muzzle velocity, this method of comparison of the power of ships was quite misleading. As I have stated earlier, the only true method of comparison is that of displacement, and if that method is adopted, it will be seen at once that German ships must have had greater *power* than their British contemporaries. The truth is that they had very superior *protection* both from gun and torpedo fire.

To take a few comparisons. The *St. Vincent* class launched in 1908 and 1909 displaced 19,250 tons. The corresponding German ships displaced 22,440 tons. The *Orion* class launched in 1910 and 1911 were of 22,500 tons displacement, whilst the German *Kaiser* class, their contemporaries, displaced 24,310 tons. It was the same with the Battle Cruisers, though to a lesser extent in some cases. I argued the question with the First Lord at considerable length on paper, and he stood out for the four ships with the Cabinet. There was great opposition to our building programme, headed, as in 1909, by Mr. Lloyd George, and it looked at one time as if the First Lord would resign, as he insisted, I am glad to say, on the main features of the programme being approved. Had he resigned the Sea Lords would, as in 1909, have followed his example. The Cabinet, however, capitulated, with the exception that they

cut out three light cruisers and some torpedo craft, and the Board accepted the decision.

The subject of personnel was the next difficulty, particularly as regards officers. We were at that time very short of lieutenants and of officers below that rank, and various proposals were put forward to save the situation. Here I did not see eye to eye with the First Lord, one of whose suggestions was that officers of the Accountant Branch should take on lieutenants' duties, including the duty of officer of the watch at sea. I pointed out that no officer could properly take charge of one of H.M. ships at sea unless he was certified as fit to do so, and that Accountant officers from their training could not possibly be so certified. The First Lord took great exception to my opposition and said that I was always trying to thwart him. I replied that I only did so when his proposals were of an impossible nature."

After the War Mr. Churchill wrote his recollections in a book entitled *The World Crisis*. In these volumes he made several statements to which Sir John takes exception. On these Sir John comments as follows :

"Mr. Churchill stated that difficulties arose in 1913 on the subject of the Admiralty reserve of oil fuel. The authorised reserve at the time was, so far as my recollection goes, three months' war consumption. This reserve was distributed in oil tanks in various places, a good deal of it of course being at the Dockyard Ports. In view of the increasing dependence of the fleet on oil fuel, and the fact that the great majority of our supply came from America, and was therefore open to attack on the sea whilst in transport to this country, I was of opinion that we should increase our reserves, and I proposed to the Board that the reserve should be gradually increased to six months' war consumption. I may mention that the Royal Commission on Oil Fuel went so far as to propose a reserve of four years' war consumption. I thought this amount totally unnecessary.

The First Lord found himself faced by strong Cabinet opposition to any proposed increase. I sympathised with him, as I knew from previous experience on the Board how difficult the First Lord's position often became when he had to make proposals to his colleagues in the Cabinet for increased expenditure on the Navy. But I felt the matter to be one of supreme importance and continued to press my proposal. Board meetings were held on the subject, at which I did not obtain the support that I expected from all my naval colleagues, and I felt, as Mr. Churchill remarks in his book, that the matter was so important that I could not continue

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on the Board unless some action was taken. Eventually a compromise was effected and approval given to increase the reserve to, I think, four and a half months of war consumption, the increase of course to be effected gradually.

Mr. Churchill makes a totally incorrect statement when he asserts that "These conclusions stood the test of war." So far from this being the case, our shortage of oil fuel for a considerable period in 1917 was exceedingly serious, being down to three weeks' supply as a whole, and to 6 *days' supply* at some of our fuelling bases. This shortage was of course due to successful attack by German submarines on so many of our oil-carrying vessels. At one time the position seemed so desperate that I, as First Sea Lord in 1917, was forced to direct that our ships should limit their sea work as much as possible, consistent of course with due regard to German sea activities, and that the speed of the destroyers should, when at sea, be limited unless under exceptional conditions. We had also to make arrangements that as much oil as possible should be brought to England from America, and other oil-producing countries, in the double bottoms of merchant ships."

To continue Lord Jellicoe's account of his activities at this period of his life :

"During the summer of 1913 I had a very pleasant interlude from Admiralty work, by being appointed to take command of the Blue Fleet for the manœuvres. Sir George Callaghan commanded the Red Fleet. I flew my flag in the *Thunderer*, commanded by Captain Oliver, who, during the first two years of the war, became Chief of the Naval Staff, remaining as Deputy Chief when in 1917 I, as First Sea Lord, assumed the title of Chief of the Naval Staff. The preparation for the manœuvres involved a great deal of work, as a special signal book had to be prepared, and plans drawn up for the working of my fleet and the operations I intended to carry out. I got my staff appointed in good time and thanks to their energy and work, especially that of Commander Carpenter¹ (later of Zeebrugge fame) and Lieutenant R. L. Nicholson, later my wireless officer in the Grand Fleet, all was ready when I hoisted my flag in the *Thunderer*.

One of the objects of the manœuvres was to ascertain the damage that a hostile fleet could effect, and to what extent landings of hostile troops in England could be carried out. The Blue Fleet, which really represented a German offensive, achieved a considerable measure of success.

¹ Afterwards Admiral Alfred Carpenter, V.C., D.S.O.

Troops were landed in the Humber and on the north-east coast of England and successful raids made in other directions. As Mr. Churchill has correctly stated, the manœuvres were stopped by the Admiralty for fear of giving useful information to the Germans.

Mr. Churchill's work whilst First Lord was, in some directions in pre-war days, of value to the Navy ; but his persistent habit of assuming for himself a knowledge of technical affairs, which he could not possibly possess, was fatal to a really successful administration, and later on during the War led to most unfortunate results.

In May, 1913, I paid a visit to Berlin, accompanied by my wife. We spent a very pleasant ten days there staying at the Hotel Adlon. During our stay Princess Victoria Luise, daughter of H.M. the Kaiser, was married to Prince Ernest of Cumberland, and Royalties from all parts of Europe came to Berlin to attend the ceremony. We witnessed the arrivals. A great welcome was extended to Their Majesties King George and Queen Mary, and we were particularly impressed by the enthusiasm shown by the crowd to the Crown Prince and Princess of Germany on their arrival.

We received invitations to all the ceremonies connected with the wedding, including lunch with the Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, the wedding itself, and the State performance at the Opera. We were also invited to dinner with Their Majesties at Potsdam. I was much struck with the charming personality of Princess Victoria Luise, next to whom I sat at dinner. Her conversation centred round her fiancé, to whom she was evidently deeply attached. After dinner the Kaiser and Admiral von Tirpitz had a long conversation with me about our Navy and particularly about our system of common entry for naval cadets, which they both criticised severely. I told them that they would have to adopt some such method in the German Navy before long, in order to obtain a superior class of Engineer officers. At that time the Engineering Branch of the German Navy was in a very inferior position to the Executive Branch ; as I anticipated, an alteration was found later on to be necessary. On leaving the Castle the Kaiser presented me with a large volume descriptive of the German Navy.

Whilst in Berlin I obtained permission from Admiral von Tirpitz to go for a two hours' flight in the Zeppelin *Hansa*. This interested me very much. We went to tea one afternoon at the Admiral's house and met a daughter who had just returned from a two years' course at Cheltenham College, where she said she was very happy. I asked von Tirpitz if he would come over to England and stay with us. He thanked me but said that he would certainly be murdered if he were to visit England, as the British objected so strongly to his naval policy !

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Whilst in Berlin I was asked to attend the Annual Dinner of German Naval officers who were landed in China for the Boxer rising. I did so, and spent a very pleasant evening amongst officers whom I knew, of course, very well. I recollect that in the course of conversation, when I asked who were expected to be the coming leaders afloat of the German Navy, I was told that Admiral Scheer was certainly one of the future leaders and von Trotha another.

We spent one afternoon at the house of Captain von Plessen, who was in command of the Royal Yacht *Hohenzollern* during one of her visits to Gibraltar. He later lost his life in a Zeppelin brought down by one of our ships off the coast of Schleswig-Holstein.

In June, 1914, my wife and I paid a visit to Aix-les-Bains ; I had a little trouble in one knee, due to an accident at football in my younger days, which under medical advice took me to Aix for treatment. We spent a pleasant three weeks there playing a good deal of tennis and making trips into the surrounding country. During our stay there the news reached us of the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand of Austria and his wife at Serajevo ; and, as time passed, the international position appeared to be one of some anxiety. We left Aix-les-Bains early in July, and on the way home spent a week end at Wimereux where later on during the war a big hospital was established.

Before I left England Mr. Churchill handed me a copy of a report by Rear-Admiral Lewis Bayly,¹ Major-General George Aston, and another officer, on the subject of taking and occupying one of the German islands, Sylt or Borkum, as a forward base in the event of war with Germany. The report favoured the occupation of Borkum. Mr. Churchill asked me to study the report during my time abroad and to give him my opinion of it on my return. I did so and expressed a view unfavourable to the report. I felt that, as both islands could be commanded by long-range gunfire from the mainland, we could not usefully hold the islands after their capture, since any vessels which we based on them would be exposed to this attack, with no possibility of reply.

Mr. Churchill's attacks on me in his book *The World Crisis 1915* read curiously when it is remembered that I had already before the war given him my opinion as to an attack on Borkum, and that he himself had agreed with the fact that I mentioned in my report, viz., that Borkum could be commanded by gunfire from the mainland. How an attack on Borkum could possibly assist fleet operations in the Baltic or lead to the German Fleet being driven altogether from the North Sea, as suggested by him, is an argument that it is difficult to follow. To suggest that we could

¹ Afterwards Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.V.O.

mine them in their harbours *as the result of the capture of Borkum* is ludicrous, as is the idea that the capture of Borkum, even if it could be held, would have assisted us in a military attack on Schleswig-Holstein.

A most useful amphibious operation at the end of 1914 would have been the capture of Zeebrugge, proposals for which were made by Sir Lewis Bayly and forwarded by me.

The truth of the matter in regard to such operations as are mentioned above is that no detailed plan of operations was ever worked out and sent to me for an opinion. I was merely asked to express my views on general subjects; and I knew well from experience how opinions altered in such matters, when they came to be worked out in detail. The Dardanelles tragedy was largely due to Mr. Churchill being allowed to start operations without a properly worked-out plan, i.e. to start a purely naval attack which warned the enemy of what might follow, and allowed the latter to make preparations to meet the military landing which it was clear to those who had studied the subject must be an inevitable part of the plan."

After Sir John arrived in England events which led to the Great War began to move with ever-increasing rapidity.

In 1914 the Admiralty decided to exercise the mobilization of the Fleet, in place of the usual Annual Naval Manœuvres. The Fleet in home waters when this exercise took place consisted of ships of the 1st Fleet, which were always fully manned, partly-manned ships of the 2nd Fleet with crews brought up to full complement, and ships in reserve specially commissioned. H.M. King George V reviewed the whole Fleet assembled at Spithead, which included 57 capital ships. The whole Fleet afterwards weighed and steamed in one long single line ahead past the Royal Yacht anchored off the Nab, flying the Royal standard, each ship being "manned" and giving three cheers for the King in passing. Some tactical exercises were then carried out in the Channel. Mobilized ships then returned to their home ports with the intention of paying-off, but the war clouds had been banking up in Europe, and Prince Louis, our First Sea Lord, cancelled the paying-off of these ships, having obtained the concurrence on the telephone of Mr. Churchill, the First Lord, who was staying in the country owing to Mrs. Churchill's very serious illness.

On July 29 the 1st Fleet put to sea from Portland and steamed off to the south-westward until out of sight of land, when course

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was altered towards the French coast, and later on to the eastward, the Fleet proceeding up-Channel at high speed. Our Battle Cruiser squadron had been paying a visit to Baltic ports, and at Reval the Tsar and Tsarina and their children dined with Sir David Beatty on board H.M.S. *Lion*, after which a ball was held on board H.M.S. *New Zealand*, secured alongside. The French President, on board the battleship *France*, also paid a visit to the Tsar in July, 1914.

When our Fleet proceeded up-Channel on July 29 they passed the *France*, which had just landed the French President. A dramatic meeting—salutes were exchanged. The 1st Fleet proceeded up the East Coast of England and anchored in Scapa Flow in the Orkneys. As the tension increased, other Naval forces also took up their war stations. The stage was set for the Naval operations of the Great War of 1914-18.

Lord Jellicoe afterwards wrote :

“Towards the end of July I attended a dinner at the United Service Club, given by Lord Morley, at which were present many distinguished naval and military officers and politicians. Lord Kitchener was one of the soldiers present. I happened to sit next to Lord Bryce, who had been our ambassador at Washington not long before. During dinner I remarked to him that the European horizon looked to be very clouded. He replied, ‘What do you mean?’ I said that it looked to me as if we might be at war with Germany before long. He then said, ‘War with Germany? Absurd. Why, any British Government that did such a thing would be thrown out of office immediately.’

A day or two later the First Lord sent for me and said that the position was so threatening that I was appointed Second-in-Command of the Home Fleet and was to join the *Centurion* at Scapa forthwith.”

CHAPTER XIV

The Grand Fleet—Part I: Preliminary Remarks

Our heritage the sea.

ALLAN CUNNINGHAM.

IN the long twenty-two-year war which we waged against France from 1793 to 1815 with only a total of two years intermission, we fought at sea, in the European theatre, only five major fleet actions: the Battles of the 1st of June (1794), St. Vincent (1797), Camperdown (1797), the Nile (1798), and Trafalgar (1805). During the whole of the remainder of the twenty or so years we were blockading the ports of the French or their Allies.

It seemed only natural, therefore, that when the Great War suddenly broke out we should at once blockade the German harbours. But vital changes had taken place in Naval armaments that rendered impossible any operation in any way resembling the old-time close blockade by major ships off the enemy's harbours. To begin with, sail power had given way to steam propulsion. In the old days, a sailing battle fleet could lie in safety and for practically any length of time off an enemy's harbour. When the wind blew off-shore, which meant a fair wind for the enemy to escape seaward, the blockading fleet could with safety beat up close to the entrance and prevent their opponent escaping unobserved. An on-shore wind was dangerous to a blockading fleet, since the shore became a lee shore, and this necessitated the ships lying farther to seaward; but the same on-shore wind made it more difficult for the enemy to leave the port. So, according to the wind, our old line-of-battle ships lay on and off and guarded the enemy's harbours without any danger of attack by mobile craft.

Steam and the torpedo had entirely altered this procedure.

No longer could ships lie indefinitely off the enemy's harbours. To remain there necessitated continuous steaming and therefore

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consumption of coal ; so that ships had to return periodically to their bases to re-fuel. This of itself rendered close blockading impossible unless double the normal number of ships was available, one half maintaining the blockade and the other half engaged in re-fuelling. Then, again, the invention of the torpedo made it extremely hazardous for large ships to lie off an enemy's port at night ; and, lastly, the advent and development of the submarine made a daylight blockade equally hazardous.

The object of a blockade is not so much to confine the enemy's ships to harbour as to prevent their leaving without giving battle. It is true that the surface command of the sea is assured, if the enemy cannot venture outside his ports ; but in the olden days, unless the sea power of the enemy was destroyed, there was always the danger that, when several ports were blockaded, ships might, without being observed, slip out of one or more of these harbours, combine, and fall on the various blockading forces in detail. This was not so likely to happen in the restricted waters of the North Sea during the Great War.

It was clearly the primary business of the Grand Fleet to seize and hold the surface command of the sea ; but, in order to understand the problems which confronted the Commander-in-Chief, it is necessary to be quite clear as to the meaning of the "command of the sea."

The "command of the sea" implies the power to prevent the enemy's ships from carrying out offensive operations on the sea. If the whole of the enemy's sea-force is blockaded, then he has lost the command of the sea in all the oceans. In August, 1914, we might be said to have had command of the North Sea ; but in all the other seas there were enemy men-of-war or commerce-destroyers over which we had not complete command. Moreover, it is not uncommon to find the term "command of the sea" used in too loose a manner ; for instance, even in the North Sea we had command of the sea only so far as battleships were concerned ; the enemy still had the power of using battle cruisers, fast light cruisers, destroyers and submarines offensively.

So, although our fleet at Scapa, or in some other northern anchorage, gave us command so far as the enemy's battle fleet was concerned, the impossibility of maintaining a close blockade off the enemy's ports allowed them to use battle cruisers and smaller vessels offensively. This offensive warfare was carried on mainly by the enemy's submarines and to a certain extent by his

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destroyers throughout the whole war. No measures that the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet could take could ensure complete command of the North Sea against the offensive action of all classes of vessels, particularly destroyers, submarines and mine layers.

What then was the strategy of our fleet to be?

A moment's thought will show that in order to render the High Sea Fleet innocuous it was not necessary to bottle up that fleet in its harbours, provided that we could confine its ships to the North Sea and at the same time prevent them from doing any *material* damage in that area. The great desideratum, of course, was to let that fleet come out and to meet it at a time when our numbers and our positions were such as to make a victory certain; but however much we might wish to bring this about, it was a matter which was beyond our power to control. If the Germans wished to come out they would come out; if they desired to remain in their harbours, they could remain, and we had absolutely no means of forcing them to put to sea.

Very well, then; we had to fall back on blockade, not of the German harbours but of the North Sea, basing our fleet in some safe harbours ready to issue at a moment's notice. Now the North Sea has three exits (1) the northern one between the Shetlands and the Norwegian coast, about 160 miles in length; (2) the Cattegat, which leads to the Baltic and there becomes a cul-de-sac; and (3) the English Channel.

At the commencement of the War, while we were transporting the Expeditionary Force across the Channel, it was most important to guard the Southern exit so as to prevent an attack in force on our transports. The Channel Fleet had this duty assigned to it. The Grand Fleet, which comprised the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battle Squadrons, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and the attached squadrons of smaller cruisers, destroyers and submarines, occupied the North Sea; and, while ready to reinforce the Channel Fleet, prevented any invasion of the United Kingdom by the German Army. During August, 1914, the Grand Fleet was at sea for 19 days out of the 26. G 6

After the Expeditionary Force had been landed in France without any attack on the part of the German Fleet, the Grand Fleet resumed its rôle of blockading the North Sea.

The method of blockade was a simple one. It consisted in keeping the fleet at anchor in harbour ready to issue instantly

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should the enemy's battlefleet put to sea ; and in making periodical sweeps down the broad waters of the North Sea. This created an uncertainty in the minds of the German High Command as to whether the Grand Fleet was, or was not, in harbour, and prevented them from forming definite and secure plans for raids on our coasts other than tip-and-run bombardments.

The ground covered by the Grand Fleet during Lord Jellicoe's very active period of command, i.e. August 4, 1914, to November 28, 1916, is shown in attached plate.

For a moment let us examine the rôles imposed on the two battlefleets by this form of strategy.

The German battlefleet could be used in three main ways. (1) They could fight our battlefleet and dispute with us the command of the North Sea. If they beat our fleet they could, should they desire to do so, send an invading army to any port of the British coast and disembark it under the protection of their surface and submarine vessels, and, what is really the crux of successful invasion, as distinct from a raid, keep communications open with their continental bases. Again, if the Germans had succeeded in obtaining command of the North Sea, they could have passed out commerce raiders to harry our coastwise and other trade in all the oceans, and have kept open the communications of these vessels with their bases. The United Kingdom would then in a very short time have been starved into submission. Obviously this was the function which their battlefleet had been built to fulfil ; and, unless some really useful object could be attained by the fleet remaining impotent in harbour, such an attack should, without doubt, have been made as early as possible in the War. They had everything to gain by so doing.


(2) The second use of the High Sea Fleet was to become what is technically called a "fleet in being" ; that is, to remain in harbour ready at any moment to issue forth and give battle to the enemy. This rôle affords considerable possibilities of success, provided full use is made of the strategic advantages that it confers. While the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet had to keep his ships ready on every day of each year in case the enemy left harbour, the German Commander-in-Chief needed to have his ships tuned up only on the day they intended to issue forth. While the Grand Fleet was obliged always to have at least two of its battleships docking and refitting, the High Sea Fleet could have its whole strength available on the pre-arranged date. While 75 per

GSHI

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5°

7°
63°



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cent of the Grand Fleet had the bottoms of their ships in different degrees of foulness and their speed suffering accordingly, the High Sea Fleet could have every ship newly docked and capable of steaming at her maximum speed. And all these advantages applied equally to their cruisers, destroyers and auxiliary vessels. One point, however, should be noticed, namely that these advantages only applied if the High Sea Fleet intended eventually to try conclusions with the Grand Fleet. If they did not intend to fight, then these very material potential advantages vanished and became of no value.

(3) Even if the German High Command did not intend the High Sea Fleet to challenge the Grand Fleet, there still remained with them another advantage of a "fleet in being." We could not know the secrets hidden in the mind of the Kaiser; therefore we were obliged to keep the Grand Fleet fully mobilized, including a large number of destroyers and subsidiary craft in attendance on the Grand Fleet, instead of using these small craft for commerce protection and submarine hunting. Thus the assumption of the rôle of a "fleet in being" on the part of the High Sea Fleet gave their Commander-in-Chief one other card, which he could have played to our very great disadvantage. While his battlefleet was lying inactive, his destroyers and light cruisers might have been very active indeed. They could at night have attacked our commerce in the Channel, in the Downs, on the east coast of England, and at the same time they could on any specific day have been re-assembled for work with the Fleet. Had such raids been successful they could, without doubt, have caused so great a volume of discontent and agitation in England, that it would have been impossible for the Admiralty to refuse to take a sufficient force from the Grand Fleet to protect our shipping in the Channel. The Grand Fleet would have been weakened in its defensive light craft, and an opening given for a successful attack at sea by the German destroyers prior to a general fleet action. To this would be added the hope of reducing our capital ship force by submarine attacks and mining operations and thus render a fleet action more likely to be crowned with success. Lastly, the battle cruisers of the High Sea Fleet could, as indeed they did, raid and bombard defenceless towns on the east coast. This sort of offensive was only of value in so far as it influenced those lacking knowledge of the essentials of sound strategy, and by causing a totally unwarranted elation on the part of the

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average German citizen, leading him to believe that Germany was winning the War.

Such, broadly, were the conditions that had to be faced by the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet in August, 1914. Which line of strategy the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet would choose was uncertain. Sir John Jellicoe had to be prepared to counter each and every one of them.

CHAPTER XV
1914 to 1915
The Grand Fleet—Part II

THE time had now arrived when the training of Sir John Jellicoe to fill the greatest command ever entrusted to an English sailor was to end, and the full benefit of that period to accrue to the nation.

Lord Fisher, whose very soul was devoted to having our Navy supreme in the great struggle which, with unerring foresight, he saw was bound to come about, had long had his eye on Sir John ; and, as far back as 1910 had decided that he was the Admiral best fitted to command the fleet in war. Having arrived at this conclusion, he used all his indomitable energy to bring it about. On December 24, 1911, he wrote :

“My sole object was to procure Jellicoe to be Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet on 19th December, 1913 ; and that is being done by his being Second-in-Command, and he will automatically be Commander-in-Chief in two years from that date. All the recent changes revolved round Jellicoe and NO ONE sees it.”

On January 3, 1912, he wrote : “Jellicoe will be Admiralissimo when Armageddon comes along.” And on April 2 :

“*I owe more than I can say to Mr. McKenna.* I owe nearly as much to Winston for scrapping a dozen Admirals on December 5th last so as to get Jellicoe Second in Command of the Home Fleet. If war comes before 1914 then Jellicoe will be Nelson at the Battle of St. Vincent. If it comes in 1915 he will be Nelson at Trafalgar.”

So it came about that when the war clouds gathered and were about to break, the Cabinet gave effect to this long-nourished, but secret, decision and Sir John was appointed to command the Grand Fleet.

Exactly how this came about is best described in Sir John's own words :

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"In the latter part of July (1914), when the situation in Europe had assumed a threatening aspect, Mr. Churchill, the First Lord, informed me that in the event of hostilities occurring involving this country, it was considered necessary that the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet should have the assistance of a Second-in-Command, and he added that I had been selected for the appointment, and it was desired that I should arrange with Sir George as to the ship in which I should fly my Flag.

On July 28th, with no premonition of coming events, I was present at a dinner party given by Lord Morley at the United Service Club. The party was interesting, as it comprised Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, Mr. Churchill, Lord Haldane, Lord Bryce, and others who later figured prominently in the Great War.

On July 30th I turned over the duties of Second Sea Lord, which I had discharged since December, 1912, to Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Hamilton, K.C.B., and made my final preparations for joining the fleet as Second-in-Command. I spent some hours at the Admiralty on the following day; and, during a conversation with Mr. Churchill and the Marquess of Milford Haven,¹ the then First Sea Lord, it was intimated to me that, in certain circumstances, I might be appointed Commander-in-Chief in succession to Sir George Callaghan. This intimation came upon me as a great surprise, and I protested against such an appointment being made on what might possibly be the very eve of war. Nothing definite was settled. I left, however, with the impression that the change was not one that had been finally decided upon, but that it might take place. I left London the same night by train for Wick, the Commander-in-Chief having informed me that he would send a vessel to meet me there."

The very drastic step of removing the Commander-in-Chief from the main battlefleet on the eve of war was one not to be taken light-heartedly, and Sir John Jellicoe fully realized the seriousness of the proposal. He knew that he himself was perfectly capable of handling the Grand Fleet; and, probably, in his innermost heart and in spite of his innate modesty, recognized that, compared with the then Commander-in-Chief, he was better equipped mentally, from study and special experience in the use of modern weapons, to grapple with the many intricate problems that were sure to arise. He was also much younger and fitter physically, and therefore more likely to stand the strain inseparable from so great a command. On the other hand, the then Com-

¹ Prince Louis of Battenberg assumed the title of Marquess of Milford Haven during the War.

1914 TO 1915—THE GRAND FLEET—PART II

Commander-in-Chief had had great experience with his fleet and knew his senior officers and the capacity of each. Although he undoubtedly had instilled into their minds his own ideas on fleet warfare, these could not differ greatly from those commonly accepted. Moreover, the feeling of the fleet could not be discounted. The Navy is an essentially loyal Service, and supersessions such as the one proposed would be certain to breed a feeling of resentment at the injustice dealt to the late Commander-in-Chief. This would have to be lived down, and would be bad for the fleet at the commencement of the War.

After due consideration and before reaching the fleet, Sir John sent the following telegram to the Admiralty :

“ 10 p.m. Saturday, August 1st.

Detained Wick by fog. Am firmly convinced after consideration that the step you mentioned to me is fraught with gravest danger at this juncture and might easily be disastrous owing to extreme difficulty of getting into touch with everything at short notice. The transfer even if carried out cannot be accomplished safely for some time. I beg earnestly that you will give matter further consideration with the First Sea Lord before you take steps.”

A telegram to the First Sea Lord was the same with the addition :

“You will understand my motive in wiring is to do the best for Country not personal considerations.”

Again he wired from Scapa, Sunday, August 2 :

“To First Lord and First Sea Lord.

Reference my personal telegram last night, am more than ever convinced of vital importance of making no change. Personal feelings are entirely ignored in reaching this conclusion.”

A reply was received at Scapa Flow 8.30 p.m. Sunday, August 2 :
From First Lord :

“I can give you 48 hours after joining you must be ready then.”

Once more Sir John wired from Scapa, 11.30 p.m. August 2, 1914, personal to First Lord and First Sea Lord :

“Yours of Second. Can only reply am certain step contemplated is most dangerous beg that it may not be carried out. Am

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perfectly willing to act on board Fleet Flagship as assistant if required to be in direct communication. Hard to believe it is realized what grave difficulties change Commander-in-Chief involves at this moment. Do not forget long experience of Commander-in-Chief."

Once more he returned to the charge. Sent from Scapa, 9.15 a.m. August 3. Personal to First Lord and First Sea Lord :

"Quite impossible to be ready at such short notice. Feel it my duty to warn you emphatically that you court disaster if you carry out intention of changing before I have thorough grip of fleet and situation. Am sure Hamilton, Madden or any Admiral recently Home Fleet will be of my opinion."

At 11.30 a.m. August 3 he added :

"Add to my last message. Fleet is imbued with feelings of extreme admiration and loyalty for Commander-in-Chief. This is very strong factor."

Then came the final answer from First Sea Lord sent off at 0.45 p.m.

"Expeditionary Force will not leave at present and therefore fleet movements with it will not immediately be required. I am sending Madden to-night to be at your side. I am telegraphing Commander-in-Chief directing him to transfer command to you at earliest moment suitable to the interest of the Service. I rely on him and you to effect this change quickly and smoothly, personal feelings cannot count now only what is best for us all. You should consult him frankly."

These telegrams show how completely Sir John was willing to sacrifice his own interests to what he considered was the good of the nation. Very few men would have tried so persistently to delay the acceptance of the greatest appointment ever offered to any naval officer of any nationality. Further, the supersession of a brother officer of distinguished career, and one for whom he had great friendship and regard, was most repugnant to Sir John's chivalrous nature.

To continue Lord Jellicoe's narrative :

"In spite of the First Lord's reiterated opinion, my views remained unaltered, although it did occur to me that some anxiety might be felt that Sir George Callaghan's health would not stand the strain of commanding the fleet in the event of war. That, however, was

a matter on which the Admiralty would be better informed than myself, and I had no hesitation in urging the opinions expressed in my successive telegrams.

A thick fog prevailed at Wick, and the *Boadicea*, the ship in which I made the passage to Scapa Flow, was not able to leave until late in the forenoon of August 2nd and arrived at Scapa Flow in the afternoon. When I reported myself to the Commander-in-Chief, the knowledge of the event which was apparently impending made the interview both embarrassing and painful, as I could see that he had no knowledge of the possibility of his leaving the fleet, and obviously I could not tell him. We discussed various arrangements, including the question of the defence of Scapa Flow, for which temporary, but naturally inadequate, measures were being energetically taken within the limited resources at the disposal of the fleet.

At about 4 a.m. on August 4th, I received Admiralty orders to open a secret envelope which had been handed to me in the train as I was leaving London, by an officer from the Admiralty. This envelope contained my appointment as 'Commander-in-Chief' of the Grand Fleet. On this order I was obliged to act, and I proceeded at once on board the *Iron Duke* and found that the Commander-in-Chief had received orders to turn over the command to me.

Sir George Callaghan had been my Commander-in-Chief during my command of the 2nd Battle Squadron. He was, in addition, a personal friend, and I, like all those with whom he had been in contact, had the most profound respect and admiration for him. The idea of taking over his command at *the* moment of his life naturally caused me feelings of the greatest pain, and moreover it was impossible to dismiss the fear that the fleet might conclude that I had been in some measure responsible for the change. This possibility had, of course, been present in my mind from the moment I left London, and it appeared to add to the objections to a change of command at such a juncture; since any idea of this nature, prevalent in the fleet, must affect the feeling of loyalty to me as the new Commander-in-Chief.

It is unnecessary to dwell on the matter, but I cannot close this portion of my narrative without paying a warm tribute to the manner in which Sir George accepted the Admiralty decision, which obviously came as a great shock to him. He behaved, as always, as a most gallant officer and gentleman, and his one desire was to make the position easy for me, in entire disregard of his own feelings.

It was decided that I should take over the command on the

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following day, but a telegram having been received from the Admiralty ordering the fleet to sea at once, I returned to the *Iron Duke*, and Sir George Callaghan arranged to leave the fleet in the *Sappho* before its departure at 8.30 in the morning.

At that hour I took over the Command from Sir George Callaghan, who then struck his flag."

It is as well here to give the following extract from a letter from Sir George Callaghan to Sir John Jellicoe.

"20th August.

MY DEAR JELlicoe,

My disappointment has been made much easier to bear by the very kind letters I have been receiving these last few days.

Yours of 13th which has just reached me is one of them and I am indeed grateful to you for all you say. It was a hard time, but we will forget it as we doubtless will both have many more shocks before it is all over.

The King was most kind and did a great deal to put me right with myself. . . .

Good luck, old Chap,
Always yours very sincerely."

All those who knew Lord Jellicoe well and have had opportunities of observing his loyal and sincere temperament, will fully believe that his statement—"the idea of taking over the command at the moment of his (Sir George Callaghan's) life naturally caused me feelings of the greatest pain"—was no conventional utterance but literally and fundamentally true.

Let us for a moment skip four and a half years and let His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury (Dr. Cosmo Lang) relate a scene at which he was present :

"When the great joy of a son came to Jellicoe he invited me to go over to the Isle of Wight to christen the boy. I found myself travelling companion to Sir George Callaghan, whom Jellicoe had displaced from his command at the outbreak of the War. He told me that all the Admirals whose flags had been flying during Jellicoe's command had subscribed together to present a gold christening cup. The question arose as to who should present it at the christening. He insisted that there was one person who had the right to claim that privilege, and that was himself.

When the ceremony was over Jellicoe said to me that after dinner he wished to show Callaghan some papers he had kept which would prove that he had done everything he could to avoid what he

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always regarded as the most painful act of his life. I said that I quite understood and that I would leave Callaghan and him together. No one else was staying in the house. Jellicoe said he wished me to be present. Accordingly, after dinner we went into his room, then he said with some embarrassment—I think I have a fairly accurate memory of the conversation—‘Look here, old chap, I have long waited to have a chance of showing you some papers to prove that I did everything I could to avoid that painful episode which neither of us can forget. Here they are.’ Callaghan at once replied, ‘Damn your papers, my dear fellow, I don’t want to see them. I have never had any doubt about it.’ That was all. I thought it was a striking illustration of the character of the two men and of the spirit of true comradeship in the Navy.”

That the Grand Fleet was in a perfect state of discipline and organization was, of course, well known to all who had served under the command of Sir George Callaghan. But big events were pending. The fleet was on the eve of being increased from four battle squadrons to six battle squadrons, and of having its cruisers, destroyers, and auxiliary forces largely augmented. A vast armada was thus being created. A considerable extension and re-organization of the staff arrangements therefore became necessary. It was here that the personality, experience and wise guidance of the new Commander-in-Chief had full scope. In a very short time his personality began to be felt. His quiet, steadfast, and courteous bearing inspired confidence and sowed the seeds of an affection that has remained in the hearts of those who served under him in the hard disappointing months which were to follow. He had one trait in common with Lord St. Vincent. That stern old sea dog never failed to lift his hat when he addressed the lowest grade of seaman in his ship, and Sir John never failed to return the salute of the youngest boy in the fleet. He soon came to be known by the rather unique—at all events unique among Naval officers—title of “Father”—a term embodying at once trust and affection.

On the declaration of war the following vibrant message was received from His Majesty the King, and communicated to the fleet—a message that was brief, to the point, and inspiring, and one that sent a thrill of elation and loyalty throughout the fleet :

“At this grave moment in our national history, I send to you and through you to the officers and men of the fleet of which you have assumed command, the assurance of my confidence that under

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your direction they will revive and renew the old glories of the Royal Navy, and prove once again the sure shield of Britain and of her Empire in the hour of trial."

Immediately on assuming command, Sir John Jellicoe proceeded to re-organize his Staff to cope with the huge work of administering the fleet. He therefore divided his Staff into two distinct sections. 1. Strategical and tactical; 2. Fuelling, storing and maintenance of the material of the fleet and the details of other than tactical considerations. Each with its own secretariat.

The strategical portion of the Staff was directly under the superintendence of Rear-Admiral Charles Madden, with three war Staff officers, a secretary and clerical staff. It is needless to particularize all the work carried out by this section. Briefly, it had to arrange the disposition and movements of ships and to examine all the tactical and strategical problems that arose, or might arise, which were special to the Grand Fleet and the particular war in hand; the questions of attacks on the fleet or its harbours by submarines or destroyers, and the best methods of defence; mines, minefields, general orders for cruising in fine weather and in fog, and the framing of detailed battle orders were all thoroughly gone into to meet the wishes of the Commander-in-Chief, who was the directing and inspiring mind.

This strategical and tactical Staff was augmented at sea by the members of the Personnel and Materiel Staff, since generally speaking the latter had considerably less work at sea than in harbour.

The Personnel and Materiel Staff had at its head Commodore Allan F. Everett,¹ with the title of Captain of the Fleet, plus a secretary and clerical staff. After a few months he was succeeded, on taking up the appointment of Naval Secretary to the First Lord, by Commodore Lionel Halsey. He was responsible for organizing and arranging all coaling, victualling, taking in stores, and routine overhaul and repairs of the fleet as well as for the periodic firings and instructional drills. He also gave fatherly assistance in the organizing of sports and games. For, queer as it may seem to those unaccustomed to dealing with large numbers of men who have to spend much of their time in semi-idleness, the question of sports and games becomes a matter of first-class importance.

The seamen and ships' companies of the Grand Fleet were far different in education and general behaviour from the men of the Navy when Sir John had joined as a midshipman. In the

¹ Afterwards Admiral Sir Allan F. Everett, K.C.B.

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previous European war discipline had been maintained by the "cat" and hanging at the yard-arm. These drastic measures were necessary because at least 50 per cent of the crews were pressed men and the sweepings of the gaols, good and gallant fighters, but often of brutal temperament and morals. When Sir John joined the Service, the use of the "cat" had not entirely died out, but during his forty years of service education had wrought wonders in all branches of the Navy. It is not an exaggeration to say that a large proportion of the seamen of the Navy in 1914 were quite as well educated as were the majority of the officers of 1870. Increased education, however, demands an increase of intellectual pursuits and recreations. The minds of the men, now awakened and made active, had to be kept employed. Partial education is apt to lead to crude Socialism ; and, unless kept in check, Socialism is antagonistic to discipline. It is true that the Captain or commanding officer of each ship and vessel of the Grand Fleet was directly responsible for the discipline of his own ship ; but something beyond the ordinary ship life was required, if the morale of the 60,000, or so, men was to be kept at a high level. The unfortunate happenings in the fleet on two occasions after the War show how necessary it is for the High Command to keep in touch with the feeling on board the ships, and forestall all tendencies that may be at work to undermine the discipline and morale of the officers and men.

Sir John, therefore, at a very early date showed great wisdom by wholeheartedly throwing himself into the schemes which had been started by the energy of Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly at Scapa, for the construction of football grounds, a golf-course and landing piers and other works of general utility. The men were also given employment in erecting batteries for the defence of the submarine obstructions, and installing a rifle and pistol range for the small-arm practice of the ships' companies. Later on, Sir John caused a canteen ship to be sent. This was fitted up by the Junior Army and Navy Stores so that provision was made for the supply of minor luxuries, which were enjoyed by the men as additions to the good but rather plain Admiralty fare. This in no small measure added to their contentment. This ship, the *Gourko*, was also provided with a boxing-ring and a theatrical stage that was frequently used for lectures, cinemas and other entertainments. She also had ample room to accommodate the Nonconformists and Roman Catholics at their Sunday Services.

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So, under a Commander-in-Chief who for the whole of his life had been addicted to sport, sport became the keynote of the life at Scapa. Inter-ship competitions in football, boxing, regattas, and athletic sports, went far to occupy the minds of the men and gave them fixtures to which to look forward, and generally caused discussions and excitement.

It is interesting to cast a thought back one hundred and twenty-five years or so to the days of Nelson, and to see how, even in those days, a far-sighted Naval officer looked carefully after the recreation of his men. During the three years that the *Boreas*, Nelson's ship, remained on the West Indies Station, in a climate which then was usually so fatal, not a single officer or man of her whole complement had died. This almost unexampled instance of good health, though mostly, no doubt, imputable to a healthy season, must in some measure also be ascribed to the wise conduct of the Captain. He never suffered the ships to remain at any of the islands more than three or four days at a time ; and, when the hurricane months confined him to English Harbour, Antigua, he encouraged all kinds of useful amusements, music, dancing and cudgelling among the men ; theatricals among the officers, anything that would employ their attention and keep their spirits cheerful.¹

So much for the life of the fleet in harbour. In addition, the ships were frequently taken to sea for sweeps down the North Sea, while gunnery drills, battle practice at targets, and all the usual peacetime firings and instructions were kept up and carried out with even more than usual rigidity. A great deal of practice firing both by day and by night was carried out by ships in the wide waters of Scapa Flow, secure against submarine attacks after January, 1915. Throughout the War, as in the old days, our blockading squadrons, by being continually at sea, became inured to cruising and practised in sea life ; thus the Grand Fleet by its sweeps down the North Sea and its sea-going drills and practices gave our men a sea-accustomedness which was largely denied to the men of the High Sea Fleet. By these means the devil of idleness and discontent was kept out of the lives of the officers and men.

The Grand Fleet command consisted originally of 4 battle squadrons, increased afterwards to 5 ; a total of 28 Dreadnoughts and 8 pre-Dreadnoughts. The cruiser squadrons consisted of 4 battle cruisers, 12 light cruisers, 42 destroyers and 9

¹ Southey's *Life of Nelson*.

armoured cruisers ; a portion of the last formed the Tenth Cruiser Squadron that patrolled north of the Shetlands to intercept and, when weather permitted, to board all ships leaving or entering the North Sea by the Northern passages. The whole command formed, in fact, a small town of several hundred mobile units of varying size, with some 60,000 inhabitants whose needs had to be attended to by the staff of the Commander-in-Chief. In addition, there was nominally attached to the Grand Fleet the Harwich Force of Light Cruisers and Destroyers. This, however, was kept in the south as a check on raids by the enemy on our shipping in the Channel and the entrance to the Thames. It was situated so far to the southward that Sir John asked the Admiralty to take charge of and direct its movements and operations.

The Commander-in-Chief further arranged with the Admiralty for a senior officer to be appointed in command of the Shetlands and Orkneys, with his headquarters at Scapa. Admiral the Hon. Sir Stanley Colville most patriotically waived his seniority—he being senior to Sir John—and was given the post, greatly to the benefit of the Commander-in-Chief and the country generally. Rear-Admiral Miller took charge more particularly of the organization of the base at Scapa.

When the fleet was at sea, either the Chief of the Staff or the Captain of the Fleet was always on the bridge in the absence of the Commander-in-Chief. By this means an officer of experience was always ready to manœuvre the fleet should necessity arise.

Although general orders for the conduct of the fleet at sea cruising and in action were issued in writing to the Admirals, Captains, and officers concerned, the considered opinion of the Commander-in-Chief on these subjects was also communicated in interviews and conferences ; so that each officer in command became thoroughly cognizant of the views and wishes of the Commander-in-Chief. This was absolutely necessary if a fleet, that in time of battle was over five miles in length, was to be manœuvred rapidly, intelligently, and co-ordinately. The general scheme at the commencement of an action, as laid down by the Commander-in-Chief, was simplicity itself. It aimed at maintaining the ships of the fleet at a steady distance from those of the enemy and employing during the action as small changes as possible in course and speed. This procedure was the one most likely to be productive of accurate gunfire. If, as the action proceeded, communication became impossible with the Commander-in-Chief, then each Admiral

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of a Division was instructed to take the necessary action to carry out the principles that had been imparted to him by the Commander-in-Chief ; but he was left with unfettered discretion to act on such occasions as his judgment might dictate. Bearing this in mind, there is no need to enlarge further on the enormous advantage that was gained by discussion of all situations that could be foreseen as likely to occur in an action. It is, of course, impossible to foresee everything that may come to pass ; but, by accustoming the minds of his Admirals and Captains to review possibilities and to arrive at definite conclusions, Sir John ensured that correct and instant action on the spur of the moment would be facilitated in cases which might be similar to those reviewed, although not absolutely identical with them. Again, when once the principles governing the movements of a fleet in an engagement have been fully communicated to the senior officers, signalling is reduced to a minimum. Each Admiral or Captain, being imbued with the views of his Commander-in-Chief, is usually able to anticipate an order given before a signal is actually made.

Those who were not in close touch with the Navy during the early stages of the War cannot have the slightest inkling of the danger incurred by our fleet, and therefore by our Allies, from the want of a secure base in which to anchor the battleships of the Grand Fleet. The Commander-in-Chief had under his orders the fleet on which the outcome of the War depended ; but until the end of 1914 there was no harbour in which that armada could lie safely at anchor. Next to instant readiness to meet the High Sea Fleet, Sir John Jellicoe's greatest pre-occupation was how to preserve his battlefleet from losses from the enemy's destroyers and submarines when lying at anchor in harbour. While the people of England moved happily about their varied business, and slept peacefully in their beds, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Fleet was driven from pillar to post, continually haunted by the spectre of a possible, even we may say probable, successful attack being made on his battlefleet by the mobile forces of the enemy. There was no harbour of sufficient size in which our fleet could lie between Sheerness and the Forth and even the latter harbour, the Firth of Forth, was only partially protected. Next came Cromarty, which had a slight gun defence against destroyers ; but it was too small to accommodate much more than one division of the battlefleet. Then farthest north of all G 8 was Scapa, a magnificent anchorage, but with three undefended

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entrances. At Scapa no provision of any sort had been made during peace-time either for the defence of this base, or for the repairs or maintenance of a fleet using it as a base in war-time. At Cromarty, as noted above, a certain amount of gun protection had been installed, but no maintenance facilities had been arranged for. Rosyth was open to attack from destroyers and submarines ; here a dockyard had been designed and started, but little of the proposed work had been carried out.

Those conversant with the difficulties of squeezing money out of the Treasury, and therefore Parliament, in peace time, for what might be called the "hypothetical" needs of the Navy, will not marvel at this state of unpreparedness. Ships are looked on as a world-wide need ; and, therefore, they appeal to those who hold tight the national purse strings ; but it is almost impossible to have those strings released and to obtain money for subsidiary purposes. Arguments, plausible and convincing, can be advanced by facile economists against spending money on bricks and mortar to provide permanent works ashore that do not show in tables of the comparative Naval strength of other countries ; works, moreover, which would only be required in the hypothetical case of a war with one single other country.

The Government that was in power immediately before the War was obsessed with a desire to come to a friendly understanding with Germany regarding the abolition of the rivalry in armaments ; it therefore hesitated to take so overt an act as turning Scapa into a first-class naval base, a work which Germany might well consider to be a direct threat to her naval power in the North Sea. It was, therefore, not until after the commencement of the War that the defences of Scapa were taken in hand and arrangements made to deal with the other deficiencies of the port, which deficiencies made it practically useless as a base for a large fleet. A considerable fillip was given to this work by an incident which happened on September 1, 1914, which is best told in Sir John's own words :

"On September 1st the Dreadnought Battle Fleet and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, the 6th Cruiser Squadron and the 2nd and 4th Flotillas were at Scapa Flow, cleaning boilers, storing, and taking in ammunition, etc. . . .

At 6 p.m. the *Falmouth* reported the periscope of a submarine in sight inside the harbour, and immediately opened fire, four rounds being fired by this ship ; she reported having probably hit

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the submarine. Directly afterwards the *Vanguard*, one of the outer line of battleships, also opened fire on an object reported as a periscope, as did one of the 'E' Class destroyers, which was patrolling between the fleet and the Hoxa entrance.

The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron was directed to weigh immediately steam was ready, which was at 8.30 p.m., and to endeavour to locate the submarine and keep her under.

The 2nd Flotilla, lying at Longhope at short notice, was also instructed to weigh at once and search for the submarine. The whole of the ships present were ordered to raise steam with all despatch and to prepare for torpedo attack, and the small craft, such as drifters, steamboats, motor boats, yachts, etc., which had steam ready and which could be collected, were at once organized in detachments to steam up and down the lines at high speed and outside the fleet, with the object of confusing the submarine and endeavouring to ram her if sighted. Colliers and storeships which had steam ready were directed to weigh and go alongside the battleships which were not fitted with torpedo nets, in order to act as a form of protection against torpedoes fired at these valuable vessels. All ships in the outer lines were directed to burn searchlights to locate and confuse the submarine.

At 6.30 p.m. the *Drake* reported a submarine in sight from that ship, thus confirming the earlier reports.

G 8 The fleet was directed to weigh by divisions as soon as steam was ready and to proceed to sea. By 9.30 p.m. the weather was exceedingly thick inside the harbour and considerable difficulty was experienced in getting the fleet out, as at this time there were no navigational facilities of any sort for leaving the harbour at night or in thick weather ; but by 11 p.m. all the ships had left the harbour without accident, and although there was a dense fog outside, the fleet cleared the Pentland Firth successfully.

G 11 The *Assistance* was ordered to Loch Ewe, and left after the fleet, reporting having sighted a submarine in the entrance while going out. The 2nd Flotilla was left behind to locate and, if possible, destroy the submarine, and the 4th Flotilla was stationed outside the Hoxa and Hoy entrances during the night, and directed to meet the fleet at 7 a.m. on the 2nd. The only ship, as distinct from destroyers, remaining in harbour was the *Cyclops*, lying off Scapa, with the telephone and telegraph cables on board, and directions were given to Rear-Admiral Miller to endeavour to locate, by means of mine-sweeping gunboats, the submarine reported to have been hit by the *Falmouth*.

No trace of a submarine was discovered, and subsequent investigation showed that the alarm *may* have been false, the evidence

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not being conclusive either way. The incident, however, made it clear that protection against submarine attack was an absolute necessity, as the fleet could not remain at a base that was so open to this form of attack as Scapa Flow. The only possible action, in the event of an alarm being given of the presence of a submarine, was to take the fleet to sea ; and, in addition to the dangers arising at that time from a hurried departure in thick weather, a feeling of insecurity was created, which was bad for morale, and the ships were deprived of opportunities for cleaning boilers, refitting machinery, etc., which, experience was showing, was essential if the steaming efficiency of the fleet was to be maintained."

In fact, the sighting of a submarine in Scapa produced the same sort of excitement as would a cobra in a drawing-room, but with the great difference that the submarine was a deadly menace to the nation and the action taken against it was a disciplined one. How profoundly disturbed would the whole population of Britain have been had it known that our Grand Fleet was thus hurried from port to port with no secure base in which to lie at anchor.

Measures were taken by the Admiralty to have the channels that gave access to the anchorage at Scapa protected with obstructions ; and although the work was carried out with feverish haste, the work on the main channel, Hoxa Sound, was only finished by December 29, 1914, and the other Channels not until February 19, 1915. As a result of this unrest the Commander-in-Chief kept the fleet at sea as much as possible. In fact, during August, 1914, he was only one complete day in harbour, and only six complete days in September. Fearing the proximity of Scapa to the German destroyer bases he made use of Loch Ewe on the West coast of Scotland. The unwelcome presence here of an enemy submarine caused him to take the fleet to Lough Swilly on the north coast of Ireland and to Loch na Keal in the Island of Mull. In fact, for a short time, the North Sea was deserted. The result of this defence of the fleet by a constant change of anchorage was that no ship of the battlefleet was lost by attack from destroyers or submarines ; an immunity which, most certainly, would not have existed had the menace been disregarded by the Commander-in-Chief.

The *Audacious*, however, was lost, on October 27, by striking a mine at sea off the north coast of Ireland. Efforts were made to keep the loss secret ; but it could not be expected that the

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American passengers on board the S.S. *Olympic* (which closed to render assistance) would exercise such restraint, and before many days the news became public property abroad.

Sir John, while stressing the necessity for the defence of the battlefleet anchorage, pointed out another need at these bases, only second in importance to their defence, namely the provision of oiling and coaling facilities as well as mechanics, plant, shops, and docks for minor repairs. All these deficiencies had to be made good and supply systems installed before Scapa became an efficient Naval base. It is not without interest to read in the German official account of the War that they did not get anti-submarine nets fixed to the entrance to their Naval harbours until six months after the outbreak of war.

The first phase in the life of the Grand Fleet began on the declaration of war and may be looked on as having ended on August 20, after the Expeditionary Force had safely passed across the Channel without attack. The Germans had thrown away their best chance for making a bid to win the War at sea. Immediately on the outbreak of war the Commander-in-Chief, in pursuance of Admiralty instructions, made a sweep down the North Sea to support the Channel Fleet during the passage of the Expeditionary Force to France. Those few days were days fraught with great possibilities. Had the Germans made a serious feint northwards with their battlefleet to draw off Sir John Jellicoe's ships, and swept the Channel with their light cruisers and destroyers, they might have achieved a good deal. But that fateful week passed with no move on the part of the enemy. With the Expeditionary Force in France, the Channel ceased to be the chief place for German attack except for small craft endeavouring to sink our ships carrying supplies and reinforcements. In future the High Sea Fleet had no worthy objective other than the Grand Fleet. But the German High Command showed no desire to try conclusions with our fleet; nor did they, as might have been expected, make a serious attack on that fleet in our poorly defended harbours with their mobile small vessels. Days of vital importance slipped by, every twenty-four hours sapping the chance of their winning the War at sea. Sweeps with the battlefleet or cruisers were carried out periodically by Sir John to keep the waters of the North Sea under due surveillance.

Perhaps the most fortunate pre-War event, and one which affected profoundly the War in the North Sea, was the cession of

Heligoland to Germany in 1890. It would have been impossible in peace time to provide that island with adequate armament protection without incurring a violent protest from Germany, since to have mounted guns on an island within 50 miles of their coast would most assuredly have been considered tantamount to a declaration of war. On the other hand, for us to have had in our possession on the outbreak of war an advanced position so near to the anchorages of the German Fleet, and one that could not undertake its own defence, would have been a very great danger. Evacuation would have meant loss of prestige ; and, with the Admiralty constituted as it was at the outbreak of war, there would have been a grave danger that the Grand Fleet might have been risked in attempts to defend this useless possession. Fortunately its cession avoided such an entanglement. But adventure was the keynote of our Admiralty policy, and a raid into the Heligoland Bight was ordered. This, as approved by the Admiralty, included only the two light cruisers and the destroyers from Harwich, with the *Invincible* and *New Zealand* from the Grand Fleet as supports. Immediately Sir John heard of the proposal he obtained Admiralty concurrence for Sir David Beatty to support the operation with the battle cruiser squadron and Commodore Goodenough's four 6-inch gun light cruisers ; for it was apparent to him that a raid by light cruisers and the Harwich destroyers into the enemy's waters, close to where his battleships and battle cruisers lay at anchor, was a foolhardy proceeding, unless some strong support was available in case our vessels met with a superior force and became engaged in a decidedly unequal contest. Very sharp encounters ensued between the opposing light cruisers and destroyers over a wide area. Our forces were being worsted when in reply to a call for assistance from Commodore Tyrwhitt, Sir David Beatty, who had rightly gauged the situation, pluckily ignoring the risk of mines, stood in with his battle cruisers and cruisers at full speed through the mist to where the *Arethusa* was partially disabled and in a very critical situation. By so doing he completely turned the tables on the Germans. The result was that owing to the support given by the battle cruisers and 6-inch gun cruisers of the *Southampton* Class we came out of the scrap with no loss of ships, and only the *Arethusa* badly damaged ; whereas the Germans lost three light cruisers, the *Köln*, *Mainz* and *Ariadne*, the last two of which were sunk by the *Lion*, Sir David Beatty's flagship. The German losses exceeded 1,000, including a flag officer and a

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commodore. Sir John's action shows how a master mind will seize on essentials and turn what would have been defeat into victory.

Early in October, from the 3rd to the 11th, the Grand Fleet blockaded the northern exit of the North Sea, from the Orkneys and Shetlands to the neutral waters of the Norwegian coast, with a view to protecting the convoy of the Canadian troops. It would have been reassuring to the thousands of Canadians had they had knowledge of the firm and iron grip kept on the throat of the North Sea by the ships of the Grand Fleet, which ensured their uninterrupted passage to this country.

The worries of the Commander-in-Chief came thick and fast towards the end of October. With the *Audacious* sunk, the *Iron Duke* and *Ajax* with leaking condenser tubes, the *Orion* at Glasgow for examination of her turbine supports, the *Conqueror* at Devonport refitting, the *Erin* and *Agincourt* newly commissioned and therefore not really efficient, the *New Zealand* in dock at Cromarty, and the *Princess Royal* detached to the West Indies, the Grand Fleet at that time could count only on 17 effective Dreadnought battleships and 5 battle cruisers, while the High Sea Fleet had 15 battleships and 4 battle cruisers, an unpleasantly small margin of superiority in view of the fact that the High Sea Fleet possessed 88 destroyers and the Grand Fleet only 42. Added to this, the High Sea Fleet had in its second line 16 pre-War battleships and 14 light cruisers to our 12 pre-War battleships of, however, greater size and armament than the Germans, and 14 light cruisers. These pre-War battleships would have become of the greatest value after a fleet action between the two Dreadnought fleets ; for, with so near an equality in numbers, few of the Dreadnoughts on either side would have come out of a pitched battle in a fighting condition. On November 5 the Grand Fleet was still further weakened by the departure of the *Invincible* and *Inflexible* to hunt for, and (as it proved) sink Admiral von Spee's Squadron in the southern waters of the South Atlantic. This lightning stroke of the veteran Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Fisher, was most needful, but the temporary loss of two battle cruisers did not lessen the anxieties of the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet. A few days afterwards, however, the newly completed battle cruiser *Tiger* arrived and afforded a most welcome reinforcement. One other anxiety grew considerably as the weeks went on, for submarines came to be reported rather frequently off the Shetlands ; so it was to the joy of

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everyone when U.18 was rammed and sunk, and her crew captured, off the main entrance to Scapa.

During the first four months of the War, in 1914, the Grand Fleet steamed 16,805 miles and the *Iron Duke* took in over 14,000 tons of coal. She was only in harbour for one complete day of twenty-four hours. An eloquent testimony to the insecurity of our Northern Naval bases.

December was ushered in by gales of wind and heavy seas, which were especially severe in the latitudes of the Shetlands. So heavy was the weather that on the 14th, when a sweep to the southwards was arranged, the Scapa destroyers could not put to sea, and the cruisers *Blanche* and *Boadicea* were seriously damaged, the latter having her bridge washed away. However, the sweep was persisted in and the Harwich destroyers were called on to supplement those from Cromarty and Rosyth.

In the early part of the same month the personnel of the German Fleet was fast becoming dissatisfied with their enforced inactivity. The officers saw that deterioration of morale would inevitably creep into their service if the supposed superiority of the British Navy was allowed to obsess the minds of the men and create an inferiority complex. No man felt this more strongly than their Commander-in-Chief, Admiral von Ingenohl. He knew that our battle cruiser squadrons had been weakened by the absence of the *Inflexible* and *Invincible* in the southern Atlantic; and the Grand Fleet by the loss of the *Audacious*. He probably did not know of the absence of the *Princess Royal*, nor of the minor but inconvenient condenser defects of the *Iron Duke*, but it seemed to him that the right moment for an attack on the Grand Fleet had not only arrived, but was fast slipping by. He applied for permission to act, but the iron hand of the Kaiser was a cold hand; nor had that August Personage any regard for the psychological effects that enforced inaction would have on the fighting efficiency of his fleet. In reply, von Ingenohl received what to a Commander-in-Chief is the most damning form of response. He was told that he could act, but that he was to do nothing to endanger the status of his forces as a fleet in being. In fact, he could engage an enemy but he must not lose ships. This miserable conception, that the first duty of a fleet was to avoid loss, was the principle that underlay the rigid control exercised by the Kaiser and his Naval Cabinet over the German Navy. They never appreciated that: "Alone by losing vessels sea supremacy is bought."

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This fatal fear, which became instilled into their navy by such restrictive orders, was the reason for their letting slip so many opportunities of limiting severely our control of the North Sea, with the consequent fair chance of winning the War ; moreover, it was the prime cause which led to the disgraceful end of their magnificent fleet. If the Kaiser was determined to keep the High Sea Fleet as a fleet in being, then while his battlefleet remained passive, his battle cruisers should have been active ; and, important above all things, no operation should have been planned with the primary object of avoiding a fight. That reasonable care should be taken to avoid engaging an enemy of distinctly superior force was obvious ; but to refuse all engagements, merely because some ships might be disabled or lost, when equal damage might be done to the opposing side, must create a disheartening and degrading feeling in any naval fighting force. The Kaiser and his advisers seem to have been obsessed by the fear of a Russian landing on the north coast of Germany. At least that was the excuse given to Admiral von Ingenohl. So, apparently, it was this bogey of invasion that caused the Kaiser to sign the death warrant of his fleet before six months had elapsed from the declaration of war.

Admiral von Ingenohl read into his instructions, however, permission to carry out a cruiser raid, and stretched that permission to the extent of backing up the raid with his battlefleet at sea. But the embargo on loss of ships was bound to make the attempt a paltry affair, in fact a failure which augmented our belief in our own superiority while, in his fleet, it increased that very feeling of inferiority which it was his earnest desire to minimize and eradicate. However, it came about that the Admiralty, on December 14, became aware of increased activity on the part of the German High Sea Fleet, and suspected that a raid of some sort or another was being prepared. They were correct in their surmise, for an operation had been planned by Admiral von Ingenohl for a raid on our east coast—the broad outline of which was that their battle cruisers should raid and the battlefleet act as a support. The Admiralty, acting on their surmise, had directed Sir John Jellicoe to despatch Sir David Beatty with his 4 battle cruisers to a point from which he would be in a position to intercept a raid. Sir John was also directed to despatch one battle squadron in support. It was no easy matter to select a rendezvous which would cover practically 300 miles of coastline ; but, taking into consideration the positions of certain minefields laid by the Germans off our east coast, he selected a

position which proved subsequently to have been the best possible. Further, he considered that the cruiser force that had been detailed was too weak. He therefore ordered the 3rd Cruiser Squadron under Admiral Pakenham to act as a further reinforcement.

At 5.15 a.m. on December 16 the destroyer screen of the battle cruisers came into contact with the enemy destroyers. When Admiral von Ingenohl learned of this encounter he turned his fleet round; and, under the paralysing influence of the Kaiser's orders not to risk the loss of ships, made for his home port. The Germans at that moment had a splendid chance of meeting and engaging a fraction of our battlefleet and our battle cruisers. Had von Ingenohl kept on, he might well have reduced the numbers of the Grand Fleet to a parity with his own, and altered the whole course of the War.

The German cruisers evaded our screening vessels in the dark, and bombarded Scarborough and then Hartlepool. These bombardments were the first intimation that the Admiralty or our ships received that any serious operation was afoot. The weather was distinctly bad and the visibility poor. The German cruisers escaped to their harbour, having run a grave risk of destruction, owing to the absence of support from the High Fleet battleships, but luck favoured them at every turn. It is needless here to describe the movements of the opposing forces; these are fully set forth in *Naval Operations*, Volume II. There was, however, one instructive point which was brought out—namely, the proper method of issuing orders to detached forces.

On receiving the news of the Scarborough bombardment, Sir John Jellicoe appreciated that his dispositions were satisfactory and he at once inferred that the enemy would probably make use of a passage that they had left, seemingly on purpose, between two minefields laid by them off the part of the coast adjacent to where the bombardments had taken place. He therefore made the following signal:

“From Commander-in-Chief Grand Fleet to Senior Officer 2nd Battle Squadron, Senior Officer Battle Cruiser Squadron, Gap in minefield between lat. 54.40 and 54.20 as far as 0.20 E. Longitude. Enemy will in all probability come out there.”

This signal is interesting, for it shows how the Commander-in-Chief, after having assigned to the admirals of the two units the duty of intercepting the enemy, did not hamper their actions

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by issuing definite orders from a distance ; but, having called attention to a probability, left them to act as their judgment might dictate according to local conditions. Unfortunately the Admiralty did not act in so wise a manner, for a message was received from Whitehall informing Admirals Warrender and Beatty that the enemy had left the coast and were probably retiring to Heligoland, and *directing* the Admirals to keep *outside* the minefields and to try to cut him off. This had to be obeyed ; so that instead of going up the channel, as Sir John had hinted and as Sir David Beatty had already commenced to do, they kept outside and missed making contact with the enemy, which otherwise they could not have failed to do. The enemy did actually issue through this channel, and in the wide waters of the offing were not subsequently brought to action for two reasons. First, the weather became thick and visibility was cruelly reduced at the critical time when the enemy would have been sighted had the weather remained clear ; and secondly, a signal by the *Lion* which did not express Sir David's intentions had the effect of recalling the *Southampton*, light cruiser, which was actually engaging the cruiser screen of the enemy's battle cruisers. The episode was a peculiar one in that both sides ran grave risks, both sides were equally fortunate and unlucky, and both sides were bitterly disappointed.

Late one night in December, 1914, while at Scapa, the Commander-in-Chief visited Fleet-Paymaster Hamnet Share in his cabin and asked if there was anything more to deal with, as he would like to turn in. Papers requiring immediate attention had all been finished, so he left the cabin. Almost immediately afterwards an orderly brought a telegram from the cypher office below. It was from the Admiralty giving the news of the sinking of Admiral von Spee's squadron by Vice-Admiral Sturdee's force in the South Atlantic. He took it at once to the Admiral in his sleeping cabin, who told him to have a general signal made to the fleet announcing this important news. While the Fleet-Paymaster was transcribing it, the Commander-in-Chief returned and remarked that, by a queer coincidence, at the moment the telegram had been handed him he was reading Psalm CXV : " Not unto us, O Lord, not unto us, but unto Thy Name give the Praise. . . ."

Although the advantages offered by Scapa as an anchorage for the fleet were great, yet many were the disadvantages of an

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anchorage in winter in those dark and tempestuous latitudes. In fact, a minor disaster overtook the Grand Fleet that, had the Germans known, might have developed into a very serious matter. In the early morning of December 26 the battlefleet, returning from a sweep down to the Heligoland Bight, ran into a heavy gale of wind. By 10 a.m. it was blowing a whole gale from the S.E. On nearing the Pentland Firth the fleet found the conditions to be exceptionally severe and navigation difficult, for the wrack of the storm blew the funnel smoke forward and caused objects ahead to become partially obscured. The 2nd Battle Squadron led the fleet into the anchorage at Scapa at 6 a.m. while it was still dark, the ships of course carrying no lights; and while the *Monarch* was altering course to avoid a patrol vessel, the *Conqueror* ran into her from astern. The Commander-in-Chief, sensing from intercepted wireless signals that something was wrong, led the 4th Battle Squadron into the Pentland Firth until definite information was available; and a very bad time, indeed, they had while turning round in the furious gale that was raging. However, in time all the other ships gained their anchorage in safety; but the result of the gale was that both the *Conqueror* and the *Monarch*, as well as the destroyers *Hope*, *Redpole*, and *Ruby*, had to go to their home ports for repair.

Christmas Day, 1914, came with the fleet at sea, and the ships all cleared for action. Sir John wrote: "We had celebrations at 6.30 a.m., 8 a.m. and 8.45 a.m. I could only attend at 6.30. We had Church at 11 a.m. Fortunately the weather was clear, so we could afford to be off deck a bit."

So the year 1914 in closing down brought grave anxieties to the Commander-in-Chief. The *Audacious* sunk, *Conqueror* and *Monarch* away under repair, *Commonwealth* refitting, *Emperor of India* and *Benbow* newly joined and therefore not yet efficient; only 20 Dreadnoughts were available, and of these, two had not been sufficiently long in commission to warrant their being considered as really fit to take a full share in an action. The Germans, on the other hand, had 16 Dreadnought battleships in commission. As a second line we had only 7 pre-Dreadnought battleships, while the Germans had 16. This gave Sir John only a very narrow margin of superiority in Dreadnought battleships. As regards battle cruisers we had a narrow margin of 5 to the German 4. Of light cruisers we had the same as the Germans, 12 and 12. But our destroyer numbers were lamentably less than those of the enemy in the proportion of 44 to the

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German 88. In fact, at this particular time the Germans had in the North Sea a force equivalent to that of the Grand Fleet. One more mischance in the fogs or gales in those dark wild latitudes in winter, one accidental happening on an undiscovered minefield, or one successful attack by the enemy's submarines, and England might have been placed more or less at the mercy of the German Fleet : our Dreadnought fleet inferior, their pre-Dreadnought fleet one hundred per cent superior, our destroyers hopelessly outnumbered. It was well for its peace of mind that the country remained ignorant and therefore happy. Well, too, may it bless the names of Reginald McKenna and John Fisher who in 1909 fought with their backs to the wall and ultimately beat those reactionary members of the Cabinet who, at one time, had obtained the consent of the Prime Minister to cutting four Dreadnoughts out of the building programme put forward and insisted on by the Admiralty as being absolutely necessary and vitally urgent.

POSTSCRIPT I

THE following letter, written in pencil at sea, gives a peculiarly vivid insight into Sir John Jellicoe's singleness of mind and purpose. It is a free confession from the heart of his difficulties and trials in assuming the command of the Grand Fleet, and yet there is all the undercurrent of conviction in his own capacity and firm belief in the victorious outcome of the War.

MY OWN DARLING MOTHER,

*"Iron Duke,"
August 7th, 1914.*

I hope you have not been anxious about me, but I have of course been simply without a moment. I was sent north as Second-in-Command, and at the last moment was told I might have to take command. I protested most strongly against the folly of changing the Commander-in-Chief on the eve of war, and after arriving up north telegraphed twice a day imploring the Admiralty not to do it, as I was sure it was a fatal error. I put on one side my strong objection to superseding a very old friend at such a moment, the idea of which so distressed me that I felt quite ill, and could not sleep at all. It was so utterly repugnant to my feelings. But the Admiralty insisted, and 4 hours before the fleet left I was ordered to transfer my flag as acting Admiral to the Flagship, and poor Sir George Callaghan left her utterly broken down. It was a cruel and most unwise step. But it is done, and I've had to make the best of it and try to grasp the work and get

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hold of all the many details at the shortest notice. I really wonder that I kept my head at all when I think of what I went through. But I am all right, Mother dear, and every day makes it easier. I cannot give you any news of our movements as all letters are censored and read (except of course my own), but I must set an example. Officers and men are not even allowed to head their letters with the name of their ships. I've done it for this letter, but you will understand if I don't do it again.

I've got Charles Madden with me as Chief-of-Staff and he helps me so much. We are entering harbour to coal now but shall be out to-night again. I dare not stay in harbour at night if I can help it for fear of destroyer attacks. I have of course the greater part of the Navy under my immediate command. The war may last some time. I should say it depends largely on what happens on shore.

You won't be anxious about me I hope, Mother dear. God will protect me and I look to Him to help me to do my duty to my country. I feel that our cause is just. The war has been forced on us, and that right will prevail in the end. I hope that dear Father is well, and that you will be able to arrange for a satisfactory man in place of Waterson, also that the high prices will not affect your comfort. I imagine that we are much better off than Germany as far as that goes. The Germans seem to be laying mines all over the sea to the danger of merchant ships. It is a cruel form of warfare which will recoil on their own heads. We have had no fighting up here as yet. I have had to capture and sink a lot of German trawlers as they have carrier pigeons on board and send information away I expect, but of course I take the crews off. I am simply overwhelmed with work and try to sleep when opportunity occurs as it is so vitally important to keep in health and my mind clear, so I know you won't expect long and frequent letters. I have asked Gwen to keep you informed about me, and Admiral Leveson at the Admiralty to contradict any false reports that get about. I will close now, dearest Mother. Give my fondest love to Father, Grace and Edie, Fred, Alice and the dear Aunts.

Ever your most loving son,

JACK."

POSTSCRIPT II

MESSAGE from Sir John to Lady Jellicoe for the wives of the men of the Grand Fleet.

14.11.14.

"I know you will be meeting the wives and families of the men and I hope you will tell them of the magnificent spirit which pre-

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vails. Our troops are covering themselves with glory during the war. The Navy has not yet as a whole, had the opportunity of fighting, but they have shown that the old spirit which carried us to victory in the past is with us now ; but those who have had the opportunity have shown that they possess the same pluck and endurance as our comrades ashore. Nothing can ever have been finer than the coolness and courage shown in every case where ships have been sunk by mine or torpedoes. The discipline has been perfect and men have gone to their death not only with gallantry but most unselfishly. One hears on all sides of numerous instances of men giving up on these occasions a plank that was supporting them to some more feeble comrade and I feel prouder with every day that passes that I command such men, and during the period of waiting and watching they are cheerful and contented in spite of the grey dullness of their lives. I am sure you will tell the wives and children and the sisters and mothers of our men of the spirit that prevails and I know that it will make them, too, desire to show in their own lives that they are animated by the same desire to do the best they can for their country, so that they will be worthy of their mankind of whom it is difficult to say too much."

POSTSCRIPT III

THE following officers also served on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief.

Captain F. C. Dreyer, who had been Flag-Commander to Admiral Jellicoe in two squadrons previous to the War, relieved Captain Lawson as Flag-Captain in October, 1915, and commanded the *Iron Duke* at the Battle of Jutland. He accompanied the Commander-in-Chief when the latter went to the Admiralty as First Sea Lord in November, 1916.

Commander Charles W. R. Royds, who was in the first Scott Antarctic Expedition, remained until promoted. On retirement after the War he became Sir Charles Royds, Assistant-Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. He died suddenly in 1930.

Those of the Staff of Sir George Callaghan who remained included Commodore A. F. Everett, Captain of the Fleet, who was eventually relieved by Commodore Lionel Halsey ; Flag-Commander Roger Backhouse, promoted Captain, September 1, 1914 ; Commander the Hon. Matthew Best, War Staff Officer ; Commander A. R. W. Woods, Signal Officer ; Lieutenant-Commander J. S. C. Salmond, Wireless Officer ; Lieutenant-Commander

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R. M. Bellairs, War Staff Officer ; Lieutenant W. D. Phipps, Signal Officer ; later on, Commander C. M. Forbes came as Flag-Commander in October, 1915.

Admiral Jellicoe had brought North with him Captain R. W. Bentinck as Chief of the Staff ; Lieutenant H. Fitzherbert as Flag-Lieutenant ; Lieutenant-Commander E. J. Hardman-Jones as Signal Officer ; Lieutenant-Commander R. L. Nicholson as Wireless Officer ; Lieutenant-Commander (N) A. F. B. Carpenter as War Staff Officer, who afterwards won the V.C. at Zeebrugge.

Rear-Admiral C. E. Madden was appointed Chief of Staff almost at once, Captain Bentinck in a similar capacity to the Staff of Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender, commanding the 2nd Battle Squadron, and Captain Oliver Leggett, Navigating Officer of the Fleet.

Fleet-Paymaster Hamnet Share, the Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief, was at first assisted by Fleet-Paymaster Charles F. Pollard, who had been with the late Commander-in-Chief, but who eventually joined Sir George Callaghan in the Nore Command, Fleet-Paymaster Victor H. T. Weekes taking his place. It occupied some time before the new war organization became thoroughly efficient, on account of the varied and immense amount of matter that had to be dealt with. On an average about a hundred telegrams were daily received and sent and on some occasions these numbers were considerably exceeded. In the Commander-in-Chief's office seven officers, six Chief and other writers, two printing presses and printers were constantly employed ; and regular watch night and day was kept by officers in the cypher office.

As soon as an order for operations or movements had been drafted, proofs had to be made and checked, and then close on 400 copies had to be produced, sometimes at very short notice, and distributed before the fleet could go to sea. Each ship acknowledged receipt of such orders by a special flag.

POSTSCRIPT IV

In the first weeks of the War, there was reason to suspect that letters, even in official mailbags, had been tampered with between London and their arrival on board the Flagship. On one occasion an envelope and its enclosure in the sealed bag from the Admiralty were found to have been neatly cut open. It happened to be a

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secret document of no great import. Since previously suspected cases, though none so daring as this, had been reported without effect, the Commander-in-Chief telegraphed to Mr. Churchill, who replied that he had made arrangements for messengers to convey despatches to the Flagship daily, and that some intelligent young Members of Parliament had been given commissions as temporary Lieutenants R.N.V.R. for the duty. This system worked well and there was no further cause for complaint. The messengers arrived each morning and as a rule returned with despatches from the Commander-in-Chief the same day. They were generally in time to breakfast at the Commander-in-Chief's table and brought the latest news from the south, which was a very welcome commencement to the day's work.

Among them were the late Sir Harold Smith, M.P., a brother of Lord Birkenhead; Sir W. Mitchell-Thomson, afterwards a Minister in Mr. Baldwin's Governments; Mr. Charles Williams, subsequently M.P. for Torquay; Lieutenants Tinker, Bangay, Gandy, Denys Hodgson, the late Victor Hodgson, A. F. Whyte (now Sir Frederick, late President of the Legislative Assembly, India, 1920-5); the Hon. Edward Gully and Gerald France, afterwards Parliamentary Private Secretary to the President of the Board of Trade.

CHAPTER XVI

The Grand Fleet—Part III, January, 1915, to May, 1916

THE year 1915 was not destined to be one of very great importance so far as war in the North Sea was concerned.

After the Dogger Bank action Admiral von Pohl was appointed to command the High Sea Fleet in the place of Admiral von Ingenohl. The new Commander-in-Chief was largely occupied with schemes for action in the Baltic, and, with the exception of one cruise late in the year, cut short by bad weather at the Horn Reef, the High Sea Fleet did not again put out into the North Sea. The passivity of the enemy and the time that elapsed without serious challenge to our naval anchorages enabled Sir John Jellicoe to obtain firmer and surer control over the northern waters, and to make his bases more secure from attack. Although the early days of January found our battlefleet still without an adequate margin of strength over the High Sea Fleet, ships gradually came along during the year. The re-tubing of the faulty condensers was completed, the damaged battleships repaired, and the battleships *Erin*, *Canada* and *Agincourt* of the emergency war programme became available ; so that, by the middle of the year, we had a reasonable preponderance in Dreadnought battleship strength over similar ships of the High Sea Fleet. The destroyer numbers also showed an improvement ; for on October 1, 1915, the Grand Fleet had 65 instead of only the 42 which were available on January 1. This number, however, did not compare well with the German 88.

The harbours of Scapa, Invergordon, and Rosyth were put into a reasonable state of defence against submarine and destroyer attack, also their equipment as repair bases was pushed well forward, and a large floating dock, brought up from the south, was installed in the Tyne. It is interesting to note that this was one of two docks which were ordered by Sir John when he was Controller, against the advice of the Naval Construction

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Department, but which he foresaw might be of great value in war-time.

The 10th Cruiser Squadron, which patrolled the northern waters between the Shetlands and Iceland, was reconstituted so as to be composed entirely of armed merchant vessels, and was increased in number to 21 ships. These established a good grip on that exit, but a leakage by enemy vessels breaking through was bound to occur, especially in the long winter nights. During the summer of this year roughly an average of 60 vessels per week were examined, of which about a dozen were sent in for extensive overhaul; and, in winter, about 33 per week were stopped and examined. It must be remembered, of course, that the nights in the northern latitude lasted for some seventeen hours.

This squadron under the command of Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair did most valuable work, but it would have been more valuable still if the Foreign Office had allowed the prohibition of the carriage of contraband of war to be more rigidly enforced. This fear of driving neutrals to side with the Central Powers, and especially the fear that the United States might declare war against us, caused our policy in respect to contraband to be halting and weak.

Sir John writes :



“We could, I believe, bring the Germans to their knees in 3 months by the blockade, if the Government would face the protests of neutral countries and take a firm stand, and risk a war with the United States, Norway, and Sweden. But they would not do it, and all the ships we send in are released again. It is disheartening work for the ships, but there it is.”

It is interesting to note that Sir John received whole-hearted support from Lord Fisher while he remained First Sea Lord. The following is an extract from a typical letter :

“MY BELOVED JELLICOE,

I'm sure you'll *at once* telegraph to me personally in cypher if you *want anything* or wish *anything altered* or *doubt the wisdom* of any orders you get.”

The Intelligence Division had, early in the War, been strengthened by the appointment of a band of scientists under the leadership of Sir Alfred Ewing, F.R.S. These were, with practice, able to decode signals. They further spent their time in drawing inferences from such subtle, small, and varied pieces of information as found their way into the Admiralty buildings.



H.M.S. *IRON DUKE* AT SEA IN A GALE

1915 TO 1916—THE GRAND FLEET—PART III

In time they became experts in deciphering codes, in fact they seemed to develop a species of second sight, so uncanny were their reasonings and deductions. The result was that any special activity on the part of the High Sea Fleet could be detected and gauged, and measures taken to warn the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet. This allowed the fleet to take longer rests in harbour and to proceed with all important exercises and firings, confident that ample notice would be given if serious movements on the part of the enemy were about to take place.

The fleet mine-sweepers were kept constantly at work, under the protection of destroyers, sweeping routes that would be used by the fleet at sea. Mining of the approaches to the passages leading to the enemy's harbours was carried on with such mines as were available, though unfortunately we were very short of this particular weapon of offence. The battlefleet was by no means idle during the year, and made sweeps on twenty-one occasions, frequently remaining at sea for several days at a time. The battle cruisers, or light cruiser squadrons, carried out fifty sweeps in different parts of the North Sea. The destroyers were constantly employed either for screening ships or hunting submarines.

The weather, generally speaking, was bad. Gales in the spring, autumn, and winter were frequent. Fogs and mists recurred in the most annoying way; for example in May, fog or mist persisted for nine days, in June for nine days, and in August for twelve days. These adverse climatic conditions were a great handicap to the carrying out of the tasks and training of the fleet.

The only exciting piece of work was the result of a sweep which started on January 23. On Monday Sir John left Scapa for a sweep in the southern part of the North Sea. He ordered the battle cruisers to assist by reconnoitring towards the Dogger Bank, together with the Harwich force under Commodore Tyrwhitt. Sir John gave Sir David Beatty a rendezvous for dawn on the following day, choosing one that he considered the best for sighting the enemy, if, as he suspected, he had left his harbour the previous evening. Sir John in the *Iron Duke*, with the 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons, proceeded towards the rendezvous. On the morning of the 24th Sir David Beatty in the *Lion*, in company with the *Tiger*, *Princess Royal*, *New Zealand* and *Indomitable*, the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, and the Harwich Cruiser and destroyer force came into contact with 4 German battle cruisers, the *Seydlitz*, *Moltke*, *Derfflinger*, *Blücher*, 4 light cruisers, and a strong destroyer

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force. A gallant action ensued, during which a large turn was made by our battle cruiser squadron to avoid a reported submarine. This, coupled with a faulty signal made by the *Lion*, which failed to express Admiral Beatty's intentions, led to the chase being abandoned.

The signal in question, as made, distinctly ordered an attack by the squadron on the *Blücher*, which already had been disabled ; while Admiral Beatty has stated that he had intended a signal to be made to order the squadron to renew the chase of the other three German ships. The result was that the *Blücher* alone was sunk, whereas had the chase not been interfered with, the *Seydlitz*, and both the other cruisers, might have shared the same fate. A disappointing action. The battlefleet coming down from Scapa, 180 miles to the northward of Rosyth, was still 140 miles distant from the battle cruisers during this engagement and therefore was unable to take any part in it.

During February Sir John had himself to go into dock. Exposure and hard work brought on what, fortunately, was not a serious illness, though one that required a slight operation and a period of rest. He entered a nursing home under the name of Mr. Jessop, so as to keep the fact of his absence from the fleet a secret. He had hardly entered before there arrived a specialist surgeon from London, another from Edinburgh and a trained nurse. These, unknown to Sir John, had been sent by Lord Fisher—a typical “Jacky” Fisher action. He looked on Sir John's health as of infinite value to the nation, and did not intend that there should be any doubt about his speedy recovery. It is most pleasant to read the many letters Sir John received during this period, and to see the regard in which he was held. Every one of the many writers impressed on him the necessity, from a national point of view, of a thorough rest so as to ensure a complete cure, and every writer agreed that there was no one who could succeed him or who had the necessary balanced experience and at the same time held so surely the affection and regard of the fleet. Lord Fisher was still anxious ; hence this typical letter :

“MY BELOVED JELLICOE,

It is good news that the doctors telegraph to me that you are doing so well. Now do please take it easy, and damn Rosyth and everything else that worries you and simply play bridge ! You are worth more than a hundred Rosyths or dozens of battleships, so put that in your pipe and smoke it, and take things easy.”

1915 TO 1916—THE GRAND FLEET—PART III

Much against his will Sir John was forced to keep the Grand Fleet in harbour during this month, since only 20 to 22 destroyers were available to form a screen to the fleet. However this was of small importance, because the High Sea Fleet had no intention of putting to sea so soon after the loss of the *Blücher*, and before the damage done to the *Seydlitz* and *Derfflinger* had been repaired.

It is interesting to note that Lord Fisher, who was then First Sea Lord, was much exercised at the Grand Fleet's being so constantly at sea and exposed to submarine attack, and on several occasions wrote strongly to Sir John advocating his remaining in harbour—even hinting that, although he trusted Sir John implicitly, he might find it his duty to obtain a Board Minute on the subject. Sir John, however, pointed out that if he kept the fleet in harbour the men would lose morale and the officers experience. Lord Fisher did not therefore press his contentions to the point of exercising restraint on the movements of the Grand Fleet.

Early in the same month the Germans declared the waters round the British Isles unsafe for merchant ships of all countries, and the submarine campaign became intensified, although as yet not *unrestricted*, that is attacking and sinking our vessels without warning. This month also saw the reorganization of the battle cruiser and light cruiser squadrons; a battle cruiser *fleet* being instituted. Sir John was critical of the word "fleet" being used for it, since the term might be construed as meaning a force apart from the Grand Fleet. He did not, however, enforce his objection once it was distinctly understood that the battle cruiser fleet remained under his orders.

March came, and with it greater activity on the part of our battlefleet, several sweeps being carried out in different portions of the North Sea. During one of these, on the 18th to be precise, while the fleet was in an area which was considered to be unsafe owing to submarine activity, the *Marlborough* signalled that she had sighted a submarine, also that a torpedo had passed astern of the *Neptune*. Shortly afterwards, as the 4th Battle Squadron was crossing under the stern of the remainder of the battlefleet, the periscope of a submarine was sighted by the *Dreadnought*. Her captain immediately altered course, increased speed, followed, and rammed her. The number U.29 was distinctly visible as her bow came out of the water for the last time. The movement of the 4th Battle Squadron had evidently been unsuspected, and came as a surprise to the submarine, preventing her from avoiding the *Dreadnought*,

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which ship was admirably handled by Captain Alderson.¹ This was a most important piece of work, for the submarine was commanded by Commander Weddigen, who had sunk, in the short space of three-quarters of an hour, the *Hogue*, *Aboukir* and *Cressy*, and subsequently the *Hawke*. He naturally was regarded by the Germans as their submarine "ace." The loss of so experienced and successful a submarine captain was bound to shake, at all events temporarily, the confidence of the other submarine captains, especially if the exact reason for the disaster remained unknown. Sir John, therefore, wired to the Admiralty asking that the loss should be kept secret. This was done, and so anxious were the officials of the German Admiralty to obtain information, that they used every means they could devise to ascertain the cause of his disappearance, even to spreading a report that the submarine had been sunk by treachery (what sort of treachery they did not specify !) in the vain hope that in denying this libel the Admiralty might inadvertently divulge the method by which the submarine had been destroyed.

The Commander-in-Chief was now gradually gaining confidence in the efficiency of the methods he was employing for defending the fleet from submarine attack ; for, in April, when the *Neptune* reported sighting a submarine while the fleet was steaming at 18 knots and the destroyers were screening, he took no notice of the report and continued on his set course. This was a considerable step forward and undoubtedly created a wholesome feeling of confidence in the fleet.

A proposal was put forward by Sir John Jellicoe for the interchange of visits between the fleet and the British army in France, whenever feasible. This was warmly agreed to by Sir Douglas Haig. When opportunities arose, therefore, small parties specially selected from the various squadrons of the Grand Fleet were sent to the Western Front.

On one such occasion a visiting party, consisting of a ship's corporal and a few other naval ratings, was in a front line trench at the time when it was raided and partly occupied by the enemy. A machine gun at the end of the trench was knocked over and the gun's crew killed. The visitors righted the gun, brought it into action again, and cleared the trench of the enemy. An official report of this gallant and effective work was received in the Grand Fleet some time afterwards, having passed through the usual

¹ Afterwards Vice-Admiral W. J. S. Alderson, C.B.

1915 TO 1916—THE GRAND FLEET—PART III

channels at the War Office and the Admiralty, and the Petty Officer and his companions were awarded medals for conspicuous bravery in action; later on, the presentation was made by the Commander-in-Chief on the quarter-deck of the *Iron Duke* at Scapa.

One of Sir John's greatest preoccupations was the shortage of oil fuel. When Second Sea Lord he had, by exerting great pressure (see page 185), had the reserves increased, though to nothing like the extent he considered desirable. The supply of oil was not a matter normally dealt with by the Second Sea Lord, but as a member of the Board he viewed our shortage with great concern. During 1915 the sea-going work of the Grand Fleet was considerably curtailed owing to the want of an adequate supply of oil fuel. It is interesting, therefore, to recall the debate on the 1914 Navy Estimates, when the question of oil reserves loomed large and it was suggested that there then existed a considerable shortage of the most important fuels.¹

The truth of the matter is that the needs of a navy are so great that it is quite impossible to supply the whole of them at any particular moment in peace-time. The Cabinet and the Chancellor of the Exchequer demand economy and criticize any increase in the Navy Estimates, and a First Lord is practically forced to keep the figures low. This accounts for the backward state of Rosyth and Scapa at that time. The defence of the latter might also have been looked on by Germany as a menace, since it could only have been undertaken with a view to war with that country. But oil was so vital that a shortage should never have been tolerated.

Numerous devices were tried for grappling with the submarine peril. One clever idea was the towing of a submerged submarine by a trawler. On July 20 the trawler *Princess Louise*, when towing C.27, sighted a German submarine, which opened fire at 2,000 yards range. The trawler slipped the submarine and the crew took to the boat. Lieut.-Commander Dobson,² in C.27, circled away and then brought his periscope to the surface and spotted the German boat (U.23) 900 yards off. He manœuvred into a good position for attack and at 500 yards fired two torpedoes, one of which hit. Four German officers and six men of the crew were picked up and brought into harbour.

A plucky Q ship operation took place in the middle of the year. Several merchant vessels, colliers and the like had been

¹ See *Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, Column 1290, Vol. LIX, 1914, and Postscript to this chapter.

² Afterwards Captain C. C. Dobson, V.C., D.S.O.

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fitted as Q ships. One of these, *Prince Charles*, commanded by Lieutenant W. P. Mark-Wardlaw,¹ sighted a Danish ship, the *Louise*, which had been held up by a submarine that still remained close to her. The submarine steered straight for the *Prince Charles* and opened fire at 5,000 yards. The usual process of deserting ship in a great hurry was gone through, during which the submarine closed to 500 yards, remaining on the surface. Then the *Prince Charles* unmasked her guns, and with her 3-pounders and 6-pounders sank the submarine (U.36). The *Prince Charles* saved six officers and warrant officers and nine men.

In June a visit was paid to the fleet at Scapa by the Archbishop of York, subsequently Archbishop of Canterbury, who, while staying on board the *Iron Duke* with Sir John, held a confirmation service on board, also a great open-air service on Flotta Island at which many thousands of men attended. He visited the majority of the ships. Then passing on to Invergordon and Rosyth, he held large open-air services at each place. Lord Jellicoe afterwards recorded :


“He was indeed indefatigable and he left amid the most sincere expressions of regret ; to me personally his visit gave the greatest pleasure. He has been marvellously energetic, visiting several ships each day, and always saying exactly the right thing in his addresses. I gave him a good send-off to-day. Had the officers and men up, and made him a short farewell speech in their presence, thanking him for his work, etc. (see also page 241). As he left, the band played ‘Auld Lang Syne.’ He was quite moved. He is a very fine man—he must have done an immense amount of good. I attended his early celebration this morning, and he brought in a special prayer for myself which touched me very much.”

On July 7 His Majesty King George V arrived at Scapa on a visit to the fleet. The visit is described by Sir John in a letter to Lady Jellicoe, from which the following is extracted :

“The King arrived on Wednesday at 3.30 p.m. On his arrival Cecil Colville² went to meet him. Entry a fine sight. The *Oak* stopped and took me on board. The King and I stood together on the bridge. We steamed all round the harbour ; cold but fine. Fleet looked splendid, cheering very good. I doubt if ever he had a better reception. At 6 p.m. finished alongside *Druid* and had enormous tea there.

¹ Afterwards Captain W. P. Mark-Wardlaw, D.S.O.

² His Majesty stayed with Admiral Colville at Longhope.



H.M. KING GEORGE V GOING ON BOARD THE IRON DUKE AT SCAPA

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Second day : the King arrived on board *Iron Duke* 9.10 a.m. Inspecting ships till 6.30 p.m. The whole thing went splendidly. 85 per cent of the officers and men passed by close to His Majesty.

Self did not attend Vice-Admirals' lunch, which enabled them to invite all the Captains. King lunched with all Vice-Admirals. There was a reception of Captains after dinner. His Majesty called me into my sleeping cabin before going and made a nice complimentary and embarrassing speech and presented me with a cigarette case. While here he used the cigarette case which I and others gave him thirty years ago in the *Excellent*.

On the last day he inspected the *Garrison* and 6,000 men, the gunboats, destroyers, etc. I drew the men into a hollow square. The King made an excellent speech."

Afterwards Sir John made a speech, and after thanking the King on behalf of the officers and men of the fleet for his visit, said :

"The honour your Majesty has paid us in coming so far, when such great demands are made upon your time, will intensify those feelings of loyalty and affection with which your Majesty has ever been regarded by the Navy. We only await the opportunity, so long desired, to prove our devotion by our deeds. I know that behind me I have the finest officers and men in the world, and that they are absolutely devoted to the service of your Majesty and of the Empire."

His letter then continued :

"I called for three cheers for His Majesty, who was much affected.

He left at 4.50 p.m. in the *Oak* yesterday. He was run across at 27 knots and arrived in London 1 p.m. to-day. His visit has done an immense amount of good. The men showed extraordinary keenness. Terrible disappointment in any ships I had to send out. The whole visit was the greatest success."

The following farewell message was sent by the King to Sir John, one which showed how keenly he felt and sympathized with the long, dreary, and so far unrewarded patience of the officers and men of the fleet.

"I am delighted that I have been able to carry out a long-cherished desire to visit my Grand Fleet. After two most interesting days spent here, I leave with feelings of pride and admiration for the splendid force which you command with the full confidence of myself and your fellow-countrymen.

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
I have had the pleasure of seeing the greater portion of the officers and men of the fleet. I realize the patience and determined spirit with which you have faced long months of waiting and hoping. I know how strong is the comradeship that links all ranks together. Such a happy state of things convinces me that whenever the day of battle comes my Navy will add fresh triumphs to its old glorious traditions."

In reply to His Majesty's gracious message the Commander-in-Chief expressed the appreciation of the officers and men of the Grand Fleet and added that it was his conviction that "the glorious traditions of the Navy are safe in the hands of those whom I have the honour to command."

His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, now King Edward VIII, also stayed at Longhope for six days, visiting many ships of the Grand Fleet.

A particularly pleasing act of courtesy by a German officer, Korvetten-Kapitän von Knorr, may be mentioned here. The following account is from the pen of Lord Jellicoe.

"At 4.30 p.m. Commodore Tyrwhitt, of the Harwich Force, reported that the German minelayer *Meteor*, which had been sighted by his vessels in the vicinity of the Horns Reef, had been abandoned and sunk by her own crew and that he had subsequently rescued 4 officers and 39 men, survivors of the armed boarding steamer *Ramsey*, who had been prisoners on board the *Meteor*. The *Ramsey* sighted and closed the *Meteor*, which was disguised as a neutral merchant ship, shortly after daylight on August 8th with the intention of boarding her. On closing, however, the *Meteor* suddenly showed her true character; her powerful armament, hitherto concealed, opened a heavy fire on the *Ramsey*, which was returned by the latter ship's greatly inferior armament of 12-pounder guns. But the surprise was too complete and the odds too heavy, and the *Ramsey* was sunk very quickly with her colours flying, 4 officers and 39 men out of a complement of 97 being picked up by the *Meteor*. Acting-Lieutenant P. S. Atkins, R.N.R., the senior surviving officer of the *Ramsey*, came north to report himself to me, and gave full details of his experiences. He stated that, when the officers of the *Meteor* abandoned and sank their ship on sighting Commodore Tyrwhitt's force, the crew, with the British prisoners, went on board a neutral fishing vessel. Shortly afterwards the British light cruisers passed close to the fishing vessels and Lieutenant Atkins signalled to the Commodore stating that they were survivors of the *Ramsey* and asked to be taken off. He added that the Commodore, who was at that time being attacked by both aircraft and submarines,



THE LAST PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN OF LORD KITCHENER. HIS ARRIVAL ON
BOARD THE *IRON DUKE* AT SCAPA

replied : ‘Steer south-west, I will return and pick you up.’ Lieutenant Atkins thereupon asked the Captain of the *Meteor* to steer south-west ; but the Germans naturally enough objected, as they desired to make their own coast. However, in spite of the fact that the British were unarmed and numerically very inferior, their arguments prevailed and a south-west course was steered for a short time until another fishing vessel was sighted ; the British suggested transferring to her ; this was agreed to by the Germans. As the British were leaving, the German captain, Korvetten-Kapitän von Knorr, asked Lieutenant Atkins if he had any money, to which he replied, ‘How could I have, seeing you picked me up in pyjamas ?’ Captain von Knorr pressed money on him, but Lieutenant Atkins said he did not see that he would require it. However, he eventually took it, Captain von Knorr handing him an English £5 note and other money. It is pleasant to record so gentlemanly and courteous an act. The money was given to me, and I sent it to the Admiralty, asking that it might be repaid, with thanks of the British for the courtesy shown to our prisoners of war.”

It must be acknowledged that the work of the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet was heavy enough when all his multifarious duties in connection with the fleet are taken into account, but here they did not by any means end. Visit after visit was made by people whom the Government wished to amuse or placate, and who had to be received and entertained. But some visitors were very welcome. On July 23 he wrote : “The Bishop of London is staying with me now !” This visit was one of particular pleasure to Sir John. The Bishop was an old friend, in fact, it is of him that the story is told of a game of golf. It will be remembered by all who have played the Royal and Ancient game with Sir John that he always tried to complete the round in the shortest time on record, almost sprinting between the strokes. After a few holes the Bishop cried a halt and said : “Look here, Jack, is this golf or a steeplechase ?”

It was the Bishop whom Sir John had, in the first place, asked to visit the Grand Fleet. But the Archbishop of Canterbury had suggested that the Archbishop of York should be given priority. Of course Sir John willingly consented, but at the same time arranged with his old friend that he should come later on. But to continue the letter :

“The Bishop ought to have arrived early in the morning but he was delayed owing to fog, and the Service at which 10,000 men would have attended had to be postponed. However in the even-

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ing there was a confirmation service on board the *Iron Duke* for the whole fleet.

He [the Bishop] remains here till Wednesday. On Wednesday 40 colonial M.P.'s are visiting me, so I have not much time, as you will see. I have to entertain them, I suppose, and make a speech. The Archbishop of Westminster comes next week, and also I believe about 40 representatives of the Allied Nations. Life is pretty strenuous, as all this is additional to one's work for the war and is no mean addition when every minute of the day is already occupied, so please forgive a short letter."

Then followed a piece of information not generally known :

"A journalist named Gerard Fiennes has been commissioned by a publisher, to write my life. I have consented, provided it does not appear until after the War, and that I see and approve of all that is written. I don't think he will find it easy to make the book interesting, and I have told him so."

All who knew Mr. Gerard Fiennes regret his early death, and also that the biography did not emanate from his facile pen.

During the visit of the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, and Mr. McKenna to the fleet from the 7th to the 9th of August, Sir John had the chance of pressing home the need for building a large number of sloops for sweeping and other fleet work. These subsequently proved to be invaluable.

Bad weather set in with autumn. As an example of the gales not infrequently met with in these latitudes it is worth while to quote the experience of the battleship *Albemarle*. When passing through the Pentland Firth this great vessel shipped two heavy seas that washed away her fore-bridge with everyone on it, and displaced the heavy iron roof of her conning-tower. Hundreds of tons of water found their way below. An officer and one man were washed overboard and drowned, and several men injured.

December ended with a sad calamity, for on the 30th the cruiser *Natal* blew up in Cromarty Firth. The reason for the explosion was never thoroughly cleared up. It was reported by adjacent vessels at 2.25 p.m. that she was on fire, and at 2.30 p.m. she blew up. Examinations by divers showed that she had not been mined or torpedoed. The cause of the disaster may have been due to the spontaneous combustion of cordite. A particularly sad feature of this tragedy was that a party was being given by the ship's company of the *Natal* to a number of local children. Thus nearly every home in Cromarty was plunged suddenly into mourning.

1915 to 1916—THE GRAND FLEET—PART III

During 1915 the battlefleet steamed 14,184 miles and the *Iron Duke* took in 17,609 tons of coal.

The early part of 1916 passed quietly enough, for gales and fogs were rife. On fifteen days in January, that is actually half of the days in the month, severe gales were experienced, and on one occasion the anemometers registered 80 m.p.h. There were losses and gains during the month. The *King Edward VII*, a pre-Dreadnought battleship proceeding from Scapa to Belfast to refit, was mined and sunk off the coast of Sutherland; on the other hand two new Dreadnoughts, the *Valiant* and *Malaya*, arrived. The weather continued to be bad. More gales and fogs in February, and still more gales in March. The chief embarrassment caused to the Commander-in-Chief by these gales lay in the fact that they prevented the destroyers working with, and screening, the fleet. This was an especial disadvantage, since it was quite possible that a gale might be blowing in Northern waters while fair weather was experienced lower down the North Sea. The High Sea Fleet might, therefore, put to sea in the southern waters while the Grand Fleet was severely handicapped up north. On the day of the Scarborough raid in December, 1914, for instance, the weather conditions were remarkable. To the eastward of longitude 3° E. the weather was fine with a light easterly wind, no sea, and perfect visibility; while on the English Coast a gale raged that made it difficult to serve the guns even on board the large cruisers.

Early in the year Admiral Scheer succeeded Admiral von Pohl. In 1920 he wrote his experiences during his period of command of the High Sea Fleet. Although an able commander he was apparently quite devoid of a sense of humour, therefore he was not seldom unconsciously humorous. No German, unless lacking the sense of the ridiculous, could have written that the failure of the German politicians to allow energetic action with submarines during the early half of the war was due "to regard for America or a wish not to exasperate England to the uttermost." This, in face of the fact that Zeppelins were being used to bombard our big towns and submarines to sink our merchant vessels without possibility of saving their crews! He further stated that his little sallies out of harbour were undertaken to force the British Fleet to leave harbour and fight the High Sea Fleet!

As a matter of fact the German Fleet in 1914 and 1915, and up to the Battle of Jutland, left their anchorage only some five times, and during these excursions they never ventured more than some 120

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miles from Heligoland, i.e. six hours' steaming, whereas the Grand Fleet swept the North Sea on over thirty occasions. Of course the truth was that Sir John Jellicoe had no intention of risking a battlefleet action in the Heligoland Bight, and Admiral Scheer had no intention of risking any fleet action at all until he had reduced our Dreadnought battleship strength to something like parity with his own by the use of mines and submarines. His raids on our coasts, from a naval point of view, were innocuous, but they were distinctly dangerous to his large cruisers. These vessels narrowly escaped being brought to action after the Scarborough and Lowestoft raids—on both occasions they were helped by good luck ; and at the Dogger Bank action they lost the *Blücher* and should, except for luck again on their part, have been annihilated.

In the meantime, month by month, our battlefleet strength was on the increase, and the gunnery practices and the time spent at sea were further increasing the fighting efficiency of the Grand Fleet. On April 25, 1916, the German battle cruisers once again made a dash at the English coast—this time to bombard the unfortified towns of Lowestoft and Yarmouth. Again they escaped by the skin of their teeth.

After the Lowestoft raid, at Sir John's suggestion, the 3rd Battle Squadron, composed of the Dreadnought and pre-Dreadnought battleships, was stationed in the Thames as a deterrent to raids being made farther south. This left the Grand Fleet with six four-ship divisions, or 24 ships, all Dreadnoughts. In addition, there was one division of the latest and fastest battleships which formed the 5th Battle Squadron. This, with the battle cruisers, gave additional units of fast ships to work at the van and rear of the line. Such was the battlefleet strength when the Grand and High Sea Fleets met at the Battle of Jutland.¹

And what of the Commander-in-Chief throughout these months ? Among the somewhat monotonous record of routine, drills, firings, and exercises, we find echoes of incidents small in themselves but indicative of a generous and kindly heart. For instance, no leave was allowed to officers and men, yet when Sir John noticed in the papers that one of his junior staff had become a proud father, he at once sent for him and told him to go to London, call at the Admiralty eight hours after he arrived, and bring back any

¹ The newly completed battleship *Royal Sovereign* had just joined the Fleet, but did not take part in the battle as she had not completed her training. The *Queen Elizabeth* and *Emperor of India* were in dock.

1915 TO 1916—THE GRAND FLEET—PART III

official papers there might be for him, remarking, "I expect you will know how to employ those eight hours." We hear of kindly messages to the families of the men ; of conversations with workmen isolated up North on the repairs of the fleet ; of attention to their comfort in their lodgings ashore, and of solicitude shown in inquiries after their families. In those small ways he endeared himself to all around him. Moreover, the fleet as a whole came almost imperceptibly to feel and appreciate his friendly hand, firm but kindly, and to note how his sound organization and the efficient supervision of his staff were stiffening the fighting qualities of the Navy, slowly but surely raising its efficiency and creating throughout all ranks a feeling, not of mere boastfulness and bravado, but of great confidence in their Chief and of their ability under him to give a good account of themselves in the grave responsibility that loomed large through the haze of the near future.

POSTSCRIPT I

THE following is from Hansard.

18 March, 1914.

MR. EYRES-MONSELL¹: If the honourable Gentleman had the supply of oil he would not be slow in letting us know the fact. He is obviously afraid and does not dare to burn oil in this country in peace-time. The real reason why the manœuvres have been stopped this year is because of the lack of oil, while destroyers that ought to be in practice are lying idle. I maintain that this is a most serious state of affairs. Since the Government have been in office they have reduced the superiority of our destroyers by 200 per cent ; they have brought them down so low that at the present time Germany has more destroyers in commission than we have. The right hon. Gentleman told us himself that the numbers are 69 to 67.

Mr. Churchill indicated dissent.

In view of the allegation made by Mr. Eyres-Monsell¹ we may recall Mr. Churchill's statement in presenting the Navy Estimates in March, 1914.

MR. CHURCHILL : We have decided to substitute this year for the grand manœuvres—not, of course, for the numberless exercises the fleet is always carrying out—a general mobilization of the Third Fleet. We are calling up the whole of the Royal Fleet Reserve

¹ Afterwards Viscount Monsell, First Lord of the Admiralty, 1931-6.

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for a period of eleven days, and those who come up for that period will be excused training next year, and will receive £1 bounty in addition to their regular pay. We have had a most admirable response. 10,730 men, seamen, and bluejackets, and 1,409 Marines are required to man the ships of the Third Fleet. We have already in the few days our circular has been out, received replies from 10,334 men volunteers and from 3,321 Marines. The test is one of the most important that could possibly be made, and it is really surprising to me that it has never been undertaken before. The cost, including the Bounty of £1, will be £50,000. Having no grand manœuvres yields a saving of £230,000, so that there is a net saving on the substitution of £180,000.

—*Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, Col. 1917, Vol. LIX, 1914.

(*Note*.—The general mobilization was so satisfactory to Mr. Churchill that he sent the Fleet Reserve back home on the Friday before war was declared.)

The general belief in the Navy was that it was oil shortage and not financial economy which dictated the policy.

The following two extracts also are not without significance in view of the defenceless state of Scapa and the backward work at Rosyth.

76. Mr. F. Hall asked the President of the Board of Trade if any scheme is in contemplation for the construction of harbour works at Scapa Flow; if any application has been made to the Government for financial assistance in the matter; and if any provision therefore is to be made in the Estimates for next year?

MR. CHURCHILL: I have been asked by my right hon. Friend, the President of the Board of Trade, to answer this question. So far as is known at the Admiralty, no scheme is contemplated for the construction of harbour works at Scapa Flow, nor has any application been received by the Admiralty for financial assistance in the matter, and no provision is being made for such works in the Estimates for next year. The existing pier at Scapa Flow is being extended for naval purposes at Admiralty expense at a cost of about £9,000 and a balance of £4,000 is being provided in next year's Estimates to complete this work.

3. Mr. Fell asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he will state when it is estimated that the works at Rosyth, at present under construction, will be completed; and will he state the estimated permanent number of persons who will reside there when the dockyard is completed and in full work?

MR. CHURCHILL: The contract date for the completion of the

1915 TO 1916—THE GRAND FLEET—PART III

works under construction is the 31st May, 1917. It is not possible to state the permanent number of persons who will reside at Rosyth when the dockyard is completed and in full work.

March 10th, 1914.
Parliamentary Debates (Commons),
Col. 1057, Vol. LIX, 1914.

POSTSCRIPT II

LETTER from the Archbishop of York¹ to Sir John Jellicoe.

H.M.S. *King Edward VII*,
3rd Battle Squadron,
8th July, 1915.

MY DEAR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,

Pray forgive my delay in writing to you. I have literally not had a moment free for letter writing since I left you. Now I would try to write.

I have no words in which to express my thoughts and my feelings. You have given me what has been, in some way, the most memorable fortnight in my life. It is difficult to realise, after a time so crowded with engagements and impressions, all that it has meant to me. It's been an exacting time; and would have been tiring, had I not been, I hope, helped by God, and continually sustained and buoyed up by all the lavish kindness I have received, and the amazing attention with which the men have listened to my words—and inspired by the grand spirit which animates your whole fleet. But I am simply saying the mere truth when I say that what has moved me most, amid all the memorable impressions of this my visit, has been my personal intercourse with the Commander-in-Chief. I think we are both men who hate "gush," and try to keep our emotions in control: but I can only say that I thank God that you are where you are at this great time. I understand what every officer, and I am sure, every man in the fleet, feels about you. I hope you will allow me to regard you as a real friend. Certainly, I owe you a deep debt of gratitude for your invitation, for all the help you gave my visit, for all the arrangements you made for it, for all the kindness and sympathy which you showed me: but my debt is deepest for what you taught me by your own example. I must not say more—please forgive me for saying so much. It is many years since I have been so profoundly moved as I was by your words as I left the *Iron Duke*: and when the Band struck up "Auld Lang Syne" as I went down the ship's side—well, I never had a harder task of self-control.

¹ Dr. Cosmo Gordon Lang, afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury.

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We had a delightful voyage in the *Oak*. My only disappointment was that no submarine appeared ! Warrender may have told you something of my visit to the 2nd squadron of your fleet. He was kindness itself : everything was admirably arranged : the open-air service on shore in perfect weather was most picturesque, and capitally "staged."

In the two days Capt. Baird told me I must have spoken to about 10,000 of the men. But I confess that when the Battle Squadron silently steamed out on Tuesday night, my heart went aboard them, and I wished I was returning to the grey seas farther north.

Here also, Admiral Bradford has been full of helpfulness and kindness, and I have enjoyed seeing and talking to Sir David Beatty and the officers of his splendid squadron, and many old Portsmouth friends. I have had a full programme. The Service this morning in the great dry dock was one of the most impressive scenes I have ever witnessed. I am told that about 8,700 men were present, besides a multitude of officers and dockyard men. Weather and accoustics perfect : and the attention of the great mass of men was wonderful. I leave to-morrow to face arrears of work of which I do not like to think. My visit has exceeded all my hopes of it. I can't tell you what I think about the hospitality, kindness and generosity with which I have been welcomed. I only wish I had been able to do more justice to a chance so great. But I tried to do my best : and I hope you feel that at least my heart was in my "job."

I shall have much to say about the Spirit of the Fleet : but I shall be silent in public until I get your signal.

Do forgive me for inflicting so long a letter on a man so busy. I hope that when please God this great struggle is through, if we are spared, I may renew these memories with you. Meanwhile, take my warmest thanks. You know, without my telling you, that you and your fleet have a place deep down in my heart and daily in my prayers.

Believe me, my dear Admiral,
Yours most sincerely,
COSMO EBOR.

CHAPTER XVII

Jutland—Preliminary Remarks

THE conduct of the Battle of Jutland was governed more by the strategical exigencies of the War than by ideal tactics ; or, to state the case somewhat differently, its tactics were severely limited by our strategical requirements—that is by the necessity for our maintaining the command of the sea. Our command of the surface of the sea was safe as long, and only as long, as the Grand Fleet was superior to the High Sea Fleet. As long as the latter refused to try conclusions with the Grand Fleet, or, having tried conclusions, left the Grand Fleet the superior force, then the oceans would remain free to us for our sea transport of troops and stores ; but once the superiority of the Grand Fleet was lost, then it was certain that the War also would be lost to the Allied cause. No longer would the German Sea forces be penned up in their harbours, but corsairs and raiders of all sorts would be able to put to sea and harass our troop and merchant transport. In fact, the control of the surface of the sea would have passed into the hands of the enemy. It was therefore obligatory that in the coming conflict no risk should be entertained that might eventually endanger the superiority of our fleet.

A layman might well ask : “ Then why fight the High Sea Fleet ? Why run any risks ? Why not rest content with our Grand Fleet acting the part of ‘ Fleet in being ’ and paralysing the opposing forces ? ”

To this there are three answers.

First. If the High Sea Fleet challenged, it had to be fought and our superiority proved by forcing the remnants back into harbour and keeping them there in a position of inferiority.

Second. If the High Sea Fleet could be decisively beaten, a large proportion of the auxiliary forces required for duties with the Grand Fleet could be released and used for commerce protection and submarine hunting.


Third. There was the psychological effect that a victory would

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have on the Allied forces, on the enemy, and on the world at large.

But the effect of a substantial reverse to the Grand Fleet would be so disastrous compared with the advantages that would accrue from a defeat of the High Sea Fleet, that anyone not serving in our Navy might well have argued that it would be better for us that the High Sea Fleet should remain in harbour than that it should come to sea and force us to adventure an engagement with guns and torpedoes by day and by night, from which little advantage could accrue compared with the disaster that would accompany an adverse ending to a battle.

This, of course, was not the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief. He knew his strength, he also knew the difficulties attending a modern fleet action. He had no doubt of the outcome of a gunnery duel in daytime. He and his predecessors had trained the fleet; he knew what his ships could do in this respect. He had great confidence in his admirals, captains, and other officers, and as to the men, he knew the spirit that inspired them; but there remained a great doubt as to what would be the practical outcome of the successful use of the new and hitherto untried weapons with which the modern battlefleets had been equipped. Surprises might well be in store—as indeed was shown by the blowing up of some of our ships by flash to the magazines, but there was no reason why one side should be favoured more than the other. He was fully determined that one outstanding principle had to be conserved: the fleet should not be risked merely for spectacular effect. Whatever else might happen, at whatever cost to his reputation, the Grand Fleet must emerge from any engagement preponderatingly superior to the High Sea Fleet. Yet both the young and the aged in the country had been brought up in the belief that our Navy was not only invulnerable but, as in the olden days, would sink and destroy any enemy's fleet that might be encountered on the High Seas. They expected, looked for, even longed for the coming battle which would bring to the country once more laurels like those Nelson had so proudly placed on her head. Our people knew nothing of the vast difference that had come over naval tactics; sail-power and sinew had yielded pride of place to steam and steel. Nor did they appreciate fully that our opponents at Trafalgar stood their ground and fought until the majority of their ships were disabled, and that at the battles of the Nile and Copenhagen the enemy's ships were anchored and could not, had they



SIR JOHN JELlicOE'S STAFF ON THE DAY HE HAILED DOWN HIS FLAG AT ROSYTH, IN NOVEMBER, 1916

Seated (left to right) : Eng.-Captain Bone (Fleet Engineer Officer), Pay-Captain V. Weekes (Secretary to Chief of Staff), Captain F. C. Dreyer (Captain H.M.S. *Iron Duke*), Pay-Captain H. Share (Secretary to Commander-in-Chief), Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Madden (Chief of Staff), The Commander-in-Chief, Commodore L. Halsey (Captain of the Fleet), Commander Charles Forbes (Flag-Commander), Commander the Hon. Matthew Best, Commander R. M. Bellairs (Fleet Torpedo Officer), Flag-Lieut.-Commander H. Fitzherbert, Captain O. E. Leggett (Master of the Fleet).
 Standing : behind Capt. Share, Commander Stevens (Assist. Fleet Navigating Officer); behind Vice-Admiral Madden, Lieut.-Commander R. L. Nicholson (Fleet W-T Officer); behind the Commander-in-Chief, Major Gardiner, Royal Marines; behind Commodore Halsey, Surgeon-Captain R. Hill (Fleet Medical Officer); behind Lieut.-Commander H. Fitzherbert, Commander W. D. Phipps (Fleet Signal Officer).

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desired, have run away. At Jutland, on the other hand, the German Fleet sought safety in the friendly covering of the mist, and welcomed the darkness of the night to run back into their harbour. But Sir John knew—well did he know—that in all probability overwhelming victory could not be obtained without adventuring unjustifiable risks, unless a full meed of daylight was vouchsafed to him, and unless the enemy stood their ground and fought the battle to the end. It was, therefore, under the impelling principle of resolution combined with sane judgment that the Battle of Jutland had to be fought when the two forces met in the evening of a murky and misty day.

The strategy marked out for the High Sea Fleet was of a totally different nature. Their Admiral had to seize, not keep, command of the sea. Boldness even to gambling should obviously be the keynote of his tactics. He could not lose that which he did not possess, whereas gambling and boldness might bring him the prize he coveted should his opponent make mistakes. But here the ill-timed caution of the Kaiser intervened. He misread the teachings of the history of sea fighting. He misjudged the true value of the High Sea Fleet to his country. The proper tactics, and even the bold strategy of any schemes that the German Admiral might desire, were vetoed by the crippling order issued by the Kaiser that the ships of the battlefleet might go to sea but were not to be risked. His officers and men were full of ardour and courage straining at this unnatural leash; they obeyed, cursing beneath their breath and sailing as near to the wind of disobedience as they dared.

Our strategy, therefore, to repeat, was to keep together, at all hazards, the ships of the Grand Fleet and maintain our superiority. The strategy of the German Admiral was to use his auxiliary weapons, the submarine, mine and torpedo, daily off our harbours, so as to reduce our battleship strength by a steady attrition.¹ Moreover, by skilfully baited traps he hoped to entice Sir John Jellicoe into dividing his fleet, so giving the chance of a portion being attacked and destroyed by the battleships of the High Sea Fleet, thus bringing down the strength of the Grand Fleet nearer to a parity with his own. But the edict of the All Highest War Lord deprived all plans of the boldness that was essential to success.

¹ We also, of course, used submarines and mines for a similar purpose; but the enemy rarely came out of his harbours.

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The German Admiral, however, held the initiative throughout the War. We were powerless to force the High Sea Fleet to leave its harbour. A fleet is no match for coast artillery. Minefields and torpedoes deny close inshore action at night. Nothing except the seizing of the hinterland to the German anchorage, and turning heavy shore artillery upon their fleet could have forced their ships to put to sea. The choice of the day of exit, therefore, rested solely with the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet. He could patiently devise and mature plans in which all his varied forces were co-ordinated. His airships and various auxiliaries could be disposed to assist and bait his lures. He could tune every ship up to concert pitch, newly docked and ready to maintain their highest speed ; he could watch for any apparently routine movement on the part of the Grand Fleet, detect any want of vigilance and choose what seemed to be a favourable moment to sally forth and bring his cherished schemes to fruition.

Meanwhile, the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet could make no plans for meeting the enemy on a definite day ; he could only wait, consuming his soul in patience, ready at any time to meet the unknown with a fleet, perforce, in a state of only average steaming efficiency. Meanwhile, however, he perfected his training and plans for fighting a fleet action. Naturally, before joining the Grand Fleet he had definite views on the major problems of war at sea, but these required modification and amplification to suit both the vast number of his ships-of-battle and auxiliary craft, and also the cruel and uncertain weather of the North Sea ; for the mists and fogs which were prevalent, and often variable even from hour to hour, were practical factors that were bound to affect the result of a fleet action.

Jutland was a battle fought late on the afternoon of a misty day in the North Sea, a day when the visibility rarely exceeded seven sea miles, and at times fell to some half—or even less—of that distance. Seven sea miles or 14,000 yards, may seem to some quite a respectable distance for an uninterrupted view at sea ; but in 1914 the accepted *effective* range at which large fleets were expected to fight was this selfsame distance of 14,000 yards. Thus it was that throughout the fight at Jutland the two main fleets hovered on the edge of an enveloping mist, occasionally just visible and occasionally obscured from each other.

Nor was the mist the only factor which made the Battle of Jutland peculiar in history, for in that battle the ships and their

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armaments were of an entirely new design and were endowed with a potential strength hitherto undreamed of. The only battle of interest that had been fought at sea during the previous one hundred years was that at Tsu-shima, a battle that proved to be a fight resembling the destruction of the proudly-vaunted Armada in the spacious, but rugged, days of Good Queen Bess. It was a battle on the one side of trained men and efficient ships and on the other of largely untrained crews lacking in morale. Moreover, the weapons used at Jutland were much more formidable than those used at Tsu-shima.

During the interval between the two battles, the Whitehead torpedo had, year by year, gained in efficiency. It had extended its 800 yards of range of action, in 1905, to 10,000 yards and even more, in 1916, and its explosive effect had been increased fourfold. This insidious and somewhat sneaking weapon had, in the intervening years, altered the whole of naval tactics, for its deadly menace had forced the effective fighting range of ships up from the 3,000 yards or so at Tsu-shima to some fourteen, sixteen or even eighteen thousand yards at Jutland. The fact that all battleships carried a torpedo armament, which was effective at a yearly lengthening range, had compelled fleets, when fighting, to stand off to a distance from each other that ensured reasonable safety from attack. This brought about the development of long-range gunnery. Skill in gunnery, and sound tactics, were still bound to be the ultimate arbiters of a fleet action, but a decision had to be obtained outside of torpedo range, otherwise an action would merely have developed into a gamble in which skill and training would have been sacrificed to sinkings by the chance adventures of torpedo attack. The torpedo, however, was not to be defeated in quite so simple a manner. Since improvements in ballistics and gunnery training had enabled an action to be fought effectively outside the range of the torpedoes carried by the fleets, the obvious riposte was for smaller vessels to be built with high speed and equipped to carry torpedoes, so that, while the major action with the heavy guns was in progress, these fast demons should emerge from behind the cover of their battleships, approach the enemy and discharge their torpedoes within striking range.

This danger overlay the whole of modern sea tactics.

In addition to the mobile torpedo from surface vessels and submarines, there was the menace in an action of the use by the enemy of the moored mine. Ever since the introduction of the blockade

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mine, in 1901, the possibility, almost the probability, had existed of mines being used in a fleet action. The only time when an offensive use, we might almost say mobile offensive use, could be made of the mine in a battle by the enemy was when in retreat and, therefore, during a stern chase. Under this condition the retreating ships could drop mines in the waters which they would have no reason to use again, but through which the chasing ships would have to pass; then it was by no means improbable that some of the chasing ships might bump mines and so be placed out of action. It was known that this was a method that the Germans intended to employ in order to reduce the numbers of our battle-fleet. It had, therefore, become an axiom in naval tactics to avoid, as far as possible, the exact water over which the enemy's ships had passed. With only a few ships under his command, the chasing admiral could keep his ships to one side of such water, but with a long line of twenty or more ships chasing in line abreast, such a divergence was impossible.

It is illuminating to notice that soon after taking up the command of the Grand Fleet, in fact in October, 1914, Sir John, in correspondence with the Admiralty, had dealt with the dangers attending submarine and mine attacks during an action, and had pointed out that he believed that submarines would accompany the enemy's battlefleet. He went on to say that

"My tactics may and probably will involve a refusal to comply with the enemy's tactics by moving in the invited direction. If, for instance, the enemy's battlefleet were to turn away from an advancing fleet, I should assume that his intention was to lead us over mines and submarines and I should refuse to be so drawn."

He desired particularly to direct their Lordships' attention to the following point :

"It may be deemed that a refusal of battle might possibly result in failure to bring the enemy to battle as soon as expected; such a result would be absolutely repugnant to the feelings of all British Naval officers and to me. But, with new and untried methods of warfare, new tactics must be designed to meet them.

I feel that such tactics, if not understood, may bring odium on me; but so long as I have the confidence of Their Lordships, I intend to pursue what is, in my considered opinion, the proper course to defeat and annihilate the enemy's battlefleet without regard to uninstructed opinion or criticism."

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He remarked that the situation was a difficult one :

“It is quite within the bounds of possibility that half our battle-fleet might be disabled by underwater attack before the guns opened fire at all if a false move is made, and I feel that I must constantly bear in mind the great probability of such an attack and be prepared tactically to prevent its success.”

The Admiralty in reply stated :

“A complete unity of thought prevails on this point between Their Lordships and yourself. You will concern yourself exclusively with the destruction of the High Sea Fleet, taking your own line, choosing your own method, and not troubling yourself at all with what is going on in England.”

The above letter puts the problem very clearly. Sir John evidently visualized that the High Sea Fleet might put to sea and, on sighting the Grand Fleet, simulate surprise and a desire hastily to retire to its harbour, thus enticing the Grand Fleet—or a portion thereof—into making a stern chase. If this manœuvre succeeded, then the German Admiral would drop mines and send submarines in daytime—or, under favourable conditions, his destroyers, to attack—and then confidently await results.

We shall see presently how Sir John proposed to counter such a danger. But first it will be advisable to explain certain technical terms and manœuvres, a clear comprehension of which is necessary in order to understand a description of the Battle of Jutland.

Fighting Formation.

In the first place it is *an axiom of naval tactics* that a modern action must be fought with each fleet formed into a single line of ships, each ship of each fleet following one after the other with their broadsides to the enemy. The reason for this is that the greatest volume of gun-fire can only be delivered when all the guns of the ships are usefully employed. This is the case only when they are pointing out on the beam, or approximately on the beam, of a ship. When firing in a right ahead or right astern direction some 50 per cent. only of the large guns can be brought into action.

At Jutland a reasonable latitude of separate manœuvre was, in certain cases, given to individual Flag officers.

It is useless to think of dividing a fleet into two or more portions with the idea of surrounding an enemy. The distances necessary to accomplish such a design are so great that the enveloping

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fleet should possess some 50 per cent. greater speed than the one to be enveloped ; a condition that in practice never exists.

So it may be accepted that single line is the fighting formation of a fleet.

But this self-same formation is the one most dangerous from the point of view of torpedo attack, because the ships are arranged so as to present the largest target to the vessels firing the torpedoes. Let us examine the matter more closely.

The torpedo may be written down as useless in a single-ship action at modern fighting ranges. When, however, a fleet comes to be the target, the conditions are totally changed, since no longer is the object a single ship but the target becomes a line of many ships. In the case of the Grand Fleet, with 24 battleships, each




FIG. 1.

about 600 feet or 200 yards long, the space from the bow of one ship to the bow of the next, AB (Fig. 1), was about 500 yards ; the length of each ship, AC, was 200 yards, so that the length of space CB was 300 yards.

Now it is easy to see that the whole line of ships from A to Z forms one long target with 24 ships each 200 yards long, or 4,800 yards of ships and 23 blanks of 300 yards each. The total length of the target was, therefore, 11,700 yards, of which 4,800 were vulnerable ships and 6,900 yards was blank space. The chances of hitting 4,800 yards of ship compared with 6,900 yards of blank is as 48 is to 69, or nearly as two is to three, so that out of every five torpedoes fired at such a line of ships, two should hit ships and three should pass through the blanks. Moreover, the line is so long, nearly 12,000 yards, that if a torpedo were fired at the centre of the line from a distance of 10,000 yards it would have

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to be deflected 30 degrees to the right or left in order to miss the line.

Cruising Formation.

Naturally, therefore, although the single-line formation was obligatory when fighting, it was too dangerous a formation to be used when cruising and at all times when not actually engaged in a fleet action. The formation shown in Fig. 2 was the one used on all other occasions. Here, it will be seen that a torpedo fired from away on the right or left would have as a target only four ships instead of twenty-four.




FIG. 2.

Deployment.

But if, when cruising, it became necessary to engage an enemy, this compact formation had to be changed to that of a single line of ships. This "deployment," as it was called, could be done in a variety of ways. The only way we need consider is that used by Sir John at Jutland. In this, the left-hand four ships steamed almost straight on, and the leader of each of the five other columns turned at once a quarter of a circle to the left—Fig. 3. Then each ship in each column followed its leader. This brought all the ships of the first column in a single line—Fig. 4—and the ships of the other five columns steering at right angles to their previous direction. Then as each ship in turn arrived at the point D it turned up behind and followed its next ahead.

Of course, this deployment could be done by letting the right-hand column go on, making the leaders of the other five columns

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turn to the right and the ships ultimately form astern of the right-hand column.

The difference, tactically, between the two methods is that when the deployment is completed the line in the first case will be five miles more to the left than it would be in the second case.




FIG. 3.

FIG. 4.

Crossing the T.

One tactical position which gives a fleet when in a single line a decided advantage over its opponent, is commonly called "crossing the enemy's T." Essentially, it is brought about by one fleet being placed in a line across the line of advance of the enemy.

It will be seen in Fig. 5 that several ships of the fleet B can bring their broadside (greatest volume) fire to bear on the leading ship or ships of fleet A, which ships can only use their right-ahead (least volume) fire.

If the Admiral of fleet A wishes to continue the action, then he must turn parallel to the fleet B and each of his ships as it turns at the point X (Fig. 6) is severely punished by the ships of fleet B.

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If he (A) does not wish to continue the action he can turn all his ships together at the same moment and run away.




FIG. 5.




FIG. 6.

Defence against Torpedo Attack.

Sir John, after deep study of the intricacies of the problem and with the assistance of his technical staff, arrived at definite conclusions as to the methods that he would use to defeat torpedo attack during a fleet action.

It was of infinite advantage to determine the course that should be followed during an action in quiet and unhurried discussion before the battle, instead of at the moment of semi-excitement replete with the varied distractions that were certain to be present during the engagement. But, having thus determined the main essentials, strength of mind was required to carry them out, without variation in principle, when the moment arrived ; for the temptation might be great to follow, on the spur of the moment, a different course from that which previously had been decided upon.

The obvious defence against mobile torpedo craft in a battle was to arrange that these should be attacked and dispersed by the light skirmishing craft (that is, the light cruisers and destroyer divisions) before they could arrive within the required range for firing their torpedoes, the so-called defenders also attacking the enemy battlefleet with torpedoes. The usual distance that the two

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fleets A and B would be apart when in action, on a day of good visibility, could be taken at, say, 14,000 yards (see Fig. 7). But the torpedoes were capable of running 10,000, and perhaps even 12,000 yards. So the attacking boats had only to steam 4,000 yards towards the enemy fleet in order to arrive within the torpedo range of 10,000 yards.




FIG. 7.

The repelling boats D, in the same time, would have steamed an equal distance. So the two flotillas would be still 6,000 yards apart at the moment that the attackers fired their torpedoes. This was too great a range for the repelling boats to make certain of dispersing the attack with gunfire. It is, therefore, fairly obvious

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that an attack could not, usually, be frustrated merely by the offensive use of counter destroyer action. The true defence in many cases had, therefore, to be one of movement on the part of the ships themselves.

It is impossible in this short summary to deal with the many intricacies involved in each method of attack and defence. All that can be done is to indicate the general principles. But, shortly, it may be said that a torpedo attack may be met in two ways—a fleet may be turned either *towards* or *away* from the torpedo. If a fleet turns away from an attack the range that the torpedo has to run is increased, the speed of the torpedo is consequently reduced by the time that it reaches the ships, and the torpedo is therefore more easily avoided. Moreover, a comparatively small turn, say of 45 degrees is usually sufficient to effect this purpose. If on the other hand, a fleet turns towards the attack, a complete turn of 90 degrees may be required, the range of the torpedo is shortened, the relative speed at which the ship approaches the torpedo is now the sum of the speed of the ship and the speed of the torpedo, or of the order of 50 knots; and, therefore, it is under such conditions extremely difficult to dodge a torpedo.

As a matter of fact, the "turn" away was used at Jutland and at all the engagements in the North Sea by all the admirals of the battleships and also of the battle cruisers both of the Grand Fleet and High Sea Fleet when threatened by a torpedo attack.

The amateur tactician, before forming any opinion on the tactics at the Battle of Jutland, should pay great attention to distances, time and speed. As a matter of fact, six minutes of time are required for any ships to move one inch in Figures 10, 11, and 12.

The celloid book marker can be used with Figures 10, 11, 12, and for the first and third "blows" in the large chart Appendix III, by placing the *base* of the notch on any ship, the semicircle then gives approximately the area visible from that ship. For the second "blow" in the large chart, the *apex* of the notch should be placed over a ship, the semicircle then shows the approximate area visible before the smoke screen was started.

CHAPTER XVIII

Jutland—Part I

The German Admiral Groos¹ in conversation with the British Naval Attaché : " You were lucky to have Jellicoe in command at Jutland : if it had been another he would have charged us, which was the very thing that we wanted."

(Note.—The following account of the Battle of Jutland is taken from the latest available sources. All times are Greenwich Mean Time. It deals in the main only with the movements of the battleships and battle cruisers and armoured cruisers. The details of actions of the smaller cruisers and destroyers have for clearness been largely omitted. In fact, it deals mainly with what was of outstanding importance or which actually came under the eyes of the Commander-in-Chief.)

ON May 16, 1916, Admiral Scheer commenced the preparations for the bombardment of Sunderland that eventually culminated in the Battle of Jutland.

Sixteen U-Boats and six or eight of the Flanders submarines were sent over to the waters of the East Coast of England and took up, and remained at, their posts from May 23 to June 1. On May 18, Admiral Scheer issued the following general order :

"The bombardment of Sunderland by our Cruisers is intended to compel the enemy to send their forces out against us. For the attack on the advancing enemy, the High Sea Fleet forces are to be South of the Dogger Bank, and the U-Boats will be stationed for attack off the East Coast of England. The enemy's ports of sortie will be closed by mines. The Naval Corps will support the undertakings with the U-Boats. If time and circumstances permit, trade war will be carried on during proceedings."

The underlying idea was to bombard Sunderland, evidently on the same lines as the hurried firings at Scarborough, Yarmouth and Lowestoft, and to use this attack as a bait to try and catch our battle cruisers and any other detached forces. At the same time, it was hoped that extensive mining and the use of submarines

¹ The writer of the official German Naval History of the Naval War.

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might reduce the numbers of our cruisers and perhaps also our battlefleet. It was further arranged (and this was a most important item in the scheme) for as many airships as possible to be ready to carry out long-distance reconnaissance work for the fleet. The airships, from their mobility, height above water, and number, could command a view, practically, of the whole of the North Sea in clear weather, so that ample warning could be given to the High Sea Fleet to run back to their harbours should the whole of the Grand Fleet be sighted.

The scheme was a sound one. If our battle cruisers and battle-ships could be reduced in number, or if a portion only of our battlefleet was fallen in with and fought by the High Sea Fleet, considerable advantage might accrue. The hope of nipping our battle cruisers was not very likely to be fulfilled, since they had a speed superior to that of the fastest German battleship ; therefore, generally speaking, unless disabled, they could steam away from any trap into which Admiral Scheer might desire to entice them.

In making out his plan of campaign Admiral Scheer burdened and handicapped himself by including the pre-Dreadnought battleships in his raid. The reason for this was purely psychological. He had only just given up command of this Division, and yielded, rather against his wiser instincts, to the request of the captains to be allowed to accompany the Dreadnought divisions. Naturally he was loath to refuse, especially since, by so doing, he would infallibly impair the morale of their officers and men by showing that he looked on the pre-Dreadnought division as having little fighting value ; he therefore acceded to their request. The only possible condition under which they might have been of use was during a night action, but the orders of the Kaiser not to risk any of the fleet precluded the Admiral from seeking such an occasion. Against the battleships of the Grand Fleet they were of no use ; slow steamers, nominal 19 knots, practically 17, weakly armed, they could neither chase nor run away. They were dubbed " five-minute ships " by the German Navy, since that was the time that it was anticipated that they could survive an action with Dreadnought battleships. Of course, if two or three happened to meet a single Dreadnought they might, in the end, have disabled her before they themselves were sunk, but such an encounter was more than improbable. Admiral Scheer, on leaving harbour, never anticipated the possibility of meeting the whole of our battlefleet. His cruisers were to raid, his Dreadnought battleships were to assist the battle cruisers, but his pre-Dreadnought battleships were to be out merely on a

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cruise to accustom them to steam on the open sea and to help keep up their morale, an all-important virtue that was becoming rather dulled by the inactivity inseparable from lying too long at anchor in their harbours.

But to return to the German plan.

Admiral Scheer was to discover that, although the scheme was well devised, the best-laid plans will go agley, for the treacherous visibility so often encountered in the North Sea prevented the use of airships on each of the days from the 23rd to the 30th of May. On the latter date the oil, and consequently the endurance, of the submarines was nearly at an end; therefore, since the co-operation of these vessels was a pivotal point in the scheme, its inception could be put off no longer, though it would have to be gone through without adequate reconnaissance. After due consideration he determined that without airship scouting it was too risky to proceed as far north as Sunderland; in fact, he feared that his attempt to entice out a portion of the Grand Fleet into the vicinity of his own might succeed only too well, and that he might without due warning have to face the whole of the Grand Fleet. He therefore reduced his excursion to a "Campaign against cruisers and merchantmen outside and in the Skagerrak."¹


His further plan was to show ships off the Norwegian coast, in order to entice out a portion of the Grand Fleet. Thus the danger to our ships from mines and submarines still existed, but the object of the High Sea Fleet in putting to sea was greatly reduced in scope.

On May 30 the Admiralty became aware of activity in the German Fleet; something evidently was afoot. They therefore ordered Sir John immediately to put to sea with 6 divisions of the battlefleet and 3 battle cruisers from Scapa and Cromarty, and directed Sir David Beatty to leave the Forth with his battle cruisers and the 5th Battle Squadron of fast Dreadnought battleships, and to steer for a rendezvous to be selected by the Commander-in-Chief. Sir John expected to arrive at a second rendezvous at about 1 p.m. on the following day. Since both fleets were accompanied by their light cruisers, spread to form advanced screens, it will be seen that a considerable area of the North Sea was covered by these two sweeps.

Sir David Beatty arrived near his rendezvous about 1 p.m. on May 31, but the battlefleet had been delayed by the examination of several steamers that were met with during the forenoon, a necessary precautionary measure. The chance examination of

¹ *Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World War*, by Admiral Scheer.

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COURSES OF THE BATTLE CRUISER FLEET AND BATTLEFLEET PRIOR TO THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND.

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a neutral vessel by a destroyer attached to the battle cruisers of the High Sea Fleet led to an encounter between the two battle cruiser fleets. The funnel smoke of the destroyer was seen from the light cruiser *Galatea*, at 2.10 she reported that a two-funnelled ship had stopped a steamer, and at 2.20 she was able further to report that two enemy cruisers were in sight.

Sir David Beatty, anticipating that he would shortly be joining up with the Grand Fleet, had at 1.30 p.m. disposed the 5th Battle Squadron 5 miles on the port beam ; so that on meeting the fleet he would be in a position to take up the stations that had been assigned to the two units under his command. He did not close the 5th Battle Squadron¹ up to the battle cruisers immediately he received the signal from the *Galatea*. A considerable gap was, therefore, still left between the two units.

Twelve minutes after he had received the signal from the *Galatea*, that is 2.32, he determined to chase in the direction of the cruiser which had been reported. The signal for the alteration in course was not passed by searchlight to the *Barham*, the flagship of the 5th Battle Squadron, nor was the flag signal repeated by the *Tiger*, although flag signals from the *Lion* (Admiral Beatty's flagship) were very difficult for distant ships to make out, and even to see at all, when hoisted by that ship.

The battle cruisers steamed off at high speed on a new course, and left the 5th Battle Squadron behind, steering on the old course. The *Tiger* called Sir David's attention to the mistake on signalling, and the 5th Battle Squadron were then given the new course. Meanwhile a tactical disadvantage had been incurred, for the gap between the two units had been increased to no less than 10 miles.

The action that ensued between the forces under those two ardent fighters, Sir David Beatty and the German Admiral Hipper, was entirely preliminary and not an integral part of the main battle of Jutland. It was a running fight between two squadrons of battle cruisers, a separate engagement, some 50 miles away from the battle-fleet, and not greatly dissimilar from that at the Dogger Bank action.

The fight between the battle cruisers lasted from 3.35 p.m. to 4.33 p.m. The 5th Battle Squadron,² even by cutting off corners, were unable to commence firing until about 4.10 p.m., and then they

¹ Commanded by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas.

² Admiral Hipper reported eulogistically on the magnificent shooting of the Squadron at 19,000 yards range. Had it been closed up to the battle cruisers at 2.20 p.m. the engagement might have had a very different ending.

JUTLAND—PART I

had to fight for a considerable portion of the time at a great range. During this period, two of our battle cruisers, the *Indefatigable* and the *Queen Mary*, were blown up by the magazines being ignited by the enemy's gun-fire. The fight had indeed been a most awesome, strenuous and tragic hour in which the utmost heroism had been displayed by all, from the Admiral downwards.

At 4.33 the light cruiser *Southampton* sighted the battleships of the High Sea Fleet steaming to the northward at high speed. The strategy of Admiral Scheer was now apparent. His battle cruisers had served as a bait to draw our battle cruisers into the jaws of the German battlefleet. A battle cruiser was no match for a battleship, since, in their design, gunpower and armour had been reduced to allow for the weight of engines and boilers necessary to obtain the requisite high speed.

One important point has to be appreciated, namely, that on the High Sea Fleet being sighted, Sir David's rôle had changed ; he was no longer a unit fighting a separate action ; he became, primarily, the scouting admiral for the Grand Fleet. At 4.40 he turned the battle cruisers round in order to fall back on the Grand Fleet and at 4.45 signalled to the Commander-in-Chief the position of the High Sea Fleet. But the order to the 5th Battle Squadron to alter course in succession was not hauled down in the *Lion* until eight minutes after the battle cruisers had turned—a delay which brought that squadron within range of the guns of the battleships of the High Sea Fleet.

To return to the doings of the Grand Fleet.

We have seen that the Grand Fleet was steaming to the southward to meet the battle cruisers. The ships were disposed in six parallel columns of four ships each, the *Iron Duke* leading the 3rd column counting from the eastward. Eight miles ahead and spread well out were the armoured cruisers *Defence*, *Black Prince*, *Cochrane*, *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Shannon*, *Minotaur* and *Warrior*. The 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with two light cruisers and four escorting destroyers were 20 miles ahead. It had been Sir John's intention to place the armoured cruisers at a greater distance, but their small excess of speed over the battlefleet, and the continual sideway movements necessary on their part in order to keep within, but at the extreme limit of visual touch in the continually varying mist, prevented them gaining their full distance of 16 miles ahead. Thus the battlefleet advanced south at high speed, zigzagging as a protection against submarine attack, with this antenna of cruisers

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feeling for any enemy and searching for any suspicious-looking craft that might require overhaul and questioning.

At 2.20 p.m. the *Iron Duke* intercepted the signal from the *Galatea* to Sir David Beatty, reporting that a German light cruiser had been sighted. Sir John immediately ordered steam to be raised for full speed. At 3.40 Sir David Beatty informed him that five enemy battle cruisers were in sight ; and again at 3.55 that he was engaging the enemy's battle cruisers. At 4.5, in spite of Sir David having the 5th Battle Squadron to support him, Sir John took no chances and ordered the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron with attendant destroyers and two light cruisers to steam south at full speed to Sir David's support. This also should have provided a link between the two fleets.

Although no enemy battleships had then been reported, Sir John stopped zigzagging and pushed on at full speed with the main fleet, since he wished to close and support the battle cruisers as quickly as possible ; almost, it seemed, scenting a stronger force ahead. The first information that the enemy's battlefleet was at sea was obtained from the signal made by the *Southampton* to the *Lion* at 4.33, which again was intercepted by the *Iron Duke*. Hitherto it had confidently been assumed at the Admiralty, from the bearing of intercepted call-signs of the German ships, that Admiral Scheer was still in the River Jade, and Sir John had been definitely informed from Whitehall that this was so. The fact that the High Sea Fleet was at sea came therefore as a total surprise to him ; but there was nothing more that could be done, for the fleet was already travelling at full speed to the southward, straight towards the place where the High Sea Fleet was reported to be. Although anxious to close the enemy's battlefleet as soon as possible, especially as it was late in the afternoon and nearly two hours of precious daylight must be lost before the two battlefleets could possibly come into touch with one another, yet it was absolutely obligatory that Sir John should keep the ships of his fleet together so as to have the whole in an orderly formation at the commencement of the action that seemed imminent. To permit anything in the way of a straggling chase was out of the question. The speed of advance of the fleet was, therefore, limited to the speed of its slowest ship. There was, for the moment, nothing more in the way of preparation to be done ; Sir John could only plot the positions of the enemy as reported to him by wireless, and wait until his scouting admiral, Sir David Beatty, came into sight, when the latter

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would inform him of the exact bearing, formation, course and speed of the High Sea Fleet. It was practically certain that our battle cruisers would be retreating either out of range, or at the extreme range, say 14,000 to 18,000 yards, of the High Sea Battle Fleet. When, therefore, Sir John sighted our battle cruisers he would know that the High Sea Battle Fleet was at least 7 to 9 miles from the battle-cruiser force. Time would therefore be available after sighting our battle cruisers to correct the course of the fleet, if necessary, and to deploy.

Sir John was, for the whole of the battle, in doubt as to the actual number and formation of the ships of the High Sea Fleet which were opposed to him. At 4.45 p.m.¹ he received a report that the enemy's fleet consisted of 26 to 30 battleships. This seemed to confirm the Naval Intelligence report that 18 Dreadnought type of battleships might be expected: that is, 1 *Bayern*, 4 *König*, 4 *Kaiser*, 4 *Helgoland*, and 4 *Nassau* classes, besides 8 pre-Dreadnought battleships and 6 battle cruisers. Sir John estimated that it was probable that the *Hindenburg* might have joined up with the battleships, for only 5 battle cruisers were reported to be in the 1st scouting group. Also that the *Salamis*, an ex-Greek battleship, might have been completed and joined up. One great disadvantage from which Sir John suffered was that from 6 p.m. until dark he never was able, on account of the mist, to see more than three of the enemy's ships at one and the same time; therefore it was impossible for him to determine what was the formation of the enemy's fleet. This was accentuated by the *Southampton* having reported at 4.46 that the High Sea Fleet was in single line ahead with the *Kaisers* leading; whereas in reality the *Königs* were in front of the *Kaisers*. When, therefore, ships of the *König* class were sighted by the *Iron Duke* it seemed that the centre, and not the van, had been encountered.

At six o'clock the critical moment arrived. Our battle cruisers, which were heavily engaged, were sighted from the *Marlborough* at 6 p.m. and by the *Iron Duke* at 6.1 p.m., but they did not bear even approximately as their reported position had led the Commander-in-Chief to anticipate. They arrived on a bearing some 45° different from the one he had expected.² It was, therefore, obvious to Sir John that the Grand Fleet could no longer be pointing directly

¹ The signal as sent by Sir David Beatty did not contain any reference to the number of the enemy battleships. This became interpolated during transmission.

² For the reason of the discrepancy see Postscript II, page 298.

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at the enemy. But how exactly did the enemy bear? The *Lion* had not made any signal reporting the bearing and distance of the High Sea Fleet. Sir John, therefore, immediately (i.e. at 6.1 p.m.) signalled to the *Lion* "Where is the enemy's battlefleet?" It was not until after a lapse of five minutes—a very long five minutes to the Commander-in-Chief waiting to deploy—that the reply came, "Enemy's battle cruisers bearing S.E." Now the Commander-in-Chief was not greatly concerned with the enemy's battle cruisers, which were but pawns in the game on the board. It was the news of the position of the battleships, and their distance from the battle cruisers, that he urgently required, in order to dispose his fleet in the best possible manner for the engagement that in all probability lay close, very close in point of time, ahead. So once more the signal was made asking for the bearing of the enemy's battlefleet; but the required information was not forthcoming. In the run north the *Lion* had been engaging the enemy's battle cruisers and had lost touch with the enemy's battlefleet; and no other one of Sir David's cruisers was able to supply the vital news. The *Southampton* had been reporting the movements of the enemy, but did not at this juncture supply any information that was of use to the Commander-in-Chief.

How different was the scene on the poop and quarter deck of the *Victory* during the approach of the two fleets prior to Trafalgar! At daylight on October 21, 1805, the two fleets were in sight of each other, but it was not until just after noon that the British Fleet had closed that of the Allies near enough for a shot to be fired.

"The weather was clear and the sun shone on the sails of the enemy and their well-formed line. The British sailors admired the beauty and the splendour of the spectacle."¹ Nelson had from 6 a.m. until noon in which to dispose his fleet for action, the speed of his ships being but two knots. In full dress, with his orders and medals on his breast and round his neck, he quietly paced the quarter deck, or stood talking to Blackwood or Hardy; and then, as Admiral Collingwood in the *Royal Sovereign* came into action, turning to Blackwood he said:

"Now I can do no more. We must trust to the Great Disposer of events and the justice of our cause. I thank God for this great opportunity of doing my duty."²

His name was still an inspiration, but he was no longer able to exercise command.

¹ Southey's *Life of Nelson*.

² Mahan's *Life of Nelson*.

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Contrast May 31, 1916 : at Jutland at 6 p.m. on a misty murky day, with the two knots of approach at Trafalgar increased to nearer forty, with the battle cruisers unable to tell the exact bearing of the enemy's battlefleet, the preoccupations of the Commander-in-Chief were very different from those of Nelson in his last and most famous battle.

Sir John was on the bridge of the *Iron Duke* wearing an old blue burberry with a band buckled round his waist ; round his neck was twisted a scarf, for the weather was damp ; his mind active and alert, waiting with suppressed impatience for the information necessary to frame the decisions on which the movements, already belated, of the fleet would depend.

With his Staff, Sir John listened intently to the dull booming of the guns in the distance ; but, as is ever the case at sea in misty weather, difficulty was found in locating the direction of the gunfire, nor, in this instance, was it possible to interpret its full import.

In anticipation of deployment he had previously directed his Flag-Captain, Captain Dreyer, who was also a gunnery expert, to have ranges taken on various bearings and to report in what direction he considered the light would be most favourable to show up the enemy's ships to the Spotter and Director officers. G 14
Captain Dreyer reported that the best direction would be to the southward and, as the sun sank lower, to the westward. Sir John received the answer in silence.

Minutes passed. After each minute the fleets were closer by nearly three-quarters of a mile.

"I wish someone would tell me who is firing and what they are firing at," remarked Sir John rather testily, for it was a tense moment ; time was getting short, and on the next move might depend the result of the action.

The picture at this moment forming in Sir John's mind as to the probable nature of the engagement is best shown in Fig. 8.

He anticipated that the High Sea Fleet would not deploy or steer to the westward ; that is *away* from Heligoland, but to the eastward, that is towards their harbours. Therefore, in view of such a movement to the eastward, at 6.8 p.m., he ordered the destroyers to take up the position previously arranged for an easterly deployment. The position, however, of the two battle fleets was not as he then imagined it to be ; and, as we shall see, when he obtained information of the exact position of the High Sea Battlefleet, he altered his plan in a masterly manner. This change did not, how-

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ever, affect the destroyers materially. Their allocation and stationing was practically the same in both deployments.

At 6.14 p.m. the firing was located as coming from the direction of the starboard wing division, and a signal was received from the *Lion*¹ giving the bearing of the enemy battlefleet. Instantly Sir John walked quickly to the standard compass, at which Captain Dreyer was watching the steering, and gazed intently for some twenty seconds in silence at the compass card. Nelson had six hours in which to dispose his fleet. Jellicoe only twenty seconds. Nelson knew that in England there was a reserve fleet equal in numbers to his own. Jellicoe knew that the whole sea strength of England was arrayed in the battle.




FIG. 8.

IN THOSE TWENTY SECONDS THE FATE OF THE EMPIRE MOST PROBABLY HUNG IN THE BALANCE. (See page 301.)

That wizard, experience, was busy in Sir John's quick brain. We can well imagine his process of thought.

"Deploy to port [it argued], and I will throw a mantle of invisibility over my fleet and light up the enemy silhouetted by the glare through the mist of the lowering sun. He is, from his bearing, too close to the Western Division for me to deploy on that Division. The bearing shows that I shall have time to deploy on the Eastern Division *on its present course* instead of, as I expected, on a course parallel to that of the enemy. I shall then cross his T and force him to steer parallel to me on a south-easterly course, and then I shall be able to force him away from his harbours."

¹ *Barham* reported similarly at the same time.

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Diagrammatically he changed his plan from that which he had previously visualized to




FIG. 9.

and so threw his line across the advance of the High Sea Fleet.

Those twenty seconds had sufficed for Sir John to make up his mind. With no enemy in sight, but with a brain now clear as to the general situation and with firm decision he rapped out the order "Hoist equal speed pendant South East," which meant deploy by equal speed manœuvre on the present course on the port division. This was a manœuvre that had rarely, if ever, been practised before by the Grand Fleet under his command, and it showed a wonderful grasp of the signal book and of tactics that, after eighteen months of various manœuvres at sea framed to be used in deployment or a general action, he should have picked out one that practically had not previously been used during fleet exercises, but which admirably suited the difficult position in which his fleet was placed.

Commander A. R. M. Woods¹ the most capable fleet signal officer, who received the order, pointed out at once that if the signal was made to deploy on a S.E. by E. course, instead of S.E.,

¹ Afterwards Vice-Admiral the Rev. A. Woods. This officer has the distinction of being at once both a retired Admiral and in Holy Orders.

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
it would obviate any chance of a mistake being made as to the column on which the deployment was to be made ; for the manœuvre was an unusual one. Sir John at once agreed, so at 6.15 the coloured flags broke from the signal halliards of the *Iron Duke* and simultaneously the signal was made by wireless. The die was irrevocably cast, the subsequent course of action was decided, and the Starboard Wing Division was, as a matter of fact, saved from what, in all probability, would have been annihilation if the deployment had been ordered on that Division. With an intuitive flash Sir John had inferred that, since he had sighted the *Lion* much more to the westward than had been expected, the enemy's battle-fleet must also be more in the same direction than the various signals had led him to anticipate, and the extent of this displacement was increased by the reports just received from the *Barham* and the *Lion*. This being the case, if he deployed on his western column the enemy would be in a favourable position to cross the T of that Division.¹ His best chance of gaining a good tactical position lay in deploying on his Eastern Division on a south-easterly course ; by so doing he would have ten minutes longer in which to allow his ships to stretch across the estimated line of advance of the enemy, and so to cross his T. The information given to him by Captain Dreyer also pointed strongly to such a deployment ; and, lastly, he knew his weakest ships were in the Starboard Division, and he preferred that these should not bear the brunt of the first attack. His wisdom in so deploying was fully borne out, as we shall see, by the actual position of that Division relative to the German Fleet, though this could not be seen at the moment owing to the mist.

THE FIRST BLOW

At 6.23 our leading battleships sighted the enemy and opened fire. Shortly afterwards, Sir John himself sighted three of the enemy's *König* class from the *Iron Duke*, and had every reason to be satisfied with his manœuvre. By the plan he had adopted he had crossed the T of the German line and brought to bear the fire of nine of his battleships (which were steaming at a steady speed on a constant course) on the leading three battleships of the enemy. These were forced to turn under this heavy concentration of fire. Thus for several minutes they did not return the fire

¹ See previous chapter for an explanation of this phrase.

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BATTLE of JUTLAND, 6:15 p.m.




FIG. 10.

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owing to their swing under helm, the bad visibility when looking northward and north-eastward, and the effective concentrated fire of their opponents.

A little later, at 6.35, these three battleships of the High Sea Fleet disappeared into the mist. No "turn" on the part of the enemy was seen from the bridge of the *Iron Duke*, although it had been detected from other positions of that ship.

It seemed to Sir John, therefore, that either the mist had thickened and obscured the enemy, in which case they would reappear very shortly and the action would be renewed, or that they had retreated to the southward. It mattered little which. Without doubt Sir John's best manœuvre was to keep his fleet practically in line of battle, ready at any moment to renew the engagement, yet "feeling" the while towards and gradually round the position occupied by the High Sea Fleet. He therefore, at 6.44, altered course one point ($11\frac{1}{4}^{\circ}$) towards the enemy, that is to S.E., and at 6.55 altered course another four points (45°) towards the enemy, to bring the course of the fleet to south. At 7.0 the *Marlborough* was struck by a torpedo fired from either the *Wiesbaden* or the destroyer V 48, but though badly damaged she remained in the line of battle.

The Positions of the Two Fleets during Deployment and the First Blow.

Let us now cut the thread of the narrative of the battle, as seen by Sir John, and hark right back and dispel those inconvenient North Sea mists that obscured and hampered his vision; let us see exactly what were the relative positions of the two fleets during the first blow.

Fig. 10, which is unhampered by mist, shows the position of the whole of the German Fleet. As a matter of fact during the chase northward the Divisions of the High Sea Fleet had been stretched out like the draws of a telescope. The actual distance of the leading *König* from the leading *Kaiser* was 2 miles; of the leading *Kaiser* from the leading pre-Dreadnought, *Friedrich der Grosse*, $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles; of the leading *König* from the rearmost pre-Dreadnought 7 miles.

Fig. 10 again shows how the error in reckoning¹ had brought the High Sea Fleet within range of the Starboard Wing, the weakest division of the Grand Fleet, led by the *Marlborough*. Had Sir John deployed on this division the result would have been much as that depicted in Fig. 11. The leading German battleships

¹ See Postscript I, page 294.

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


FIG. 11.

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(*König* 6.20) would have crossed the T of the *Marlborough* Division (*Marlborough* 6.20) forcing each ship to turn, as shown, from B towards A, and they would have been unmercifully *strafed*. The 5th Battle Squadron would have suffered also and would have masked much of the fire of the other battleships of the *Marlborough* Division.

There is no more dangerous position for ships to be in than to have to pivot round a point under a concentration of the broad-side fire of a number of the enemy battleships. Admiral Togo accepted this position at Tsu-shima because the Russian Fleet was sighted close on his bow ; but, realizing that he had a feeble enemy opposed to him he accepted the risk and his ships did not suffer materially. Admiral Scheer twice got into the same position, once later on, as we shall see, and saved his ships on both occasions by turning them all suddenly round together and running away. Our Starboard Division could not have carried out this latter tactic as they would have been engaged in deploying ; moreover, if they had turned round, they would have thrown the whole line into confusion. They would, perforce, have been obliged to continue the deployment and would have suffered badly, more especially as this division was composed of the weakest of our ships which would have been opposed, under adverse gunnery conditions, to the strongest of the enemy's battleships. Moreover, a most favourable opportunity would have been afforded to the enemy's destroyers to bring off a torpedo attack ; and we should have surrendered to the enemy the inestimable advantage of the superior visibility when firing to the southward and westward.

Sir John had, indeed, wisely deployed on the eastern division. By his prompt action he countered the main disadvantage by which he had been threatened, and in which he had been placed by the errors in fixing the geographical position of the two fleets.

The only subsidiary disadvantage that can be alleged against his method of deployment is that contact of his eastern divisions with the enemy was delayed for ten minutes. But this, as a matter of fact, was an advantage, since it allowed him to take up an important tactical position, and cross the T of the enemy's line.

Fig. 12 shows what actually happened at the other end of our line.

When the leading ships of the German *König* Division sighted our battlefleet, they found our leading ships almost directly ahead of them at the position shown by *K.G.V.* They saw that in

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BATTLE of JUTLAND

6.35 p.m.




FIG. 12.

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a few minutes the whole of the leading ships of the British line would be doing exactly what their fleet would have done had Sir John deployed on the Starboard Division ; namely, they would be *strafing* the leading ships of their opponent's line. The tables had been completely turned on the Germans, and they were landed in a very awkward position. But Sir John had scored yet another point, namely by giving his gunners an enormous advantage over those of the enemy, in affording them a bright though misty horizon against which the German ships were silhouetted ; while the Germans had no such advantage. This is fully confirmed by Admiral Scheer, who remarks that : " As regards effectiveness of artillery the enemy was more favourably situated, as our ships stood out against the clear western horizon, whereas his own ships were hidden by the smoke and mist of the battle."

This favourable situation had been created by the foresight of Sir John Jellicoe.

Reference to Fig. 12 shows that the leading ships of the High Sea Fleet which had turned parallel to our line were under the concentrated fire of nine of our battleships. Then, at 6.30, we see how all the German battleships turned together and ran away from our gun-fire into the mist on a south-west course.

Unfortunately the ships of the Battle Cruiser Squadron, in taking up their position ahead of the battleships, trailed smoke behind them and obscured the vision of some of our battleships. This was an inconvenience, however, that it was impossible to avoid.

It should also be noted how our battle cruisers, having formed ahead of the battleships, gave Admiral Scheer the idea that the *Invincible* was our leading battleship, and that the head of our line was at the place she was occupying.


THE ARMoured CRUISER ACTION

We must now deal with a cruiser action which was in progress before, during and after the deployment. It was of smaller importance, but must for several reasons be dealt with here.

It will be remembered that very shortly after receiving news of Sir David Beatty's encounter with the German battle cruisers, Sir John had ordered the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron under Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood to proceed at full speed to reinforce the other battle cruisers.



The "Preparative" hoisted at the yardarm of the *Iron Duke* at Jutland, to turn the Fleet away from a threatened torpedo attack.
Sub-division to turn two points to port



Signal to deploy hoisted at the mast-head of the *Iron Duke* at Jutland. "Equal speed pendant, C. L." by which the Fleet was deployed on the Easternmost Division on a S.E. by E. course

JUTLAND—PART I

At 5.30 p.m. the *Chester*, one of the two light cruisers of Admiral Hood's command, became engaged with the German 2nd Scouting Group of 4 light cruisers. The *Chester*, smothered by their shell-fire, ran for protection to her 3 battle cruisers, and Admiral Hood, steering towards the sound of the guns, came suddenly out of the mist and was able, with his 3 battle cruisers, to give the German light cruisers a sound and unexpected hammering. The *Wiesbaden* was soon disabled and stopped, and the *Pillau* and *Frankfurt* were badly damaged, the *Elbing* alone escaping damage.

Admiral Jellicoe was still some 14 miles to the northward, but closing fast, and ahead of him was the screen of armoured cruisers. Seeing that the *Wiesbaden* was still afloat and had not surrendered, Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot in the *Defence*, with the *Warrior* in company, closed to finish her off—but almost at once, at 6.20, these ships came under the fire of the German battle cruisers as they emerged from the mist at a comparatively short range. Two salvoes struck the *Defence*; her magazine was fired, and she blew up and sank immediately. The *Warrior* only barely escaped the same fate. Rear-Admiral Hood, meanwhile, had placed his battle cruisers ahead of those under Sir David Beatty's command.

A quarter of an hour afterwards, at 6.55, another tragedy took place. Hood, leading the battle cruisers, had closed to some 8,000 yards range (the maximum that the thickened mist permitted) from the German battle cruisers, which ships concentrated their fire on Hood's flagship, the *Invincible*, which was firing salvo after salvo with great accuracy at the German battle cruiser *Derfflinger*. The concentration was too severe, and the *Invincible* received damage; her magazine igniting, she blew up and sank almost at once.

So ended the first phase of the battle. Let us sum up the course of events. Immediately on sighting the High Sea Fleet Sir John, by his deployment, had placed his fleet in a sound position for attack. On the leading ships of the High Sea Fleet being sighted, our leading divisions had struck a shrewd blow which the enemy were unable to stand up to or counter. Sir John recorded with satisfaction how he had noted hits being made by his flagship, the *Iron Duke*, and other battleships. Captain Dreyer reported that at 6.33 while the *Iron Duke*, steering S. 71° E. at 17 knots, was in action with the German battleship *König*:

“Bearing of enemy S. 14° W., bearing of the sun N. 54° W. The enemy was lit up by the sun, whereas the *Iron Duke* was perfectly

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invisible to them in the mist. However that may be, the *König* battleship did not return the *Iron Duke's* fire although heavily hit.”¹

The enemy fleet stepped back, so to speak, to avoid further punishment, and ran away both from the Grand Fleet and also from their own home port. Round number one had therefore been distinctly in Sir John's favour.

This may seem to be a bold assertion, considering that Sir John had lost 1 battle cruiser, 1 armoured cruiser sunk, 1 armoured cruiser disabled, with the *Warspite* badly damaged; but these losses, although unfortunate, did not have, nor in the future could have, any bearing on the all-important battlefleet action—the action on which depended the command of the sea. Here it was that Sir John had so markedly scored. The High Sea Fleet battlefleet had been outmanœuvred, had been forced to retreat under cover of the mist, on a course which led them away from their port, and Sir John had thrust his fleet in between them and their harbour. The Germans found themselves up against a fleet not only far superior in numbers and their equal, if not their superior, in gunnery, but commanded by a man of supreme and unsuspected tactical skill. Admiral Scheer had seen enough to convince him that it was by the torpedo alone that he could hope to obtain any advantage over the Grand Fleet.

We left the Grand Fleet circling round the High Sea Fleet and steering due south. We saw also that Sir John did not turn directly towards the place at which they had last been seen, and this for two reasons. (1) He was not aware that they had turned directly away, and (2) he had previously determined not to chase through the water over which the enemy's ships had passed. He was far too skilful to risk his fleet by playing into the hands of Admiral Scheer. He preferred to outmanœuvre him, bar his way of retreat, and engage him when again sighted. So the Grand Fleet circled with every eye fixed on the wall of haze which hid the movements of the enemy; everyone expecting momentarily to see the enemy ships reappear. But it was not for nearly half an hour, that is not until 7.5 p.m. that the *Southampton*, which ship had left the rear of the line and pushed over towards the assumed position of the German Fleet, sighted the six leading German Dreadnoughts and came under their fire.

¹ Jutland official despatches, page 53.

CHAPTER XIX

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THE SECOND BLOW

IN the meantime Admiral Scheer, after retreating from the first encounter with our fleet at 6.30, again turned his fleet round together at 6.55 and steered to the eastward along B,C,D,E (Appendix III). He states that this was a move undertaken because he dreaded an action "which would partake of the nature of a retreat, since disabled ships would fall into the jaws of the pursuer."

He states that he intended to charge our fleet and he argues that, "this manœuvre would be bound to surprise the enemy, to upset his plans for the rest of the day, and if the blow fell heavily it would facilitate the breaking loose at night."

Needless to say, it did nothing of the sort. If Admiral Scheer really intended to give a formidable thrust at the battleships of the Grand Fleet it is incomprehensible that he should have stationed his battle cruisers in the van. On these comparatively feeble ships fell a considerable portion of the thrust. For an admiral, in 1916, to charge with his ships in line ahead at the broadside of the enemy's line of battle was, as it proved to be, futile ; but to take the shock with his battle cruisers in the van was an incomprehensible manœuvre, as they were not nearly so heavily armoured as his battleships.

The fact of the matter was that Admiral Scheer was on the horns of a very serious dilemma. He could not fight the Grand Fleet by day. His first encounter with that force had been by no means encouraging—almost leading to disaster. It was imperative that he should get back to his harbour before daylight on the following day, or annihilation awaited him. The alternative was to charge the Grand Fleet with his battlefleet and try to attract their attention while he launched a torpedo attack to reduce their numbers. So charge he did—in a bull-at-a-gate manner—to use his own words "advancing regardless of consequence and bringing all the destroyers to attack." This was the great concerted tactical stroke on which Admiral Tirpitz and all the German leaders

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counted for victory ; it was on the delivery of this stroke that the whole of the German strategy in the North Sea, and the main part of their battle tactics, had been based.

It was the tactic laid down by Admiral Tirpitz and looked forward to with enthusiasm by all the best brains in the German Navy ; namely, the equalization of the two fleets by the reduction in numbers of the ships of the Grand Fleet through the delivery of a smashing torpedo attack.

Now was the chance ! Never had German optimism visualized a more favourable opportunity ; the two fleets only 7 miles apart ; the weather hazy ; the smoke of the ships hanging in the murky air ; the sea smooth ; six flotillas, carrying 224 torpedoes ready for the attack—surely out of 224 torpedoes six or seven of the enemy must be incapacitated, if not sunk ?

Once more fate raised the balance to weigh the issue.

ONCE MORE THE FATE OF THE EMPIRE WAS IN DOUBT.

But Sir John had no intention of playing into the hands of the enemy. Regardless of the odium he might, and actually did, incur, he, as we shall see, defeated the German attack and dispelled for ever their hopes of victory on the surface of the North Sea.

At 7.10 the Grand Fleet sighted the leading German battleships and opened fire, and within five minutes the *König*, *Grosser-Kurfürst*, *Helgoland*, *Friedrich der Grosse* battleships (at E, Appendix III) were hit, some frequently, some severely. The battle cruisers of course suffered the worst, the *Derfflinger* and *Seydlitz* had their gun armaments wrecked, and *Lützow* in particular (at L, Plate Appendix III) were all virtually wrecked.

The German line was routed, and turned away at F, and with the idea of saving his battleships Admiral Scheer hoisted (at 7.13) a signal for the battle cruisers to turn towards the enemy and cover the attack that the destroyers were about to make. Poor devils ! Already battered, they were to be still further sacrificed to allow the battleships to escape. They *did* turn their broadsides most gallantly to our line, but could not stand the punishment, so, as soon as the destroyer attack had developed, they turned and sullenly followed after the battlefleet. They still had a sufficient speed to prevent our battleships overtaking them.

It was indeed fortunate for the German battle cruisers that their naval authorities had profited by the experience of the *Seydlitz* at the Dogger Bank action, where the magazine of this ship had been ignited by the burning of neighbouring charges and the ship

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nearly lost. Prompt measures had therefore been taken to make the magazines of all their ships immune to such accidents from flash of burning charges. We had not had the same experience and therefore not the same warning. If we had been so favoured it is possible that our three battle cruisers, or at any rate two of their number, might have been saved from the terrible accidents that befell them, involving in each case their complete loss. But it was undoubtedly the reason why the German battle cruisers were able to stand up to the severe punishment they endured without disaster. As it was, the *Derfflinger*, which previously had had her after turret totally wrecked and the entire battery of 5.9-inch guns placed out of action, now had practically the whole of her armament reduced to the same condition. The *Lützow* was almost in a sinking condition, the *Seydlitz* was badly wrecked, the *Moltke* and *Von der Tann* were also badly damaged.

The following short extract¹ from the pen of the Gunnery Lieutenant Von Hase of the *Derfflinger* gives a good idea of the terrible nature of the fire of our battleships.

“The battle cruisers temporarily led by the Captain of the *Derfflinger* whilst Admiral Hipper was shifting his flag, now hurled themselves recklessly forward at full speed to cover the approach of the destroyers towards the enemy's line. A perfect rain of projectiles beat upon them throughout their advance. Salvo upon salvo fell close at hand, and shell after shell struck the ship. It was a most thrilling experience. As all voice pipes and telephone leads to the fore-top had been shot away, I could no longer communicate with Lieutenant Von Stosch and therefore had to spot for myself. I had been firing from all four turrets when at 7.13 p.m. a terrible disaster occurred. A 15-inch projectile penetrated the armour of ‘Cæsar’ turret (second turret from aft) and burst inside. The gallant officer of the turret, Lieutenant Von Boltens-tern, had both legs torn off, and with him perished practically the entire guns' crews. In the turret itself one main and one secondary charge were set on fire by splinters. The flames penetrated to the working chamber, there two main and two secondary cartridges also caught fire. The cartridges emitted great tongues of flame which leapt out beyond the turret to the height of a house. But they simply burned, they did not explode as the enemy's had done. That was the salvation of the ship. Nevertheless, the effect of the burning cartridges was appalling. The leaping tongues of

¹ This extract is taken from *Kiel and Jutland*, Skeffington & Son, a book that all who are interested in Jutland or our navy should read.

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flame slew everyone within their reach. Of the 78 men comprising the turret crew, only five contrived to escape through the aperture provided for ejecting empty cartridge cases, and several of them were terribly injured. The remaining 73 men were killed on the spot, dying gallantly amidst the heat of the battle, loyally executing the orders of the officer of the turret to the last.

A few moments afterwards a second catastrophe overtook us. A 15-inch shell hit the roof of 'Dora' turret (the aftermost turret), penetrated it, and burst inside the gunhouse, and again its effects here were frightful. Under command of the gallant Captain of the turret Arndt, the crew of 'Dora' turret had fought heroically to the very end. Here too the flash set fire to every secondary cartridge which was not in its protecting metal case, as far down G. 18. as the hanging room, and also to some main cartridges. Huge flames, mingled with yellow smoke, were now soaring skywards from both after turrets, two ghastly funeral torches.

The enemy had our range to an inch. My heart stood still as I thought of what must be taking place inside the ship. So far, we in the armoured tower had fared very well. My thoughts were rudely interrupted; of a sudden, it was for us as if the end of the world had come, a tremendous roar, a mighty detonation, and then darkness fell upon us. We felt a terrific blow; the whole conning-tower, which reeled as if shaken in a giant's grip, was thrown upwards and then settled down vibrating on its base. A heavy projectile had struck the Gunnery Control Tower some 20 inches from where I stood. The shell exploded but could not penetrate the thick armour as it had struck it at an unfavourable angle. But it tore huge pieces out of the armour and poisonous greenish yellow gas poured into the Tower through the look-out slits. 'On gas masks,' I shouted, and everyone pulled his mask down over his face. I continued to control the fire with my own mask on though it made my orders difficult to understand. As, however, the gas speedily dispersed, we cautiously removed our masks. We made certain that the control instruments were in order. Nothing had been smashed. Singularly enough even the delicate mechanism of the training pointer gear was still in good condition, thanks to the springs on which it was hung. A few splinters had penetrated into the Conning Tower through the look-out slits and had injured some of the occupants, including the Navigating Officer. The tremendous impact had forced open and jammed the armoured door of the Conning Tower. Two men vainly tried to reclose it, but it was jammed too hard. Help, however, was forthcoming from an unexpected quarter. Once more we heard a terrific roar and crash with the noise of a thunderbolt

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as another 15-inch shell burst below the bridge. Deck plates flew aloft and the tremendous air-blast blew overboard everything that was not firmly riveted down. The Chart-house disappeared bodily, with all charts and apparatus inside—and last but not least, my fine cloak which I had ordered to be hung inside, vanished for ever. And a strange thing happened : the mighty blow of the bursting 15-inch shell slammed-to the armoured door of the Conning Tower. A polite man the Englishman ! Having opened the door he kindly closed it for us. But was the courtesy intentional ? At any rate it pleased us greatly. I again tried to make out the enemy through my periscope. Salvoes continued to fall near us, but we could see scarcely anything of the foe who enclosed us in a semicircle. All that we could see distinctly were the huge golden red flashes from the guns ; only rarely could the hulls of the ships be discerned. I had the range taken from these flashes, this being the only means available of estimating the distance, and without much hope of hitting anything I fired salvo after salvo from the two forward turrets. I could feel how our fire was soothing the nerves of the ship's company. If we had not fired at this moment the whole crew would have given way to profound despair, for they well knew that if things went on like this for a few more minutes we should be lost. But so long as we continued to fire there must be hope.

At 7.18 p.m. we received a signal from the Commander-in-Chief 'Manœuvre off the enemy's Van.' This meant that we were no longer to steam towards the enemy, but to fight a running action with his leading ships. We therefore turned to W. 6° S.

A pause in the action was urgently needed, and at 7.37 p.m., as enemy's ships were no longer visible, orders to this effect were given. All guns' crews had to come on deck to put out fires. The forward Conning Tower was enveloped in flames and smoke, and the crews of the 5.9-inch guns were organized into fire parties. The guns were silent, but within the ship an obstinate struggle was in progress against fire and water. Although everything inflammable had as far as possible been removed from the ship and flames, we were continually finding fresh fires, particularly linoleum, wooden deck planking, articles of clothing and paint work. Towards 8 p.m. we had got the worst fires under control, though the ship was still burning in several places. Smoke and occasionally thick yellow fumes continued to pour out of 'Cæsar' and 'Dora' turrets, but the fumes gradually cleared away after the magazines had been flooded. None of us would ever have believed that any ship could survive so many bad hits. After the action we counted about 25 hits from 15-inch shells and as many more from projectiles of lesser calibre. The powers of resistance displayed by our ships

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together with the great effectiveness of their armaments constituted a brilliant testimony to the genius of their creator, Grand Admiral Von Tirpitz.

The *Lützow* was no longer in sight at 7.20 p.m. The following note had been made in the after Gunnery Control Tower. 'Target obscured by dense smoke from *Lützow*' and thereafter the burning ship had vanished amidst the haze and smoke that restricted visibility.


But our consorts *Seydlitz*, *Moltke* and *Von der Tann* were still with us. They also had been punished severely; the *Seydlitz* worst of all. In her case, too, flames to the height of a house were shooting up from one turret. Every ship was on fire. The *Seydlitz* was heavily down by the bows.

When Admiral Hipper, in his destroyer, had proceeded alongside the *Seydlitz*, he learned that her W/T gear had been shot away, and that several thousand tons of water had already entered the ship. He had accordingly prepared to board the *Moltke* commanded by Captain Von Karpf, the former Captain of the *Hohenzollern*, but at that moment such a terrible fire was opened on the vessel that the Captain considered it too dangerous to stop. Admiral Hipper also enquired of us what damage the *Derfflinger* had sustained. On being informed that "only two 12-inch and two 5.9-inch are available on the port side, 3,400 tons of water are in the ship, and all signalling gear, with the exception of a W/T receiver is destroyed," he gave up his intention of boarding us. As soon as circumstances permitted he transferred his Flag to the *Moltke*. But throughout the fourth phase of the action the battle cruisers were led by the Captain of the *Derfflinger*. The name of Captain Hartog will for all time be associated with the death charge of the battle cruisers at Jutland."

It was under cover of their battleships and of their sorely tried battle cruisers that the torpedo flotillas advanced to the attack. Admiral Scheer intended that the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th and 9th Flotillas should have taken part in the attack, giving a potential discharge of 224 torpedoes. But as a matter of fact, the 2nd and 7th did not find our fleet, so were unable to do so; and the 3rd, being beaten back by our attack, only fired one torpedo. The 5th, for the same reason, fired none; the other two really were the only ones that took part and fired 31 torpedoes at a range of about 7,500 yards.

It was now that Sir John acted on the principle that he had laid down. He knew that the enemy's destroyers would be called on to attack, and he thoroughly appreciated how deadly such an assault might be. They were already seen advancing. He there-

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fore countered the danger in the manner that calm study, long deliberation, and concentration had previously determined. He signalled at 7.22 to the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron to attack the torpedo vessels of the enemy at utmost speed ; with them went half of our 11th Flotilla to the fray. The result of the gun-fire of these vessels and also that of the battleships caused the enemy destroyers to fire their torpedoes at a range of 7,500 yards. Then, having waited as long as was safe, at 7.22 he turned his fleet away
G 16 from the attack, just two points ($22\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$) ; but being informed by Commander Bellairs¹ (who was stationed at the instrument for indicating the extent of the turn that was necessary) that the two points' turn was insufficient, he turned, at 7.25, another two points. As he gave the order he knew full well that the prophecy he had made to the Admiralty would come true, and that, by pursuing the correct tactic, odium would be his reward (see page 248). Very fortunate it was for England that he made these two turns, for twenty or more torpedoes were sighted between the ships of the Grand Fleet ; but they were running slowly, being more or less exhausted after their long journey, the distance of which had been lengthened by Sir John's turn away. It was the slow running of the torpedoes, which had been fired at a range of 7,500 yards from the battlefleet but which range had, by the turn away, been increased to 10,000 yards, that allowed time after the tracks had been sighted for the ships to be individually manœuvred out of danger.

It is a matter of common knowledge that experiments with torpedoes fired at a line of ships have proved that out of every 100 torpedoes fired at a range of some 8,000 yards, 30 torpedoes hit ships even if they be manœuvred individually to avoid the torpedoes, in the same manner as the 1st Battle Squadron was manœuvred at Jutland. Increasing the range that the torpedoes had to run from 7,000 yards to 10,000 yards had thus insured the safety of the fleet. The total range sacrificed by these two turns at the Battle of Jutland was only about 3,000 yards, but this distance, and the respite in time given by the manœuvre, allowed the Germans once more to gain cover under the friendly shielding of the haze and smoke. The torpedo had come into its own.

The advocates of the torpedo as a weapon had never claimed that it could win a battle, unless of course the enemy accepted the menace without taking adequate action. The gun alone could win the battle. But they had always insisted that the torpedo

¹ Afterwards Rear-Admiral R. M. Bellairs, C.B., C.M.G.

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would impel the use of tactics which would be extremely disadvantageous to an enemy so attacked. This is what had happened. Had there been no fear of torpedo attack the Grand Fleet would have turned and kept the High Sea Fleet and its battle cruisers under fire for a little longer, until hidden by the smoke screen ; this might well have meant the loss of one or more of their ships. But this the torpedo forbade. If, however, Sir John had made a big turn towards the enemy, accepting the torpedo danger, and ordered a general chase, he could not have hit the enemy ships by gunfire, as they were blotted out by the smoke screen, nor could any reasonable number of ships have overtaken them before nightfall. Let us see why.

The High Sea Fleet had, for the second time, been advancing in line ahead. When all the ships turned away "together" from our fleet the slow ships became the leading ships on the rearward course, well in front of the *Königs* which had been engaging our line. In fact, there had been a replica of the 6.30 condition, only on an east and west instead of a north and south course. The result was that the *Königs*, having two or three knots greater speed than our main fleet, would have steamed right away out of sight into the mist. The *Kaiser* class, which had the same speed as our fleet, and which had been out of sight during the brief action, would have continued to keep out of sight. And lastly, the ships of the *Deutschland* class, which were slower than our fleet, were so far away that they could not have been overhauled before dark.

So, even had a turn towards the enemy been ordered, no action would have ensued, as our battleships would have been steaming much slower than the *König* class ; there would, however, have been a danger to our fleet from mines. But—and this is very important—any large turn towards the enemy would have brought our ships within sight of the 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 7th German Destroyer Flotillas and enabled them to bring off an attack.

Thus ended the second blow.

The High Sea Fleet had charged the Grand Fleet and its leading battleships and battle cruisers to be met by a devastating fire from our battleships, which again were steaming across its T. They crumpled up ; and, for the second time, turned together and sought safety in the obscurity of the mist and smoke, kicking out, as it were, while retiring, by sending back a torpedo attack. The kick was effective, since it relieved the pressure of our ships on the High Sea Battlefleet, and allowed it to escape once more

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into the mist ; but owing to Sir John's tactics of meeting the destroyer attack with gunfire, and then turning away and launching a counter-attack, the German torpedo attack tactics had failed to produce the result hoped for. The anticipated result has been well expressed in *Der Krieg zur See*, by Admiral Tirpitz : " If we should succeed, however, in launching a destroyer attack against any considerable portion of the British Fleet, either by day or night, I believe we should accomplish great things. The long years of thorough training carried out by the destroyers are guarantee enough."

Round two, like round one, had ended in Sir John's favour.

Sir John continued wisely to keep his fleet between the enemy and his ports. He was, therefore, surprised when at 7.47 p.m. he received a signal from Sir David Beatty saying : " Submit van of battlefleet follow battle cruisers we can then cut off the whole of enemy's battlefleet."

What did Sir David mean ?

The whole of the enemy's fleet was already cut off from its harbours. Moreover, Sir David was, from his previous signals, known to be steering a course further from the position in which the enemy's fleet had been approximately located than the battlefleet was steering. The message was ambiguous and puzzling. Giving consideration to the fact that Sir David might have sighted the enemy fleet and be in sight also of our leading battleship, Sir John ordered the *King George V*, the leader of the line, to follow the *Lion*, Sir David's flagship ; but the *Lion* was out of sight, so the signal was never obeyed. As a matter of fact, Sir David had acted on surmise only. He had neither the Grand Fleet nor the High Sea Fleet in sight at the time that he had made the signal.

The third blow came just before dark.

THE THIRD BLOW

The two fleets had been steering on converging courses and at 8.20 p.m. our battle cruisers sighted and fired on the German battle cruisers and scored some hits on these already sorely stricken vessels. Almost at the same time the old pre-War Dreadnoughts of the German Fleet were seen to emerge from the mist (at V, Plate Appendix III). Sufficient light remained for the battle cruisers to register one or two hits upon them before night closed down and

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further firing became impossible. Had one more hour of daylight been available, the whole of the enemy pre-War Dreadnoughts would probably have been sunk ; and if two hours had been vouchsafed, the *Kaiser* class Dreadnoughts would have, not improbably, shared the same fate.¹

NIGHT TIME

At 9.17 p.m. darkness having set in, Sir John formed his fleet for night cruising in three columns parallel to each other, and steering south at 17 knots. The first difficulty that faced him was to decide which of the three entrances to German ports would be chosen by Admiral Scheer. The passage by the Horns Reef was the nearest, and was the one that he would undoubtedly have used under normal conditions ; but the very fact that it was the most obvious one would not improbably cause him to select one of the other two. The passage through the minefields to Heligoland was his second—and this was one very much in Sir John's mind ; the third was the Ems channel by the Frisian Islands. All that Sir John had to guide him in his decision were the intercepted messages deciphered and forwarded to him by the Admiralty, and the reports from his own cruisers and destroyers. He could do nothing but await these messages, and in the meantime steam a course and a speed that would allow his fleet both to cover the Horns Reef entrance and also to regain touch with the High Sea Fleet should they choose either of the southern passages. As a precautionary measure he sent the *Abdiel* to lay mines in the Horns Reef channel.

Sir John further stationed his destroyer flotillas 5 miles in rear of the columns of the Grand Fleet at 9.27 p.m. so that :

(1) They would be in an excellent position to attack the enemy's fleet should they turn to the southward with a view to regaining their bases during the night.

(2) They would be in a position to attack enemy destroyers should they attack our battlefleet.

(3) They would be clear of our ships—so that neither would they attack any of our battleships, nor our battleships fire on them. During the night they were several times seen from the *Iron Duke* to be in action. It was thought that they were engaging light craft but, in fact, they were attacking the German battlefleet.

¹ For the combination of the three " blows " see Chart, Appendix III.

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The destroyers behaved with great gallantry and made various attacks with torpedoes under very heavy fire at close range. The German pre-Dreadnought *Pommern* was sunk by our 12th Destroyer Flotilla.

It has been suggested that Sir John should have explained the general situation to the destroyers. But this is splitting hairs. The destroyers knew perfectly well from their printed orders that their business was to attack any of the enemy battleships that were sighted by them. They also knew why they had been stationed well astern of the battlefleet.

Just before dark an unfortunate mistake was made by the signal department of one of our ships. The *Lion* had lost the secret challenge for the night and asked the *Princess Royal*, her next astern, to pass it on to her. Now the safety of thousands of our men, especially those in our destroyers, depended on the challenge being known to our own ships only. Yet the *Princess Royal* passed this vital information by flashlight. Either this message or a challenge made by some other ship was taken in by some of the German ships and the secret flashed broadcast to the High Sea Fleet.

Then came the tragedy. The *Castor*, leading a division of destroyers, sighted some cruisers. They made the British challenge, and therefore apparently were friendly. But almost immediately afterwards they opened fire. The *Castor* replied ; but the destroyers did not fire their torpedoes, for they were still doubtful whether the cruisers were friend or foe, and they suffered badly.

In cases of doubtful identity the rule that has always been followed in our Navy has been that destroyers should not attack, lest they should sink any of our own ships. But on the other hand it was, in such a case, obligatory for all ships to fire on the destroyers. The fact of the German ships firing on the destroyers could not, therefore, in the face of the challenge being correctly made, be taken as conclusive evidence by our destroyers that they were enemies and not friends.

But to return to Sir John and his problems. These were complicated by the unfortunate system adopted by the Admiralty in passing on to him the messages intercepted during the night.

At 10.45 he received a message sent out from the Admiralty at 9.58 p.m. *giving the position and course of the rear ship of the enemy's battlefleet.*

The signal on which the message was based had, in reality, been made by the officer commanding a Torpedo Division of the

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High Sea Fleet *to ships under his orders*. Most unfortunately all mention of this source of origin was omitted from the message as sent to Sir John ; he, therefore, assumed that the information came from a ship of the line and that the signal was both reliable and authoritative.

But the message was obviously incorrect so far as position was concerned, since it placed the German Fleet, at 9 p.m., 8 miles to the southward (that is approximately ahead) of the *King George V*, which was the leading ship of the Grand Fleet battlefleet. The fact that the information contained in this message was false naturally tended to create a general distrust of the signals intercepted and deciphered by the Admiralty. If coming from an authoritative source, it could only have been made with intent to deceive, or else the deciphering at the Admiralty was at fault. Had Sir John known that it emanated from a small craft relying on dead reckoning, he would instantly have surmised the reason for the error in position, and paid no further heed to it.

Again at 9.53 p.m. a signal of the utmost importance was intercepted by the Admiralty, *in which the German Commander-in-Chief urgently asked for the Horns Reef to be reconnoitred by an airship in the early morning*. For some inconceivable reason this was not passed on to the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet. Had it been received by Sir John it would have told him conclusively that the High Sea Fleet was making for the Horns Reef.

At about the same time, three further messages were intercepted by the Admiralty, which indicated that the German battlefleet was on a S.S.E. course at a speed of 16 knots, and that the German battle cruisers were taking a position astern of the battlefleet.

These three signals were paraphrased by the Admiralty, and reduced to a single signal stating that the German battlefleet had been ordered home at 9.14 p.m., battle cruisers in rear, and giving the course and speed.

G 17 This was not sent off until 10.41 p.m. It was not received in the *Iron Duke* cypher room until 11.05 and not handed to the Commander-in-Chief until about 11.30 p.m. At that same time, 11.30, Captain Duff¹ reported from the *Birmingham* that the enemy's battle cruisers were steering south. This was on a course practically parallel to that of the Grand Fleet. A few minutes later a signal from Commodore Goodenough, that had been jammed and greatly delayed, sent at 10.45 via the *Nottingham*, was received by Sir John at 11.38 ; this placed the 4th Scouting Squadron to the westward of the line of advance of the Grand Fleet.

¹ Afterwards Admiral Sir Arthur Duff, K.C.B.

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Which of the reports was correct? That from Captain Duff supported by the one from Commodore Goodenough, or that from the Admiralty?

The latter made the High Sea Fleet at 9.14 p.m. steering for the Horns Reef; the former showed that the High Sea Fleet at 10.45 was steering for the Heligoland or Ems route.

The 9.58 signal had made Sir John doubtful of intercepted messages, so he accepted the ocular reports from Captain Duff and the Commodore in preference to the Admiralty intercept; especially as over two hours had elapsed between 9.14, the time of origin of the Admiralty intercepted message, and 11.30, the time at which it had been deciphered and handed to him; moreover, the *Nottingham's* signal had been despatched one hour and a half after the Admiralty message had been sent off.

Had the Admiralty repeated the three messages instead of making a pot-pourri of them, the reiteration would have convinced Sir John that the High Sea Fleet was in reality making for the Horns Reef. It was a piece of bad luck that Captain Duff had sighted the German cruisers just after they had hauled from S.S.E. $\frac{1}{2}$ E. to a South course in order to avoid an attack by our destroyers. Had he sighted them a short time earlier, or even later, he would have been able to report the actual course on which the High Sea Fleet was steering.

After this, up to 12.44 a.m., five messages were intercepted by the Admiralty, all dealing with the course and position of the High Sea Fleet. None of these was forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief. But at 1.48 a.m. another pot-pourri was sent embodying messages received by the Admiralty at 8.40 p.m., 12.35 a.m. and 1 a.m. *This gave the midnight position and course of the Lützow, and went on to state that all German submarines were being hurried from German ports to attack, and that one German flotilla was returning round the Skaw.*

A queer mixture of signals, respectively seven hours, one and a quarter hours, and three-quarters of an hour old. It was not received in the *Iron Duke* until 2.40 a.m.

At 1.15 a.m. another message, giving exact position of the head of the High Sea Fleet was intercepted by the Admiralty but not sent on. So far, therefore, Sir John had received no information to prove that the High Sea Fleet was not still to the westward of him.

At 2.30 a.m. Sir John turned the Grand Fleet to the northward,

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in order to collect the various units dispersed during the night, and to arrive off the Horns Reef by daylight.

Then at 3.29 a.m. the Admiralty signalled that at 2.30 the German Main Fleet was in latitude 55° 30' N. longitude 6° 50' E.

In other words, the High Sea Fleet was just off the entrance to the passage at the Horns Reef. But this message was not received by Sir John until 4.15 a.m. It was then too late to cut off the enemy before they could enter the route between the minefields.

Naturally those in authority at the Admiralty were desirous not to pass more messages to the *Iron Duke* than necessary; but there is no doubt that had a signal occasionally been passed to the Commander-in-Chief confirming the course and the speed of the High Sea Fleet, Sir John would have grasped the fact that the High Sea Fleet were making for the Horns Reef: while the failure to pass the 9.52 p.m. signal ordering an airship reconnaissance off the Horns Reef early in the morning can only be classed as a very unfortunate oversight.

Sir John was not the only one who was deceived as to the position of the High Sea Fleet, for at 4.4 a.m. on June 1, Sir David Beatty signalled to him, two hours after the order had been given for the fleet to turn for the Horns Reef:

"When last seen enemy was to the westward steering south-west, and proceeding slowly. Zeppelin has passed astern of me steering west. Submit I may sweep south-west to locate enemy."

And on June 9 he wrote to Sir John:

"Your sweep to the south was splendid and I was certain we should have them at daylight. I cannot believe now that they got in to the N.E. of you, and feel they must have tried to the S.W."

Admiral Scheer said he was equally in the dark with regard to the position of the Grand Fleet, for he stoutly maintained that it had never swept southward at all, but had steered to the northward for the whole of the night.

There were other messages sent to Sir John from vessels in his own fleet which never reached him. Constant wireless jamming by the Germans was in progress and the destroyer wireless sets were too feeble to get through. And there was yet another failure in the fleet that night to report information which would have been of infinite value to Sir John. It is an omission difficult to account for except that the human brain, unless thoroughly trained, is a poor reed to lean upon in an emergency. On board two ships,

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THE NIGHT

HIGH SEA FLEET passes astern of GRAND FLEET.

Intermediate times show positions of German Van and of nearest ship of G.F.

⌚




FIG. 14.

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the *Valiant* and the *Malaya*, German battleships were suddenly seen at 11.30 p.m., lit up in the flashes of gun-fire, and were sighted nearly astern. In neither case was the fact reported. Had Sir John received this information he would immediately have known that the Horns Reef was the passage selected for entry, and would have altered course to cut off the High Sea Fleet.




FIG. 15.

Abscissæ, distances from High Sea Fleet; Ordinates, Greenwich Mean Time.

It is easy to see how the two fleets missed each other. At 8.30 p.m. the two battlefleets were abreast of one another, only some 12 miles apart. From then, until 11.30 p.m. the fleets steamed on slightly converging courses. To borrow an excellent simile from a published account of the battle,¹ the two fleets were steaming down the legs of a very acute angled V: the High Sea Fleet down the left leg and the Grand Fleet down the right (Fig. 14). Admiral Scheer had withdrawn his battle cruisers from the van to the

¹ *The Riddle of Jutland*, Gibson and Harper.

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rear of the line ; Sir John had closed up his fleet into four columns. (The *Marlborough* and five battle cruisers had, however, fallen astern of the remainder of the fleet so that the fleet was in three columns only.) It was these two movements which placed the rear of the Grand Fleet slightly in advance of the van of the High Sea Fleet. For a part of the night from 9 p.m. to 1 a.m. the two fleets were within a few miles of each other and gradually closing. From 8.30 p.m. until 11.30 p.m. the speed of the High Sea Fleet was one knot slower than that of the Grand Fleet ; it thus dropped 3 miles farther behind. This just allowed the tail of our line to pass the apex of the V before the van of the High Sea Fleet arrived there. It was at this point that the *Malaya* and *Valiant* sighted the leading German battleship. After this critical moment the tracks of the two fleets formed the lower half of an X, the High Sea Fleet going down the right leg and the Grand Fleet down the left leg, and every minute drawing farther apart.

Sir John had originally intended to alter course at 2.30 and to steer for a position covering the entrance to the Horns Reef Passage. But so convinced was he that the enemy was still to the westward of him that he changed his plan and steered back on his tracks in order to collect his destroyers, and to have them in company with him in the battle which he expected would develop in the morning.¹

At 3.44 he sighted a zeppelin steering to the westward, so he altered course in that direction, expecting thereby to meet the High Sea Fleet.

He then searched the whole area of the Horns Reef, and our fleet remained until 1 p.m. grim, disappointed, but undisputed possessors of the battlefield. After which, the enemy showing no disposition to leave their harbour, the ships of the Grand Fleet returned to their home ports.

POSTSCRIPT I

DURING the run north, long-range firing took place between the battle cruiser fleets and between the 5th Battle Squadron and the 1st Division of the High Sea Fleet. It was unfortunate that the dead reckoning of both fleets was in error owing to zigzagging and the running fight of the battle cruisers. The Grand Fleet reckoning placed the battle fleet 4 miles to the eastward of their true position, and that of the battle cruisers, which had been heavily engaged with the enemy, placed them 6 miles to the westward.

¹ See also Postscript V, page 302.

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There had also been confusion in signalling the geographical positions by the *Southampton* during the run north, since the positions consecutively signalled gave that ship impossible speeds. For instance, the difference between the 4.30 p.m. and the 4.46 p.m. positions made the ship to be apparently steaming at the rate of 45 knots.

The best that Sir John could do was to plot the positions signalled and take the mean position that these gave as the position of the High Sea Fleet. The position thus obtained from signals prior to 5.40 placed the High Sea Fleet at 6 p.m. 17 miles E.S.E. of their true position, and the signals after 5.40 placed the High Sea Fleet 6 miles East of their true position. The result of the position calculated at 5.40 was to lead Sir John to believe that the High Sea Fleet was directly ahead of the Grand Fleet. Up to the moment of establishing visual touch, by means of a linking of ships each in sight of the other, these geographical positions were the only clues on which to base the relative bearing and distance of the two fleets. Obviously, since the geographical positions were incorrect and the reports from the cruisers inconsistent, Sir John's estimate of the position of the High Sea Fleet relative to his own was also incorrect. It was in order to correct any such errors that visual touch was of such great importance. Sir John wished to have his line of advance directly pointing towards the advancing High Sea Fleet when the latter came in sight, and further to have the centre of his line directly opposite to the leading ships of the High Sea Fleet. He would then have each of his wings equidistant from the enemy, and he could advantageously deploy on whichever wing he desired.

Fig. 16 is well worthy of study since it deals with a problem which is of great interest to a tactician. Sir John naturally wished to sight the High Sea battlefleet right ahead of the *Iron Duke*, instead of this they were sighted some 40° on his starboard bow. The errors in dead reckoning account for this to some extent but not entirely. All the positions of the enemy after 5 p.m., due to reports, have been plotted in Fig. 16. The most important, in fact the critical one, was that marked "Estimated position of van of enemy battlefleet at 5 p.m. from early reports." From this is obtained the estimated position of the van of the High Sea Fleet at 6.14 as shown, 23 miles away and slightly on the starboard bow of the *Iron Duke*, so that, when sighted, the High Sea Fleet would have been nearly ahead of the *Iron Duke*. The reports

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from the *Southampton* at 5.40 and 5.50 were conflicting as they made the High Sea Fleet travelling $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles in ten minutes or at a speed of 45 knots. Too much reliance could not therefore be placed on them. The result was that the Commander-in-Chief was in the dark as to the bearing of the High Sea Fleet until the *Barham* sighted the battlefleet and signalled its correct bearing.

Four reports of the positions of the High Sea Fleet were received prior to 5 p.m. Lord Jellicoe wrote :

“ If a mean position for the German battlefleet is taken from a study of these four reports it will place the centre in Lat. $56^{\circ}33\frac{1}{2}'$ N. Long. $6^{\circ}27\frac{1}{2}'$ at 5 p.m. and the van in Lat. $56^{\circ}35\frac{1}{2}'$ N. Long. $6^{\circ}26\frac{1}{2}'$ E. at the same time. This is probably the conclusion arrived at at the time, although it is difficult to recollect the sequence of events.

Between 5 p.m. and 5.40 p.m. no further information as regards the position of the German battlefleet was received. Working on the assumption that the van was at 5 p.m. in Lat. $56^{\circ}35\frac{1}{2}'$ N. Long. $6^{\circ}26\frac{1}{2}'$ E., and that the course was North and speed 15 knots as reported by the *Southampton*, it would have appeared to me, up to 5.40 p.m. that on the course that the British battlefleet was steering, the German battlefleet would be right ahead and 30 miles from the *Iron Duke* by 6 p.m. Its real position was 17 miles W.N.W. of where it was assumed that it would be at this time.

Soon after 5.40 p.m. further information began to come in. The Commodore 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron reported at 5.40 that the enemy had altered course to N.N.W. and he gave the *Southampton's* position as Lat. $56^{\circ}46'$ N. Long. $5^{\circ}40'$ E. No bearing or distance of the enemy was given, but if it was assumed that the centre bore East 10–11 miles from the *Southampton* as reported in the 5 p.m. signal, it put the German van in a position 15 miles to the north-westward of the position which had been worked up from the previous reports. Some little time later, a report came in from the *Black Prince*, also time 5.40 p.m., giving a position for the enemy's battle cruisers, and this placed them another 13 miles to the north-westward of the position in which the *Southampton* placed the German battleships.

There was evidently something very wrong, and the assumption was that the ships reported by the *Black Prince* must be our own battle cruisers. On this basis the German Cruisers might be placed some 6–7 miles ahead of the ships reported by the *Southampton* on a N.N.W. course. Reports of gun-fire to the southward began to come in from our cruisers and at 5.45 p.m. Sir Robert Arbuthnot in the *Defence* reported ships in action bearing S.S.W. and steering N.E. The position given for the *Defence* was clearly not correct

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


FIG. 16.

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as it placed her much closer to the *Iron Duke* than she actually was at the time, but taking her as being more or less in her correct station, the report, if taken as referring to our own battle cruisers, placed the latter within 2 or 3 miles of the position given by the *Black Prince*. The course N.E. was, however, difficult to understand, in view of that given by the *Southampton* for the enemy.

At 5.50 Sir Cecil Burney reported gun flashes and heavy firing on the starboard bow of the *Marlborough*, and at 5.50 another report came in from the *Southampton* which gave the enemy's course as N., instead of the N.E. of the *Defence* report; and if, again, assumptions were made as to the bearing and distance of the ships reported, as was done in the case of the 5.40 report (but owing to the decreased visibility the distance was taken as less than in the previous reports) the van of the German battlefleet would be taken as bearing about S. by E. $\frac{1}{2}$ E. 21 miles from the *Iron Duke* at 5.50 p.m. But the report stated that the German Battle Cruisers were to the south-westward, or astern of the battlefleet, and this introduced a fresh complication.

With a view to clearing up the situation, and of bringing the enemy with greater certainty ahead, the course of the battlefleet was altered to S. at 6.2 p.m.,¹ but, just after this, the *Defence* and the *Warrior* came into hot action with a German light cruiser on a bearing nearly ahead of the *Iron Duke*, and it was thought that the heavy firing heard in this direction might be from our battle cruisers, and that the enemy's Main Fleet was actually ahead. Course was therefore altered back to S.E. in order to bring the Guides of columns approximately abeam of each other ready for instant deployment to meet an enemy sighted right ahead.

The general uncertainty made it of absolutely vital importance to obtain a report of the bearing and distance of the German Battlefleet from the first vessel of the Battle Cruiser Fleet sighted by the Battle Fleet. Hence the signal to the *Lion* when sighted by the *Iron Duke* at 6.1 p.m.—'Where is the enemy's Battle Fleet?' This signal being repeated at 6.10 p.m. and the reply being received at 6.14 p.m. On the receipt of this reply the signal for deployment, already too long delayed, was made."

POSTSCRIPT II

ERRORS in reporting the constitution of the High Sea Fleet.

Lord Jellicoe wrote :

"Accurate knowledge of the strength of the enemy's battlefleet was of course a matter of equal importance to reports as to its

¹ See insert to Fig. 16.

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position and movements. From information furnished by the Naval Intelligence Department I expected that the High Sea Fleet in May, 1916, would consist of eighteen Dreadnought Battleships, viz :

1. *Bayern* Class
4. *König* Class
5. *Kaiser* Class
4. *Helgoland* Class
4. *Nassau* Class

besides eight pre-Dreadnought battleships and six battle cruisers.

It was believed that the *Bayern*, a new battleship armed with 15-inch guns, had joined the fleet, as also the *Hindenburg* battle cruiser, and the knowledge that only five battle cruisers were in the first Scouting Group when in action with our battle cruisers made it possible that the sixth had temporarily joined the battlefleet. It was also considered possible that the *Salamis*, an ex-Greek battleship, might be completed and with the battlefleet. After the action we found from German reports that neither the *Bayern* nor the *Hindenburg* were with the High Sea Fleet, and that the *König Albert* was also absent, and that only six pre-Dreadnought ships were present, the total battlefleet strength being, therefore, 22 instead of 27 or 28.

As regards destroyers, it was assumed that all available vessels of this class would be present, and that this number would be at least 100.

Such information under this heading as had reached me from our battle cruisers and light cruisers was contained in three signals :

(a) At 4.45 from Sir David Beatty, the signal¹ which reached me reporting the force as consisting of 26 to 30 battleships (this signal was passed by the *Lion* through the *Princess Royal* and was received at 5.05 p.m. Its general effect, as will be noted, was to confirm the Naval Intelligence reports).

(b) At 4.46 from Commodore Goodenough, reporting the enemy's battlefleet as in single line ahead with the *Kaiser* Class in the van.

(c) At 5.50 from Commodore Goodenough, reporting the enemy's Battle Cruisers as being to the Southwestward (i.e. in rear) of his battlefleet.

The real order of the High Sea Fleet was, battle cruisers leading, the *König* Class in the van of the battlefleet with the *Kaiser* Class following, and pre-Dreadnought ships in rear, and the strength of this battlefleet was 22 ships. Both order and strength were considerably at variance from the information received.

These discrepancies would not have been of so much importance

¹See page 263, footnote 1.

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in clear weather, since it would then have been possible to have seen the whole German Fleet from the *Iron Duke*, but under the conditions existing at the time that the fleets met (when it was rare to see even four ships at once, and then so indistinctly that it was very difficult to distinguish their class), the lack of accurate knowledge exaggerated the difficulties of divining the position, order and movements of the enemy.

The absence of full information, and the discrepancies between the dead-reckoning positions of the ships with the *Iron Duke* and those with the *Lion*, produced two important results. They were as follows :

(a) The 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron under Sir Horace Hood (which had been detached to reinforce Sir David Beatty as soon as the presence of any enemy ships were known) did not sight our 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadrons until 6.16 p.m. Indeed, at 5.40 p.m. when in approximately the same Latitude as the battle cruisers under Sir David Beatty, they were 20 miles to the eastward of him. Fortunately the *Chester* light cruiser, which was scouting to the westward of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron and steering to the southward, sighted and became engaged with the German light cruisers of the 2nd Scouting Group, then steering to the northward ; and this engagement drew the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron in that direction and led to contact being eventually made.

(b) The deployment of the battlefleet for action was materially affected," (as mentioned in the foregoing postscript).

"(c) During the whole period from 6.14 p.m. until dark it was impossible to divine to what portion of the German battlefleet the ships occasionally in sight belonged and in what formation it was steaming."

POSTSCRIPT III

The Destroyers in company with the High Sea Fleet.

THE following information has been culled mainly from the German official account of the Battle of Jutland published in *Der Krieg zur See—1914-18*. Nord See. Volume V.

At the commencement of the battle 61 German destroyers were present, carrying 296 torpedoes.

When at 7.21 p.m. (G.M.T.) Admiral Scheer ordered his destroyers to attack, they had already fired 50 torpedoes out of 296 carried.

The 1st Flotilla (4 boats) and G.37 and V.45 with a total of 22 torpedoes were standing by the badly damaged *Lützow*.

Thus 224 torpedoes were available for the attack.

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In the massed attack :

6th Flotilla (4 boats) fired 11 torpedoes out of 14 available.	} British gun-fire prevented more of these 58 torpedoes being fired. 2 German destroyers sunk.
9th Flotilla (9 boats) fired 20 torpedoes out of 44 available.	
3rd Flotilla (6 boats) fired 1 torpedo out of 23 available.	} Beaten back by our counter-attack when they endeavoured to close our battlefleet which had turned away.
5th Flotilla (11 boats) fired 0 torpedoes out of 44 available.	
2nd Flotilla (10 boats plus 3 of 6th Flotilla) fired 0 torpedoes out of 63 available.	} Started to attack close astern of 6th Flotilla, but recalled by the light cruiser <i>Regensburg</i> as the Grand Fleet battleships had vanished into the mist.
7th Flotilla (9 boats) did not obey the signal as the Senior Officer thought he was too far in rear. He had 36 torpedoes available.	

The total number of torpedoes fired in massed attack on British battlefleet owing to Sir John's counter manœuvre was only 32 out of 224 torpedoes available.

If the Grand Fleet had been turned *towards* the attack, the 3rd, 6th and 9th would have attacked as before, and the 2nd and 7th would then have sighted our fleet and, together with the 5th, also brought off an attack, in a second wave ; or, perhaps, in the case of the 7th a third wave. This attack in waves is a great danger as it makes it difficult for ships having altered course to try and dodge one zone of torpedoes, to alter again effectively to avoid another wave of torpedoes coming from a different direction. Supposing that 120 torpedoes out of the 224 had been fired at the fleet this would have brought up the number fired to 152 instead of the 32 which actually were discharged.

POSTSCRIPT IV

THE statement made on page 266 that, during the twenty seconds Sir John Jellicoe took to decide on his method of deployment the fate of the Empire was in the balance, is by no means an exaggeration. The tactical considerations have been dealt with on page 272, but these necessarily were condensed so as to avoid breaking the thread of the narrative unduly ; these can now be expanded. It should be remembered that, in the battle-cruiser action during the early afternoon, the Germans had sunk two of our battle cruisers when fighting an action in which they were vastly inferior in numbers, and in which they themselves had suffered only slight damage. The news of this victory must have been signalled throughout the High Sea Fleet ; so a spirit of elation, confidence

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and derring-do must have been created. Admiral Scheer throughout the action proved himself a most capable commander and one not likely to let an opportunity slip by. If, as has been suggested, Sir John had deployed on the *Marlborough* Division, Admiral Scheer would have found himself across the T of that Division and would have made the most of the situation. So for some quarter of an hour or more the last three columns of the Grand Fleet would have been exposed to a superior gun-fire at ranges from 8,000 to 12,000 yards; and, so bunched up would the half of our battlefleet have been, that in a successful torpedo attack there would have been about an even chance of each torpedo hitting a battleship, instead of a two to three chance against with ships in a normal line-ahead formation.

The vulnerability of our magazines must also be borne in mind, so that the superiority in numbers of the Grand Fleet over the High Sea Fleet might well have disappeared in that quarter of an hour.

The deployment on the western division would further have been complicated by the presence of the 5th Battle Squadron. If the deployment had been on this squadron the situation would have been aggravated, and if on the *Marlborough* Division the 5th Battle Squadron would have been placed in a very awkward position indeed.

Moreover, the advantage of better visibility that accrued to our director officers and spotting officers when firing to the southward and westward would have been surrendered by us and transferred to the enemy.

When all these points are taken into consideration the statement that the fate of the Empire was in the balance cannot be considered to be an exaggeration.

POSTSCRIPT V

CRITICS with but poor insight have quoted Sir John Jellicoe's statement in the *Grand Fleet, 1914-1916*, page 385, as a sign of weakness and of a desire to avoid action on the early morning of June 1, because of the absence of his destroyers. The statement runs :

“The difficulties experienced in collecting the fleet (particularly the destroyers), due to the above causes, rendered it undesirable for the battlefleet to close the Horns Reef at daylight, as had been my intention when deciding to steer to the southward during the

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


FIG. 17.

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night. It was obviously necessary to concentrate the battlefleet and the destroyers before renewing the action."

In the first place it must be remembered that both Sir John and Admiral Beatty were convinced that the enemy's battlefleet was still to the westward of the Grand Fleet.

Secondly, "closing the Horns Reef" did not mean taking the Grand Fleet close to the entrance of the channel between the shoals and the minefields, but to a position that covered the entrance; which would have been anything from, say, 12 to 15 miles from the entrance to the passage through the minefields. It was obviously necessary not to come in close up to the entrance, but to keep at such a distance that Sir John could safely, in an action, manœuvre a fleet that was 5 miles in length.

Reference to Fig. 17 will show that the place to which he intended to steer was somewhere about that marked as occupied by the High Sea Fleet at 2.30 a.m. In fact, had he carried out his original intentions, the two fleets would, in all probability, have met about that spot. But if, as he believed, the enemy was still to the westward of the Grand Fleet his obviously correct procedure was to retrace his course and concentrate his fleet at some such point as (A) which would still deny the entrance to the Horns Reef to a fleet coming in from the westward every bit as well as if he had been at the 2.30 position. His fleet would then have been concentrated ready for battle; but if, with the High Sea Fleet to the westward of him, he had steered as he originally intended, he knew that he would have delayed his concentration for an hour or two, during which time he might have had to engage the High Sea Fleet. The Destroyer Flotillas of the High Sea Fleet had been searching separately by flotillas for the Grand Fleet during the night and had been ordered to concentrate by 4 a.m. at Horns Reef or proceed home round the Skaw; most of them, therefore, would have been with their fleet during an action.

At 3.44 a.m., although the cruisers, destroyers and the 6th Division of the battlefleet had not rejoined, Sir John altered course by divisions to the westward, as it seemed probable that the presence of the Zeppelin airship which had been sighted might also have indicated the presence of the High Sea Fleet¹ in that direction.

From this it is quite clear that, had Sir John known that the High Sea Fleet was passing across his stern, he would have steered

¹ *Vide Grand Fleet, 1914-1916.*

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to cut them off at daylight, although handicapped by the absence of a portion of his fleet and destroyers.

It is needless to attempt to speculate as to what would then have happened on that damp misty morning, with a visibility varying from a ship's length to about 4 miles, and with the enemy's destroyers in some cases perhaps well within torpedo range before they would have sighted our ships, or been sighted by them.

It is impossible to close this chapter without including a tribute, which Lord Jellicoe would have rejoiced himself to have voiced, to the gallantry and leadership of Lord Beatty on whom had fallen the conduct of the Cruiser action of the Dogger Bank and also the action preliminary to the battlefleet action at Jutland. He was a born leader of men. In these actions he was ably supported by the Rear-Admirals, officers and men under his command during the intense strain of a modern action at sea. Tribute must also be paid to the gallantry of the officers and crews of the smaller vessels to which detailed reference is impossible owing to the limitations imposed by the scope of a volume which deals with the whole of the life of Lord Jellicoe.

CHAPTER XX

Remarks on Jutland

Of course I am not satisfied, as given clear weather the battle would have been final and there would have been no German Fleet left, whatever happened to us. But that can't be helped. It is ludicrous for the Germans to claim a victory. Victory always rests with the force that occupies the scene of action, and we did this for the greater part of the next day, until it was quite clear that they had all gone home or as many as were left to go. If they had been so confident of victory they would have tried to go on fighting instead of legging it for home.

Extract from a letter from Sir John to Lady Jellicoe, 6.6.16.

THE object of fighting a battle should be to assist the strategy of a campaign. Battles are the sinews of strategy. A drawn fight may greatly further a campaign, whereas a Pyrrhic victory may ruin one.

The standard by which to judge a naval battle is not that of the tonnage sunk on each side, nor the numbers of the various classes of ships destroyed or permanently disabled, but *the effect the battle has on the outcome of the war*. The respective losses only become of value to the extent that they may affect this major consideration.

Judged by this standard Jutland was a substantial victory, since it practically destroyed all German hope of obtaining command of the sea. We are an old seafaring nation with a long and glorious sea tradition. Our sailors have learned by bitter experience in the past that the most economical way to lose ships is to lose them in battle. The result of the Battle of Jutland was that the High Sea Fleet (accounted by the Germans to be the victor) remained in harbour and watched us transport, without interruption, millions of men and millions of tons of ammunition and stores to whatever part of the globe we wished to deliver them. The Germans, at all events in June, 1916, knew that their fleet was beaten, and that the great torpedo offensive by which they had hoped to defeat our fleet in action had failed.

We lost, in the battle proper, not counting the preliminary

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cruiser action, 68,500 tons of ships to the German 61,180. We lost the battle cruiser *Invincible* as against the *Lützow* ; the armoured cruisers *Defence*, *Black Prince* and *Warrior* to the old battleship *Pommern* ; the Germans lost 4 light cruisers, *Wiesbaden*, *Frauenlob*, *Elbing* and *Rostock*, whereas we lost none ; but we lost 6,800 destroyer tonnage to the German 3,686.

There was little to choose between the losses in the main battle ; for the *Invincible* and *Lützow* were the only large ships of capital value that were lost by either side. On the other hand, our supremacy on the surface of the sea was not only maintained, but emphasized. Previous to the battle we had lost, in the strenuous battle cruiser fight some 50 to 60 miles away from the battlefleet, two battle cruisers, the *Queen Mary* and *Indefatigable*, some 45,800 tons, whereas the enemy suffered no corresponding battle cruiser loss.

The German Admiral, after weeks spent in the preparation of a design to reduce the numbers of our battlefleet, found his labour frustrated and that he was defeated at all points. He discovered to what extent all plans were dependent for success on the North Sea weather ; that no accurate forecast of the results of any operation could be made ; and, above all, that he was opposed to an Admiral who was not going to play into his hands by being tempted, as he had hoped, into any rash tactics.

The general tactics of the two battlefleets could not have been bettered. With those of the Grand Fleet we have dealt. Those of Admiral Scheer were those best adapted to the needs of the moment. He had chased at utmost speed a portion of the Grand Fleet. His want of airship scouting, and the fact that his battle cruiser squadron had been to the eastward of our battle cruisers on the run north, had deprived him of the knowledge that the main body of the Grand Fleet was at sea. On first contact with the Grand Fleet, being out-manœuvred, he quite rightly retired precipitately to gain breathing space. He then promptly tried to blast a passage through our fleet by the use of torpedoes, in order to regain his harbour of refuge. When this failed, he again withdrew into the mist. Then he adopted the only tactic that could save at all events the majority of his ships, for it was almost certain that if he had remained at sea till the next day most of his ships would have been sunk by the Grand Fleet in a general action. He therefore, during the hours of darkness, steered straight for the Horns Reef Passage and called for airship reconnaissance there.

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If he ran into the Grand Fleet—some of his ships at any rate would get through and probably a *pro rata* number of the Grand Fleet would be sunk. So he set his teeth and signalled that the course to the Horns Reef was to be persisted in at all costs. He was fortunate. He passed astern instead of through the Grand Fleet. But the seven hours of tense anxiety through which he had passed between 8 p.m. and 3 a.m. were bound to leave their mark, and cause him to exercise a great restraint on the future movements of the fleet.

In a subsequent interview he stated that, had he been certain of the position of the Grand Fleet during the night, he would have engaged them. Perhaps ; but unless luck had greatly favoured him he would have had to face a very irate Kaiser when he returned to harbour, for his orders were not to risk the ships of the High Sea Fleet. Moreover, he had opposed to him an Admiral who had no intention of fighting a night action, if such an action could be avoided. Undoubtedly Admiral Scheer had made up his mind to keep his course, and if he came across the Grand Fleet he would have had no alternative but to fight his way through them. Ten minutes of intensive gun-fire and ramming, and what remained of the High Sea Fleet would have gained their much-needed shelter ; and the Grand Fleet would have suffered as much, if not more. Although he further states that he considered that he would have inflicted severe damage on the Grand Fleet, he winds up with the confession " that it must be admitted that in an engagement under these circumstances the decision would be influenced to a large extent by luck."

It is not without interest to consider for a moment what advantage would have accrued to the country had a fleet action taken place in the early hours of June 1.

The Grand Fleet would have been at a disadvantage from the absence of the destroyers which had become scattered in the series of attacks during the night. Admiral Scheer had arranged for his destroyers to meet him at a rendezvous at daylight with the exception of one flotilla which had proceeded home via the Skaw. Suppose, therefore, each side had lost equally in numbers of ships, what advantage should we have gained ? It is indeed, barely conceivable, judging from all previous wars, that the whole of the High Sea Fleet would have been sunk, but if it had been, we also should have lost probably say 16 of our battlefleet to the German Dreadnoughts, and two more to their 6 pre-Dreadnoughts—we should

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then have lost say 18 out of 28 of our Dreadnoughts. Of what profit would this have been to us? Strategically none. We should have had no greater command of the sea than we had before the battle. True, the Baltic would have been open to us if we cared to risk further losses by mine and submarines in those tortuous, narrow and shallow channels. But what could we have done? A landing on the open coast, dear to the heart of Lord Fisher, could at best have been but a feint. True, our Allies would have been heartened—but then the whole of the Naval energy of Germany would have been thrown into the submarine campaign and destroyer attack on the English Channel and our East Coast shipping. Against this we could have released the Grand Fleet auxiliary craft; but it is doubtful if we should not have been worse off rather than better off. Some 20,000 more lives would have been lost on each side, and a useless and bloody page written in the Naval history of the two countries.

If, on the other hand, the battle, as is most likely, had developed into a running fight, then only a percentage of the German ships would have been lost and probably an equal, or even greater, number on our part would have been sunk. The Germans would still have had a fleet "in being" and we should still have been obliged to keep a fleet at Scapa. Again stalemate.

As a matter of fact, after Jutland Sir John suggested the paying off into the reserve of one division of the Grand Fleet, which offer, however, was not accepted by the Admiralty. He felt, in view of the result of the Jutland battle, that our command of the North Sea was absolutely secure even with a reduced battlefleet.

Before the Grand Fleet had even entered Scapa after the battle, the German communiqué claiming a victory at Jutland was released by the Admiralty Censor. This production created doubts and anxiety, while the subsequent statement issued by the Admiralty, coupled with the handling of the situation for the next few days in London, caused the British public to believe that we had suffered a defeat at the hands of the German Fleet. These communiqués will be dealt with more fully later. It is sufficient now merely to mention that they were responsible for the letting loose of a flood of criticism by so-called Naval experts, who had neither the necessary information, nor the insight that should have been a fitting equipment for those who charged themselves with the important

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duty of instructing the British public. Added to this came private letters from officers and men in the fleet who had seen, as through blinkers, only that minute part of the action which was visible from their own ships.

Lord Jellicoe has left on record his views of these criticisms. He wrote :

“ Before it is possible for anyone to realize the difficulties which confronted me as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet at the Battle of Jutland, it is essential for a clear idea to be formed and continually kept in view, of the two main factors, to which those difficulties were entirely due.

These two factors were :

(1) The absence of even approximately correct information from the battle cruisers and their attendant light cruisers regarding the position, formation, and strength of the High Sea Fleet.

(2) The lack of visibility when the battlefleet came in sight of a portion of the High Sea Fleet, due largely to mist and partly to the unavoidable smoke of our own battle cruisers.

None of my critics, nor those responsible for the compilation of the Admiralty narrative of the battle, nor those who attempted to reply to my observations in that narrative, appear to have realized, in the least degree, the extent to which the factors mentioned above affected my handling of the fleet during the two hours that followed the meeting of the Grand Fleet and the High Sea Fleet.

I find it quite an easy matter to point to movements which I should have ordered had even a fraction of the information at (1) been before me, but on the other hand I find it exceedingly difficult to state that *without further information* I should have acted differently.”

He further mentions a consideration that has previously escaped notice, but which in May, 1916, was very important ; for clouds which might well develop into war clouds were at that time hovering over the Western horizon.

“ One circumstance was in my mind throughout the action, but which (under advice) I did not refer to in my book *The Grand Fleet*, as being at the time of its publication a delicate subject. This was the possibility of the United States of America coming into the War on the side of our opponents, a possibility which increased the desirability of not running unnecessary risks with the Grand Fleet. In the early part of 1916 our relations with the United States were, owing to questions of blockade, becoming distinctly strained. The United States Government had appointed a Naval Board to report

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upon the question as to whether it was necessary, as stated by us, to take merchant vessels into harbour for examination. Our contention was that the submarine danger rendered it impossible to stop ships at sea for a sufficient period to carry out the examination. The United States Naval Board reported that there was no justification for ships being brought into harbour, as the examination *could* be carried out at sea. The report had been sent to me for remark, and of course I disagreed entirely with the conclusion arrived at. I had also been informed, both by the Foreign Office and Mr. Page, the United States Ambassador, that the relations between the two countries on the blockade question were in a very strained condition. Hence there was reason to fear the outcome of this position, and reasonable caution was a necessity."

Lord Jellicoe then quotes passages from British and United States despatches on which he based his views, but which cannot be reproduced here. One from another source will suffice :

Mr. Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, U.S.A., in his published memoirs wrote :

"The British have only the stupidity of the Germans to thank for saving them from having a very serious situation develop in their relations with this country (U.S.A.) in the spring of 1916."

But to return to the critics. As a result of the disappointment felt at the outcome of the battle, and the several communiqués, criticisms became insistent, with the result that five points were seized on and used as evidence that Sir John had failed as Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet.

These were :

(1) That Sir John should have raced down south with the fastest portion of his battlefleet, when at 4.33 he received information that the German Battle Fleet were at sea.

(2) That the Grand Fleet should have been deployed on the Western instead of the Eastern Division.

(3) That on seeing the enemy turn away at 6.42 p.m. he should have turned towards them and chased.

(4) The turn away to avoid torpedo attack at 7.20 was condemned in no measured terms.

(5) That the Grand Fleet should have been off the Horns Reef Passage at dawn.

The critics gave little heed to the adverse conditions met with by Sir John during the different phases of the battle, especially the variable mist which formed a matrix in which the smoke of

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the ships hung persistently like a pall obscuring sure vision. They discounted the disadvantages of the lateness of the hour of contact ; for one hour more of daylight would have spelled victory either at dusk that night or at daylight the next morning. They did not appreciate the effect of the jamming of wireless signals throughout the dark hours, nor did they know of the curious practice of the Admiralty in their methods of passing information to the Commander-in-Chief.

They, in their armchairs, never pictured the difficulties which confronted Sir John as he stood on the bridge of the *Iron Duke*, in mist and darkness, contending with limited vision, and disentangling the truth from conflicting reports ; had their views been more judicial and less hurried, criticism might well have been turned into eulogy at the way in which these troubles were dealt with and difficulties overcome. However, since the criticisms have been made they must be answered.

As regards (1).

Sir John's business as Commander-in-Chief was to fight an action maintaining command of the sea, but not to gamble. The interval of time between 4.40 p.m. and 6 p.m. is one hour and twenty minutes. The difference in speed between his fast and his slow ships may be taken as being $1\frac{1}{2}$ knots. If Sir John had rushed on with his faster ships they would have gained only two miles over the slow ones and his fleet would have been disorganized and in a higgledy-piggledy formation due to general chase. But it is interesting to note that, while Sir John would have been wrong to rush pell-mell towards the German battlefleet with his fast ships, leaving the slower ones to follow as best they might ; and while, as we have seen, Sir David Beatty was wrong when he acted in a similar manner ; yet Admiral Scheer was perfectly right in rushing on to the northwards with his fast *König* class, and leaving his slower ships behind. The reason for the same tactic being right in one case and wrong in both the others was that Sir John expected to fight a battle in which it was both strategically and tactically unwise to risk any chance, or to give the enemy the slightest advantage. If he did not have his full strength at hand at the moment of meeting the enemy his units might be beaten piecemeal. In the case of Sir David nothing, not even a single minute, would have been lost by concentrating ; but everything was risked, and much lost by not doing so.

With Admiral Scheer it was different. He at last had fallen

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in with the 5th Battle Squadron, a small detachment of the Grand Fleet, equal in number and not much superior in speed to his *König* class. It was his business to fight these, and to damage them as much as he possibly could. If he did not chase with his fastest ships he stood no chance of engaging the enemy. He was therefore perfectly right to chase. But Sir John would have been wrong to have done so.

The second criticism has been already dealt with in the description of the battle. Sir John's masterly and unexpected deployment on the Eastern Division on a S.E. by E. course at once raised him to the first rank as a Naval tactician.

It is impossible to emphasize too often how skilled an admiral should be, and how sound should be his tactics in these days when ships are mere mobile steel castles floating on treacherous water, carrying on board large stores of high explosives, defended by what must often be inadequate armour, and their bottoms exposed to under-water attack. Tactical skill is more essential to an admiral now than it was in the days of the old wooden sailing line-of-battleships.

We can take the results of the accidents to the battle cruisers as an example of what might have happened to the battleships, for a most important consideration arises out of the accidents to the magazines of the battle cruisers. The arrangements for the supply of cordite from the magazines to the guns was exactly the same in the battleships as in the battle cruisers. There was, therefore, no reason, if the front armour of the turrets of a battleship (always a weak spot) had been penetrated by a shell which burst inside the turret, why the cordite flash should not have been communicated to the magazine in the same way as was the case in the battle cruisers. Fortunately damage to our battleships was minimized by the tactics employed by Sir John, whereby the fire of several of our ships was concentrated on a single ship of the enemy. This upset the fire of the enemy and caused it to be erratic. The result was, that our battleships were, when in action, under a rather inefficient fire from the enemy's guns. But had our fleet been commanded by a less skilled or more rash admiral, we should most probably have suffered severe losses from the cause that reduced the strength of the Battle Cruiser Squadron, which in the earlier engagement had lost 33 per cent. of their number. We had 28 Dreadnought battleships to the German 16. Two, the *Marlborough* and *Warspite*, were disabled; this made the relative

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strength 16 to 26. Suppose Sir John Jellicoe by faulty manœuvring or undue optimism had lost 33 per cent. of his ships, our Dreadnought strength would have been reduced to 18 against the German 16. It is well to bear this in mind so as to appreciate to the full how fortunate it was for us that the Grand Fleet was manœuvred in so sound a manner during the battle, whereby all gambling with chance was avoided.

As regards the third criticism, that of not closing and chasing the German Fleet when it disappeared at 6.42 p.m. after their turn away, it is sufficient to quote Sir John's own words :

"I imagined this disappearance of the enemy to be due merely to the thickening of the mist, but after a few minutes had elapsed it became clear that there must be some other reason and at 6.44 I hauled up one point to south-east and at 6.55 four more points to south, signalling at the same time to Sir Cecil Burney (*Marlborough*, 6th Division) to ask if he could see any of the enemy's battle-ships and receiving a reply in the negative. At this time the visibility, as stated in my official despatch, was about 12,000 yards, but the light was extremely baffling. These conditions were ideal for an attack by enemy destroyers, and it was also quite possible that mines might be dropped by the enemy's light cruisers in rear of the retiring fleet. The danger from submarines under the special circumstances of our meeting with the High Sea Fleet was not considered to be great. Lastly, the direction in which the enemy had retired was not known. For these reasons it was advisable to move further to the south-eastward before attempting a large closing movement."

This gives in the clearest possible manner the argument for the enveloping sweep.

As for the fourth criticism, which deals with Sir John's turn-away of four points, 45° in all, to avoid torpedo attack, we have already shown that by the turn-away he saved several of his ships from being hit by some of the 32 torpedoes fired at the fleet, a number which he had every reason to expect would have been greatly exceeded. The *Marlborough*, already hit by one torpedo and listed over, eluded three torpedoes ; the *Revenge* swerved vigorously and saw one torpedo pass only ten yards from her bow, while another passed equally close under her stern ; the *Hercules* and the *Agincourt* put their helms over sharply and sheered 60° out of the line. A torpedo was seen to pass between the *Iron Duke* and the *Thunderer*. The *Colossus* dodged another, the *Revenge*

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swerved again. These torpedoes were actually seen, all of which must have hit and incapacitated six of the battleships if their beam and not their sterns had been exposed to the attack. But there were certainly other torpedoes which passed and were not noticed. Further, the 2nd, 5th and 7th German destroyer divisions were unable to attack our fleet owing to the turn-away. Indeed, our battlefleet strength might well have been reduced to that of the High Sea Fleet had Sir John not defeated the attack by the sound tactic of turning away.

It has been argued that, because no ships were struck by torpedoes, there had been no danger in the torpedo attack, and that the Commander-in-Chief had taken a needless and rather pusillanimous precaution. These critics have failed to appreciate the simple fact that it was because of the tactic of the Commander-in-Chief that the menace of the attack was annulled; and that had these precautions not been taken, then the forecast of competent tacticians might well have been verified in a manner very unfortunate for us. The happenings of 7.20 were exactly those which had been foretold by far-seeing Naval officers: viz., that an enemy sore pressed would take advantage of his torpedo equipment to hold up his adversary's advance by the dire threat of fatal losses. In a very practical manner indeed did the torpedo come into its own in the Great Battle, and justify the reasons for its existence as an adjunct to the gun-armament of modern fleets.

As regards the fifth criticism we have shown the obscure position, regarding the intentions of the enemy, in which Admiral Jellicoe was placed owing to the information of his own ships being diametrically opposed to that received from the Admiralty, and owing also to the failure of the Admiralty to pass on to him, in full, a large part of the information that had been received by them from the deciphered signals of the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet. We have also shown that Sir David Beatty was as convinced as his chief that the enemy were to the westward for the whole of the night.

When, however, we review the battle with the detachment due to the lapse of time, we are forced to the conclusion that not only have the criticisms set out in the aforementioned five points been fully answered, but that two other points on which no word of criticism has hitherto been passed are open to debate.

The first is, whether Sir John Jellicoe was justified in insinuating at night his fleet between the enemy's ships and their nearest

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point of entrance to the German harbours? Was the boldness of this act justified?

The second is, was Sir John justified in seeking a battle in the morning off the Horns Reef?

Regarding the first of these queries, if Sir John's action is judged purely from the point of view of moves on a strategical and tactical board, the answer must be that he was not justified. For two things must be remembered. First, that Admiral Scheer had six pre-Dreadnoughts in his fleet, and at night-time each of these was able to tackle a Dreadnought and might torpedo her before being sunk. If he could have exchanged these for six British Dreadnoughts (that is, if they could, even though themselves disabled, have put six of our Dreadnoughts out of action by close range torpedo fire) we, with the *Marlborough* and the *Warspite* already disabled, would in an action on the following day, have had only the superiority of some four Dreadnoughts. A torpedo attack during the night might well have reduced, or even reversed, this superiority, or, as shown in the battle-cruiser action, one or more lucky salvoes might have doomed an equal number of ships.¹

In the second place although the Admiral of the weaker fleet had the inestimable advantage of selecting the day on which to give battle to our fleet (which enabled him to have every ship tuned up to battle pitch, and every auxiliary craft on the sea or in the air in a state of preparedness), yet the Commander-in-Chief of the stronger fleet, and the one having the greater *cruising* speed (that is, our Grand Fleet) had the advantage of choosing the time of day for the battle, or rather had the advantage of avoiding such times during the twenty-four hours as were disadvantageous to the encounter. He also could avoid any locality where our damaged ships might have found themselves in a position of danger at the end of the action. This most important point has been completely overlooked by the critics of the battle.

The Grand Fleet was supreme at sea, and would remain so until challenged and beaten by the High Sea Fleet. We were, in fact, in the position of the holders of a championship trophy, the trophy being the command of the sea. There was no need for us to hunt out aspirants to the title, nor to fight them at a disadvan-

¹ It is interesting to note that throughout the night the German destroyers hunted for our fleet, but they never found it. They never believed that our fleet would continue steering to the southward close to their fleet during the night.

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tage. We were in a position to say : " If you wish to wrest from us our title and the tremendous advantages that go with it, come out and we will meet you at the time of day and in a place which suits us. You can do no harm until you have met us and beaten us at the place and time which we will choose."

This was the sound and scientific and safe way of treating the Central Powers at sea. But it was not the way the British nation regarded with favour. Nothing short of sweeping the High Sea Fleet off the seas, when and whenever they might have been met, would have satisfied them. No Admiral in the position of Admiral Jellicoe could, in 1916, having in view public opinion, have retired his fleet from a position masking the main passage of entry of the High Sea Fleet into its harbour merely because night had fallen on the two fleets, and because darkness brought with it the possibility of a peculiarly dangerous form of attack.

Both strategically and tactically it was sound to do so ; psychologically, it was practically impossible. Had the Admirals been merely playing a war game, the correct procedure would have been followed ; but the ignorance of the British public where sea matters are concerned, and their love of sensation and deeds of glory, impelled a risk which it may well be argued was tactically and strategically unjustifiable.

The same class of argument applies to Admiral Jellicoe's action in seeking to cut off the German Fleet at the Horns Reef on the morning of the 1st of June. The Horns Reef was no place to select to fight a battle on which the command of the sea might depend. The battlefield was flanked by minefields and no less than 300 miles from the nearest English base, while the enemy's fleet was only 120 miles from their harbour. Had the fleets met in the early grey of a breaking dawn, when the light was still treacherous, and with a visibility varying from 2,000 to 6,000 yards, the Grand Fleet, with its destroyers absent, and disorganized by the encounters of the previous night, might have been at a serious disadvantage, and after the action any damaged ships might have been difficult to salve from the neighbouring minefields. Why, then, deliberately place a fleet at so manifest a disadvantage when no real material object was to be gained ? The answer is, that public opinion and the ardour of the officers and men of the Fleet demanded such an action. Psychology was dominant and overruled all other considerations.

A Commander-in-Chief often has to be, certainly he should be, a great dam to public opinion, a check on the overflowing zeal

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of those under him, and a wet blanket on that gallantry which heedlessly runs unjustifiable risks. The individual fighter does not appreciate how very small is the part that his ship, and those near him, play in a great naval battle. His range of vision is very limited. The Commander-in-Chief has to take into account not only the tactics of the whole fleet, but also the whole strategy of the War, and still further the psychology of his officers and men, his fellow-countrymen and their allies. Moreover, the position of the Commander-in-Chief holding the command of the sea is infinitely more difficult, and his policy liable to be much more unpopular, than that of the Commander-in-Chief of the weaker "fleet in being," who can undertake heroic risks and is able legitimately to play a bolder and more popular rôle in a great war.

These are points which should be appreciated and kept in view when discussing the tactics of a modern Armageddon on the sea ; and judged by them, the conduct of Admiral Jellicoe, our Commander-in-Chief at the Battle of Jutland, must not only find complete justification but be awarded the highest commendation and praise.

POSTSCRIPT I

Two matters require a few words of explanation, namely :

(1) Why three of our battle cruisers blew up. (2) Whether the damage done by our armour-piercing shells was as great as that inflicted on our ships by those of the Germans. As regards (1), critics have suggested that our cordite was inflammable. Of course it was ! It would not be of much use as a propellant if it were not inflammable. These ships were, in all probability, lost by the charges in the gun-house becoming ignited by a bursting shell and the flash being communicated to charges in the magazine. Between the gun-house and the magazine there was a train of cartridges constantly moving up to the gun-house. If the charges in the gun-house became ignited, an enormous volume of incandescent gas was generated very rapidly. If the gas could not find an exit of sufficient area to the outside of the turret, the pressure inside the turret rose and of necessity the gas was forced backwards down the hoists and into the magazine if the door was open, igniting any charges it might meet *en route*. If a sufficient pressure of gas developed in the magazine the cases containing the cordite stowed there would inevitably be crushed in, the charges would be exposed and a terrific explosion would

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occur, for the difference between a charge burning and exploding is purely a matter of the *rate* at which the charge burns. In the open, a charge burns slowly and the pressure is dissipated, under pressure it is instantly converted into gas and an enormous pressure is generated.

The reason why we lost cruisers from this cause and the Germans did not is easily explained. The large ships of both fleets had the same system of supply, but the Germans, owing to the use by them of the Krupp breech mechanism, were obliged to keep most of the charge in the case of 11-inch guns, and half of the charges of their large guns, in brass cases ; also the primer of black powder which was used to ignite the charges was at the bottom of the brass case well protected from flash. The front, that is the exposed portion of the charge, required no primer, and was double bagged ; and, on the latest patterns, enclosed in a metallic envelope. Thus the German charges could not burn rapidly if ignited, and explosion did not result. With us the whole of the charges were packed in silk bags and each had its own primer ; ignition was, therefore more easily communicated by flash. This of itself was not the main determining cause between the difference in loss of ships in the two navies. Luck stepped in against us and in favour of the Germans. At the battle of the Dogger Bank, in the *Seydlitz*, a charge caught fire in a turret and the flash penetrated to the magazine. It was only by flooding the magazine, incidentally drowning the magazine personnel, that the ship was saved. We had no such experience. The Germans were warned, we were not ; the Germans took steps to deal with the danger, a danger of which we remained unaware. Consequently, when Jutland was fought the German ships were fortified against such disasters, whereas every one of our ships, battleships as well as battle cruisers, were open to the dread disaster that came to the *Queen Mary*, the *Invincible* and the *Indefatigable*. Needless to say that after Jutland steps were taken—the same steps as a matter of fact that the Germans had already taken—to prevent a recurrence of similar accidents.

As regards the damage inflicted by shell. There is little doubt that the German armour-piercing shells were superior to ours when striking armour at an oblique angle. Sir John Jellicoe when Controller of the Navy in 1910, as a result of the firings he initiated in that year against H.M.S. *Edinburgh*, gave instructions for the ordnance committee to investigate the problem of the better penetration

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of our shell at oblique impact. However, after he left the controllership and took up a sea-going command, the matter was not pushed on with energy. After Jutland, and especially after he became First Sea Lord, he renewed the investigation with vigour ; so that the problem was completely solved in 1917, with regard both to the shell and their bursters. Consequently by October, 1918, when the German Fleet put to sea, but refused to face a second Jutland, 12,000 new and thoroughly efficient shells were in the shell-room of the Grand Fleet—a fine performance and one reflecting considerable credit on all concerned.

POSTSCRIPT II

FROM Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, First Sea Lord. June 3, 1916 :

“Four¹ of their battleships are going to Kiel for repairs. *Seydlitz* is on shore outside the Barrier No. 9 buoy, Wilhelmshaven, and others have plenty of damages. They won't publish them and claim a great deal more than they got, and we cannot ² contradict them. They tried to hide the loss of the *Elbing* and did all they could to find the boat with her survivors. As far as we can see the *Von der Tann* is their only battle cruiser fit for service and they are using battleships for outpost duties with their 4th Scouting Group. . . . Very sorry for the loss of so many people of the very first class. I hope you are not tired out. I much appreciate the way you stuck to it all night in their waters.”

POSTSCRIPT III

As might have been expected, there was no doubt in the minds of the most experienced senior officers, some retired, as to the result of the battle, as is clearly shown by the following extracts from their letters addressed to Sir John Jellicoe, written when misrepresentation was at its height, some before and some after the Jutland Despatch had been published.

It is worth while to note that the congratulations came from men of vastly differing attainments and experience. For instance, Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, a Naval historian learned in the past :

“June 9th. I have waited . . . before sending you my hearty and admiring congratulations on your victory. It was splendid,

¹ Increased in letter of the 7th to six.

² For fear of disclosing extent of our intercepts.

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and in all the glorious history of our great Service has never been surpassed. Never was there shown on the sea greater skill, courage and coolness than in your Grand Fleet in the late sea fight."

And again :

"The so-called Jutland papers have been published to-day in *The Times*, or at least an important part of them. I have read that part carefully twice over. My perusal of them has only confirmed the view which I have long held, viz. that your conduct in the battle was in every way admirable. It came up to if it did not surpass anything in our long record of victory. It was the most thorough victory that we have ever won. You defeated not only a particular fleet but a whole Navy. Your foresight at the beginning of the war was fully justified. We throughout the British Empire ought to be thankful that it was to you to whom the Grand Fleet was entrusted."

Admiral Arthur M. Farquhar wrote :

"Yours is indeed a difficult and terribly responsible position. Thankful I am that the security of the country is in such cool and capable hands."

Admiral Lord Beresford was not behindhand in praise :

"Now that I have read your despatches and know the facts you will please allow me to tell you of the pride and admiration I feel for you and my old brother officers also the men under your command, so many of whom I was proud to command in days gone by. You command the sea, but you cannot command the weather. If you had done so not a single German ship would have returned to port. Your manœuvring strategy and tactics were superb."

Admiral Sir Michael Culme-Seymour, June 9, in his day one of the finest of our admirals and handlers of a fleet that our Navy possessed, wrote :

"I cannot help sending you a line of congratulation on the late fight and say what a pleasure it gave me to see my old friend doing so well. I am afraid you must feel a shade of disappointment you did not get the whole lot but that was from all I gather owing not only to their bolting at once, but to a very great degree—if not entirely—to the thick weather, which was sheer bad luck. I am told that the way you commanded the fleet both before, during, and after the battle, was splendid, as I knew it would be, and I look forward to your despatch."

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Admiral Sir Robert Lowry on June 12 :

"I most warmly congratulate you on a victory which only night and the chances of escape which darkness gives prevented being a most complete one. Every day seems to bring out how much more decisive it was than our native modesty at first led us to claim."

Admiral Sir William May, who had commanded the Home Fleet—an admiral of high attainments.—July 7 :

"I must send you a few lines to congratulate you on the result of the Naval battle, and your sweeping the enemy off the sea. . . . Well, I hope the Germans will soon give you another chance and if they will only fight it out I am sure you will wipe them out."

Lord Selborne, who had been First Lord of the Admiralty from 1900 to 1905.—June 7 :

"The most glorious traditions of the Navy were upheld in the battle of May 31st and I can only express my great sorrow at the loss of so many splendid officers and men and condole with the Grand Fleet that the German Fleet was able to evade you and escape in the haze and darkness . . . May God keep you and strengthen you."

The members of his Staff were also full of admiration. Commodore Lionel Halsey, the Captain of the Fleet, wrote on June 8 :

"I can only say that no words of mine can express what we all feel for him, absolute admiration and the most perfect confidence. His work and responsibility during the last 8 days have been more colossal than ever, but it appears to make no difference to him and I can't imagine any man on this earth who could compete with it all as he does."

Admiral Sir Charles Madden, Chief of the Staff :

". . . it was a considerable victory in spite of great difficulties ; and the part of the Fleet which was under his immediate control was handled as only a ' Master ' could have done and all so quietly and with so much consideration for all in touch with him and under his command."

The last extract is from a letter written by Sir James Thursfield, the doyen of Naval Press Correspondents, a man who had earned the regard and esteem of all Naval officers with whom he had come in contact. It is a great pity he was not a younger

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man at the time of the Great War and that he had not been with Sir John Jellicoe as a representative of the British press accredited by the Admiralty on board the *Iron Duke*. On July 16 he wrote :

“I hope it is not too late for me to offer you my very hearty congratulations on the brilliant handling and splendid fighting of the fleet’s squadrons and flotillas under your command in the ever-memorable action of 31st May off the Jutland Bank. I have waited to digest the despatches before writing, because, as experience has shown, nothing is more mischievous or more misleading than to form premature appreciations of what has happened before the true facts are known. I am sorry there was some misapprehension when the first accounts were published, but that I attribute to the profound ignorance of naval warfare and its issues in which the British Public is contented to dwell. Every one ought to have understood from the very outset that, however heavy and deplorable our losses might have been, an enemy who abandons his objective and hurries back into port is an enemy who is so far beaten and demoralized.

Your admirable despatch seems to me, if I may say so, to do justice to every one but yourself. I am merely a student and an outsider, but I think I know enough of naval evolutions to perceive that the critical point, and most critical it was, of the whole day’s proceedings was the joining up of the Grand Fleet with the Battle Cruiser Fleet in the face of the enemy, already engaged with the latter. It was inevitable of course that you should not be able to tell us how it was done. But when we do know, as I hope we shall some day, I feel convinced that this series of evolutions will be adjudged to be one of the most brilliant and intrepid that has ever been carried out by any British Admiral in action. I can only think of Quiberon Bay and of Nelson at St. Vincent in comparison.”

It is very interesting to see how a civilian who, however, for the greater part of his life had dealt with sea matters and had accompanied ships from the very inception of naval manœuvres, should have put his finger on the deployment of the fleet as the most critical moment of the whole of the battle.

On the day of Lord Jellicoe’s funeral a brilliant writer ¹ ended a tribute with these words :

“Seventeen years ago steamed the German Navy in surrender. Seventeen years ago this very week.

Jellicoe was not there to see it. But he knew then that he had

¹ Mr. Gordon Beckles, in the *Daily Express*.

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been right at Jutland, that the blockade was what mattered, not the battering of a few German Battle Cruisers at risk of his own.

He knew—even then—that wars are not won nowadays with a single dashing battle.

Not that he said much about it ; nor wrote best-selling books about it ; nor revealed how the politicians, in their infinite wisdom, told him how to go about the job.

No, he preferred to be a seaman first, and an idol second, he was a man of distinguished courage.

He was a hero.

But it is almost a tradition to treat our Admirals with fickle justice—in life.

Thank God the British Nation has had the sense and decency to lay Jellicoe beside Nelson—in death.”

CHAPTER XXI

Grand Fleet Jutland to November, 1916

AFTER the rumour reached England that a battle had been fought it was only natural that public excitement and anticipation should run high. The country, fed from youth up with accounts of the victories in the old French wars, believed firmly that when once the Grand Fleet and the High Sea Fleet met, the latter would be wiped out. Nor were these exaggerated views in any way corrected by the utterances of our leading politicians during the early stages of the War. For instance, Mr. Winston Churchill, when First Lord of the Admiralty, with an optimism which flowed over the narrow margins of possible achievement, stated publicly that if the German Fleet persisted in remaining in harbour we would dig the ships out like rats from their holes, in spite of the fact that it was quite impossible for us to exercise any pressure that would have forced the High Sea Fleet to put to sea, short of our Army taking the land defences of their naval ports and turning their guns on the ships taking refuge therein, as had happened at Port Arthur. It would have been incalculably more enlightening to the nation and helpful to the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, if, in all public utterances, our leading politicians had stressed the fact that the choice of the day that the High Sea Fleet would put to sea, if ever it did, lay entirely with the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet ; and that the place and time of day at which any battle would be fought, however disadvantageous, would be a matter outside the choice of the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, since public opinion would demand that an action be fought even if the conditions happened to be somewhat unfavourable ; also that the number of hours of daylight that were available would largely influence the outcome of the battle. The British public, therefore, were totally unprepared for any news but that of a sweeping victory. Such was the state of public opinion when the following German com-

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muniqué was released by the Press Censor about noon on June 2, just two hours before Sir John arrived at Scapa with the Grand Fleet.

“During an enterprise directed northward, our High Sea Fleet encountered on May 31st the main part of the English fighting fleet, which was considerably superior to our own forces. During the afternoon a series of heavy engagements developed between the Skagerrak and the Horns Reef which were successful for us and which continued throughout the night.

In these engagements, so far as has been learnt at present, the large British battleship *Warspite* and the battle cruisers *Queen Mary* and *Indefatigable* were destroyed, as were two armoured cruisers apparently of the *Achilles* type, one light cruiser, the new destroyer leaders *Turbulent*, *Nestor* and *Acasta*, a large number of destroyers and one submarine.

Through observations beyond challenge it is known that a large number of English battleships suffered damage from our ships' artillery and from the attacks of our torpedo boat flotillas during the day and night engagements. Among others the large battleship *Marlborough* was struck by a torpedo as has been confirmed by prisoners. Several of our ships rescued portions of the crews of sunken English ships among them being the only two survivors of the *Indefatigable*. On our side the light cruiser *Wiesbaden* was sunk by hostile artillery during fire during the day engagements, and the *Pommern* during the night by a torpedo. The fate of the *Frauenlob*, which is missing, and some torpedo boats which have not yet returned, is unknown. The High Sea Fleet returned to our ports during the day.”

The account suppressed, and quite rightly from the German point of view, all losses which were unknown to their enemy. The loss of the *Lützow* and three more light cruisers should have been added to the list. Moreover, the statement that the High Sea Fleet returned to harbour *during the day*, although perfectly true, hid the fact that they had escaped from our fleet under cover of the night. To the man in the street the communiqué seemed to describe the defeat of the Grand Fleet. It was, of course, broadcasted by the Germans to the world. Throughout the War the Germans, whether in Europe, in the East, or on the American continent, placed high hopes in their propaganda, which was intended to convince the world at large that they were winning the War. The Jutland communiqué was possibly their smartest action in this respect, for so cleverly was it worded that it carried

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conviction to millions of men and women who knew nothing of naval warfare. The Admiralty censor was in a difficult position when the report reached London while the Grand Fleet was still at sea. He took advice of his superiors and held it up for twenty-four hours, after which time it was certain that the German report would arrive in the country from Continental sources. Further holding up would, therefore, be worse than publication.

The German report was issued from the Admiralty to the British Press about two hours or so before the Grand Fleet arrived at Scapa. If it created doubt and distrust in the British eyes what must have been its effect in other countries? The fact is that the Germans lost the Battle of Jutland but won a world-wide success when their version of the meaning of the events of May 31 was issued by our Admiralty without any suggestion that it concealed the fundamental point—that they had returned to their home ports as quickly as possible, leaving the Grand Fleet in command of the North Sea and all the Seas.

The Admiralty was naturally anxious to issue as soon as possible its own account of the battle, and eagerly pressed Sir John Jellicoe for a statement of what had happened, from the Grand Fleet's point of view. It was obviously impossible for Sir John to give full particulars of the battle until he had received reports from the various units which were only just arriving at their respective home ports. He had however telegraphed at 10.30 a.m. on June 2, before anchoring, a short summary of our losses; and at 7.10 p.m. he supplemented this and gave a list of vessels he considered the Germans had lost. At 11.30 p.m. he telegraphed a brief account of the fight. At 7 p.m. on June 2—that is, before receiving Sir John's account—the Admiralty issued a communiqué.

Before reading this document it is advisable to recall the personalities of those responsible for its issue. Mr. Arthur Balfour was First Lord of the Admiralty, a man with one of the most acute brains in England, one who could divide a hair in debate with marvellous dialectic skill, a philosopher and metaphysician, but one who had never been a success as a practical party politician. He had no aptitude for understanding the mentality of his countrymen, nor of making an appeal to the masses. It was on account of the lack of these qualities that his term of Premiership had resulted in disaster to the Unionist Party, who for the following ten years were relegated to the back benches.

Admiral Sir Henry Jackson was First Sea Lord, very able, a

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good sea officer, brilliantly clever, but again essentially a scientist, a man of minute accuracy of statement and thought.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson, who was holding special office at the Admiralty, was a man of bold thoughts and deeds, who disliked publicity and the Press, and spurned, rather than heeded, public opinion.

Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver was Chief of the Naval Staff, again thoroughly sound, but possessing no gift of popular appeal. He was most certainly not a publicist.

Naturally, therefore, a communiqué issued from such sources would be certain to be pedantically accurate, but it would also be without much vision or popular appeal. It was a thousand pities that the issue of the communiqué fell to this quartette. In his palmy days Lord Fisher was the man to issue such a statement—accurate, yet every word putting the battle and its outcome in the proper light. Or better still, Mr. Churchill, a man of vivid imagination and true political instincts.

Here is the Admiralty publication, a most unfortunately worded statement, which, when read by the man in the street, seemed to confirm the German report of a victory for their fleet.

“On the afternoon of May 31st a naval engagement took place off the coast of Jutland. The British ships on which the brunt of the fighting fell were the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and some cruisers and light cruisers supported by four fast battleships. Among these the losses were heavy. The German battlefleet, aided by low visibility, avoided prolonged action with our main forces, and soon after these appeared on the scene the enemy returned to port, though not before receiving severe damage from our battleships. The battle cruisers *Queen Mary*, *Indefatigable*, *Invincible*, and the cruisers *Defence* and *Black Prince* were sunk. The *Warrior* was disabled and after being towed for some time had to be abandoned by her crew. It is also known that the destroyers *Tipperary*, *Turbulent*, *Fortune*, *Sparrowhawk* and *Ardent* were lost and six others not yet accounted for. No British battleships or light cruisers were sunk. The enemy's losses were serious. At least one battle cruiser was destroyed, one battleship reported sunk by our destroyers at night, two light cruisers were disabled and probably sunk. The exact number of enemy destroyers disposed of during the action cannot be ascertained with any certainty but it must have been large.”

The result of the issue of this document was to confirm the opinion created by the German communiqué that we had suffered

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a serious defeat. Not unnaturally, the ordinary reader believed that the Admiralty had made the best of the matter, and that more lay behind the statement than appeared on its surface. They never believed that the Admiralty had made the worst of the battle. It even confirmed the belief of the Germans themselves that they had gained a victory, a belief which is still firmly held by the whole of the German nation.

Disillusionment and bitter disappointment reigned throughout the country, where really universal rejoicing should have prevailed.

Unfortunately, Sir John Jellicoe had a deep-rooted aversion from publicity. He had noticed how, in the last year of Sir John Fisher's tenure of office at the Admiralty, the wise publicity that had characterized his early policy had, by the end of 1910, grown out of control ; he had marked how the opposition of Lord Charles Beresford to the Board of Admiralty, in 1908, had been championed by one section of the Press, while Sir John Fisher was the idol of the opposite section. This paper warfare had led to violent recrimination which unfortunately found its echo in the Navy. Hence, Sir John Jellicoe would have none of it. It is easy to sympathize with and to honour his highly correct point of view, but every practical man who lives in the limelight should recognize the immense educative effect that the Press has on the multitude, and that a regulated connexion with the Press is of great value in directing public opinion into proper channels and preventing false ideas from taking root.

Sir David Beatty had with him, on board the *Lion*, a friend, who, if not actually a press correspondent, yet wielded an able pen. But no writer or correspondent who was not in the Fleet Flagship, in close touch with the Commander-in-Chief, could write with full authority, or be in a position to explain the tactics and record the strategical results following on the battle. Further, no one who was on board a cruiser, during the battlefleet action, even the flagship of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, could obtain anything more than a slight conception of a battle fought over so large an area ; moreover, his perspective would perforce be restricted, and have its point of view centred on the doings of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and not on those of the fleet as a whole. This constriction would, without fail, affect his writings both at the time and after the battle. If Sir John had had on board the *Iron Duke* one of the many reputable correspondents who wrote on, and had made a study of, naval subjects (a man, say, of the calibre of the late

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Sir James Thursfield), the aid given him at the moment would have been invaluable. Such a correspondent could have written a true and sober account of the battle that would have satisfied the Press and the British public. It would have given, in a general manner, Sir John Jellicoe's aims and objects both before and during the fight, and detailed the success that had been achieved. But this help was denied to the country.

During the afternoon of June 3 the Admiralty received a communication from Sir John, objecting strongly to the communiqué as giving a totally false impression of the battle. A good deal of further trouble would then have been saved if the Admiralty had at once taken the Press into their confidence and given them a lead on the lines of a communiqué issued by them a day or two later, which pointed out how the German Fleet, after being severely punished, had been compelled to seek refuge in their protected waters. But there was no one at the Admiralty wise enough to give the Press such a lead and so stop the campaign of innuendo, criticism, mistrust and suspicion which dominated the Press for weeks to come. Instead of such direct action, the Admiralty floundered yet more deeply, going from bad to worse. Mr. Churchill was called in to write an appreciation of the battle. This he did in his usual able and masterly manner, but the Press was annoyed, their suspicions had been aroused. Why Mr. Churchill? Why not the Press? Could not the Press be trusted? Thus mistrust and doubt were aggravated rather than allayed.

One of Sir John's first acts on returning to Scapa had been to send to the King, on the morning of June 3, a message of humble duty and respectful and heartfelt wishes on His Majesty's birthday. The following reply was received from His Majesty and communicated to the Fleet.

"I am deeply touched by the message you have sent me on behalf of the Grand Fleet. It reaches me on the morrow of a battle which has once more displayed the splendid gallantry of the officers and men under your command. I mourn the loss of brave men, many of them personal friends of my own, who have fallen in their Country's cause. Yet even more do I regret that the German High Sea Fleet, in spite of its heavy losses, was enabled by the misty weather to evade the full consequence of an encounter they have always professed to desire, but for which, when the opportunity arrived, they showed no inclination. Though the retirement of the enemy immediately after the opening of the general engage-

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ment robbed us of the opportunity of gaining a decisive victory, the events of last Wednesday amply justify my confidence in the valour and efficiency of the fleets under your command."

This message was far more than a conventional message of thanks. Coming as it did, at the moment when the wave of depression, owing to the German communiqué and the Admiralty blunder, was percolating through the fleet, it showed that the King felt, the King knew. The keen insight of the King, who had been and ever was a Naval officer, had dispelled the miasma and had assessed the battle at its true worth. Immediately a new feeling of elation swept through the fleet. Their King knew. God save the King.

One unfortunate outcome of all the wretched misunderstanding and recrimination caused by the communiqués was that the blame for the supposed failure of the battle was not only fixed on Sir John Jellicoe's shoulders, but Sir David Beatty came to be looked on as the man who had borne the brunt of the fighting and had not been backed up by his Commander-in-Chief. The signal made in all innocence by Sir David, "submit the van of battleships follow battle cruisers. We can then cut off the whole of the enemy's fleet," was taken to mean that Sir John Jellicoe was at the time keeping away from the German Fleet, while Sir David was egging him on to attack, and that, had Sir David received the backing he had asked for, a victory would have resulted. This fallacy has already been exposed,¹ nor has such an interpretation ever been claimed by Lord Beatty; but the masses were kept in ignorance of the truth.

The net result was that Sir David was extolled and Sir John was awarded the blame for the escape of the German Fleet.

We are reminded of Burke's famous panegyric of Fox :

"He will remember that obloquy is a necessary ingredient in the composition of all true glory : he will remember that it was not only in the Roman custom, but it is in the nature and constitution of things, that calumny and abuse are essential parts of triumph."

Now that the details of the Battle of Jutland have been made public and thoroughly explained by many competent writers, the injustice of the hastily-accorded blame has become fully manifest, and requires no further emphasis. But Sir John never contradicted nor explained. His nobility of character refused to allow him to publish any denial or explanation or to enter on any controversy.

¹ See page 286.

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That the Commander-in-Chief should have been defended from the cruel attack to which he was subjected is undoubted, but this was not done ; so for years the myth persisted, much to the detriment of Sir John's reputation.

In order to give an example of the temptations which assailed Sir John, and which he repelled, it is well to quote from his correspondence with a journalist. On June 9 this journalist wrote to him to the effect that he had been fortunate to obtain from the highest quarters a considerable amount of information regarding the Battle of Jutland, which had helped him in his self-imposed task of enlightening the British public, and asked Sir John to supply him with detailed information on certain matters. He ended by saying that all knowledge of the source of the supply would remain a matter entirely between him and Sir John, and that no one in the Navy, journalism, or politics would ever know from whence the information was derived.

Sir John replied that he was quite ready at the proper moment to deal with criticisms of himself or the actions of others, but that the Press was not the place to meet it in advance, that it was the business of the Admiralty to approve, or if they disapproved, to take the requisite action. He also mentioned that he was sending the letter to Mr. Balfour (the First Lord), so that he could decide what he did, or did not, wish done as to the supply of information to the Press.

In his letter to Mr. Balfour, Sir John said that it was, to his mind, unthinkable that the report of the fleet movements should be communicated in any other way than in an official despatch, and he continued :

"I am not concerned to defend my action in the Press, or to let anyone do it for me. I presume that the Admiralty will express an opinion if such is necessary.

I daresay the journalist in question has done good service in keeping the head of the public straight, and that he will do more in that direction, but I do not desire that there shall be any opportunity for it to be said that I have prompted any writings in the Press ; and I think it infinitely preferable that all the information on the subject that it is desired to give should be given by the Admiralty alone."

On June 6, while the Battle of Jutland was still occupying full attention, the public were staggered by the news that the *Hampshire*, a County class cruiser, had been sunk off the Orkneys, and that

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Lord Kitchener, his Staff—and practically the whole of the ship's company—had been lost. This was the first public intimation that Lord Kitchener was at sea on a mission to Russia, or that he was even meditating leaving England. The full details of this tragic affair were not known until some time after the event, since the reason of the sinking had to be ascertained, and it was doubtful at first if this had been caused by a mine or a submarine. Moreover, a full report involved the disclosure of our mine-sweeping arrangements in the vicinity of Scapa. In the absence of direct evidence, popular opinion inclined towards the submarine, since this harmonized with the sensational belief in spies and the existence of a network of espionage. The most extravagant surmises passed from mouth to mouth. The story, as now known, is perfectly straightforward and simple. But it is one of those curiously unfortunate happenings where Fate seems to have fought hard to bring off a cruel finale, using safeguard after safeguard as a means of causing ultimate disaster.

In the early months of 1916 Lord Kitchener had considered that it was advisable that he should visit Russia in order personally to discuss the supply of munitions and other details with the Russian Government. This was approved by the Cabinet. On May 26 Sir John was informed of the project and told to detail a cruiser to carry the Field-Marshal to Archangel. On the 27th Sir John wired back proposing H.M.S. *Hampshire*. After this date, that is from the 30th onward, this ship was engaged in the Battle of Jutland and only returned to Scapa on June 2. It is quite impossible that the information should have leaked out to Germany regarding the mission or the route to be followed, for the latter was only definitely arranged on the afternoon that the ship left for Archangel with Lord Kitchener on board.

Lord Kitchener arrived at Thurso and there embarked in the destroyer *Oak*, arriving at Scapa on the morning of June 5. He lunched on board the *Iron Duke* with Sir John Jellicoe. A north-easterly gale was blowing, and Sir John suggested to him that he should postpone starting until the weather had moderated. Lord Kitchener was, however, anxious to keep to his dates, since he had allotted a bare three weeks for the whole time of his mission, and preferred to sail at once.

That same afternoon Sir John and his Chief of the Staff, Sir Charles Madden, had a lengthy consultation to enable the former to determine finally the route to be taken. He considered it

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advisable not to send the ship, as originally proposed, outside the islands, on account of the heavy weather. Sir Charles Madden fortunately left on record the points discussed at this momentous consultation. The three possible passages were reviewed from the points of view of safety from minefields laid by surface mine-layers, and from submarine attack. The possibility of mines being laid by a submarine was considered to be negligible, since no submarine had, so far, laid mines north of the Tyne, owing, it was believed, to the fact that the mine-laying submarines did not carry enough oil and had therefore an insufficient radius of action. The White Channel was placed out of court because the weather had prevented adequate sweeping ; and the inshore channel was eventually chosen as the safest, since this passage was constantly under supervision and therefore immune from the attentions of surface mine-layers. Moreover, it was more sheltered in the existing weather. Sir John then told Sir Charles to send for Captain Savill, give him his sailing orders, and inform him that he was to keep 1 to $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles off the shore. This was about 3.30 p.m.

The reasons therefore for finally selecting this particular route were :

(a) With a N.E. wind there would be less sea and therefore more chance of the destroyers being able to keep up with the *Hampshire*.

(b) It was practically impossible for the route to have been mined by a surface mine-layer, owing to the long hours of daylight and the supervision kept over the Channel.

(c) Up to this date no mine-laying by submarines had taken place farther north than the Tyne, presumably owing to their small radius of action.

Evidently the Germans had received information from neutral vessels that the selected channel was being used by our ships. This was true for auxiliaries, but was incorrect so far as men-of-war were concerned. The presence of the German minefield was subsequently verified. It could not, however, have been placed there to entrap the *Hampshire*, because that particular route was not selected until between 3 and 4 p.m. on the day that she sailed. Sir John subsequently stated that nothing more could have been done or other action taken, short of delaying the sailing of the *Hampshire* for two or three days until mine-sweepers could sweep ahead of the ship ; but to such a delay Lord Kitchener, who was working to a three-week programme, would have been loath to consent. Sir John further stated that he did not consider that any

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delay in sailing was necessary, for, with the knowledge at his disposal regarding the enemy's mine-laying possibilities, he would not have hesitated to take the Grand Fleet to sea on the same night by the same route as taken by the *Hampshire*. He therefore did not press Lord Kitchener to delay his sailing ; the suggestion had been made rather from the point of view of comfort than of safety.

At 4.45 the *Hampshire* slipped from her buoy and picked up her two destroyers at 5.45 p.m. By 6 p.m. she had, owing to the gale, reduced her speed to 15 knots. At 6.20 the destroyers could not make more than 10 knots headway, so Captain Savill signalled to them to return to their base—a perfectly sound procedure, since the destroyers were intended merely as a guard against submarine attack, and no submarine could have attacked in the gale that was raging. Between 7.40 and 7.45, after the *Hampshire* had reduced speed to $13\frac{1}{2}$ knots, and all hatches except one had been battened and shored down (for she was taking in heavy seas overall), an explosion occurred. Between ten and twenty minutes after the explosion the ship sank. All except twelve men were drowned. No boats could be lowered owing to the heavy sea that was running. The men who survived were saved by means of Carley floats, which were washed off the upper deck as the ship went down.

The German official history of the War states that Submarine U.75 laid 22 mines in several detached groups off Noup Head as a part of Admiral Scheer's offensive scheme that led up to the Battle of Jutland, and that the minefield was laid on false information that men-of-war were making use of this route. This was the minefield that caused the disaster.

Fate, indeed, was against Lord Kitchener. The links in the fatal chain of events are remarkable.

(a) The minefield was laid as part of the offensive strategy of Admiral Scheer which led up to the Battle of Jutland. Had any week been selected for Lord Kitchener's journey other than the one chosen, the channel would have been free of danger.

(b) The information on which the minefield was laid was false.

(c) This was the first minefield ever laid by a submarine north of the Tyne.

(d) A gale made it inadvisable for the route first selected to be adhered to, for it had not been swept, and was open to mine-laying by surface vessels.

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(e) The same gale prevented the route selected being swept ; but it was safe from mining by surface vessels.

(f) Lord Kitchener's programme did not lend itself to curtailment ; delay in sailing, therefore, would have been inconvenient.

(g) The various routes discussed were safe except the particular one which had been selected because, so far as could be foreseen, it appeared to be the safest.

(h) Had the weather not necessitated sending back the destroyers, a considerable number of lives might have been saved.

So Death stalked its victims and used the scrupulous care and studied prevision of the Commander-in-Chief as stepping-stones to fulfil its fell purpose. If a second cruiser had been provided as an escort, matters would in no way have been improved. The second cruiser would in all probability have been sunk also. All who have had experience of the minefields in war time know the almost useless risk that is incurred by one ship endeavouring to help another that has been mined. Moreover, the fury of the gale would have prevented the saving of many lives.

This disaster came quickly after the disappointment created by the reports on Jutland. Again the British public complained. For, in default of full and clear explanation of the event, it seemed as if someone had blundered. Of course no full explanation could be published at the time, for this would have involved laying bare our mine-sweeping arrangements in the vicinity of Scapa. So again it seemed as if something had been kept back, as if there were behind the statements something more that had not been divulged. Thus the accident came to be looked on as Sir John's fault ; or, if not actually his fault, his negligence ; for, considering the large number of ships that were attached to the Grand Fleet, it seemed as if due care had not been exercised in protecting so valuable a life. Misfortunes, indeed, do not come singly. Sir John felt the loss acutely ; Lord Kitchener had been confided to his care and had lost his life ; but he had no reason to reproach himself ; he had left nothing to chance, the pros and cons had been thoroughly explored, and on the evidence definite action had been taken. Luck in this instance had turned against both Lord Kitchener and Sir John.

In forwarding the report of the Court of Inquiry Sir John added a minute :

"I cannot adequately express the sorrow felt by me personally and by the officers and men of the Grand Fleet generally, that so

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great a man should have lost his life while under the care of the fleet."

Sir Charles Madden, Chief of the Staff, records how this disaster affected Sir John.

"The loss of the *Hampshire* and Lord Kitchener is a great blow ; and we all admire the splendid courage which J. J. showed when he heard of it and since. It positively made me feel sick, and I can't get it out of my head ; seeing the ships blow up on the 31st had no such effect, as that was all in the day's work, but this is different."

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The fleet settled down to its usual North Sea routine : sweeps down south, and gunnery and other practices. In addition, a patrol of the Archangel route was instituted to protect the northern trade from raiders ; and all patrols were strengthened with a view to protecting trade routes.

We get an occasional glimpse of the husband and father, but these are rare.

On 30th June, 1916—"I went to visit the ships at Rosyth last Saturday, and spent the day there. Then to London. At the Admiralty all the time, but we stayed with Mr. Leveson. Gwen [Lady Jellicoe] came with me and had Lucy up from school, much to her delight, whilst I was in London. Lot of business at the Admiralty, and my despatch will, I expect, be issued early next week. The King's visit went off very well indeed. He stayed in the *Iron Duke*. . . .

I took Gwen and Lucy to the Exhibition of National Economy one morning on my way to the Admiralty. The Queen was opening it. I did not mean the Queen to see me, but she arrived whilst I was talking to the Committee, and I was caught. She talked to me for some time. Lucy was presented and did a very good 'bob.' It is the anniversary of our wedding day to-morrow, Mother dear. I shall see Gwen and the children. They are all well, but Prudy had a little teeth trouble and has caught a cough with it."

Sniping with torpedoes was carried on by the German submarines, but no large German men-of-war ventured out to the North Sea until August 19. On that date, once more Admiral Scheer tried to lay a trap for a portion of our fleet ; once more submarines were to attempt to effect a reduction in our battle-

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fleet strength ; once more Sir John nearly came to grips with the High Sea Fleet ; once more Sir David nearly came into action with his battle cruisers. At 12.15 p.m. the British and German battle cruisers were only 30 miles apart and the battleships less than 60 miles. Directional wireless showed that the two fleets were infallibly converging at right angles on each other. A general action seemed certain. Then once more fate loaded the dice against the British Fleet and threw a main in favour of the Germans. An accident, a pure mistake, again determined the issue. Just as a mistake on the part of the Germans led to the loss of the *Hampshire*, so their fleet was saved by a mistake made by the Zeppelin L.13. This scout sighted Commodore Tyrwhitt's Light Cruiser Squadron, and, as often was the case during the War, the airman mistook the nature of the ships, which seemed but exaggerated specks on the surface of the water ; so he reported to Admiral Scheer the presence of an enemy's force of thirty units including battleships, cruisers and destroyers moving up from the southward.

Here was the very chance for which Admiral Scheer was looking. So he turned his fleet of some ninety vessels to annihilate this portion of our battlefleet.

On steamed our Battle and Cruiser Fleets. But when at 2.30 p.m. they reached a position in which they should have sighted the German Fleet, they found the sea blank. Admiral Scheer and his fleet had chased a will-o'-the-wisp right away from the spot where the two fleets would have met. A bitter, bitter disappointment to our fleet. Admiral Scheer had once more been favoured by that fickle jade fortune, who for the third time had ostentatiously turned her back on Sir John. The weather at Jutland—the *Hampshire*—August 19—a threefold buffeting by Fate.

The net result of the whole operation was that we had 2 light cruisers, the *Nottingham* and the *Falmouth*, sunk by submarines, and the Germans had the battleship *Westfalen* twice struck by torpedoes fired by E.23, though they managed to bring her back into port.

This was the last time, except for one short sortie in 1918, that Admiral Scheer seriously tempted fortune on the High Seas, for the High Sea Fleet, thereafter, remained moored in their harbour in a forced inactivity which in the end bred mutiny.

For several months Sir John had been communicating freely with the Admiralty on the subject of the measures which should

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be taken to deal with the submarine menace, which was monthly growing and assuming most disquieting proportions, bidding fair, unless checked, to lose us the War. His letters, both official and also private, to the First Lord and First Sea Lord put this point of view very clearly. He was convinced that the High Sea Fleet would not put to sea again after their second scuttle back on August 19. He suggested paying off into reserve one of the divisions of the older Dreadnought battleships and giving up some of his destroyers to join in the anti-submarine campaign. His opinion on these subjects impressed the Admiralty, and the Cabinet decided that, in view of his belief, it was now safe for him to leave the Grand Fleet to a subordinate, and suggested that it would be of great advantage if he would undertake a reorganization of the anti-submarine warfare. When first approached by Mr. Balfour he asked permission to refuse, but subsequently on November 24, 1916, as the *Iron Duke* was about to proceed to sea with the fleet, Sir John received a telegram from Mr. Balfour again asking him to go to the Admiralty as First Sea Lord, and at the same time expressing the hope that he would consent. He consulted his Chief of the Staff, Sir Charles Madden, who considered that he should accept the post so as to put into execution the projects he had devised and pressed on the Admiralty. He himself was loath to leave the fleet which he had commanded for the whole of the War, and to take on the onerous duties of Naval Head of the Admiralty, which he anticipated would be a most difficult task for one who was a sailor and not a politician. However, after due consideration, he accepted. Mr. Balfour intimated that the Cabinet had named Sir David Beatty as his successor. Sir John was satisfied, indeed he was convinced, that the High Sea Fleet would give no further trouble, which forecast proved him once more to be correct in his judgment.

On leaving the fleet he issued the following general memorandum :

“ In bidding farewell to the Flag Officers, Captains, Officers and men of the fleet which it has been my privilege to command since the commencement of the War, I desire to express my warmest thanks to all ranks for their loyal support during a period which I know must have tried their patience to the breaking point.

The disappointment which has so constantly attended the southward movements of the fleet might well have resulted in a tendency to staleness and a feeling that the strenuous efforts made to main-

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tain the highest state of efficiency were unavailing, if the opportunities for testing the results were so seldom provided by the enemy. But this is far from being the case. I am proud to be able to say with absolute confidence that the spirit of keenness and enthusiasm has constantly grown, and I am convinced that the fleet gains efficiency from day to day. We have benefited from experience and we have turned that experience to good account.

Whilst leaving the fleet with feelings of the deepest regret, I do so with the knowledge that officers and men are imbued with the spirit which has carried their forefathers to victory throughout all ages whenever, and wherever, they have met the enemy of their country ; and, whilst giving our present foe full credit for high efficiency, I am perfectly confident that in the Grand Fleet they will meet more than their match, ship for ship, in all classes and that the result will never for one moment be in doubt.

May your arduous work be crowned with a glorious victory resulting in a just and lasting peace."

War in the North Sea, with the exception of depredations by small craft, was over.

Sir John had given a good account of his stewardship. He, it is true, owed a great debt to his predecessor, and no one was more eager to acknowledge the enormous advantage he had gained by inheriting the magnificent fleet which had been turned over to him by Sir George Callaghan, a fleet trained to a high degree of excellence and fit in every way to meet the enemy and uphold the honour and ensure the safety of the country. But at the same time, on assuming command, he saw that it was no moment for resting. The fleet was on the eve of considerable augmentation—so he increased and re-organized his Staff to meet future requirements. Then, at once, he had to face a problem with which his predecessor had not been called upon to deal—namely, the security of the Grand Fleet when at anchor. This he tackled in a way that the Admiralty disliked ; it seemed to them foolhardy, but constant change of anchorage and long periods at sea ensured in the end the safety of the fleet ; so he kept the fleet always moving, even steaming over to the west coast of Scotland until his main harbour was made safe for the fleet to occupy. Further, no one knew better than Sir John the wide difference that lay between shooting and hitting. Hitting only could win a battle, so the battle shooting of his fleet became his greatest preoccupation—and the excellence of the result attained is fully testified to by the experiences of the enemy at Jutland.

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At the commencement of his command he suffered from a certain disadvantage which was brought about by the curt method adopted by the Admiralty in the supersession of his predecessor, and also owing to the affection with which that most popular officer had been regarded. These were bound to provoke a certain amount of resentment in the fleet. This was in no way the fault of Sir John Jellicoe, nor could he, as Commander-in-Chief, explain the steps he had taken to try to postpone the action of the Admiralty. This feeling had to be lived down ; and it was in so doing that his natural charm of character, and a wonderful personality, came to his aid.

Then came Jutland, where it is now acknowledged that he has earned the reputation of being a tactician second to none in olden or modern times. His deployment and his avoidance of torpedo attack bear, one the stamp of genius, the other of self-control.

Sir John's high praise of the Admirals of the Grand Fleet and of the manner in which they supported him are recorded in the Jutland battle despatches. The country has great cause for pride in them. In all his labours he received a vast assistance from his most capable Staff, without their help his work would have been far harder ; but they in their letters testify their affection for him and their admiration for his genius and fortitude.

Immediately on accepting the post of First Sea Lord, Sir John wrote to his predecessor, Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, and received the following characteristically charming letter in reply :

"I am deeply touched by the kind and generous tone of your letter of appreciation of the good relations that have existed between us during my service as First Sea Lord. The knowledge that I succeeded in retaining your confidence and that of the fleet is a very great gratification to me. As you well know, I have as great a confidence in your ability to do the work in the Admiralty as well as you have done it in the far more onerous post of Commander-in-Chief, and I have no feeling but a sense of relief that it has now fallen into your capable hands, and I feel convinced that your administration will achieve success as far as human foresight and guidance can control such operations. That Divine guidance may assist you also is the wish of your very sincere friend and old colleague."

Sir Henry Jackson had, indeed, had a strenuous year and a half of office. He had done well, and without doubt he welcomed the fact that it was Sir John Jellicoe and no other who was to

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relieve him. The affairs of the Navy would, he knew, be in strong and safe hands.

On leaving, Sir John received many letters from his officers expressing their devotion and sorrow ; one is here selected as forming a fitting epitaph to mark his departure from the fleet for which he had laboured so hard and from which he departed with such infinite regret.

"It has been one of the happiest years in a very happy life in many ways, and it has been a very great pleasure to serve under one who possesses the power of inspiring the confidence, devotion and affection of his subordinates as you do. We were such a happy family under you, always sure of matured consideration of anything put forward, and confident that at the supreme moment your foresight and judgement would place us at an advantage against an enemy whom one cannot fail to respect in preparedness for war. Madden and Halsey we owed much to also.

I wish you God Speed in your appointment from the bottom of my heart."¹

POSTSCRIPT I

NATURALLY, when picturing in our minds the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet we summon up a vision of an austere man, full of work by day and often by night, with many weighty thoughts and absorbed in his duties and the decisions he is called on hourly to make. It hardly occurs to us that this embodiment of authority has a private life—the life of a devoted father and an ideal husband. During his command of the Grand Fleet he suffered the loss of his father and mother, and his father-in-law, and was for months on end separated from his wife and children—the latter being at a particularly fascinating age. He kept up a constant correspondence with his mother and sisters, in which frequent reference is made to his absent children.

18th October, 1914.

"The children are splendid and Gwen intensely busy with her funds, etc. She is collecting quite a lot of money for the men's clothing and for Christmas gifts. I should like to see all the wives and children of the men get Christmas presents. I fear the War hits them harder than most people.

¹ Vice-Admiral Sir T. H. Martyn Jerram, afterwards Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram, G.C.M.G., K.C.B.

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27th April, 1915.

The children seem to be pretty well recovered now, poor mites. I am afraid they suffered a good deal at first, especially Lucy. Prudence seems to be a regular pickle and to be encouraged by Norah and Myrtle to be up to all sorts of mischief. I do wish I could see them all. Things are comparatively quiet afloat at the moment. I went for a 7 mile walk on Sunday!! The first real walk since last July.

5th August, 1915.

I had a delightful time while with the family. They are splendid, and Prudence seems to remember me quite well, although she has a habit of calling anyone in uniform 'Daddy.' She came to tea with me a few days ago, and I had the best of times with her. The others are full of spirits. There are some trees in the garden at Kindace that are their great delight. They climb them all day and up to date have had no casualties. They have had many romps with the midshipmen, who go out there to play games with them. It does the midshipmen good to get away a bit."

And here it will not be out of place to give a short epitome of the work done by that most capable wife of the Commander-in-Chief, Lady Jellicoe, whose energy and devotion to work for the Navy were simply phenomenal.

First of all, with Lady French as joint President, she started the United Service League, to which over 100 clubs for soldiers' and sailors' wives were affiliated—a much-needed social benefit for those whose husbands were at the Front or away in ships. At the end of the War the surplus funds, until exhausted, were devoted to a maternity home for soldiers' and sailors' wives.

Then Lady Jellicoe organized the fleet fund for providing comforts for the fleet. The whole of the work in connection with this was carried out by voluntary workers, who were chiefly the wives of Naval officers. About £150,000 in cash was raised which was spent in blankets (which were very much needed by those on board the ships of the Grand Fleet and the 10th Cruiser Squadron in the bitter cold of the Shetlands and further north) in thermos flasks, gramophones, etc. In addition, 50,000 articles of clothing were sent to the fleet. It says a good deal for the organization and hard work of all concerned that only £300 was spent in administering this fund. Lord Plender acted as honorary auditor. At the end of the War there was a surplus for disposal of £20,000 which was turned over to the Grand Fleet fund.

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After the Battle of Jutland, this energetic and sympathetic lady raised and administered a fund for the wounded and the families of those who had been killed. The wounded and the nearest relations of the killed were written to personally. Lady Jellicoe was also President of eight of the canteens of the Y.M.C.A., and also looked after those in the hospital ships. At her instigation her father, Sir Charles Cayzer, presented Invergordon with six hard tennis courts, which were laid out by Commander Hillyard, of Wimbledon fame. These were a great boon to the officers and wives of the ships using that base.

The Duke of Devonshire undertook the presidency of Princess Mary's Committee for chocolate boxes, and on this Lady Jellicoe served. These mementoes are still treasured in thousands of families. Here she was particularly helpful in seeing that the claims of the officers and men of auxiliary vessels were not overlooked.

Then, after Sir John had left the Grand Fleet and was at the Admiralty, Lady Jellicoe served on the Navy League Committee and raised a large sum for the Y.M.C.A. She raised £600 in Trafalgar Square by voluntary labour on Life Boat Day. In addition, for a short time she nursed every afternoon at Lady Ridley's Hospital in Carlton House Terrace, and continually visited all the Naval hospitals.

This work was in addition to visits to many towns to meet the mothers and wives of sailors afloat, at all of which she had to speak or read messages from Sir John. In fact, in one letter, Sir John records that she had, in order to carry out such visits, spent four nights in the train out of six. The whole of her work is a fine record of ability and devotion.

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POSTSCRIPT II

H.M.S. *Iron Duke*.

Fleet Flagship, Grand Fleet, August 4, 1914–November 30, 1916. Record of coal taken on board and mileage steamed in the North Sea and Northern Waters.

1914	Total Coal taken in.	Total Mileage.
August	3,531	4,671
September	3,480	4,570
October	2,299	3,104
November	2,558	2,680
December	2,280	1,780
	14,148	16,805
1915		
January	1,005	1,696
February	1,690	118
March	2,343	1,774
April	2,616	2,625
May	1,767	1,713
June	1,444	1,293
July	1,475	829
August	1,216	398
September	1,033	1,005
October	979	715
November	1,170	958
December	1,071	1,060
	17,809	14,184
1916		
January	1,561	232
February	1,445	1,292
March	1,635	1,174
April	1,706	1,515
May	1,557	2,012
June	950	625
July	1,745	1,239
August	1,423	868
September	1,304	781
October	1,520	796
November	1,572	816
	16,418	11,350

CHAPTER XXII

1916 to 1918 Admiralty

FIRST SEA LORD 4.12.16 TO 9.1.18

That is why I consider the steps taken to counter the submarine attack as the most important contribution made to victory during the year 1917.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, *War Memoirs*, Vol. IV.

The *Official History*, Vol. V, of Naval Operations regarding Sir John Jellicoe's final decision to adopt convoy :

"The choice involved perhaps the heaviest responsibility ever faced by a naval chief—a decisive tactical manœuvre in the greatest battle in history—the 4 years' battle for the use of sea transport."

The Silent Navy :

Never in the history of warfare has a great victory been reported with so little clamour and emotion.

Grand Admiral von Tirpitz in his book referring to the anti-submarine measures evolved by the Admiralty says that these "constituted a tremendous achievement on the part of the English."

COMMERCE protection on the high seas has been in existence ever since the reign of Queen Elizabeth. It was in her time that the value of overseas trade came first to be appreciated. It is true that regulation by Royal Command regarding sea trade had been promulgated spasmodically for many years before her advent to the throne, but these edicts dealt mainly with piracy and such unlawful acts. But war on commerce, as a definite branch of warfare, only came into existence in the late Tudor era. Needless to say, so commercially-minded a lady as Queen Elizabeth did not protect the trade of her merchants gratuitously. She made the merchants pay in one of two ways, either they had to pay all the expenses of a man-of-war convoy, or they had to hire one of the Queen's ships, which then also shared in the trade as well as affording protection, and it is fairly certain that she did not neglect to take a goodly portion of any money that was made out of such a venture. Our trade expanded during the next fifty years and grew in importance, so we find that, in the more demo-

cratic days of the Commonwealth, the State undertook the protection of trade as a national duty free of charge. In the succeeding Dutch wars a new practice arose, that of embargoes. The ships of enemy countries, as well as of our own nationals, were immediately, on the outbreak of war, placed under embargo, that is, were not allowed to leave port. Those of the enemy were confiscated and the national ships were detained until ships of war could be commissioned and detailed to protect them, and—what was of great importance in those days—the best men of their crews were removed to help the mobilization of the King's ships. In those days only a few ships of the Royal Fleet were kept constantly in commission, the remainder were paid off "in ordinary"; that is, all stores, spars, sails and rigging removed, only the lower masts left standing. There was also no system of providing crews except the press-gang, so that weeks, and even months, might elapse before crews could be found for them and, therefore, before our commerce could be adequately protected.

Towards the end of the French war, that is, early in the nineteenth century, convoy was a recognized practice. The distant trade usually had escorting vessels provided, and the waters off those headlands that were steered for by our ocean-going ships when returning to our shores, or that were passed by our vessels when coasting, were patrolled by sloops and even frigates. Of course, above and beyond these were our main fleets, which blockaded the enemy's ports and prevented serious raids by fleets on our commerce. Smaller ships and privateers were in reality the main depredators. This, it will be noticed, was much the same practice as was used by us at the beginning of the Great War. Our Grand Fleet, the 10th Cruiser Squadron and the Dover Patrol more or less bottled-up the enemy's ships and confined them to the North Sea. A few raiders were loose when the War started, but not in sufficient numbers to warrant a universal convoy system. For convoy has distinct disadvantages, and should not be resorted to unless absolutely necessary. The advent of the submarine introduced an entirely new danger, and complicated vastly the problem of the protection of sea-borne trade.

Not long before the War commenced, Admiral Sir Percy Scott publicly raised the question of the safety of our commerce against submarine attack. There were two schools of thought; one championed by Sir Percy, who foresaw a universal attack on commerce, the other which considered such an attack unlikely because of the

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danger that would be incurred of turning neutrals into belligerents, since it was more or less certain that submarines would find it impossible to discriminate between enemy and neutral vessels, with the result that many of the latter would be sunk. Both were right. The indiscriminate attack on merchant vessels did take place, and this did directly lead to the United States of America entering into the War. It was the enormous moral and potential aid to the Allied cause given by the entry of the United States into the War, rather than the number of their men actually engaged on the battlefield in France, which in the end gave victory to the Allies. If America had not come to our aid in April, 1917, it is probable that the moral effect of the severe losses incurred by the French in the early part of that year, unrelieved by future hope of American assistance, might well have led to the conclusion of an early and unsatisfactory peace.

But even after this danger of collapse had been averted, there remained the threat of the starvation of the country, both in food and munitions. This was prevented by the intensive anti-submarine steps taken by the Admiralty and the institution of the convoy system, and it was impossible to institute an effective convoy system until after America had joined in the war. We shall also see that without the freedom of the American harbours, without our being able to organize with her assistance the facilities at her ports, without her reserve of destroyers and other craft, no trans-Atlantic convoys could have been safely run. There is no desire to belittle the magnificent aid given by the United States to our armies on the battlefields in France, but the moral support and the sea assistance that were given were of even greater service and, certainly, of more immediate value ; indeed the latter staved off the starvation of our country.

Men talk, and authors write glibly, about the Atlantic, the North Sea, and submarines ; but, when reading or listening, people often find it difficult to grasp mentally the vast extent of the oceans. The picture that our mind records is usually that culled from a cursory glance at a map. Instead of visualizing the Atlantic as a vast, widespread sheet of water, as an expanse over which we can travel in all directions in the fastest ships for several days seeing nothing but seemingly unending water, our mind pictures a map-like area bordered by land. If we think of a submarine in such waters, then our picture of a submarine is bound to be grotesquely large compared to the true extent of water, for, on a map, a sub-

marine depicted to scale would be infinitesimally small. It is because of the want of appreciation of the true relative size of the oceans and of the vessels on them that the layman finds difficulty in understanding the naval problems inherent to the protection of commerce. Most people, for instance, picture the Battle of Jutland, if they picture it at all, as two lines composed of a large number of ships firing at each other. Few picture it as four or five smudges of rather dark grey barely visible against a misty grey background ; yet that is all that was actually seen of their opponents by most of those who took part in the battle.

But to return to the Atlantic and a submarine. Imagine England and Scotland and Wales rolled flat, all hedges, towns, lakes, rivers removed until it was merely a sandy waste. One single rabbit in that vast area would be relatively the same in size as a submarine in the North Atlantic. Moreover, it would be a rabbit which could disappear under the sand in half a minute without leaving a track behind it. A fair-sized goat would represent the largest Atlantic liner. Out in the open sea, therefore, the chances of a submarine finding a ship, or of a destroyer finding a submarine, were small. When, however, the shores of Great Britain were approached, when the Irish Sea and the English Channel were neared, or still more so when the large ports were approached, the offensive work of submarines became more marked. It was, so to speak, in these funnels of approach that the submarines watched and lay in wait for their prey ; here they used gun-fire, they mined the routes that the ships then were obliged to follow, and they used their torpedoes with deadly effect.

Out in the open waters of the Atlantic the chief danger lay, as of old, in cruiser raiders, which could chase and sink ship after ship by gun-fire. The blockade of the North Sea, and therefore of the German harbours, greatly reduced but did not entirely remove this danger ; but the submarines off the American and the British coasts and in the Mediterranean were responsible for our chief losses. To show how deadly was this peril it is merely necessary to quote the losses in April, 1917, which amounted to 599,000 tons of shipping.

Before Sir John Jellicoe joined the Admiralty, on December 4, 1916, there had been in existence a Trade Division of the War Staff under Captain Richard Webb, R.N.,¹ which section was responsible for carrying out offensive and defensive anti-submarine

¹ Afterwards Admiral Sir Richard Webb, K.C.M.G., C.B.

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measures for the protection of our trade. The defensive measures mainly comprised the arming of merchant ships ; the arrangement of special routes for traffic in lieu of those most generally followed ; furnishing advice to the masters of ships ; general blockade measures against enemy's trade in neutral vessels ; and the control of the Dutch convoy. The work of this department was little recognized by the public at the time, but the steady restraint, and the throttling control of trade which it exercised on the Central Powers was largely responsible for forcing the hands of Germany, and leading that country to make the gambler's throw of adopting intensive submarine action against neutral as well as enemy merchantmen. It was, therefore, to a certain extent responsible for the United States of America entering the War on the side of the Allies.

Mr. Lloyd George, further, with commendable foresight, was in December, 1916, on the point of instituting the Ministry of Shipping, with its Controller a member of the Cabinet. Up to then no Department had power to exercise any control over merchant shipping. These vessels were owned by private companies and run by private enterprise, sailings and ports of destination being arranged by the managing directors over whom the Government had no control. This resulted in a great waste of tonnage, that is, waste so far as the supply of essentials was concerned. Moreover, it will now be easily appreciated that no successful convoy system could have been inaugurated unless those in control had dictatorial powers over the times of sailing, the cargoes carried and the constitution of the convoys. In fact, the old embargo system was revived, greatly amplified, and made applicable to modern sea-traffic conditions. Sir Joseph Maclay¹ was appointed Controller, and the Ministry, when organized, took over the direction of mercantile shipbuilding, the allocation of tonnage for various purposes and the control of the port facilities in Great Britain. The Transport Division at the Admiralty was absorbed into the new Ministry. A complete card index of all the shipping was prepared, giving full details regarding tonnage, speed, cargoes, bunkering, etc.

The organization of this Ministry was completed and the Department in full working order by April, 1917 ; but in December, 1916, this Ministry was only vaguely planned. The work of the Admiralty hitherto, so far as trade was concerned, had been largely defensive. Sir John was determined to transform this into an offensive policy ; therefore, immediately on arriving at the Admir-

¹ Afterwards Lord Maclay.

alty, he proceeded to augment and re-organize the Naval staff so as not only to deal with the ordinary Naval matters connected with the War, but to provide a special branch of the Naval Staff composed of young officers whose experience, energies and brains would concentrate on anti-submarine work.¹ He had brought with him from the Grand Fleet Rear-Admiral A. L. Duff,² whom he placed in charge of the Anti-Submarine Division ; Captain F. C. Dreyer,³ four commanders, three lieutenant-commanders, two engineer officers, and the necessary staff. Several officers of the existing staff also remained on. In *The Crisis of the Naval War*, by Lord Jellicoe, the successive changes in organization which resulted are given in full detail ; it is therefore not necessary here to enter fully into all the variations which were carried out.

It will be sufficient here to state that the anti-submarine department was divided into sections each with a post-Captain at its head—these dealt with trade matters, convoys, anti-submarine offence, and mine-sweeping. Further modifications and expansions were made as time went on and experience indicated to be necessary.

An excellent memorandum had been written by the Board of Admiralty for the War Council in November, 1916, before Sir John had joined the Admiralty ; this put the situation regarding trade and the submarine menace clearly and concisely. In one paragraph it said :

“Of all the problems which the Admiralty have to consider, no doubt the most formidable and the most embarrassing is that raised by the submarine attack upon merchant vessels. No conclusive answer has as yet been found to this form of warfare, perhaps no conclusive answer will be found. We must for the present be content with palliation.”

Mr. Lloyd George criticizes this memorandum in his War Memoirs with a bluntness that is almost inconceivable ; he took the opportunity in that book to quote this Memorandum in order to revile its authors, dubbing the Admirals at the Admiralty as men “whose caution exceeded their courage,” “whose hands were trembling and paralytic,” so that even by 1934 he had failed to see that no truer note could possibly have been penned. Not only in Novem-

¹ In accordance with the views expressed by him in his letter to the Admiralty from the *Iron Duke*, dated 29/10/16.

² Afterwards Sir Alexander Ludovic Duff, K.C.B.

³ As Assistant Director.

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ber, 1916, but also in July, 1918, no conclusive answer had been found to indiscriminate sinking of merchant ships in wartime ; nor, probably, in the near future will any be found, so that we, perforce, must still be to a considerable extent content with palliation, the extent of the palliation depending largely on the number of vessels that a country may have at its disposal to protect its merchant shipping. The Admiralty, in fact, stated what was to Mr. Lloyd George an unpalatable truth, worded fairly, squarely and bluntly. He disliked disagreeable facts, hence a disagreement began between him and the Admiralty which induced him to meditate a "sack the lot" campaign. However, for the moment a new First Sea Lord had arrived. Mr. Lloyd George hoped that he would make more congenial promises and produce some scheme from up his sleeve that would settle for ever the submarine menace. Sir John was neither a conjuror nor a sycophant, but what he did do was to study the question thoroughly from the Admiralty point of view—he already had done so from that of the Grand Fleet. To the Cabinet he re-stated and underlined the gravity and difficulty of the situation, and he soon came to the conclusion that the urgent requirements of the moment were a great increase in the provision of offensive weapons for the anti-submarine patrols, more patrol boats and improved instruments for detecting the presence of submarines. Immediately, therefore, he set about accelerating production and the provision of those deficiencies which at the moment seemed to be most urgent. He and the men who had come with him infused new life into the Admiralty, and threw their energies into providing anti-submarine armaments. These comprised an increase of aircraft, including new types of seaplane carrying heavier bombs (six submarines were destroyed by aircraft in 1917) ; hydrophones for the detection of submarines by oral methods (these were installed in patrol craft, and the shore hydrophone stations were largely developed). "Otter" gear for the protection of merchant ships against mines was introduced and its supply hastened (95 G 19 British ships were fitted with this gear by July 1 and 900 by December 1, 1917). A great increase was effected in Q ships, that is, armed vessels disguised as merchant ships. During July 78 such vessels were operating. Above all the supply of depth charges was immensely increased. In January, 1917, there were only sufficient to allow four to each destroyer, in July the weekly output was only 140, by the end of 1917 this had reached 800 and was rapidly increasing ; while early in 1917 only from 100 to 300 per month

could be expended, during the last six months of the War 2,000 per month were exploded in the vicinity of submarines. This increased supply enabled the escorts to act offensively and with effect against submarines. Over 2,000 anti-submarine howitzers and bomb-throwers were ordered in the spring of 1917. A large increase in the supply of guns to merchant vessels was effected. In September, 1916, 1,749 ships were fitted ; by the end of February, 1917, 2,899 ; by May 15, 3,253 ; and by the end of December, 3,636 had been installed. The result of this increase was that between January 1, 1916, and January 1, 1917, out of 310 defensively armed vessels attacked, 236 escaped, 62 were torpedoed without warning, but only 12 were sunk by gun-fire ; whereas during the same period 302 *unarmed* ships were attacked, and of these only 67 escaped, 30 were sunk by torpedoes without warning, but 205 were sunk by gun-fire.

These were some of the results of the immediate and early work of Sir John as First Sea Lord, and they should not be forgotten when, later on, the very considerable immunity which was assured to our ships by the convoy system is discussed ; for it was this vast increase in offensive weapons which rendered the submarines increasingly chary of attacking our ships, whether singly or in convoys. One result in particular must be emphasized, namely that the arming of merchant vessels had a potent effect on German sea policy, for a submarine could no longer come to the surface, and discover if a ship was an enemy or a neutral merchantman, since had it done so it would have stood a good chance of being sunk by gun-fire from any ship it might meet. The submarine had to remain submerged, its only method of attack being to sink the vessel with a torpedo whether enemy or neutral, without inquiry as to nationality. This additional cause of damage to neutral shipping was a potent factor in causing the United States to enter the War.

During the War the Germans used their submarines offensively against commerce in four ways, namely, laying mines, sinking by gun-fire, sinking by bombs after boarding under threat of torpedo or gun attack, and by torpedoes. At the commencement of the War they had no mine-laying submarines, and the torpedo-carrying submarines were used mainly against our men-of-war, and not against the merchantmen.


It was only natural that, with the history of the old wars behind us, the question of convoying merchant ships should have been

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mooted early in the War. In fact, convoy to a limited extent was in force during the whole of the War. For instance, all ships carrying troops across the Channel were escorted by destroyers. The Canadian and Australian troopships were escorted, and special protection was given to particularly valuable ships both in home and foreign waters. But the convoy of merchant ships on a large scale presented considerable difficulty, and not until February, 1917, did a special form of convoy, that of protecting the coal trade to France, come into existence. In the first place, until 1917, we had insufficient ships available to carry out such a system at all adequately. The introduction of a system of convoys was not a policy to be lightly adopted. It was all very well for Mr. Lloyd George to champion convoys, egged on by unofficial advisers who had neither the responsibility of introducing them nor sufficient accurate knowledge to appreciate the difficulties inherent in the undertaking; but responsible officers, like Sir John Jellicoe and Admiral Duff, had to be assured that sufficient means were at their disposal to protect the convoys, and also that the danger to shipping would be reduced and not augmented by the introduction of the convoy system.

The first—and up to April, 1917, the insuperable—difficulty was to find a sufficient number of vessels to form the escort of the convoys. It is well here to state that the number actually employed on this service in September, 1917, and which Mr. Lloyd George expected the Admiralty suddenly to produce at the beginning of that year, was 70 Destroyers, 11 Sloops and 48 Trawlers, besides cruisers, armed auxiliary cruisers, British and mercantile cruisers.

A favourite argument advanced by the lay advisers beforementioned was that the French coal trade was convoyed by a few trawlers only, and that those ships when convoyed were known to sail in a straggling formation; if this protection had proved itself to be sufficient, surely a small protection only was required for ocean convoys? Why make a fuss about Atlantic convoys? Surely, it was argued, the same methods of defence would succeed. As a matter of fact, the protection of the French coal trade had been instituted by Admiral Duff; by it a protection was afforded which was adequate for ships which traversed only *protected* waters, that is, waters which already were patrolled, and in which submarines found it wellnigh impossible to make systematic attacks; but the protection against submarines that was required in *unprotected* waters was in quite a different category. Moreover, no surface raiders



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From a snapshot.

dared to show their noses in protected waters, a very flimsy escort only was therefore necessary, and one, in reality, provided more to give the ships' crews confidence, and assurance that should a ship be sunk her crew would be saved by one of the escorting vessels, than as an actual protection against attack. Under these conditions a closed-up formation was unnecessary; in fact, taking collision into account, it was safer to let the ships straggle than to keep the convoy in a fairly close formation—a condition that was entirely reversed in open sea convoy.

One important step that was taken by Sir John at an early date (in fact, in February, 1917) was to obtain the views of officers of experience in the mercantile marine on the subject of the safe navigation of the ships in a convoy, since the number of ships which were necessary as escort to the convoy depended on the extent to which merchant ships could safely be relied on to keep in fairly close company in all weathers. It was, of course, obvious that the ships had to extinguish their lights at night-time, otherwise the convoy would be hopelessly given away (it would have had the appearance of a town crossing the sea) and station-keeping at night without lights is no easy matter. A meeting was therefore held by Sir John at the Admiralty which was attended by a number of experienced masters in the merchant service.

The following account of the conference is given by a member who was present.¹ It is necessary to reproduce it *in extenso*, as Mr. Lloyd George² complains that the Shipping Controller was not consulted as to its constitution and that the smaller ships' captains were not consulted.

"It was a meeting between professionals of the same service, that is—the sea. It was not an occasion for obtaining the opinions of amateurs, however distinguished or experienced they might be as shipowners or anything else. There was no need to utilize the services of the latter in the form of the Ministry of Shipping, in order to make the necessary contact. The Admiralty had their normal channels which were in daily and hourly use. There was no need to select whom they should meet nor for any elaborate arrangements to obtain their presence, all that had to be done was to ask the officers to come and to see that they were fully

¹ *The British Legion Journal*, Feb., 1935. "The Introduction of the Convoy System," by Captain Bertram H. Smith, C.B.E., R.N., a Member of the Trade and Mercantile Movements Division of the Admiralty War Staff during the War. Quoted by courtesy of the Editor.

² *War Memoirs*, III, 1158.

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and truly representative. Sir John Jellicoe promised to call such a meeting and implemented his promise with the least possible delay. The Admiralty 'Shipping Intelligence Officer' in London was directed to invite the masters of the ships then in port to a meeting on the following day in sufficient numbers, with the only reservation that every class of ocean-going ship must be represented and that masters of purely coasting or short sea trip ships (who were unaffected by the question) were not required and need not be bothered. The orders passed through the present writer, who also attended the meeting and therefore speaks from personal knowledge. The meeting was fully representative and included captains of every class of ship from the large passenger liner through smaller passenger ships, the cargo liner and other intermediate types to the ordinary tramp. The First Sea Lord dispassionately and impartially stated the object of the meeting, namely, to get the unbiassed views of the Merchant Service ; he pointed out how station was kept, what apparatus was required, and what was involved in zig-zagging in company. He then invited each officer's opinion in turn, beginning with those of the Merchant Service and following with those of the Naval officers. Many of the former would have had personal experience of station-keeping when up for their Naval training as R.N.R. officers ; they were unanimously of opinion that, as things were, it could not be done. Those of the latter (i.e. the Naval officers) who dealt with the movements of merchant shipping, while generally considering that these opinions seemed sound and unanswerable, pointed out that experience had shown that the Merchant Service officers had carried out every task imposed on them by the Admiralty, however difficult, unreasonable or impossible it had appeared to be ; therefore nothing could be said to be impossible for them ! ”

The more important of the objections raised by the Merchant Service officers were that it would be impossible for the ships of the convoy to keep even reasonable station at night if the ships extinguished their lights. They had none of the station-keeping instruments fitted in men-of-war ; no manœuvring valves in their steam supply ; nor, since their best officers were serving in the Navy, had they anyone competent to use them even if they were fitted. The whole of the conditions were different from those met with ordinarily in the Merchant Navy, and they considered that the Captains of the ships convoyed would have to be on deck all night for a week or so. They were convinced that one of two things would happen : either the ships would straggle or there would be collisions. The conclusion reached was, that without sea-training and practical

experience it would be folly to put ships of the "Tramp" class into convoys. In summing up, one of the masters said: "In the Navy you can absolutely rely on the movements of your next ahead and next astern. In our convoy, not only would we be unable to depend on either, but in addition we would have no means of adjusting our speed within the widest limits." Naturally these arguments appealed to the Naval officers but not to the civilian element, who had no practical knowledge of sea work, and who rarely visualized such inconvenient matters as fogs and gales of wind. It was on the opinions expressed at this interview that Sir John based his statement that it was doubtful if merchant ships would keep station sufficiently well on each other for a few destroyers only to screen them sufficiently. Sir John, however, kept an open mind, and he quite appreciated that the opinions expressed did not in any way preclude the use of convoys if means could be found of overcoming the difficulties adumbrated by the masters. And means were found in a way which could not have been foreseen at the moment, namely by America entering the War on April 5, 1917. The objections raised by the masters were then largely met, because the convoys sailing from America had at least five or six days' practice together in keeping reasonable station, before entering the areas which were infested with submarines.

To the uninitiated the establishment of a convoy system seemed a simple project. Like Mr. Lloyd George, many seemed to think that all that was involved was the provision of a few armed vessels to escort an assemblage of merchant ships from port to port. Sir John and his Staff at the Admiralty viewed the matter in an entirely different light. The number of merchant vessels to be convoyed was considerable; and, as we have seen, the vessels available to protect the convoys were comparatively few. Moreover, there was a doubt, and a very grave doubt, whether it was wise to congregate a fleet of merchant ships, whether such a mass would not be more easily attacked by submarines than was the case with single ships. It looked almost as if a convoy might prove to be merely a herding together of vessels in a way which would facilitate slaughter. There was no experience which could furnish an answer to this question, and until an answer could be given there emerged from the fog of doubt the absolute necessity, if there were to be convoys, of having the ships thoroughly protected. It has been said that the mathematical odds in favour

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of quasi-immunity lay with the convoy system and were against isolated sailings. But at sea, mathematical odds do not always give the anticipated result. The danger to a convoy lay rather in the intrepidity of a submarine commander than on arithmetical calculation. It is well to quote the case of the *Justicia* to show how escorts could not be relied on to protect even a single ship. This ship, of 32,000 tons, was escorted by no less than 12 patrol vessels, yet she was attacked and sunk, five torpedoes in all being fired at her from two submarines between 4 p.m. on July 19, 1918 and noon on July 20 : 69 depth charges were dropped by the patrol in the hopes of sinking the submarines but they escaped. During the hunt a third submarine was, however, sunk. Before the *Justicia* sank, 40 patrol boats were collected in endeavours to save her. This is a good example of what really bold and determined captains of submarines could effect. There is little doubt that if all the German submarines had had captains of the quality of Captain Weddigen and the Captains of U.B.64 and U.54 our convoys would not have enjoyed the quasi-immunity which was provisionally vouchsafed to them.

There were three distinct areas on the convoy routes, each of which necessitated separate protection. First came the points of assembly near the American coast—this was a place of vital importance and could not be adequately dealt with before April, 1917 ; for until the United States entered the War the American ports were not available for the assembly of the convoys. They were even closed to our armed merchant vessels—in fact, the attitude of that country right up to their entry was one of strict neutrality—a neutrality so strict as rather to be strained to our disadvantage. To *assemble* a convoy of ships in the open sea would be to court disaster ; and again, owing to American neutrality, we were not able to have in the ports of that country convoy officers who could, on the spot, regulate the sailing of the merchant ships and so arrange the convoys. Next came the route followed by the ships in crossing the ocean ; and then the third, the dangerous areas entered and passed through when near to our own coasts.

The first of these, as we have seen, argued the necessity for assembly in a harbour, while in the second an old cruiser or battleship or specially armed merchant ship was required to protect the convoy from attack by a surface raider. The third required destroyers, sloops, or, with slow convoys, trawlers, so as to force

submarines to submerge outside a distance dangerous to the convoy. We required 70 destroyers for the convoys, and before America entered the War we could only scrape up some 20 or 30. The Grand Fleet took charge of the Scandinavian convoy; this took 30 of its destroyers, leaving only 70 for the protection of the fleet. This number could not, in the early part of 1917, have been further reduced with safety.

Then, still further inshore came the minefields. It was appalling to think of the possibility of a convoy becoming entangled in a minefield, when several ships might well have been sunk in their endeavours to avoid the mines; whereas a single ship might have passed through in safety, or, if mined, would act as a warning to those coming after her, and give them plenty of time in which to avoid the minefield.

Such were the outstanding difficulties with which Sir John Jellicoe and Admiral Duff were brought face to face, the majority of which were non-existent in old-time convoys. One thing was quite certain at all events, American convoys, as distinct from Canadian convoys, of which a few already had been in existence for troop transport, could not be started unless the United States entered the War.

In addition to the purely naval difficulties there were several mercantile disadvantages, which, although eventually overcome by the combined work of the Ministry of Shipping and the Admiralty, yet appeared important in the earnest discussions which preceded the adoption of the convoy system. We have pointed out that the escorts were difficult to provide, but it was on the number of escorting ships available that the frequency of the sailing of convoys depended. Some ships, therefore, although loaded, might have ten days, a fortnight, or even perhaps three weeks to wait, for an opportunity to sail. Then, when at sea, the speed of a convoy is the speed of its slowest ship, so that some ships might have to sacrifice one third of their usual speed. On a long trip, say of thirty days, this, together with the delay of the start, might mean approximately a loss of time equivalent to one complete journey. Then, again, the convoy system meant the simultaneous arrival of a fleet of ships at a port, and this, probably, before the previous convoy, now emptied, had cleared the harbour ready for the return sailing. This meant temporary congestion of the port. There was also the time taken in coaling the ships, and the supply of coal to many ships at one time.

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Such were the problems that had to be faced. Sir John could not, without undue optimism, dismiss them as unworthy of consideration. They loomed very large to those on whom rested the responsibility of introducing the system. If convoys proved vulnerable and not a success, then the whole traffic of the world would have been upset and incalculable damage would have been done. When the convoys were approved and started the opinion of the Admiralty was well expressed by Admiral Duff in one sentence "We have burned our boats." It was a case either of success or absolute disaster.

On April 5, 1917, the United States of America entered the War on the side of the Allies. This at once changed the whole complexion of the convoy system. Atlantic convoy became possible. The three main difficulties were to a great extent wiped out. Assembly could take place in American ports and agents be installed to deal with the various matters associated with shipping; such as bunkering, discharge and taking-in of cargo, and arrangement of the constitution of the convoys. Secondly, the difficulty of station-keeping was mitigated by the ships having several days' steaming in company before entering dangerous waters, and thirdly, an addition of convoying ships and destroyers could be obtained from the American Navy. Immediately plans were put in operation to start convoys, and three weeks afterwards, that is, on April 26, Admiral Duff was able to put forward a scheme for convoys from Dakar, Gibraltar, America and Canada; this was approved by Sir John on the following day.

On April 30, 1917, Mr. Lloyd George visited the Admiralty with a view to going into the whole question of anti-submarine warfare. Admiral Duff, as head of that department, was the Admiralty officer mainly concerned with the interview. He afterwards distinctly left on record that it was anti-submarine work and not convoy that was discussed, and that the interview in no way affected the introduction of the convoy system. One good point did, however, result, and that was that Admiral Duff was made a member of the Board of Admiralty and Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff to direct the whole anti-submarine campaign; this gave him a greater status at the Admiralty which was of distinct advantage when initiating and running the convoy system. Captain W. W. Fisher¹ succeeded Admiral Duff as Director of the Anti-Submarine Division. Anent this meeting, Mr. Lloyd George states

¹ Afterwards Admiral Sir William Fisher, G.C.B., G.C.V.O.

that he found the Admirals "chastened in spirit," but this was not so. The convoy system had at that date been adopted in principle as a result of the entry of the United States into the War; this had led rather to elation, and the fact of adoption was in no way a sign that their previous opposition had not been justified. There is one point overlooked by Mr. Lloyd George and others who have criticized the delay in starting convoys, and that is that Sir John, by refusing to adopt the convoy system until he and his co-workers were satisfied that it could be safely started and the ships reasonably protected, made the system ultimately a success. Had he been a weaker man and yielded to the importunities of Mr. Lloyd George and to those who wished to rush the matter, we might well have incurred a disaster, or a series of disasters, which might have led to the condemnation of the convoy system. When the convoy system proved to be a success, all who had advocated its adoption immediately clamoured that it should have been adopted before, not recognizing that it became a success because it had been soundly organized, and that it might have proved a ghastly failure had it been started with an inadequate number of vessels for the escorts.

It is not necessary here to trace the convoy system through all the successive stages of its development. Enough has been said to show how the system was introduced on a sure basis, without undue, and what might easily have been criminal, haste. It remains only to point out the more important facts that governed its progress. After the entry of the United States into the War, Admiral Sims was sent to London in command of all the American units. No more happy choice could have been made. A man of great sea experience and expert knowledge, of broad views and charming disposition, he worked with and for the Allies with a self-abnegation and whole-heartedness that the Navy can never forget. Immediately on his arrival, Sir John, who had known him for several years, showed him all the confidential figures relating to the attacks on our own and the Allied commerce which it had not been thought desirable to publish in full. Naturally Sir John did not minimize the danger of starvation that lay ahead. It was his business to paint the canvas in the darkest shades and to show the position in its worst light, so as to bring home to the American Navy Board the critical nature of the position of our commerce, and the need for immediate action on their part. The Admiral was deeply impressed and recorded his views in the book that he subsequently

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published.¹ In this he quotes Sir John, in reply to a question as to whether there was any solution of the submarine problem, as saying : "Absolutely none that we can see now." Naturally, it is difficult after a lapse of time to quote an answer accurately. What Sir John maintained that he replied was, "None at present, as the measures being devised now could not be immediately successful." Lord Jellicoe subsequently remarked : "We certainly were not in the state of panic which has been ascribed to us in certain quarters, but we did want those engaged in war on the Allied side to understand the situation in order that they might realize the value that early naval assistance would bring to the Allied cause." In all matters Admiral Sims co-operated in a whole-hearted manner, detailing all the United States vessels to work with our units under the Admirals who were commanding them, thus ensuring unity of control which is so necessary in war and so frequently absent from international operations.

It is true that when the convoy system was started both Sir John and Admiral Duff were by no means sure that it would turn out to be the success that it ultimately proved to be ; but they were thoroughly convinced of the desirability of trying it, and considered that it would prove to be better than the existing system of sailings. Undoubtedly the German submarine service had deteriorated, and the increased auxiliary measures of offence on the part of the merchant vessels and their escorts which had been provided by the Admiralty in 1917 considerably helped the success of the new system.

It is needless to enter into detail regarding the amplification of the scheme ; certain definite steps, however, deserve to be mentioned.

On May 3 Admiral Sims telegraphed to the Navy Board that the Atlantic Convoy had been approved.

On May 6 the experimental Gibraltar Convoy sailed and arrived in England on May 20.

On May 17, a Committee of four Naval officers with a representative of the Ministry of Shipping, Mr. Norman Leslie,² was appointed by the Admiralty to draw up a complete organization for a general system of convoy. The Committee presented a very valuable report. After passing Admiral Duff it came before the First Sea Lord on June 11, who forwarded it to the First Lord, proposing approval and to put the recommendation in force as

¹ *The Victory at Sea.*

² Afterwards Sir Norman Leslie, K.C.B.

soon as the necessary vessels for escort and convoy duties became available.

Paymaster Captain Manisty¹ was appointed organizing Manager of Convoys on June 25, and carried out the onerous duties of his office in a brilliant manner.

Captain Whitehead² held the responsible post of Director of Mercantile Movements.

It is only necessary to give a list of the convoys in operation in September, 1917, to show the rapidity with which the convoy system developed with the assistance received from the United States (page 364).

The convoys in the Mediterranean presented special difficulties, since not only were the narrow waters more favourable to the submarines and their attacks, but to begin with, the protection was jointly under the three Allied Powers, France, England and Italy. The total number of destroyers and sloops and trawlers required for the system authorized was 286, of which only 212 were available in September, 1917. These were in addition to those required for troop transport protection. At first these convoys met with considerable losses and the system was nearly discontinued. The third and fourth homeward convoys were very successful, but losses in later convoys led to further doubts and opposition. The time saved compared with the Cape of Good Hope route, however, was so material that the Ministry of Shipping pressed for the continuance of the system.

Such is a very condensed summary of the introduction of the convoy system. Its history proves once more the value of thorough investigation and absence of undue haste in organizing sea operations. Its success, although chiefly due undoubtedly to the officers and men of the Mercantile Marine, as well as the devotion of the crews of escorting vessels, the organizing officers at the Admiralty and at the ports of sailing, also was, in no small measure, due to Sir John Jellicoe and Admiral Duff. These recognized the gravity of changing fundamentally the whole system of sea transport across the seas and its method of protection, and insisted, against great political pressure, on a proper, sound, and sufficient organization before putting this revolutionary measure into force.

Now to turn to the other branches of defence of commerce from submarine attack. The important question of how to stop the

¹ Afterwards Paymaster Rear-Admiral Sir Eldon Manisty, K.C.B.

² Afterwards Vice-Admiral F. A. Whitehead, C.B.

Area Served.	Assembly Port.	Speed Limits.	Frequency.	Destination E. or W. Coast.	Average No. of Ships in Convoy every 8 Days.	No.S./M. Zone Escorts.	Composition of S./M. Zone Escorts.	No. Ocean Escorts.	Composition of Ocean Escorts.
Canada . . .	Sydney C.B.	8½ to 12½	Every 8 days	E. and W. alternately	18	1	6 destroyers 5 sloops	5	British cruisers.
Portland M. } Boston } New York } Philadelphia } Ports South of Co- lon including Gulf and West Indies }	New York	do.	do.	do.	do.	do.	do.	6	U.S. cruisers.
Hampton Roads }	Hampton Roads	do.	Every 4 days	do.	44	2	22 destroyers	12	4 British cruisers and 8 specially armed merchant escort ships with 3-6-inch guns.
All N. America .	Halifax	12½ and upwards	Every 8 days	W. only	12	1	11 destroyers	5	Armed auxiliary cruisers.
Brazil }	Dakar	8½ to 11½	do.	E. and W. mixed	16	1	do.	6	British Mercantile auxiliary.
Argentine }	Sierra Leone	11½ and upwards	do.	do.	10	1	do.	5	do.
Do.									6 special service vessels.
Mediterranean } and } Huelva }	Gibraltar	7 and upwards	Every 4 days	E. and W. alternately	34	2	4 destroyers 48 trawlers	10	3 armed boarding steamers. 1 sloop temporarily attached.

Total escorts in 8 days : 9.

Total ocean escorts : 49.

Total ships convoyed every 8 days : 152.

Total force in S./M. Zone : 70 destroyers (including 22 U.S.A.), 11 sloops, 48 trawlers. In addition for subsidiary work 11 destroyers, 15 P Class.


exit of submarines from the German ports had been under consideration since the commencement of the War and no satisfactory system had been arrived at other than by a military occupation by the Allies of the Belgian coast. Close blockade of the enemy ports had been suggested. This involved keeping destroyers, or some such vessels, close off the enemy's ports. Since these, unless supported, could be blown to atoms by a sortie of the larger craft which lay inside the harbours, we should have been obliged to keep our Grand Fleet also close in the offing, exposed to submarine attack and to the minefields laid by submarines. No form of surface blockade could possibly ensure that submarines could not pass through the blockade line on a dark night. It was useless to talk of laying mines off the enemy's harbours, for such minefields could be swept up with ease under cover of their shore guns and their mobile fleet. The submarine was a most elusive fish. For instance, a submarine could dive well to the eastward of the entrance to the Dover Straits and continue under water not showing a ripple until well into the broad waters beyond Beachy Head. How could such a submarine be stopped? There was only one solution, namely, to lay a wall of mines, that is lines of mines at different depths so that the whole formed a vertical wall. Such an obstruction would in the end most surely confine the submarines into the southern part of the North Sea. The suggestion for laying such a wall both in the North Sea and also in the Straits of Dover was made originally to Sir Henry Jackson, in 1915, when First Sea Lord, by the Admiral in command of the Dover Patrol, and renewed again, so far as Dover was concerned, when Sir John came to the Admiralty. To lay such a wall of mines in the Dover area presented no difficulties ; but in the North Sea it was a very different matter ; whereas 30,000 mines only were required to close the English Channel, 120,000 were required for the North Sea barrage. Moreover, there would always be a channel of neutral water left near the Norwegian coast which it would be difficult to close. However, no mines were available at either of the above times. The British pattern mine had been designed for use against ships and was practically useless against submarines. The only thing to do was to copy the German mine—100,000 of these were ordered by Sir John early in 1917, and, with the great aid given by America, mines began to come in, and by the autumn sufficient were available to close the English Channel. The barrage was completed in December, 1917, and the first submarine was destroyed

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on the 19th of that month. Subsequently the barrage accounted for some seven submarines in the early months of 1918. The minefield proved to be too dangerous for the German submarines to venture a passage by the Dover Straits, and these were therefore closed completely by the middle of 1918, and this was entirely owing to the prompt action taken by Sir John and his staff in ordering *and hurrying up* the manufacture of the mines. The North Sea barrage was only completed just before the end of the War, and this in spite of the active co-operation of the United States and other resources. Sir John strongly urged that the army should retake the Belgian coastal area both on account of the danger to our shipping from the Submarine Boat base at Bruges, and also because of the grave danger that the aerodromes in Belgium brought to the docks and shipping in Dunkirk, the principal port for the northern armies. Reference to the attached Plate will show the practical nature of this danger.

Another operation to which Sir John gave wholehearted support was a proposal to land a division of troops on the Belgian coast, with the primary object of driving the Germans out of Ostend, Zeebrugge and Bruges. This operation was agreed to by Sir Douglas Haig when, and only when, the British Army in the Passchendaele advance should have reached Roulers. This the Army never succeeded in doing, so the very extensive preparations made by the Navy were never brought into use. He also approved proposals for mounting 18-inch guns in two monitors so as to bombard the submarine shelters at Bruges, but the mountings were not completed during his tenure of office at the Admiralty.

A further proposal was to block the canal at Zeebrugge. The blocking of the two waterways to Bruges, one from Zeebrugge and the other from Ostend, is a subject on which much nonsense has been written. It is as well to understand that it is a physical impossibility to block a channel and prevent the egress and exit of vessels of the size of submarines and destroyers drawing some 14 feet of water or less, if there is a rise and fall of tide of 14 feet. Even if a stone breakwater were placed across such a waterway, every part of the obstruction above high water could be easily removed at any tide, and everything down to low-water level could be removed without men even getting their feet wet. To remove such an obstruction should not take more than from two to three weeks. When proposals were asked from the Admiral of the Dover Patrol for blocking Zeebrugge he reported that it



was impossible to block the channel for more than three weeks or perhaps less. Even the steel plates of a blockship could have been cut away in that time with oxy-acetylene blow pipes, and a channel formed that would allow submarines and destroyers to pass, two or three hours each side of high water. However, Sir John decided on an attempt being made ; but before the proposal which had been put forward and approved by him could be undertaken Sir John had left the Admiralty, and another scheme was prepared and carried out. He never saw the details of this proposal and therefore cannot be held in any way responsible for them. The attempt was gallantly carried out by all engaged, but twenty-four hours after the so-called blocking a submarine was passed out past the blockships. An attempt was made at the same time to block Ostend, but the blockships missed the port and ran on to the Belgian coast. The attempt was repeated some weeks later without success. The result was that the Germans continued to use the Ostend-Bruges canal, and therefore to pass their destroyers and submarines out from Bruges as steadily as was the case before the attempt had been made ; and, after three weeks, a channel past the blockship had been dredged which could be used at all states of the tide. The net result was that the submarines and destroyers, as had been foretold, had free exit to the sea. The whole matter can be put in a homely way. In order to keep dogs in a house, and out of the street, it is well to close the front and the back door. In this operation the front door (Zeebrugge) was merely put on the chain, which allowed dogs to squeeze past, and the back door (Ostend) was left open so that they could go out and gain the street by a slightly longer route. In the meantime the dogs scratched a bit away from the door-post to give themselves a free passage by the front door. Taking all these facts into consideration, no blame can attach to Sir John for these ports not having been closed during his tenure of office. It is impossible to achieve the impossible ; but, realizing that such an attack would be welcomed by the Navy, he approved of the attempt being carried out.

One important alteration in Naval administration was brought about in the spring of 1917, at the instance of the Prime Minister, namely, to put all constructional work at the Admiralty under a civilian. The proposal also involved putting mercantile construction under the same head. This had several obvious advantages, since a balance between the two classes of construction, Naval

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and Mercantile, could be better arrived at under a single head than between two departments. Sir Eric Geddes was selected for the post of controller and Sir John was deputed to confer with him on the subject. Sir Eric accepted on the understanding that he had Sir John's support at the Admiralty while occupying his new post. This support was cordially and loyally given.

The following is the description given by Sir John of his interview with Sir Eric.

"I learned from Sir Eric Geddes that he felt capable of undertaking the work on the understanding that he was assured of my personal support ; he said that experience in his railway work in France had shown the difficulty of taking over duties performed by other officers, and stated that it could not have been carried through without the strong support of the Commander-in-Chief ; for this reason he considered he must be assured of my support at the Admiralty. In view of the importance attaching to combining under one administration the work of both Naval and Mercantile shipbuilding, and, influenced in some degree by the high opinion held of Sir Eric Geddes by the Prime Minister, I came to the conclusion that his appointment would be of benefit to the Admiralty work and therefore gave him the assurance, and said that I would do my best to smooth over any difficulties with the existing Admiralty officials whether Naval or technical."

Sir Eric was, therefore, offered and accepted the post of Admiralty Controller, but it was arranged that a Naval officer should continue to hold the post of Third Sea Lord, and that he should be jointly responsible, so far as the Navy was concerned, in all design work on its technical side whether for ships, ordnance or inspection. Sir Eric asked that Rear-Admiral Sir Lionel Halsey (who at that time was Fourth Sea Lord) should be given the appointment of Third Sea Lord, and this was done. The new organization necessitated an enormous increase in staff and a vast change in the departments, about which Sir John remarks :

"It will be readily understood that such an immense change in organization, one which I had promised to see through personally, and one which was naturally much disliked by all the Admiralty departments, threw a vast volume of extra work on my shoulders, work which had no connection with the operations of war, and this too at a period when the enemy's submarine campaign was at its height. I should not have undertaken it but for the hope that the

change would result in greatly increased production particularly of warships and merchant ships. The fulfilment of promises, as regards production, were no better for the extensive change."

One great advantage that did result from the change was the creation of a Directorate of Materials and Priority, which controlled the distribution of all steel for all services and produced a very beneficial effect on the issue of supplies of steel to shipbuilders. On July 17 Sir Edward Carson, greatly to Sir John's regret, was relieved from his post as First Lord, and appointed a member of the War Cabinet. Sir Eric Geddes became First Lord. It is not too much to say that it was owing to the cordial relations that existed between Sir Edward and Sir John, and the constant and unfailing assistance and support that the latter received from Sir Edward, that the great work achieved during the last half of 1917 was successfully instituted and accomplished.

To sum up Sir John's work at the Admiralty. When he arrived he brought with him capable and experienced officers from the sea to help him, senior officers of general experience, junior officers endowed with special knowledge and novel ideas. The Anti-Submarine Division was manned almost entirely by officers who had served at sea during the War. Convoys were at that time out of the question except in certain isolated localities.

Mr. Lloyd George was in a hurry, and was convinced that he knew better than the Admiralty how to protect shipping ; egged on by some junior officers and laymen, he urged the immediate adoption of convoys. Sir John knew the difficulties, in fact the impossibility of so doing, and warned him to this effect, and at the same time he devoted all his energies to an active offensive against submarines. He withstood Mr. Lloyd George's visionary schemes until America entered the War ; then Atlantic convoys became feasible and were instituted as quickly as possible. Here it is well to quote Admiral Sims, who came to England with a mind strongly in favour of convoys. In his book he remarks : " Civilians in general were more kindly disposed towards the convoys than seamen because they were less familiar with the nautical and shipping dangers that it involved." Again, before America entered the War : " There was, however, still one serious impediment to adopting the convoy system, and that was that the number of destroyers available was insufficient." Then, with reference to the provision of destroyers by the United States : " I do not see

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how otherwise it [convoy] could have been established in any complete way at such an early date." And dealing with the criticisms regarding action before the introduction of the system—"This criticism is of course justified; still we must understand that it was the only possible method until we had enough anti-submarine craft to make the convoy practicable."

Mr. Lloyd George's criticisms in his *War Memoirs* are chiefly remarkable for their invective. He refers to "The condition of utter despair which the Admiralty was in," "Men whose caution exceeded their courage," "Admirals with fear-dimmed eyes." He is "amazed on looking back that the convoy system was not started earlier." The Admiralty "were stubborn." If there was one virtue that Sir John possessed—rare perhaps in an admiral—it was firmness without any vestige of stubbornness. Mr. Lloyd George fails to differentiate between the two. We had a "palsied and muddle-headed Admiralty," and so on. There is little doubt that the average person will have no difficulty in deciding who was in the right—Sir John Jellicoe and Admiral Sims, men of great sea experience, or Mr. Lloyd George, who perforce was a man totally ignorant of sea conditions, and who could not understand how anyone who had "seen a heavily laden tramp successfully battling through the breakers of the Bay of Biscay storm" could "doubt the capacity of the sailors who had manned those buffeted and swamped vessels to handle them with complete efficiency whatever the demand," a capacity which a seaman would realize does not include ability for "keeping station without lights in a closed up convoy," a condition requiring totally different sea experience.

Sir John then threw his energy into helping the work of the Dover Patrol in bombarding Ostend and Zeebrugge, the former whenever the weather permitted, but vetoed Mr. Lloyd George's egregious scheme of employing the Grand Fleet for a purpose and duty for which they were entirely unfitted.

He supported the scheme for landing troops on the Belgian coast—blocking Ostend and Zeebrugge—and by the provision of mines enabled the Folkestone-Grisnez barrage to be laid, which closed the channel to submarines, and, by his restraint on the Admiralty hotheads, enabled the changes in patrol of the Straits to be effected gradually and without disaster. He never spared himself; frequently he and Admiral Duff were to be found in consultation as late as 11 p.m. and after.

During his term at the Admiralty, and by the provisions for

which he was responsible, the average loss in shipping per month in February, March, April, 1917, the first three months of unrestricted submarine offensive, was reduced to approximately one-half in October, November, December, 1917.

Owing to the offensive measures he introduced the submarine menace had been practically conquered by the end of 1917, in that then we were sinking submarines at the same rate as they were being produced in Germany, and the measures he had laboured to introduce had not by then had time to attain their full offensive force.

Sir John's activities were prodigious. Soon after his arrival there in December, 1916, it became known in the Admiralty that "every minute the First Sea Lord writes contains some action."

With regard to his achievement in breaking the back of the submarine menace it is admitted by the German historians that the defeat of the submarine meant the defeat of Germany. Two hundred German submarines were destroyed, chiefly by British agency. This is worthy of the peroration of Thucydides: "This was the greatest of all achievements and events of the War, the most decisive for the victors, the most ruinous for the conquered, for they were utterly defeated and swept from the sea, and out of their great host few returned home."

The life of a Flanders submarine was estimated at five to six cruises. By the end of 1917 it was felt in the Admiralty that the submarine had shot its bolt.

A wonderful record.

And the result?

Although Mr. Lloyd George in his *War Memoirs* wrote: "That is why I regard the success of the steps taken to counter the submarine attack as the most important contribution made to victory during the year 1917," yet in December, 1917, he caused the man to whom this contribution to victory was mainly due to be, as Sir John remarked, kicked out of his office! Truly the ways of the politicians are beyond the wit of man to fathom and understand.

This period of Lord Jellicoe's life carries with it a warning to the country, for it shows how easily a Dictator Prime Minister, imbued with a false idea of his own capacity and technical knowledge, may go far to ruin a country engaged in a war for its very existence.

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POSTSCRIPT

- Convoy.* *Summary of Creation of Convoys.*
- 4.12.16. Sir John took up appointment as First Sea Lord.
 - 12.16. Ministry of shipping formed, but duties not decided.
 - 12.16. } Orders for bombs, anti-S./M. guns, depth charges, trawlers
 - 1.17. } and mine sweepers placed.
 - 2.17. Conference with Merchant Service masters, who condemned convoys under the conditions then obtaining.
 - 6.2.17. French coal trade protected—navigating in protected waters and not requiring full convoy.
 - 2.17. Scandinavian convoy started. Run by C.-in-C. Grand Fleet.
 - 5.4.17. United States entered the War, whole complexion of convoy changed.
 - 4.17. Ministry of Shipping complete.
 - 26.4.17. Admiral Duff put forward proposals for Atlantic convoy, South American and Gibraltar convoy.
 - 27.4.17. Proposals approved by Sir John Jellicoe—Mr. Norman Leslie appointed Head of Convoy Section of Ministry of Shipping.
 - 30.4.17. Mr. Lloyd George visited Admiralty to confer on anti-submarine warfare.
 - 3.5.17. Admiral Sims telegraphed to U.S. Government to say that Atlantic trial convoy had been approved.
 - 10.5.17. Experimental Gibraltar convoy started, and on
 - 20.5.17. Arrived in England.
 - 17.5.17. Atlantic Convoy Committee constituted, including representatives of the Ministry of Shipping.
 - 24.5.17. Experimental Hampton Roads convoy left.
 - 7.6.17. Hampton Roads convoy arrived in England.
 - 6.6.17. Atlantic Convoy Committee reported on proposed organization for a general system of convoy.
 - 11.6.17. Committee's report approved by Sir John Jellicoe.
 - 15.6.17. Committee's report approved by First Lord.
 - 15.6.17. Hampton Roads convoy: 4-day interval approved.
 - 22.6.17. Sydney (Cape Breton) convoy 8-day interval approved.
 - 25.6.17. Paymaster Captain Eldon Manisty appointed organizing Manager of Convoys, and Head of Convoy Section and Staff.

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Convoy.

Summary of Creation of Convoys.

- 6.7.17. New York convoy to East Coast of England : 8-day interval approved.
- 6.7.17. New York convoy for West Coast of England : 8-day interval approved.
- 20.7.17. Gibraltar convoy : 4-day interval.
- 31.7.17. Sierra Leone convoy, fast vessels.
- 31.7.17. Dakar convoy, slow vessels.
- 8.8.17. Outward Atlantic convoys approved.
- 23.8.17. Fast outward combined Troop and Mercantile convoy approved.
- 10.9.17. Through Mediterranean convoys instituted.

It is impossible here to enter fully into the great work done in the way of provision of offensive armament for anti-submarine action during 1917, or the details of the convoy system. Further information will be found in the two books written by Lord Jellicoe on the subject—*The Crisis of the Naval War* (Cassell) ; *The Submarine Peril* (Cassell).

CHAPTER XXIII

1918

Leaving Admiralty

IT may seem to be peculiar to devote a complete chapter to the dismissal of Sir John Jellicoe from the Admiralty. But it was one of the chief of several short-sighted acts committed by the British Government in the last year of the War, and one which indirectly affected greatly Lord Jellicoe's reputation. It is difficult to conceive a more definite and undeserved attempt to degrade an officer in the eyes of the nation, and to mark him with every indignity as a failure, than to dismiss him suddenly and without explanation from so high and important an office as that of First Sea Lord in wartime. The inference drawn by the public generally must have been that there were weighty reasons to prompt such an act. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the reasons that were advanced for this step and to determine, so far as is possible from the known facts, what justification the politicians had for his removal. The difficulty of so doing is somewhat reduced owing to the fact that separate reasons were given to different persons in authority. If these reasons can be proved to be false, then Sir John's dismissal can be triply condemned.

Let us first step back one moment to the time when Sir Edward Carson was First Lord. Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair testifies that just before Sir Edward Carson was removed from the position of First Lord of the Admiralty, he told him (Admiral de Chair) that Mr. Lloyd George was trying to turn Jellicoe out of his post of First Sea Lord ; but that while he (Carson) was there he would on no account allow it, and added that it would be a disaster if Jellicoe left the Admiralty at that time. This throws a sinister light on subsequent events. Here is what Lord Jellicoe wrote at the time of his dismissal.

“For some weeks before I left the Admiralty I had occasion to take some exception to the methods of Sir Eric Geddes, the First Lord, although no serious disagreement occurred.

I had on more than one occasion told him that I was much concerned at the very slow rate of ship construction, both Naval and Mercantile. I had said that I feared the organization set up by him as Controller had failed to produce better results—if as good results as—the old organization in the hands of Naval officers and other Admiralty officials. I mentioned that information reached me from various sources that the shipbuilders disliked the organization, and could not work with the new officials as well as they had done with the old ones, and that their methods caused great and avoidable delays.

I also said that I had found, during my visit to Sheffield, that the Armament Firms were greatly dissatisfied with the new organization, which delayed matters and was much inferior to the procedure of working direct with the Director of Naval Ordnance.

I knew well from conversations with Captain Dreyer that great pressure was constantly brought to bear on the Director of Naval Ordnance, and the Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance, to accept designs and munitions which were not up to the standard of efficiency required for the Navy. In these attempts the Ministry of Munitions lent a hand against the Director of Naval Ordnance. The Third Sea Lord and the Director of Naval Ordnance had been faced with many difficulties in this way, and Sir Eric Geddes, as First Lord, was antagonistic to the Director of Naval Ordnance; presumably, because of his attitude on the subject of the retention of design and inspection in the hands of Naval officers at the time when Sir Eric Geddes became Controller a few months before.

The result of my conversations with Sir Eric Geddes was that he said he would ask the Controller, Sir Alan Anderson, to see the shipbuilders and find out if there were any matters that could be put right. I do not think this was ever done in my time.

The next difficulty that arose was in regard to Admiral Bacon. I fancy that Admiral Wemyss represented to Sir E. Geddes his view that Admiral Bacon should be replaced. As to this I always said that if Sir R. Bacon did not carry out the wishes of the Board, he would, of course, have to go; but, so far, he had as quickly as was possible altered his arrangements in accordance with any views expressed by me. This process was going on and it was early yet to talk of any such measure as supersession. An admiral must be responsible for carrying out Admiralty orders in the way he thought best. I pointed out, as was only natural, the invaluable work carried out in the Dover Patrol by Admiral Bacon since he took command."

Sir John thoroughly understood, and appreciated to the full,

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the fact that the Admiral in command at Dover was solely responsible for the safety of the eighty or so merchant vessels that passed daily, and at night, through the Straits, for the transport of troops, and the harbours to and from which these sailed ; whereas Sir Rosslyn Wemyss and his coadjutors, who formulated the instructions which were issued in the name of the Admiralty, had not even *a vestige of personal responsibility* regarding any disaster that such instructions might bring about ; being merely a committee sitting at the Admiralty. Sir John appreciated that it was his business to see that the Admiral at Dover had a reasonably free hand in interpreting these instructions.

To continue Sir John's remarks :

" We had not any particular difference of opinion on this subject. Sir E. Geddes saw Admiral Bacon, and was, apparently, satisfied with the interview.

A further difficulty arose between Sir E. Geddes and myself on the subject of the treatment of certain Flag officers.

The loss of the second Norwegian Convoy caused a good deal of comment, and it was not clear why the protecting cruisers *Mino-taur* and *Shannon* were not present at the time of the attack. Sir D. Beatty, in a reply to an enquiry of mine, told me the orders under which they had acted, and this showed that they should have been there at the time of the attack unless something had prevented them carrying out the orders.

I had a bad cold during the week-end after the attack and was in bed on the Saturday when Sir H. Oliver was sent over by Sir E. Geddes to see me. He said that the First Lord desired an immediate enquiry ordered, and that it was to be composed of very senior Flag officers whose names were to be reported for approval ; and that all the facts were to be brought out. He added that if I refused to order this sort of enquiry he intended to send up Lord Fisher to enquire into it. Sir Rosslyn Wemyss also saw me and said he had told the First Lord that Naval Courts of Enquiry were quite common, and that there was no need to make a fuss about them as the procedure was well understood ; and Sir D. Beatty, in ordering the enquiry, could be directed to include enquiry as to the dispositions for the protection of the convoy, the subsequent escape of the raiding destroyers, etc.

I wrote to Sir E. Geddes, enclosed my proposed telegram to Sir D. Beatty, and said that it would be very foolish to send Lord Fisher upon such a mission, which would cause great ill feeling in the fleet, and would moreover produce no good result.

Another subject over which we had some difference of opinion

was the view of the treatment to be awarded to an Admiral as to his conduct in the North Sea.¹

On this occasion the Admiral did not at once turn towards the enemy light cruisers on sighting them, so as to get between them and their base ; nor did he go full speed, but only 25 knots. He turned first to the northward, although 20 miles clear of any mine-fields. Sir D. Beatty, in forwarding the report of the action, said that it was to be regretted that the Admiral had acted in this manner.

I therefore proposed that the latter should be directed to explain his action, and that Sir D. Beatty also should be directed to report on certain points on which his own orders were not clear.

Sir E. Geddes agreed, but having been told by Admiral Beatty during a visit to the fleet that he, Beatty, disapproved of the action of the Admiral, wished to act against him quickly. During the next week or so Sir Eric Geddes frequently referred to the latter with impatience and wished to hasten the report, and said that in his opinion Admiral Beatty was trying to shield the Admiral, and this was having the effect on him (Geddes) of making him all the more determined to make an example of him. I said that this was unjust and wrong and that he must await the receipt of the report. This happened more than once and as I thought showed a want of justice on the part of Geddes.

The next incident was on the subject of an honour for Admiral Duff, whom I had recommended for a K.C.B. in the New Year Honours. Geddes discussed the matter with me and asked if I had recommended him for his services afloat or at the Admiralty, I replied the latter. He said he objected to his manner, and I said I was recommending him for his services and not his manner. Geddes then said that he did not like his manner to him or the wording of some of his minutes. I then said that I feared he did not realize that the Sea Lords were his colleagues and not his subordinates, and that it was both their right and their duty to state their opinions quite clearly and frankly, realizing of course that he was the responsible minister.

After some further talk he agreed to put forward Duff's name."

In fact, Sir Eric Geddes was the wrong type of man to have had as First Lord. He was, of course, like all civilians, totally ignorant of the Navy, its feelings, and its customs. But, further, he had had no training either as a politician or diplomatist. Thus absence of this class of education left him with an energetic temperament untempered by experience, so that his actions tended to

¹ It is evidently impossible here to enter into the rights or wrongs of this matter.

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become rather like those of a bull in a china shop, which caused him to be a considerable nuisance to his First Sea Lord.

Lord Jellicoe continues :

“ For some little time prior to my dismissal Geddes had been trying to leave the Admiralty and go back to the railways in France, which work, he told me on more than one occasion, he found more congenial. The matter had been under discussion during the visit of the United States Mission, and Colonel House had expressed the opinion that Geddes should not leave the Admiralty, as the United States people had confidence in him. Discussions continued and it was decided by the Prime Minister that he could not be spared. The matter again came up at the Paris Conference in November ; and got so far as the Prime Minister proposing that Sir Joseph Maclay should relieve Geddes. Maclay discussed it with Geddes ; but, as a result, did not accept the appointment. The Prime Minister then told Geddes that it was decided that he should remain at the Admiralty ; this Geddes told me.

However, at the Versailles Conference, which followed immediately, the question was again raised. The military view being that the state of the railways in France and Italy was so bad that no one but Geddes could put them right, as he had prestige with the French. The Prime Minister expressed the opinion that Geddes should go to the Railways.

Discussions took place on the return of the Ministers to England, and it was once more decided that Geddes should not leave. Lord Derby then wrote a strong Minute to urge that this decision should be reconsidered. This was considered and the decision re-affirmed.

On December 24th, Smuts, who had just returned from Italy, brought up the matter once more at the Cabinet ; saying that it was essential that the railways should be put right, and that the whole military campaign rested on this.

It was once more decided that Geddes should remain at the Admiralty.

That evening I received a letter from Geddes dismissing me. The assumption in my mind is that Lord Northcliffe was pressing the Prime Minister to get rid of me, the Prime Minister was pressing Geddes. I know from Carson that Northcliffe had frequently pressed both him and the Prime Minister during his tenure of office to get rid of me.¹

¹ Mr. Lloyd George in his *War Memoirs* states that Sir Douglas Haig expressed the opinion that Sir John should leave the Admiralty. Anything more foreign to Sir Douglas's general reserve and discretion can hardly be imagined. There is, moreover, nothing in Sir Douglas's diary or papers that gives the slightest colour to such a statement. See also Postscript.

At 6 p.m. on December 24th I received Geddes's letter of dismissal. No reason was given, merely a statement that he considered a change desirable. The letter was marked 'Personal and strictly private.'"

Why the letter should have been marked "private and personal" is not apparent—at least not from Sir John's point of view. If he was dismissed he was dismissed, and that was the end of it. If it was because the King had not been informed, then the King should have been informed before the note of dismissal was sent. To tell a man that he is dismissed and to try to make it a confidential matter is of course absurd and contrary to the ordinary principles of English public life. It was, however, important from the First Lord's point of view, for, had Sir John immediately informed his colleagues, there is little doubt that the Prime Minister, late on Christmas Eve, would have been faced with the choice of finding an entirely new lot of Sea Lords—Sir Rosslyn Wemyss excepted—or a new First Lord! But, by delaying such action for twenty-four hours or more, any such complication was prevented. Sir John continues :

"Since the note had been marked private and personal I felt a difficulty in consulting anyone as to my line of action, but decided I must speak to someone, and saw Halsey (Third Sea Lord), told him what had occurred, and that I felt I could hardly carry on under the circumstances, and proposed going on leave, telling Wemyss (Deputy First Sea Lord) to carry on. I asked if he thought this course justified, and he agreed. I then wrote accordingly to Geddes, saying, however, that of course I would do what was best for the Service. He replied that it would be convenient if I went on leave and that Wemyss would carry on. I left that evening. Geddes motored to Sandringham next morning (Christmas Day) and saw the King, and in the evening wrote me that he would like an answer before noon the next day as to whether I would accept a Peerage. At first Gwen (Lady Jellicoe) and I decided to refuse it, but on second thoughts I accepted for the following reasons.

- (1) For the sake of the Service, which got so few honours.
- (2) So that I should not sink into obscurity, but to have a platform from which to speak if things went wrong, and foolish action was taken with the Navy.
- (3) For the sake of my children, as History might never know the truth and might say I was kicked out, apparently justly, as no honour was conferred.

Several people, including Lord Beresford, advised me to take the Peerage for the above reasons.

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On the night of the 26th, Geddes and Wemyss went to Rosyth and saw Beatty on the 27th. Before Beatty saw them, and after he had read of my dismissal in the paper, he wrote me a strong letter saying that he was filled with dismay, etc., at the course taken. He said he would write again after seeing Geddes but he did not do so. I assumed that Geddes had made some statement to him which had changed his opinion, and did not write to him again for about a month but eventually did so in case his letter had miscarried. He replied that nothing had been said to alter his views, but no reason had been given, etc.

Geddes and Wemyss arrived back on the 28th.

Halsey asked me on the morning of the 25th if he might consult with the other Sea Lords as to their course of action. I said 'Yes,' since by the 25th it was apparently known by the various officers that something had occurred, as Wemyss gave out that I was on leave. I advised Halsey that the Sea Lords should not resign as it would do no good and be bad for the country. Geddes would only get in, as Sea Lords, officers who would do his will and who had no knowledge of the Admiralty, and the results might be fatal to efficiency."

Now for the continuation of the story as told by Admiral Duff :

"About 6 p.m. on December 25 Halsey came to my room and told me that Jellicoe had been dismissed, and that the manner of his dismissal was curt if not offensive. Meeting of Sea Lords in my room to discuss the situation. Various opinions expressed, no decision reached. Eventually went in a body to see Wemyss. Result of conversation was a letter to First Lord asking for an interview in order that the reasons for Jellicoe's dismissal might be explained to us as we were very much perturbed in view of our responsibility to the Navy and the country. I learnt during this conference that Wemyss was appointed First Sea Lord. (N.B. Jellicoe had received the letter of dismissal on Christmas Eve, but only assented on Christmas afternoon to the Sea Lords being told.) Left the Conference at 8 p.m., it having been agreed that the letter to First Lord should be sent to him by special messenger. This however was not done, it was withheld without the consent of the majority of the Sea Lords.

Meetings however took place between Sir Eric and the deputation of the Sea Lords, in which the First Lord disputed the right of the Sea Lords to ask him for an explanation of his action in dismissing Sir John, yet he said 'As man to man I am prepared to tell you what I will not tell you as First Lord.'"

His explanations unfortunately were not at all clear to his hearers, who received the impression that at a meeting previously,

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in the Prime Minister's room, at which the Prime Minister, Mr. Balfour, Sir Edward Carson and Geddes were present, the question of Sir John's retention had been discussed and that both Mr. Balfour and Sir Edward Carson had agreed that a change of First Sea Lord was desirable.

"At the end of the interview the Sea Lords had another conference, but adjourned without coming to a decision, as it was felt that until Oliver and myself had seen the First Lord a decision should be postponed.

At about 6 p.m., as I had not been sent for by the First Lord, I asked the Sea Lords to meet and come to a decision in order to leave me free to deal with the personal aspect of the situation. At the meeting I argued strongly that the opinions which I understood had been expressed by Balfour and Carson carried so much weight that the Sea Lords would not be justified in resigning as a protest against what, in their opinion, might well prove a calamity to the country.

First Lord and Wemyss went north to Rosyth.

December 28th. First Lord and Wemyss returned, and my personal situation became so acute that I both gave a verbal resignation and received a verbal dismissal, on which I quitted the Admiralty on leave.

December 31st, Monday. Returned to the Admiralty for interview with First Lord. Heard no further developments this day as regards action by Sea Lords.

Tuesday, January 1st. Returned to Admiralty to make formal decision, whether I remained on Board. First Lord sick and away all day.

Found situation has become acute on account of it having become known that Sir E. Carson declared that he had always maintained that Jellicoe was the only possible man for the post of First Sea Lord. Correspondence had passed between Sir Edward Carson and Jellicoe on the matter. In the afternoon Halsey saw Carson by arrangement; the latter corroborated every detail what he had written to Jellicoe. Sea Lords met at 7.15 and decided to address a new note to First Lord pointing out how seriously we viewed the development of the situation, and making it plain that unless the matter were cleared up we would not remain his colleagues.

Draft discussed. Oliver agreed to draw up the document."

The gist of the document was that the Sea Lords had full confidence in Sir John Jellicoe and they were gravely concerned

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at his removal. They agreed they had no constitutional right to question the action of the First Lord in this respect, but at the same time they felt that they had a responsibility to the country. Moreover, Sir Edward Carson had categorically denied that he had made any such statement as the Sea Lords had understood was attributed to him. They therefore asked Sir Eric to explain the discrepancy, but said that they would continue their duties until an explanation was afforded.

So far the history was written by Admiral Duff at the time. At this point it is well to return to Lord Jellicoe's account. He had heard of the statement that Sir Eric Geddes was said to have made to the Sea Lords. He then wrote :

"I had seen Carson the day before who had told me that he considered my leaving a national disaster and that he had so informed Bonar Law and was going to say the same to the Prime Minister. He also said that he knew of no one who could take my place, and that the whole time he was First Lord he could never find any prominent Naval officer who did not agree that I was the person best fitted for the post of First Sea Lord."

Sir John wrote at once to Sir E. Carson, saying what he had heard—Carson immediately wrote to Sir Eric denying that he had made any such statement as had been attributed to him. Sir Eric replied in a letter so obscurely expressed that neither Carson nor Jellicoe, who was shown the correspondence, could understand what he meant to convey. The matter ended by Sir Edward Carson telling Sir Eric that he desired no further communication from him on the matter. Mr. Balfour wrote to Sir Edward Carson, in reply to a letter from the latter, denying also that he had made any such statement. The King was informed that Sir John had lost the confidence of the Cabinet. Sir Edward Carson, however, told Sir John several times that he knew for a fact that the matter had never been discussed at the Cabinet at all—General Smuts wrote to Lady Jellicoe deploring the fact that Sir John was leaving the Admiralty, and said he first heard of it when it was published in the Press.

Admiral Duff continues :

"The climax came with an invitation from Lytton, Pretymann and Macnamara to meet the Sea Lords and discuss the whole matter, and especially the letter we addressed to the First Lord after Halsey's interview with Carson.

The line taken by the politicians was that Balfour's memory of events had failed,¹ so it had become simply a question of whether Geddes or Carson had the better memory ; that for patriotic reasons, we were bound to remain ; that our going would create a great *furor* in the country, and that we would be universally condemned for creating a turmoil in the country. On the larger question of whether Jellicoe's dismissal warranted our resignation on patriotic grounds we were in a position of some difficulty, as Wemyss being an untried man ² we could not say he must prove a failure. After interminable argument we decided to remain. My position was a peculiar one, as although dismissed by the First Lord, I had had in my pocket for some days a letter asking me to remain, which I had purposely left unanswered, and in fact had not decided what answer to make. There is one thing that I can most certainly put on record and that is that the decision of the Naval Lords was very much against their inclination, and was come to on purely patriotic grounds."

The Sea Lords, having decided to remain, initialled a memorandum to the First Lord agreeing that a misunderstanding anent his statement must have taken place.

Lord Jellicoe now continues :

"At the time that I left, Geddes sent Everett (Naval Secretary) over to me with a suggested communiqué to the Press. I said I did not desire to associate myself with the communiqué but that I objected to any further statement about future employment, as it would be only eye-wash. Later, in spite of this, the proposed communiqué was sent me by Steele (Private Secretary) at Geddes's desire, to obtain my concurrence. I repeated my desire not to be associated with it ; but said that as I was asked I objected to the paragraph about my services (which was an inadequate description) and to the paragraph mentioning further employment.

Both however were included.

The occasion of my departure from the Admiralty brought me a very large number of letters from Naval officers, especially those who had served with me in the Grand Fleet. They were all of the most flattering character and deplored my departure. The receipt of these letters gave me all the assurance I required that I had retained the confidence of the fleet and the Navy. Many of the letters from the Captains were written in the names of the

¹ This was not so, as he had written to Carson corroborating the latter's statements, as will be seen in the third volume of Sir E. Carson's life by Mr. Ian Colvin. This was unknown at the time to the Sea Lords.

² As an administrator and in responsibilities attaching to the office of First Sea Lord.

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officers and men and I heard from many sources that the men were greatly disturbed. Indeed, I received letters from some of them.

The question of the action to be taken as to my dismissal was discussed by Mr. Asquith, Mr. McKenna and Mr. Runciman, all of whom were greatly disturbed at my leaving. Mr. Asquith saw Mr. Bonar Law about it and asked what reply would be made to a question from him as to why I had gone. Bonar Law stated that the reply would be to the effect, that there was no specific reason beyond the fact that a change was considered desirable, as the organizations were being changed, and it was thought best to have as First Sea Lord an officer who was not committed to the older methods.

In view of this the three ex-Ministers considered it would be useless to press the question. They realized that the reasons given might not be the whole of the reasons ; but that the attitude adopted was one from which no result could be obtained. I agreed, and no action on the subject with my consent was taken.

I had discussed the question also with Lord Selborne. My own view was that it was more dignified to say nothing at all on the subject, at any rate while the War lasted."

Mr. Bonar Law's reply was, of course, an official exactitude.

Sir John deals thus with the changes.

"(a) The new Deputy First Sea Lord, Rear-Admiral Hope ¹ (who succeeded Admiral Wemyss, the previous Deputy First Sea Lord), and who, since the spring of 1917, had been Director of the Operations Division, was given the responsibility for operations in foreign waters with a Director of Operations (foreign) under him. The special gifts, experience, and aptitude of this particular officer for such work enabled him, no doubt, to relieve the pressure on the First Sea Lord for administrative detail very materially.

(b) The Operations Division was separated into two parts. This was a change in name only.

(c) The Director of the Intelligence Division and the Director of Training and Staff Duties were shown as working immediately under First Sea Lord.

(d) A Director of the Air Division was introduced, as the Naval Air Service had been separated from the Admiralty and placed under the Air Ministry."

Everyone must recognize that these alterations were trifling, but they served to give a faint colour wash to Mr. Bonar Law's statement, and would without doubt have been agreed to by Sir John Jellicoe.

¹ Afterwards Admiral Sir George Hope, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

What then is the explanation of Sir John Jellicoe's dismissal? Let us review the reasons given :

(1) Sir Eric Geddes, quite rightly from the constitutional point of view, pointed out to the Sea Lords that they had no right to demand reasons ; but as man to man he gave reasons which apparently were so involved or vague that the Sea Lords believed that Sir Edward Carson and Mr. Balfour had agreed that it was desirable that Jellicoe should leave the Admiralty.

This erroneous interpretation of the interview was stoutly denied by Sir Edward, and also by Mr. Balfour.

(2) The King was told that the Cabinet had decided on Jellicoe's removal. This Sir Edward denied and General Smuts was horrified at such action being taken.

(3) The public were to be informed, had Mr. Asquith asked a question in the House of Commons, that there was no specific reason beyond the fact that a change in organization at the Admiralty had been decided on, and it was thought better to have as First Sea Lord an officer who was not committed to the older methods.

The changes that were actually made, we have shown, were such as those to which Sir John would readily have agreed.

(4) And lastly, thirteen years afterwards, the Official History ¹ of the War had the effrontery to advance as a reason for Sir John's supersession that "Great as were Sir John's powers, and admirable as were his devotion and endurance, there was among those who met him frequently at the Council table no doubt that the strain was bearing hard upon him, and could not further be prolonged with justice to him or advantage to the Service."

That this is contrary to fact is borne out by the testimony of Sir Edward Carson, and General Smuts, as well as by that of the six Sea Lords,² and Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson who were in constant communication with him. Further, Mr. Asquith, Mr. McKenna and Mr. Runciman should certainly have been so informed.

Had mental or physical failing been the real cause, both Sir Eric Geddes and Mr. Lloyd George would have stated the fact openly, but to have done so would have been to court ridicule

¹ It should be appreciated that in a paragraph attached to the title page of this book the Admiralty state that they "are in no way responsible for the accuracy of its statements."

² In their memo to the First Lord the Six Sea Lords stated that they had full confidence in Sir John's ability to perform his responsible duties.

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and contradiction. In fact, Mr. McKenna writes¹: "The suggestion that Jellicoe was suffering from strain is new to me and quite ridiculous. I saw him constantly at the time and he certainly showed no indication whatever of unusual fatigue."

One thing, however, is perfectly apparent, and that is that there was no real reason, in substance, for so drastic and dangerous a step being taken as to remove a man of the calibre of Sir John Jellicoe from high executive office while a war for national existence was being waged by the country.

Shortly after Jellicoe had been dismissed, Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair was sounded by Admiral Wemyss as to whether he would consent to take a seat on the Board of Admiralty. Admiral de Chair naturally refused, as he felt that he could not meekly acquiesce in what he considered was an injustice to Jellicoe and a danger to the nation, and he expressed himself forcibly on the subject.

In the allocation of honours for war service we are reminded of the awards accorded to Nelson after the Battle of the Nile.

Sir John Jervis, after the battle of Finisterre, where the success attained was largely due to Nelson, was created an Earl.

Nelson, after a far more material victory at the Battle of the Nile, was created a Baron.

Much in the same spirit, Jellicoe, who had destroyed the sea power of the High Sea Fleet at Jutland and broken the back of the German submarine warfare, was created a Viscount—a title usually reserved for a moderately efficient Cabinet Minister on retirement. Truly as was said of Nelson:

"The degree of rank which the Prime Minister thought proper to allot was a measure of the gratitude of the Government, though not of his services."

In reviewing the arbitrary action of Mr. Lloyd George, whereby he deprived the country of the services of the most efficient of its Naval officers during the vital struggle on the sea, it is well to take into account how people other than Mr. Lloyd George and Sir Eric Geddes viewed Sir John Jellicoe as an administrator. It was commonly known at the Admiralty that every minute written by Sir John impelled action. He did not merely comment, as is so often the case with administrators; he either ordered a definite line of action, or, where the concurrence of the First Lord had to be obtained, he proposed a definite policy. A peculiar tribute comes from a man² who met Sir John only once during the War,

¹ Dated 21.8.36.

² Sir Charles Fielding, K.B.E.

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but that once was sufficient to imprint indelibly on his memory a recognition of capacity for action on the part of one whom he calls the "great little man."

"Not only was he a magnificent sailor, but had he been a business man, he would have been amongst the most successful. I remember a very smart piece of business he did during the War. Lord Jellicoe, Lord Milner and myself were appointed by the War Cabinet as a small committee to settle a certain question. We had a meeting the same evening at five o'clock for an hour, and the next evening at five o'clock for another hour. At the end of that time the decision was arrived at to be reported to the War Cabinet. Lord Jellicoe, as Chairman, had to draw up the report. My own experience of other Government Departments suggested to me that I should get the document for signature in about three or four days. Jellicoe drew it up that evening and had it typed, signed by himself and Milner, and on my desk at the Ministry of Munitions for my signature at ten o'clock the next morning."

Another competent judge, Sir Robert Borden, the Prime Minister of Canada, in conversation expressed the wish that it had been possible for him to have Lord Jellicoe as a member of his Cabinet.

His wonderful record in New Zealand, and the manner in which his ministers looked to him for assistance, and valued his help, bear witness to his capacity as an administrator. Lastly, there was no Naval officer of experience in 1917 who would not, without reservation, have agreed that there was no one in the Navy who had so great a general knowledge of the varied weapons of that Service and their uses, and of the functions of the widely differing ships and vessels.

Yet all this ability, all this unique experience, was swept on one side by the arbitrary act of a Prime Minister, who, whatever his ability might have been as a politician, was utterly ignorant of the Naval Service and its requirements, and whose great boast was that he could break through red tape; even, apparently, when red tape meant the delay that was necessary to ensure sound, and not rash, action.

The fact was, that throughout his Premiership during the War, Mr. Lloyd George was ever looking for a soldier and sailor who would promise to win the War within three months. Hence his dissatisfaction with the splendid material he had at his disposal. It is not at all improbable that the press campaign against Sir John Jellicoe, backed up by the ignorant criticism of his conduct

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of the Battle of Jutland, led Mr. Lloyd George to believe that Sir John was no longer a popular figure but was esteemed to be a failure. This being so, it seemed that little adverse comment would ensue if he were to dispose of this firm, tenacious, and therefore inconvenient, man, who spoke strongly, dispassionately and without optimism on such subjects as the necessity for food rationing, the dangers attending the dissipation of sea carrying capacity in eccentric campaigns, and the submarine peril.

Mr. Lloyd George little thought that in years to come, when the merits of Sir John's work came to be appreciated, that the treatment he meted out to him in 1917 would be reckoned one of his greatest mistakes as an administrator. It was far from his mind that Sir John's work at the Admiralty would then rise like the ghost in Hamlet, to add one more proof of that fatal inability to judge character and competence that dogged his path throughout his war administration.

However, there is this much to be said for Mr. Lloyd George ; he had the acumen to keep Sir John Jellicoe in office at the Admiralty until that great seaman had broken the back of the German Submarine Campaign and assured the country from starvation.

Then, having achieved this task, one which Sir John himself, at first, deemed to be almost impossible, he was thrown without ceremony, courtesy or excuse, on to the scrap-heap.

POSTSCRIPT I

AFTER the publication of Mr. Lloyd George's *War Memoirs* Lord Carson was interviewed on the subject of statements made therein regarding the services of Sir John Jellicoe. The following account of the interview is reproduced by courtesy of the Editor of the *Morning Post* :

"Just imagine ! What the little popinjay says amounts to this : ' When I became Prime Minister I found the Army without a General and the Navy without an Admiral, and I had to supply the place of both ! ' "

It is ridiculous on the face of it ! Just consider ! On the one hand you have Jellicoe who knew every branch of Naval warfare and whom the Navy trusted ; who, as they all agreed, was the best man they had ; and, on the other side, you have Mr. Lloyd George who could only know what other people told him, for he knew nothing at all about it. How could anyone hesitate between two such opinions ?

And let me say here what I thought of Admiral Jellicoe. He was, in my opinion, for what it is worth, the best man at his job that I met with in the whole course of the War—for knowledge, calmness, straightness, and the confidence he inspired in his officers. Admiral Beatty himself told me that Jellicoe was the best possible man to be First Sea Lord. Beatty's strength was action, he was like a cavalry leader, but Jellicoe had these qualities, and that knowledge which made him the ideal man for the direction of the whole Navy."

When it was pointed out that Mr. Lloyd George had stated that Admiral Jellicoe was against the convoy system, Lord Carson replied :

"It is the biggest lie ever was told ! Why I, myself, took the First Sea Lord to have breakfast with the Prime Minister in order to explain the position to him. Jellicoe did not oppose the Convoy system, but he required time to organize it ; he told Mr. Lloyd George that the time was not ripe. At first there were not enough suitable ships available for that work, and it was thought that to have a bad convoy was worse than to have no convoy at all. You can imagine what havoc might have been wrought if one or two submarines had found a rich concentration of merchantmen under the guard of ships unequal to the defence. It was not easy to provide the cruisers and destroyers, and the merchant skippers themselves said they would rather trust to their own heels, and their own judgment, in getting through than be all packed together under the convoy of some old cruiser slower than themselves. But the Prime Minister would not listen to reason. Almost every day he would be demanding that I make a change at the Admiralty. 'Sack the lot !' was his favourite expression. 'Why don't you get fresh men with sea experience ?' One day I said to him, 'I must be under a strange hallucination, Mr. Prime Minister, for I thought that Admiral Jellicoe had just come from the sea !'

I had a list made out of all the Naval officers at the Admiralty with a record of their services, which I had great pleasure in showing to the Prime Minister, for it proved how very many of them had seen active service. But this did not convince him a bit. He would meet some imaginative midshipman, or sub-lieutenant, from the fleet who would set him going all over again. Once at his request I saw a junior officer who Mr. Lloyd George thought was going to save the situation. Well, I said I would gladly see the young gentleman and he came to my room. I told him that as there was no one present but myself he could speak with complete freedom. He said, 'Thank you Sir, since you ask me to speak freely let me say that I have no confidence in Admiral Jellicoe.'"

Lord Carson chuckled reminiscently.

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"So we went over the First Sea Lord's record together and he could find no fault with it ; and, beyond that, he had no practical suggestion to offer at all. The tittle-tattle grew to be such a plague that I had to issue an order that, if officers were found to be gossiping about the affairs of the Admiralty at people's luncheon tables, I would take a serious view of their conduct. But I suppose Mr. Lloyd George must have listened to it.

The constant fault-finding was not only discouraging to the High Command, but was bad for discipline. If I had done what Mr. Lloyd George asked me to do the whole thing would have broken down.

Mr. Lloyd George, indeed, was so rude to Admiral Jellicoe that the First Sea Lord came to me several times and pressed me to accept his resignation, stating that, as the Prime Minister had obviously no confidence in him, it would be better if the Government got someone in who they trusted.

'My dear Admiral,' I said, 'who is your Ministerial Chief?' and he replied, 'Why you, Sir.'

So I said, 'Have you ever found that I lacked confidence in you?' and he was good enough to reply that there were the happiest relations between us.

'Then my dear Admiral,' I said, 'let me say to you what I should say to the youngest officer in the Service—Carry on.'"

POSTSCRIPT II

ALTHOUGH further evidence is unnecessary to prove the good work done by Sir John Jellicoe when First Sea Lord, yet it will not be out of place to add the testimony of Lord Lytton, who was a Civil Lord of the Admiralty during this period. He wrote :

"Of Sir John Jellicoe's services at the Admiralty in the later days of the Great War I can speak from personal knowledge. I know that our ultimate salvation was due to the anti-submarine organization which he established when he became First Sea Lord. That was a service that cannot be exaggerated, but not everyone knows how entirely this was the work of Sir John Jellicoe."

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson, an officer of great ability, who was looked up to by the Navy as the finest Admiral the country possessed prior to the War, who had a happy knack of direct comment, thus summed up Sir John's dismissal : "The dismissal of Sir John Jellicoe is a disgraceful concession to an unscrupulous Press agitation."

CHAPTER XXIV

February, 1919 to August, 1919 The World Cruise—Part I

The true processe of English policie
Of utterward to keepe this reign in rest
Of our England—that no man may deny
Nor say of sooth—but it is one of the best
In this that who seeth South North East and West
Cherishe merchandise, keepe the Admiraltie.

*A libel on English Policie
from*

Hakluyt's Voyages.

THIS chapter deals with an important but not spectacular work undertaken by Lord Jellicoe for the Empire.

In 1919 he accepted the invitation of the Admiralty to go on a Naval Mission to visit India, Australia, New Zealand and Canada in order to confer with the Governments of those Dominions with a view to determining the best way in which they could help the Mother Country in supporting her Naval forces. At the same time, in addition to these conferences, while in each Dominion his mission visited all the harbours, inspected the Naval facilities, wrote volumes dealing with the requirements peculiar to each country, and made concrete suggestions for the creation of disciplined Naval forces. Beyond this the mission compiled statistics showing the cost of equipping and maintaining forces of various sizes, so that the respective Governments should have material from which to choose the help it could give and that which was most suitable to its finances.

The story of the mission is a record of work done and places visited. It reveals the extraordinary enthusiasm with which the peoples welcomed Lord Jellicoe as representing the British Navy, and also for his personal services during the War.

There is little doubt that the visit of so great a national figure as Lord Jellicoe, as well as the knowledge that he brought to bear on the problems of the defence of the Empire, did much to strengthen the ties between the Dominions and the Mother Country.

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It is, of course, impolitic to give more than a general account of the various reports or the proposals submitted by Lord Jellicoe to the various Governments, since these are of a secret nature. Needless to say, the reports of the mission do not make reading of general interest, but in spite of this it is undoubtedly desirable to leave on record a summary of the work that was carried out, and of the cordial welcome extended by the people of each Dominion.

In March, 1917, the Imperial War Conference requested the Admiralty to consider what would be the most effective post-War scheme of Naval defence for the Empire. The result was an Admiralty Memorandum, submitted in May, 1918, which sought, in view of the experience gained during the War, to resuscitate the ideal of a single Imperial Navy. The whole Naval force of the Empire was to form one Navy, all effective units being under the control of an Imperial Naval Authority, both in peace and war. Ships were to be available to serve in any waters, and officers and men in any ship. Local Navy Boards, each under a Minister for the Navy, were to be established by the Dominions working in co-operation with the Imperial Naval Authority but directly responsible to their own Parliaments. The Imperial Naval Authority and its staff was to deal with all questions of Naval strategy, and subjects connected with the provision, equipment, efficiency, organization and utilization of the Navy as a fighting force.

The Memorandum was considered by the Dominion Ministers, who ultimately informed the Admiralty that the proposals, as set forth in the Admiralty Memorandum, for a single Navy at all times under a central Naval Authority were not considered practicable. They maintained that, although purely from the standpoint of Naval strategy the reasons put forward for it might be strong, yet the experience gained in the War had shown that in time of war a Dominion Navy could operate with the highest efficiency as part of a united Navy under one direction and command established after the outbreak of war. On the other hand, they fully recognized, and had always kept in view, that the character of construction, armament and equipment, and the methods and principles of training, administration and organization, should proceed upon the same lines in all the navies of the Empire. The Ministers went on to inform the First Lord that for this purpose the Dominions would welcome visits from a highly qualified representative of the Admiralty who, by reason of his ability and experience, would be thoroughly competent to advise the Naval authorities

of the Dominions in such matters. There can be little doubt that in making this suggestion the Dominion Ministers had, from the first, Lord Jellicoe in mind. A little later Sir Joseph Cook, Australian Minister for the Navy, who was then at Australia House, London, wrote to the First Lord as follows :

16.11.18.

"I should say that the duties required of Lord Jellicoe (in Australia) would be to view the whole Naval position in the light of the circumstances of the War, and more particularly with respect to the composition of the building scheme suggested by Sir Reginald Henderson ¹ some seven or eight years ago.

As you know, a very elaborate scheme was propounded, including a building programme to be completed about the year 1933, together with an extensive scheme of Naval Bases to meet these fleet developments of the future.

The War has modified our view of many things and most certainly the Navy will not have escaped the influence of the changed conditions. It is to look at the whole of the arrangements and prospects in the light of to-day that we should like Lord Jellicoe's services to be made available to us. What we require is the opinion of a man whose authority and status will secure for it unquestioned respect throughout Australia. I think Lord Jellicoe such a man, hence my anxiety that you should let us have him for the purpose named."

On November 18, 1918, Lord Jellicoe accepted the mission to visit Australia, New Zealand and Canada, provided that the date of departure was postponed till March, 1919. He proposed during the interval to study the whole subject in readiness for his visit. The Viceroy of India ² subsequently agreed to the mission being extended to embrace India. The question of including South Africa presented difficulties. Eventually it was decided that it was impossible to arrange a date that would suit the political state of that country without unduly prolonging the time the mission would be absent from England ; the visit was, therefore, in the end, abandoned.

The War Cabinet having given approval to the arrangements, a public announcement on the subject was issued to the Press on December 20, 1918, in the following terms :

"It having been intimated by the Dominion Ministers, at the

¹ Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson, G.C.B.

² Lord Chelmsford, afterwards Viscount Chelmsford, G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., G.B.E.

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close of the recent Imperial War Conference, that the Dominions would welcome visits from a highly qualified representative of the Admiralty for the purpose of advising the Dominion Authorities on Naval matters, the Board of Admiralty, with the approval of the War Cabinet, have deputed Admiral Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa, G.C.B., O.M., to proceed on a visit to the Dominions and India for this purpose early in the New Year."

The following instructions were handed to Lord Jellicoe :

"1. The Admiralty have had under their consideration the invitation contained in the Memorandum of 15th August from the Dominion Ministers, stating that the Dominions would welcome visits from a highly qualified representative of the Admiralty for purposes of advice.

2. Whilst the Admiralty do not depart from their declared views as to what would be the most effective scheme of Naval defence of the Empire, they cordially recognize that the main object of this invitation is the promotion of uniformity in Naval organization and training and types of Naval *matériel* throughout the Empire with a view to efficient Naval co-operation.

3. They therefore propose to depute Lord Jellicoe to visit the Dominions to advise the Dominion Authorities whether in the light of the experience of the War, the scheme of Naval organization which has been adopted or may be in contemplation requires re-consideration, either from the point of view of the efficiency of that organization for meeting local needs, or from that of ensuring the greatest possible homogeneity and co-operation between all the Naval forces of the Empire.

4. Should Dominion Authorities desire to consider how far it is possible for the Dominions to take a more effective share in the Naval defence of the Empire, he will give assistance from the naval point of view in drawing up a scheme for consideration."

In some ways paragraph 2 was the most important part of Lord Jellicoe's instructions. It accepted the view of the Dominion Prime Ministers that the object of the visits was to advise them how to get the greatest possible efficiency, homogeneity and co-operation between all the Naval forces of the Empire on the lines which they had decided to follow, in preference to the scheme recommended in the Admiralty Memorandum of May 17, 1918. It, however, appeared to reserve the Admiralty position in regard to that scheme. At the same time it was apparently intended to ensure that Lord Jellicoe himself should understand that he was to consider any proposals made by the Dominions on their merits,

and not merely to use them as a means of carrying on a crusade on behalf of the Admiralty scheme.

It had been intended that India should be visited after the Dominions, but early in January it was ascertained that this would not suit the Government of India, and Sir Joseph Cook agreed to the postponement of Lord Jellicoe's arrival in Australia. The Viceroy asked that Lord Jellicoe should reach Delhi before March 15 as he (the Viceroy) had to go on tour on March 22. This was impossible owing to work which was in progress on board the *New Zealand*, and the India Office were so informed. Before sailing, it was arranged that on arrival at Bombay Lord Jellicoe should proceed at once to Delhi, where the Government of India would still be assembled, and where the Viceroy undertook that any officials he wished to meet could be summoned. But up to the date of sailing Lord Jellicoe's instructions in respect of his Indian visit had not been formulated. On February 21, just before sailing, he telegraphed to the Admiralty asking that these instructions might be telegraphed to him before he left Suez, and actually they were cabled to him on March 3, two days before he left Suez. They were to the effect that he should advise the Government of India whether the existing Naval organization required reconsideration as a result of war experience, either from the point of view of its efficiency for meeting local needs, or in order to ensure the greatest possible homogeneity and co-operation between all the Naval forces of the Empire. Further, in the event of the Government of India desiring to consider the possibility of India's taking a more effective share in the Naval defence of the Empire, he was to give assistance from the Naval point of view in drawing up a scheme for consideration.

The status to which Lord Jellicoe was entitled as head of a mission was in some doubt, so before sailing he applied in writing to be given the

"status of a Commander-in-Chief . . . as, in the event of my being given an inferior status, the importance and prestige of the mission would be lowered in the eyes of the people of the Dominions, a result which, I feel sure Their Lordships will agree, would be regrettable."

For various reasons it was not convenient to give him the status of a Commander-in-Chief. But the Board of Admiralty approved of his having a status *equivalent* to that of a Commander-in-Chief,

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and the India and Colonial Offices were so informed. In India he was awarded order of precedence after No. 6 in the Indian Table, i.e. after the Army Commander-in-Chief, and Lieutenant-Governors.

With a happy foresight the *New Zealand*, a Dreadnought cruiser presented to the British Navy by that Dominion, had been chosen to convey the mission. Moreover, the selection was almost prophetic, as it was to New Zealand that Lord Jellicoe went as Governor-General shortly after the termination of the cruise. H.M.S. *New Zealand* sailed on February 21, 1919. The programme of the tour as actually carried out is shown in Postscript I.

It should be mentioned here that the great interest which the tour aroused in all parts of the world led to numerous requests for its extension. For instance, the Governor of Tasmania, at the request of his Ministers, took special steps to ensure that Tasmania should be included in the Australian itinerary. The China Association in London, on behalf of their Shanghai Branch, pressed the Admiralty to allow Lord Jellicoe to visit Shanghai. A like request on behalf of the European Community in Saigon was made through the British Consul. The Admiralty, however, were obliged to reply that it would not be possible for the tour to be extended to China.

The mission was peculiar in one respect, namely that the *New Zealand*, a British man-of-war flying the flag of Admiral Lord Jellicoe, also carried Lady Jellicoe. This again was a happy provision, for in view of the amount of entertaining that was bound to occur at every port visited, a hostess was a most desirable addition to the mission. Captain Oliver Leggett¹ was in command of the ship, and the staff which accompanied Lord Jellicoe was composed of Commodore F. C. Dreyer, C.B., C.B.E., as Chief of the Staff, Paymaster-Captain H. H. Share, C.B., as Secretary, Commander B. H. Ramsay, M.V.O., Flag-Lieutenant L. V. Morgan, M.V.O., D.S.C., Commander H. R. Sawbridge as Anti-Submarine Officer, Lieutenant-Commander R. H. de Salis, D.S.C., as Mining Officer, Wing Commander E. D. M. Robertson, D.F.C., of the Royal Air Force (joined later) and Paymaster-Commander C. K. Lloyd, Secretary to the Chief of the Staff. During the few weeks at their disposal at the Admiralty, it devolved on this staff to collect detailed information on almost every subject connected with the Navy, varying from Foreign Intelligence to the cost of maintenance of

¹ Afterwards Vice-Admiral O. E. Leggett, C.B.

an Admiralty trawler, and from the minutes of an Imperial Conference to the daily movement of an enemy raider.

When the *New Zealand* sailed she also had on board, as Lord Jellicoe's guests, Mr. Reginald McKenna ; Captain P. F. Warner, of cricket fame, who took passage as far as Egypt ; and Mr. Eustace Burrows, the Admiral's cousin.

Bad weather was experienced on the way to Gibraltar. On arrival, deputations from the Chamber of Commerce presented Lord Jellicoe with an address of welcome and congratulation. A garden party given by the Governor, and sundry dinners were included in the official functions. Port Said was reached on March 3, and during the coaling Lord Jellicoe and his Staff visited Cairo and, accompanied by Sir Milne Cheetham, the acting High Commissioner, paid an official visit to the Khedive. On the evening of the 5th the *New Zealand* left for Bombay. The Admiral and his Staff were daily employed, during the passage, in investigating the problems concerning the Indian Ocean and preparing a report for the Viceroy and his Council. On arrival at Aden, further reports on the subject of Naval Defence, etc., were received from the Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies Station, Rear-Admiral Sir Ernest Gaunt, K.C.B. The condition existing, and future policy regarding the constitutions of the squadron in East Indian waters, personnel, defence of harbours, costs of maintenance, etc., were dealt with, ready for full discussion with the local authorities on arrival in India. From Aden Lord Jellicoe telegraphed that his work in India would be facilitated if he could be kept informed of the direction in which opinion at the Peace Conference was heading in the matter of prohibiting submarines or limiting their use—a policy which was, and is, favoured by the British Admiralty. But it was not until after he had left India that the Admiralty were able to give him any forecast of the probable decision of the Conference, which was, of course, like that of subsequent international conferences, unfavourable to the British view.

On March 14, the *New Zealand* arrived at Bombay. The Chairman of the Municipal Corporation, Mr. Rahumtulla Currimbhoy, read an address of welcome to Lord Jellicoe. The usual official visits were exchanged. Lord Jellicoe and Staff then left for Delhi. On the following Monday, the conferences began, Lord Jellicoe conferring with the Viceroy and the members of his Council. Daily conferences took place until the 21st. The weather was consistently good throughout the stay and though high, the tem-

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perature was dry and bearable. Lord Jellicoe then visited Agra, Cawnpore and Lucknow, returning to the *New Zealand* on March 26. Work on the report was then pushed forward with energy. The *New Zealand* paid a visit to Karachi, where the local defences were examined, returning to Bombay on April 2. On the way back, a little preliminary practice with big-game rifles was carried out by the Admiral and the Chief of the Staff, as they had been invited by the Maharajah of Gwalior to take part in a tiger shoot. In the meantime Lady Jellicoe had met a tiger when out shooting with Miss Thesiger at Dehra Dun, but wisely the *shikari* who was with them dissuaded them from shooting at him, as they were on foot.

Shortly before the ship reached Bombay, a telegram was received from the Admiralty informing Lord Jellicoe of his promotion to Admiral of the Fleet, as from April 3, and ordering him to hoist his flag accordingly. At 6 a.m. on April 3 therefore his personal flag, the Union Jack, was broken at the main. The following were among the telegrams exchanged on Lord Jellicoe's promotion : "Grand Fleet tender heartiest congratulations on your high promotion—David Beatty." Lord Jellicoe replied : "Please convey my warmest thanks to the Grand Fleet for congratulations. It is especially pleasant to me as it will be to the Grand Fleet that you are similarly honoured."

April 7 was remarkable in that, for the first time since arriving on March 14, the Admiral had an evening free from engagements. The whole visit had been a succession of receptions, addresses and functions which supplemented the very hard work and the daily technical work of the mission.

Much assistance was rendered to the mission throughout the stay in India by General Loch, who was untiring in making arrangements for the Staff officers to visit the important parts of the coast-line, harbours, land sites and fortifications. His great experience was invaluable to the commission.

On April 18 the Admiral of the Fleet and Chief of the Staff and Flag-Lieutenant took a holiday, going to stay with the Maharajah of Gwalior, who had prepared a four-day tiger shoot of five beats. On the first day a sandstorm somewhat interfered with the arrangements. In the afternoon, however, when shooting from a *machan*, Lord Jellicoe wounded a tiger in the foot. The Chief of the Staff, Flag-Commander, and Flag-Lieutenant proceeded to track it on foot, and the first-named with a snap shot hit the beast

in the head at 20 yards. This drove him into the open, where the Admiral finished him off. He measured 8 feet 1 inch. The next day, Sunday, the Admiral of the Fleet and others attended service at the English church at 8.30 a.m. On this day a tigress was killed ; it was uncertain by whom, so it was called the "Staff tigress" ; it measured 9 feet 1 inch. On the third day, a tigress and two tigers were bagged. On the fourth day Lord Jellicoe brought down a tigress which, however, turned before stopping and mauled somewhat slightly two sepoys, whose wounds were treated with iodine and a *douceur* of 300 rupees each from the Maharajah, to which Lord Jellicoe added a further 100 rupees. The whole stay had been pleasant and successful under the able and kindly management of the Maharajah.

At the conclusion of this visit Lord Jellicoe went to Simla, where a typed report was handed to Lord Chelmsford, the Viceroy ; and for a couple of days tennis and riding were indulged in while the Report was in the hands of the printers. While travelling from Simla to Bombay, Lord and Lady Jellicoe visited the Maharajah again at Gwalior. After breakfast Lady Jellicoe was taken to see the Maharajah's two wives and children. She found them singing Scotch songs. The children were called George and Mary after the King and Queen. On April 30 the *New Zealand* left for Colombo. Messages were exchanged between the Admiral of the Fleet and the Viceroy and Governor of Bombay. Everyone left with regret, but with many pleasant memories of the kindness and hospitality which the officers and men had met with during their stay.

Before Bombay was left the citizens of that city presented the ship with a beautifully-worked silver Benares bowl, and two carved headpieces representing Maori heads, and some months later came a consignment of matchboxes with the arms of the city embossed on them—one for each officer and man in the ship.

The Report rendered by Lord Jellicoe to the Viceroy consisted of a covering letter, one confidential volume of general recommendations, and a secret appendix printed separately. Copies were also forwarded to the Admiralty. The Report drew attention to the lessons of the War, and stated that war experience had shown that the present Naval organization did not meet requirements in Indian waters. The organization was deficient in that the number of vessels in the East Indies Squadron, available for the protection of trade against enemy surface vessels, was insufficient. Harbours were inadequately defended against modern sub-

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marine attack and bombardment from the sea. There was no minesweeping organization such as the War had shown to be essential. Lord Jellicoe submitted that the first direction in which India should meet her naval responsibilities should be to provide for the adequate defence of the principal harbours against such forms of attack as were probable in future wars. He then went on to suggest the abolition of the Royal Indian Marine, as then constituted, and the formation of a Royal Indian Navy manned and maintained, so far as was possible, by the people of India, supplemented by help from the Royal Navy. The necessary training establishments should be started and there should be a Naval Board, whose head should be a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council. In his letter to the Admiralty, Lord Jellicoe explained that the Government of India did not seek his advice on any definite points, nor did they suggest any particular line of policy, and that therefore, after a close examination of the conditions existing in India, he took it upon himself to suggest such a policy and organization. It is interesting to note that Lord Jellicoe's conception materialized fifteen years later, by the Royal Indian Navy being constituted in August, 1934.

On the passage to Australia the old time-honoured ceremony attending the initiation of novices who had not previously crossed the "line" took place, on Thursday, May 8. It was the first occasion in the history of the world on which an Admiral of the Fleet had crossed the equator with his flag flying on board a man-of-war. Each novice received a summons from Father Neptune worded in the following terms :

"Whereas it has pleased Us to convene a Court to be held on board His Britannic Majesty's ship *New Zealand* on the Upper Deck thereof at the hour of 9.30 a.m.

By these presents we summon you to appear at the said Court to tender us the usual homage and to be initiated into the mystic rites according to the ancient usages of our kingdom. Hereof you, nor any of you may fail, as you will answer at your peril, and to the delight of our trusty bodyguard."

The Admiral of the Fleet, on seeing the certificates to be awarded to all those who were duly initiated, decided to earn one for himself, although it was by no means the first time he had crossed the equator. A bath and ducking stool were duly provided and the court proceeded merrily. His Majesty invested the officers

with the Order of the Old Sea Dog, the Admiral receiving the most exalted order accompanied by the doggerel lines :

“ This order on you We bestow
An ‘ old sea dog ’ henceforth you go
With wishes of the best, Sir.”

The Commodore, Captain, Secretary and others received suitable grades of the order in appropriate terms. Lady Jellicoe was not forgotten and had bestowed on her the “ Insignia of the Most Unfathomable Order of the Deep Sea Needle.” She, also, was excused rendering homage, as she was suffering from the effects of a most ferocious and wanton attack made by an ampère which had leaped from an electric fan and bitten her severely, on the hand. Many old sea dogs insisted on re-initiation. Each candidate after presentation to Their Majesties was passed by the King’s Eminent Physician, who fortified him with a bitter tonic or a soap pill, occasionally both ; he also sounded their backs and chests with a wooden mallet, sometimes also their heads. The Barbers were busy. The Lady Barbers massaged (! !) the heads while two others lathered and shaved and made a speciality of trying to remove tattoo marks. Even the invalids from the sick bay insisted on being initiated. These were gently treated and were loudly cheered by their shipmates. Then the ducking began. King Neptune rose and said : “ My very old friend, the Admiral of the Fleet, has expressed a wish to be again initiated. I consider it a real honour that he pays Us and an example to other old friends of Ours.” Attended by his Staff he was duly ducked, and on emerging was received with three enthusiastic cheers from the whole company. A ripple of excitement ran through the audience as Lady Jellicoe came forward, in spite of the advice of her physician, so that she, ever a sportswoman, might receive the full right. A few drops of sacred water took the place of the bath ; shaving of course was unnecessary. The day’s proceedings ended in the Admiral of the Fleet giving a supper party on deck to all those who had taken part in the cast of the performance.

Three days afterwards Vice-Admiral Nakano, commanding the Japanese training squadron of two cruisers, *Tokiwa* and *Azuma*, passed and saluted the Admiral of the Fleet. Again during the whole passage preliminary documents were prepared for presentation to the Governor-General and Cabinet of the Australian Commonwealth.

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The *New Zealand* arrived at Albany on May 15, at which place a long stay was impossible, but the short time available was occupied with an inspection of the Naval base at Fremantle and consultation with the members of the Government of Western Australia at Perth. Lord and Lady Jellicoe stayed at Government House with Sir William and Lady Ellison-Macartney. Discussions took place with Mr. R. Settle, the Director of Naval Works, regarding the proposed Henderson Naval Base. Commander Ramsay, Wing-Commander Robertson, and Lieutenant-Commander de Salis proceeded to Melbourne to collect information and documents in readiness for the Admiral of the Fleet on arrival. The *New Zealand* next sailed for Port Lincoln and Adelaide ; a short time only was spent at the former place, and the ship arrived at Adelaide on May 25. The Admiral of the Fleet and Lady Jellicoe were the guests of Colonel Sir Henry Galway. A large number of places were visited, among which were the Town Hall for a civic reception, the Adelaide Club, the "Cheer up" Hut, a canteen for soldiers and sailors, Parliament House where lunch was served ; and then a reception was held in the evening. Next day Lord Jellicoe gave a lunch ; a reception was held at the Grand Central Hotel by the South Australian Branch of the Navy League, and in the evening a ball given by the Mayor. The *New Zealand* left for Melbourne at 4 a.m. the next morning. Such was the round of official receptions and functions ; similar entertainments took place at all the ports visited in Australian waters.

On May 29 the *New Zealand* anchored in Hobson Bay, off Williamstown, and at 10.15 a.m. the next day the Admiral of the Fleet and Lady Jellicoe drove to Government House, Melbourne. Unfortunately, H.E. the Hon. Sir Arthur Stanley, Governor of Victoria, was seriously ill and unable to take part in the reception ceremonies. However, the Admiral of the Fleet was able to pay him a visit in his own room. The Depot at Williamstown was inspected and also the large Naval Base at Flinders Bay, the party being accompanied by Admiral Sir William Creswell and officials from the Navy Office. A great feature of the reception of Lord Jellicoe by the people of Australia, in the distant townships as well as in the cities, was the genuineness of the admiration and the cordiality which were shown by all classes. Influenza claimed several victims among the officers of Lord Jellicoe's Staff. Work, however, proceeded regularly without interruption, for the Australian Report proved to be the most voluminous document of the

mission. Rear-Admiral E. P. F. Grant, C.B.,¹ relieved Admiral Creswell in the post of First Naval Member, but the latter remained to assist the work of the mission, to which he was attached for the whole period of the stay in Australian waters.

The *New Zealand* next visited Hobart in Tasmania. Unfortunately the ship's company were not free from influenza, and consequently the ship was placed in quarantine. Captain McArthur, the Harbour Master, came on board and accompanied the Admiral of the Fleet in his barge during his inspection of the harbour and Derwent River. He remained on board during the stay of the ship, and afterwards was landed at the quarantine station, where he remained for a fortnight under observation. After a comparatively rough passage they arrived at Jervis Bay, where the Royal Australian Naval College was inspected. There was no Chaplain at the College, so on Sunday, June 22, a number of officers and their wives came on board for service. Afterwards the chaplain landed and baptized eleven children of the officers and men who had been waiting some time for the ceremony. Lady Jellicoe acted as godmother to three of the children. It had been intended to have a large number of cadets on board to see the ship and have tea, but an outbreak of influenza prevented this, much to their chagrin.

On June 23 the *New Zealand* arrived at Sydney. Lord and Lady Jellicoe landed at 10 a.m. The course from the ship to the elaborately-decorated landing-place was lined by motor-launches, yachts, "eights" and small craft of every description. An official call was made on the Governor, Sir Walter E. Davidson, K.C.M.G. After consultation it was decided that with very few exceptions all official functions and entertainments should be cancelled, on account of a very serious outbreak of influenza. Then came a round of inspections—Cockatoo Island, the Dockyard, Garden Island, the Naval Base and Spectacle Island, the Ordnance Store. At 2.45 p.m. Sydney Signal Station passed the news that Germany had agreed to sign the Peace Treaty unconditionally. A thanksgiving service was held the next day on board, which was attended by the Governor-General and the Governor of New South Wales. His Excellency the Governor-General delivered a brief address of thanks and congratulations to the Admiral of the Fleet and officers and men as representatives of the Royal Navy. It is interesting to note that on this occasion officers wore frock coats and swords for the first time since the outbreak of the War. All officers assembled

¹ Afterwards Admiral Sir Edmund Grant, K.C.V.O.

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in the Admiral's cabin to drink the health of the King, and by His Majesty's command the "Main Brace" was spliced for the ship's company.

On June 24 the Admiral of the Fleet hoisted his flag in the *Suva*, a 2,200-ton ship belonging to the Australian Steam Navigation Co., which had been specially chartered to convey the mission to the Northern Territory and certain of the South Pacific Islands. The Admiral of the Fleet and Lady Jellicoe left by train for Brisbane.

Here is a typical incident :

"In our railway journey from Sydney to Brisbane every station we stopped at was crowded with people, and there was generally a brass band playing 'Rule Britannia.' Lord Jellicoe got no rest, as he had to show himself and say a few words on each occasion. One night about 10 p.m. he was sitting in the window of one of the carriages, at a little out-of-the-way station where the train had stopped for a few minutes (somehow the people in the district got to know the train might stop there and the station was crowded), the only lamps on the station were oil lamps and it was very dimly lighted. Two girls who had been walking along the platform looking in at all the windows, suddenly came to ours, and looked in, and said 'We want to see the Admiral,' and went on, 'We have never seen an Admiral and we have come 150 miles to see Lord Jellicoe.' Lord Jellicoe said, 'You have got your wish, you are talking to two Admirals now.' They were tremendously surprised. They told us they were the daughters of English parents and they loved England more than any other country on earth, though they had never been to England. They seemed quite thrilled at holding a little conversation with Lord Jellicoe and went away supremely happy." ¹

For part of the journey Major-General Sir Brudenell and Lady White travelled in company with Lord and Lady Jellicoe, and very interesting information on the Military questions of the Dominion was obtained from the General, who had served with distinction as Chief of the Staff to General Sir William Birdwood. Shortly before arriving at Brisbane, Mr. Ryan, the Premier, and Mrs. Ryan boarded the train. An official call was made on the Governor, Sir Hamilton J. Goold-Adams, G.C.M.G.

Then came the inspection of all the Naval Works. After which the *Suva* with the Admiral of the Fleet and Staff, also Rear-Admiral Sir Percy Grant, First Naval Member of the Australian Naval

¹ Admiral Sir Percy Grant, K.C.V.O.

Board, and Captain Hon. B. Clifford, Private Secretary to the Governor-General, sailed for the Solomon Islands. The respite from the interruption caused by festivities was very welcome and the work of the mission was pressed forward with energy. All the masses of information that had been collected, were analysed, considered and conclusions recorded.

The Admiral of the Fleet, accompanied by Rear-Admiral Sir Percy Grant and his Staff, went in a motor-boat to Inboli, about one hour's run, and visited the English missionary who, with his wife, gave them a warm welcome. Their astonishment and delight at Lord Jellicoe's sudden appearance was very great. At noon of the 11th the Admiral of the Fleet and Staff left for Tulagi with Mr. Charles Workman, the Resident Commissioner. They were met and escorted by a big native war canoe, manned by 24 natives, all of whom were prisoners convicted of murder, except four, who were warders. Originally the idea had been for the whole crew to consist of murderers, so keen were they to do honour to Lord Jellicoe, for the excitement among the natives at the prospective visit had been great; but Mr. Workman had decided that it was advisable to have the four warders. They paddled the canoe as fast as the motor-boat and kept up their war cry with yells that were truly stirring—a novel Naval escort for an Admiral of the Fleet. Needless to say, murder is not so heinous an offence in cannibal countries as in more civilized regions, and there are many mitigating considerations attaching to the crime. In the afternoon the Admiral of the Fleet received all the British residents; but just before stepping into the boat he took into his arms the baby girl of one of the mothers standing near and held her for a short time. The mother's look of joy was something to witness. The *Suva* left for Fauro Island and Rabaul. Here the British Administrator, Brigadier-General G. T. Johnston, C.B., C.M.G., called on the Admiral of the Fleet. The flag was then shifted to H.M.A.S. *Una*, late the German gunboat *Komet*, and Lord Jellicoe, accompanied by the Administrator, visited Duke of York Island.


The following account of Lord Jellicoe's energy and endurance has been left on record by Admiral Sir Percy Grant:

“At another Island at the entrance of the harbour on the south side was a precipitous cliff called the Sugar Loaf, about 560 feet high. We arrived before breakfast and Lord Jellicoe announced his intention of climbing the cliff after breakfast. The Staff were rather aghast at the idea, as it was somewhere about 105° temperature in

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the shade, and the cliff almost perpendicular. They approached me to see if I could dissuade him from this project and to suggest we could get an equally good view of the harbour by steaming round it in a motor-launch. Lord Jellicoe, however, was set on the climb ; so, after breakfast, we all landed at a small village at the foot of the cliff and having persuaded a native to act as guide, we made the ascent, with Lord Jellicoe and the guide leading. It was the steepest climb I ever remember, through dense brushwood in terrific heat. It was so steep we had to help one another almost step by step. On the way up I prevented one of the seamen who was accompanying us up, and just ahead of me, from taking up in his hands what he called a slug. It was the biggest and fattest centipede I have ever seen. There were lots of them about. Eventually we arrived at the top, and we threw ourselves down on little grass plots to take breath. Lord Jellicoe, though the oldest, seemed to be the freshest of the lot of us. Now came the question of getting down, and it looked such a difficult problem, we signalled to the ship to send ropes and sent the native guide to bring them up. However, as there was some delay in getting the ropes, we decided to risk the descent, so we slithered and slipped over boulders, most of the time in a sitting position, and eventually reached the beach ; but, I regret to say, several of us without the seat of our nether garments, and we had to secure our coats round our waists for decency."

Then came a visit to Port Samarai, and next Port Moresby, where Lieutenant-Governor Judge H. P. Murray, C.M.G., called on the Admiral of the Fleet. Here, in spite of terrific heat, Lord Jellicoe played tennis. Then on to Thursday Island, where in company with Major Sweetland of the Royal Australian Artillery the forts were inspected. The passage down inside the Great Barrier Reef was then made, and eventually Port Gladstone was reached. After inspection the train was boarded for a passage to Newcastle, where the Naval facilities of the place and also Port Stephens were thoroughly examined. Sydney was reached on August 8 and the flag once more transferred to the *New Zealand*. The finished and bound edition of the Admiral of the Fleet's report of his mission to the Commonwealth was received from the printer. Lord Jellicoe presented personally one complete copy to the Governor-General and sent a complete copy to the Prime Minister, Mr. Watt, with whom Lord Jellicoe discussed the whole subject on the following day. Amid the usual farewell messages the *New Zealand* left on August 16 on her way to New Zealand. The ship was lustily



GOVERNMENT HOUSE, WELLINGTON

cheered by the small craft with which the harbour was crowded to give the Admiral of the Fleet a hearty send-off.

On August 20 the Admiral of the Fleet arrived at Wellington, where the *New Zealand* received a most enthusiastic welcome. The Governor-General, the Right Honourable the Earl of Liverpool, P.C., G.C.M.G., G.B.E., M.V.O., was called on at 10 a.m., who returned the call and received a salute of 19 guns. Lord Jellicoe's reception at all the places was so cordial and enthusiastic, and the hospitality so lavish, that it is impossible to make an adequate record within the limits of space available. It is needless to recount the many receptions, banquets, lunches and other functions which were given in his honour during his stay in this most loyal and hospitable Dominion. Suffice it to say that in the 40 days spent in New Zealand, Lord Jellicoe entertained, or was entertained, at about 40 receptions, 15 lunches, 8 dinners, not including those at private houses in which he stayed, and a dozen balls or dances. The work of the mission at their report was fairly strenuous, especially for the Admiral of the Fleet, who had, in addition, an orgy of public functions and speech-making. In nine days he made no less than 25 speeches. On August 28 the new Parliament was opened at 3 p.m. The Admiral of the Fleet and his Staff and the officers of the *New Zealand* stood on the right of the throne while Lady Jellicoe sat with the Ministers' wives. The Governor-General referred in graceful terms to Lord Jellicoe and the object of his visit.

While at Wellington Lord Jellicoe wrote to the Admiralty asking for definite instructions about his visit to South Africa. He pointed out that in his instructions, dated December 23, 1918, it was stated that the question of a visit to the Union was not then decided, and that the only information in his possession as to the object of such a visit was contained in certain semi-official letters which had passed between the First Lord and the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Copies of these had been supplied to him before leaving England. He added :

“The object of my visiting South Africa is not clear from a perusal of those letters, and I beg to request that I may be informed of the duties expected of me during the visit ; and that information regarding the present attitude of the Union towards the question of co-operation in the Naval defence of the Empire may be furnished to me, as well as details of the existing Naval organization in those waters.”

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In reply to this letter, Lord Jellicoe received a telegram from the Admiralty informing him that the instructions in Admiralty Letter of December 23, 1918 (the original terms of reference) were to be regarded as applying also to South Africa. The telegram, however, went on to inform him that a new Admiralty Memorandum on Imperial Naval Defence, containing a brief summary of Admiralty views on the broader aspects of the subject, was being forwarded to him at once ; and that this should be the basis of any advice on strategical requirements contained in future reports to Dominion Governments. The Admiralty Memorandum referred to was despatched on November 3, and the receipt of it was acknowledged by him from Ottawa on December 5, by which time, of course, his Indian, Australian and New Zealand Reports had been rendered and he was half-way through his mission in Canada. A summary of the contents of the Memorandum is given in the Appendix.

Lyttelton was next visited, from which place the Admiral of the Fleet, Lady Jellicoe and the Staff went by train to Christchurch. Here heavy rain fell which turned to snow ; in spite of this, however, Lord and Lady Jellicoe visited several parts of the neighbouring country at which were assembled large numbers of school-children. The special feature at the ball that was held was the Debutantes Lancers, danced at the same time as the official set. There were no less than sixty debutantes.

A special trotting race meeting was also held. There were seven events, six with the horses driven and in one they were ridden ; when driven the horses were harnessed to a " scully," a very light vehicle, the drivers being perched on the axle with their feet on the shafts. Both near and both off legs worked together like the movements of a camel. Although the jockeys used their whips freely the horses never broke into a gallop but maintained their regulation pace. On Sunday the 7th, Lord Jellicoe handed to the Bishop for the custody of the Dean and Chapter a white ensign flown by the *New Zealand* at Jutland. This was done with full military honours. A special service followed, with an address most appropriate to the occasion. After the ceremony, the Admiral of the Fleet and Staff proceeded by motor to Dunedin. At the Drill Hall, where an enormous civic reception was held, an adult choir of 850 members sang most beautifully. Port Chalmers was visited, and on the 11th the whole party motored back to Christchurch. On September 13, the *New Zealand* anchored in Queen



Leslie Hinge

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET VISCOUNT JELlicoe OF SCAPA INSPECTING GUARD OF
HONOUR OF H.M.S. CHATHAM, 1923

Charlotte Sound, about two miles from Picton, where the people were most hospitable, and two days afterwards returned to Wellington. Meanwhile, work on the report had been daily continued, so that by September 19 proofs were available for correction and the papers borrowed could be returned to the Minister of Defence, the Naval Adviser, and others. Lord Jellicoe had been materially assisted by three distinguished statesmen whose names, together with that of Mr. Seddon, will always stand out in the history of this Dominion as being the principal founders and instigators of her strong forward policy, namely, Sir Joseph Ward, Sir James Allen, and Mr. W. F. Massey (Prime Minister).¹ Sir Joseph Ward, when Prime Minister in 1909, was mainly responsible for the effort which led to the gift of the battle cruiser *New Zealand* from the people of the Dominion. Sir James Allen, who had long been associated with Sir Joseph Ward, had for years studied the Pacific problem.

The *New Zealand* next left for Auckland, stopping off Napier for a short time, where Lord Jellicoe exchanged greetings with the Mayor and citizens. Then on to Gisborne, where steamers loaded with children steamed round the ship. The universal desire of the people to teach the children of New Zealand the importance of sea power was very evident at all places visited. On September 22 Auckland was reached, where hospitality was as profuse as at all other places. Here Lord Jellicoe motored to Takapuna where, accompanied by Mr. Blomfield, the Mayor, he proceeded to the school and unveiled a memorial to the late Lieutenant-Commander Sanders, V.C., D.S.O., R.N.R. The Admiral of the Fleet had been instrumental in obtaining the V.C. for this officer, who lost his life in a sailing Q ship, called *The Prize*, during the War. Mr. Blomfield, the Mayor of Takapuna, describes this typical and characteristic act of Lord Jellicoe.

“As an instance of his kindness of heart and thoughtfulness of the grief of others, Lord Jellicoe, as Admiral of the Fleet, while the fleet was in Auckland Harbour, New Zealand, after the War, communicated with me, as Mayor of Takapuna, asking for information of the whereabouts of the late Lieutenant-Commander W. E. Sanders, V.C., D.S.O.’s parents or people. Giving His Excellency all the information he required and placing him in knowledge of the place and position of Sanders’ father, a boot-maker in Takapuna, a marine suburb of Auckland City, just across the Harbour

¹ Afterwards Sir William Ferguson Massey.

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in which the Admiral's fleet was lying ; Lord Jellicoe expressed his wish to meet old Sanders.

Leaving his ship with Lady Jellicoe, Lord Jellicoe journeyed across and I introduced old Ted Sanders, the father of the V.C. hero, to him.

Lord Jellicoe greeted the old man warmly in the little boot-repairing shop and gladdened the old man's heart with his glowing admiration of the son's bravery, expressing the opinion that young Sanders was 'one of the bravest men he had ever known,' and his wonderful deeds in the Mystery Ship *The Prize* in sinking submarines, one of the greatest of the war records.

Presenting old Ted Sanders with several beautiful water colour drawings of *The Prize* in action, and conveying his sailorman's gratitude and admiration of his son, and well wishes left the old man with tears of gratitude raining down his face.

Lord Jellicoe also expressed his willingness to unveil a memorial to Lieutenant-Commander Sanders, V.C., D.S.O., who spent his boyhood days in Takapuna, and got his sea taste from Takapuna's beautiful beaches. He left his ship to cross the Harbour. I drove him out to Takapuna, where he performed the unveiling of the memorial and spoke feelingly to the people of Takapuna who gathered there to a man, woman and child. There also gathered the Auckland members of the Motor patrol boats in their smart uniforms, that is all that had returned from the duties in the Home waters during the Great War. While driving Lord and Lady Jellicoe along the beautiful Takapuna coast-line with its wide stretches of lovely sea and island view, his Lordship exclaimed, 'What a beautiful place ! My wish is to come here as Governor-General of your people and end my days in this lovely spot.'"

On the following day the Admiral of the Fleet paid a graceful compliment to the Merchant Service by asking the captains of four merchant ships to lunch. On September 26 Rotorua was visited. On arrival the carriage was dragged through the streets by returned soldiers, headed by their band. The place is well known for its hot baths, temperature of these varying from 90° to 110°. It was here that Lord Jellicoe came into close touch with the Maori population. There still remained a "Pah" or fortified village—kept for show. Here the party were received by a body of about 20 braves in native costume armed with a nondescript collection of firearms. All the warriors were "on the knee" except the Chief, who received his visitors in the usual Maori way and with much tongue play (the tongue of the Maori is said to be longer than that of an ordinary mortal). Posturing and grimacing form



Sport and General

"NOT QUITE SO PERFECT A SWING": EARL JELlicoe DRIVES

a large part of Maori dancing. The posturing is often most graceful, the clean sharp movements of the arms and legs showing up the muscles in a remarkable way. In the afternoon a Peace reception was given as distinct from the morning war reception. At this the women did a "Poi dance." The *poi* is a small ball of flax strips attached to about 3 inches of worsted which is held in the hand, the *poi* hanging down. By jerking the wrist, the *poi* bangs on the back or side of the fist, rather like "cup and ball"; when thirty or forty women each with two *pois* make these movements, all in perfect time, the result is a series of beats and soft clicks each time the *poi* hits the hand. At the same time the women moved their arms, heads and hips all in perfect unison and sang a song, the tune being rather like "Little Brown Jug." Two men moved up and down the lines of women posturing, grimacing and shaking their clubs. The women all wore white blouses and red skirts with a blue sash over the left shoulder and a wreath of greenery in their hair. The dress was very effective. Then came a combined *poi*-and-canoe dance when the younger women sat in two lines, one facing one way and one the other, like two canoes passing each other, a line of elderly ladies forming the background with *pois* with long strings. The dance consisted in the young girls leaning forwards, backwards, and from side to side imitating the action of paddling and swinging their *pois*, and in the background the old ladies threw out their *pois* and hauled them in again hand over hand.

The party then broke up to inspect the Geyser Valley, escorted by the women guides who are clever and original in their descriptions of the sights, and who speak English perfectly with a very pretty accent.

On Sunday, September 28, Lord and Lady Jellicoe and some of the officers attended service in the Anglican Church at Ohinmutu, where the service was conducted in Maori and English. In the afternoon many played golf. According to one golfer :

"The links which are quite close to the Geyser Valley are probably unique. You have to play out of the crater, where you can feel the ground to be hollow and rather fear the result of taking too much of the solid earth with the niblick, or you may play into a porridge basin, in which case you need not worry about playing out at all ; or, again, you may have a choice between an alum stream and an extinct crater with the green perched up between."

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Auckland was again reached on October 1. Then came farewells. The usual parting messages were exchanged and the ship left for Suva in Fiji. The hospitality and warmth of welcome tendered everywhere by the inhabitants of New Zealand to Lord Jellicoe and the officers and men of the ship were quite unparalleled, and every soul in the ship carried away pleasant memories of the Dominion and its people.

Immediately after anchoring at Suva, Fiji, a party of native chiefs from the province of Cakaudrove, headed by their hereditary chief, the Hon. J. A. Rabice, O.B.E., came on board and performed the ceremony of Cavuikelেকে. The ceremony should, as a matter of fact, be performed at the previous port of call; for the weighing of the anchor by the natives of a neighbouring port is an invitation for the ship to pay a visit to their harbour. In this case it mainly consisted of an address and a presentation of whales' teeth. The welcome was gracefully worded :

"I hold up these whales' teeth in the presence of you, the great Commander-in-Chief of the Seas, on behalf of those who rule in Fiji, our Governor and his colleagues of the Administration, and on behalf of the natives of Fiji. We, your humble servants, make this humble offering to you in token of our invitation to you to set foot on our shores. We do so in accordance with the ancient chiefly customs of our land. At the same time we beg you to protect us, the people of Fiji. If this be but a poor offering, we hope that you will nevertheless receive it with kindly feeling. Fiji is but a small place and a poor one, and its population is not great. It is with the greatest pleasure that we behold you to-day, and realize that Fiji is not forgotten by the Great Chiefs of the Empire. I have spoken at great length and I now offer these whales' teeth to you, the great Commander-in-Chief of the Seas, the defender of Britain."

At the end of the speech the chief cries out "*Mana*," and all present reply in chorus "*e dina a muduo*," and the ceremony ends. The Admiral of the Fleet paid an official call on H.E. Sir Cecil Hunter Rodwell, K.C.M.G., Governor of Fiji and High Commissioner of the Western Pacific. The inhabitants were most hospitable, sending off large consignments of limes and coconuts to the ship's company. Lord and Lady Jellicoe stayed with the Governor at Government House. Work continued on the report all the forenoon; in the afternoon native ceremonies were held on the parade ground, the chief being that of Yaqona or Kava drink-

ing. Dances then took place, those of the men being the most striking.

On the following day a display of walking with bare feet on white-hot stones was given. For this, a pit some twenty feet in diameter and two feet deep is dug, and a pile of large stones and logs is built up in the middle. The logs are fired some nine hours before the performance is timed to start, and by this means the stones are raised to a white heat. Just before the performance, a party from the tribe, in full native dress, surround the pit and commence to withdraw the blazing logs. This is performed with the aid of loops of dry root secured to the ends of long poles. The pile of stones is then spread out evenly all over the pit. Finally, when all was ready, a party of ten natives came on to the scene and walked round the pit on the hot stones. Only about three of these, however, were observed to complete the circle. The whole tribe then threw bundles of green leaves on to the stones; and, emitting weird cries, followed with their food, which they proceeded to cook as they squatted on the greenery, which was by now emitting a dense cloud of smoke and steam. No information could be obtained locally as to how the natives performed this feat, but the legends in connection with the rite state that one of their tribe (i.e., the Beqa Tribe) once captured a serpent which, in return for its life being spared, gave to its captor and his descendants the power to "Walk through the oven." It is understood that medical examination of the feet of the performers before and after the ceremony has revealed nothing abnormal.

On October 11 Suva was left, Levuka reached. A cricket match was played and the ship was successful just as darkness fell. On October 13 Apia, Samoa, was reached. After a stay of a couple of days, during which the grave of Robert Louis Stevenson was visited, H.M.S. *New Zealand* sailed for Christmas Island. Here three inhabitants were found, one an American, Mr. Joe English, one a Frenchman, and the third a Tahitian. Mr. English was manager of the company working copra on the island. The ship that had left them had promised to call within three months, but fifteen had elapsed and no ship. Lord Jellicoe agreed to take all three to Fanning Island, where there is a telegraph station, so that they could make inquiries about Père Rougier, the head of the firm. October 20 saw the ship at anchor off English Harbour, Fanning Island. The island was visited by the German cruiser *Nürnberg* in September, 1914. She landed a party to destroy the

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telegraph cables and instruments. However, the work was only partially done. The spare instruments were not discovered and the cut cables were not towed into sufficiently deep water. After the cruiser left, Mr. Grieg, of the Fanning Island Company, dived in shark-infested waters, fished up the ends of the cables, joined up the instruments and re-established communication within six months of the *Nürnberg* sailing.

On October 24 the ship arrived at Honolulu, Mr. McCarthy, the Governor of the Federated Territory of Hawaii, was called on, and the call of Rear-Admiral Fletcher of the Pearl Island Naval Base was returned. A very formidable series of entertainments had been planned, too numerous to mention. Lord Jellicoe and the Chief of the Staff were taken round the defences by Major-General Morton. The send-off on departure was characteristic of the warm-hearted hospitality showered on the officers and men throughout the visit. Hilo (Hawaii) was next called at, and the volcano of Kilauea visited. Its crater, some eight miles in circumference, is covered with lava. The centre is called the "Pit" and is about 80 yards in diameter, and is full of liquid lava. The surface is dull black and continually in motion, forming oily waves ; when these waves collide, or where they are thrown against the walls of the crater, red-hot lava is exposed and thrown into the air ; these splashes of red-hot spray have the appearance of great bunches of crimson flowers being thrown into the air.

On November 1 the *New Zealand* sailed for Esquimalt. Deck hockey, Admiral and Staff *v.* midshipmen, resulted in a win for the gunroom. A miniature rifle meeting was won by the petty officers' team, and a deck tennis tournament, in which Lord and Lady Jellicoe both took part, was won by Lord Jellicoe and his partner, Sub-Lieutenant Thomas. So with daily work on the Canadian report, the seven days' trip passed rapidly.

An incident which showed Lord Jellicoe's characteristic thoughtfulness took place in the early part of the cruise. While playing with a medicine-ball with other officers on the quarter-deck, on a day when there was a stiff breeze and a fair sea, the ball went overboard. Not wishing to lose it, Lord Jellicoe told the Captain to turn the ship and try to pick it up. This everyone knew meant water coming in all open scuttles. All the officers jumped below to close their own scuttles ; the Admiral of the Fleet also went, but afterwards it was discovered he had gone to close the scuttle of the cabin in which an officer was lying sick.

CHAPTER XXV

1919 to 1920

The World Cruise—Part II

ON November 8 the *New Zealand* arrived at Esquimalt, the fine harbour in the Island of Vancouver that for many decades has been our Naval Base on the western shore of Canada. The usual official calls were made, and Admiral Sir Charles Kingsmill, the Director of the Naval Service of Canada, arrived, bringing a considerable amount of information on Canadian Naval affairs, which was of much value to the mission. He remained on Lord Jellicoe's Staff for the whole of the Canadian visit. The Dockyard Naval establishments and fortifications were visited, and Lieutenant-Commander de Salis was despatched to inspect Port Alberni and Burrard Inlet. The Admiral of the Fleet visited Duncan Bay, situated below the Narrows at the north-east corner of Vancouver. Here the ship anchored, and Lord Jellicoe and Staff embarked in the *Stadacona* in order to pass the Narrows. The passage can be exciting, unless the five to fifteen minutes of slack water is hit off; for the current runs at 12 knots at high tide; one captain maintained that he had known it up to 20 knots. In the middle of the passage is a nasty rock, the Ripple Rock, ready to make matchwood of any vessel that might get out of control. Quite a number of ships are lost yearly on this wicked snag. Malcolm Anchorage was visited and Port McNeill was reached. Here the *Stadacona* anchored, and in spite of the fairly big sea that was running Lord Jellicoe determined to land; so he took the Staff ashore in the whaler. The *Stadacona* afterwards returned to the *New Zealand*. Lord and Lady Jellicoe and the Flag-Lieutenant landed and lunched with the lumbermen at their camp. Here they were welcomed by Mr. Moore, who was in charge of the camp. The ingenious machinery was examined with interest. A fir tree some 250 feet high was felled, and then the Admiral of the Fleet and his Chief-of-the-Staff tried their hands at sawing down another giant tree. Their experience led them to

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admire the ease and grace with which the practised lumbermen handled their saws. At 6 a.m. the following day the *New Zealand* entered Vancouver Harbour. After Church Service on Sunday the Admiral of the Fleet decorated Lieutenant Cassady of the R.N.C.V.R. with the D.S.C., which had been awarded him for assisting in the destruction of a German submarine off Dartmouth, in the summer of 1918.

During the afternoon came the sad news of the death of Lady Cayzer, Lady Jellicoe's mother. This unfortunately necessitated Lady Jellicoe shortening her stay with Lord Jellicoe and returning home to her children, who had been in her mother's charge. Meanwhile, however, with her indomitable pluck she continued to fulfil her many engagements, not allowing her personal sorrow to detract in any way from the success of the mission.

The Chief of the Staff, with Commander R. Stevens, C.M.G., the Assistant Director of the Naval Service of Canada, and Lieutenant-Commander de Salis, left in the *Stadacona* to visit Prince Rupert Harbour and from thence to rejoin the mission via the Grand Trunk Trans-Continental Railway.

On November 20 Lord and Lady Jellicoe and the remainder of the Staff left the *New Zealand*, to travel across Canada by the Canadian Pacific Railway. So a very enjoyable visit to the Island of Vancouver came to an end, and most vivid memories were carried away of the hospitality and geniality of the people of all the places visited.

A private car named the *Nipissing* (after one of the Canadian Lakes) was placed at the disposal of the Admiral. He had to break his journey to attend official receptions at Calgary and Regina, the headquarters of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, where they were entertained by the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Richard Lake, and Lady Lake. Then on to Winnipeg, where Lord Jellicoe received a Civic Welcome and was entertained by the Navy League. During the afternoon he spent several hours skating and playing squash rackets, a welcomed break after the sedentary train journey. A large dinner at Government House followed.

Ottawa was reached on November 27. Here Lord and Lady Jellicoe were the guests of Their Excellencies, the Duke and Duchess of Devonshire. Spacious offices had been selected for the mission, and work began in earnest. Everyone was most kind, helpful and hospitable. The working hours of the mission were from 9.30 a.m. to 1.15 p.m. and from 3 p.m. to 7.30 p.m.,

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lunches, dinners and dances being wedged in between these hours of labour. The entertainments and hospitalities were too numerous to recount.

On December 5, upon receiving the new Admiralty Memorandum on Naval Defence, Lord Jellicoe telegraphed to the Admiralty from Ottawa asking if the Canadian Government were being informed of the Admiralty views set forth therein. The telegram continued :

“If not, am I at liberty to inform Ministers? Apparently it is thought here that Admiralty views are as stated in Memorandum to War Cabinet on Naval Defence of the Empire dated 17th May, 1918. This is being quoted in the press and has not been questioned by Government.”

The Admiralty replied on the 6th that the Dominion Governments would not be informed of the Admiralty views until they had been considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence, whose decision was awaited. Lord Jellicoe was told there was no objection to his communicating the contents of the Memorandum confidentially to the Canadian authorities if he informed them as above.

Throughout his tour Lord Jellicoe was much handicapped by uncertainty as to whether surplus ships from the Royal Navy would be made available for the Dominion navies, and, if so, whether as gifts or otherwise. Just before he left New Zealand the Admiralty indicated that certain classes of ships would be available, and asked for his estimate of the probable maximum total requirements of all the Dominions, and of the Government of India, in order that the Admiralty might be able to proceed freely with the disposal of the surplus. Lord Jellicoe replied that this information would be telegraphed from Fiji or Honolulu but that in the meantime the Government of New Zealand was pressing for his advice on the subject. This he would be better able to give if he could know for certain whether the Admiralty was prepared to make a gift of ships to New Zealand. Many subsequent telegrams on the subject passed between Lord Jellicoe and the Dominions, and between him and the Admiralty, but no satisfactory conclusion was reached. As late as December 1, when he was half way through his Canadian tour, he telegraphed to the Admiralty : “Matters would be greatly facilitated if position regarding gift of ships were clear.” The Admiralty, however, were apparently not authorized to make definite promises about

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this, and only replied that the ear-marking of vessels for the Dominions after January 31, 1920, whether for gift or purchase, could not be guaranteed.

During his time at Ottawa it became clear to Lord Jellicoe that the chance of securing Canadian Naval co-operation must be seized at once or lost for an indefinite time. He therefore wired to the Admiralty :

“ Canadian Cabinet is discussing amount naval estimates for next few years. Decision will probably be affected by amount of British estimates. Desire is being evinced to bear proportionate share naval defence of Empire. Request information by wire at earliest possible moment of probable approximate annual total British naval estimates for next two or three years for confidential information of Ministers. Decision will be reached shortly so that matter is urgent.”

The information asked for was such as no one was able to supply at that date. At the end of 1919 the Admiralty and the Government were just beginning to feel their way along a new line of Naval policy which resulted, within two years, in the Naval Conference at Washington and a great reduction in Naval expenditure. No reply to this telegram was ever received. Mr. Walter Long, who had now become First Lord, subsequently wrote to Lord Jellicoe accepting full responsibility for the omission. He said :

“ I am distressed to find that a telegram you sent on November 30th was never answered. I don't quite understand how this happened, as I remember the telegram very well and thought I had dictated a reply. The only excuse I can offer you is that we have been through a really awful time during the last six months. . . . Anyhow, all I can say is that I am very sorry, and I do not pretend that my explanation is a justification for your being left without an answer.”

Having received no reply to his telegram of November 30, Lord Jellicoe wrote privately to the First Lord on December 3. This letter fully describes the state of Naval affairs in Canada at the time and it reflects Lord Jellicoe's personal character very clearly. For these reasons it is here quoted in full :

3.12.19.

“ MY DEAR FIRST LORD,

I have sent two or three telegrams since arrival here on the subject of the attitude of the Canadian Government towards a

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Naval policy for Canada. I felt it necessary to do this because the situation is critical.

Sir Robert Borden, pressed hard by Mr. Ballantyne, is in favour of an immediate start being made. On the other hand, some Ministers wish to postpone matters either for political or for financial reasons.

Mr. Ballantyne, who is very much in earnest, is concerned that unless the matter is settled now, before I leave Canada, nothing will be done for several years. He tells me distinctly that unless a serious start is made now, he intends to wipe out completely the present Canadian Naval Service, as being a pure waste of money. He is right.

For this reason a very sympathetic attitude towards Canada is most desirable now. If possible, modern ships should be offered as a gift. Light cruisers and submarines are the principal requirements. I trust that the Admiralty will be able to do this, so that the opportunity of starting Canada on the right lines may not be lost.

I find myself pressed very hard by the Government here to undertake what is really propaganda work. I am begged to make speeches constantly all over the Dominion and these requests are strongly backed by Ministers. It is most distasteful work to me, but I do not feel I can refuse entirely, so that a very large proportion of my time is being devoted to this sort of work, rather to the exclusion of the work for which I was sent here. I hope you will agree that I have done right to help the Government here to this extent.

Will you be so good as to tell me whether you are still of opinion that I should visit South Africa? I confess to a feeling myself that such a visit will be a waste of time and fruitless so far as producing any Naval effort is concerned. My knowledge of the present state of feeling in South Africa is, however, not great. My feeling is that I should find myself doing pure propaganda work and that with but faint hope of any result. Such work is a very considerable strain when associated with other duties and I much dislike the publicity attendant upon it. It also requires much diplomacy and one may easily offend South Africans on the one hand or run counter to Home Government views on the other. I have noticed that the expense of my tour has already been questioned in the House of Commons and it is doubtful whether the chances of accomplishing useful work in South Africa are worth the expense involved.

If you still think the visit necessary, I should be very grateful if you would send me a wire after reading the above. If I did not go to South Africa I might find it helpful to extend my time in

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Canada. There is a great deal to do here and not much time in which to do it.

You will, I know, understand that I am anxious and ready to do whatever you desire or think necessary, but I thought it as well to put the matter before you again."

As previously stated, it was found impossible to arrange a convenient date for the South African visit, which was consequently abandoned. Before Lord Jellicoe reached Canada the British Minister at Panama had written to the Foreign Office asking that the *New Zealand* should pay an official visit there "as a compliment to the Republic which would be very highly appreciated, and which would do much towards augmenting the sympathy already felt here for the British Flag—a sympathy which those Germans in Central America who were unable to return home during the War have worked so hard to undermine." On November 12, therefore, the Admiralty telegraphed to Lord Jellicoe to arrange for the *New Zealand* to anchor off Panama for two days to pay an official visit to the Republic before going through the Canal—the time to be made up by shortening the visit to Jamaica. The visit took place from December 13–16, while Lord Jellicoe was in Halifax, and it was a complete success.

In the meantime Lord Jellicoe visited Halifax, then Quebec, after which the party returned to Ottawa. The Admiral of the Fleet, Lady Jellicoe and Staff stayed henceforward at the Hotel Laurier. It was bitterly cold, the temperature one day falling to 20° below zero. Lord Jellicoe, who was an excellent skater, "placed the puck" (the technical term for what would be represented by "kicking off" at football) at a big professional Ice Hockey Match at the Ottawa Arena. On Christmas Eve Lord and Lady Jellicoe, the Chief of the Staff, Paymaster-Captain and Mrs. Share, and the Flag-Lieutenant went to stay at Government House for Christmas, where they remained until their final departure from Ottawa on December 31.

Meanwhile the work of the mission had been proceeding apace.

Unfortunately on the eve of the departure from Ottawa, Lady Jellicoe developed a severe attack of tonsillitis and the doctor refused her permission to travel. So the projected visit to Admiral Sims at Newport had to be cancelled. Lord Jellicoe had to leave, but Lady Jellicoe remained with the Flag-Lieutenant for two more days to travel with Sir Robert Borden, the Prime Minister.

In New York, the Admiral of the Fleet spent the day with

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Mr. Schwab, and visited Brooklyn Navy Yard in company with Captain Jackson, U.S.N., who had been Chief of the Staff to Admiral Mayo during the War.

After lunch Lord Jellicoe and Mr. Schwab accompanied Lady Jellicoe on board the *Adriatic* on her departure for England.

On the 4th Lord Jellicoe left for Washington, where he and his Staff were the guests of the United States Navy. He was met by Admiral Niblack, Captain Hart, U.S.N., Colonel Miles, U.S. Army, and Captain Blake, D.S.O., our naval attaché, who had been gunnery officer of the *Iron Duke* at Jutland. Later the Hon. Ronald Lindsay, British Chargé d'Affaires, called on Lord Jellicoe.

Next day the Admiral of the Fleet and Staff accompanied by Admiral Niblack and other American officers called on Mr. Daniels, the Secretary of the U.S. Navy, and Mr. Lansing, the Secretary of State. The Navy Yard was then visited, where they were received by Admiral Grant, U.S.N. The wonderful facilities of the Yard received close inspection. After leaving the Yard the party visited the Capitol. Lord Jellicoe was introduced to the floor of the Senate, where he conversed with many of the Senators present.

On leaving the Senate he proceeded to the House of Representatives, where the party was accommodated with seats in the Diplomatic Gallery. On entering the House the members gave the Admiral of the Fleet a splendid reception, clapping heartily. After this Mr. Mondell, the leader of the Majority Party, rose and proposed that the House should show its appreciation of the services of Lord Jellicoe, one of the great Captains of the War, by rising and applauding. This was done in a warm-hearted and enthusiastic manner.

After leaving the House a visit was paid to the Army and Navy Club ; after which Lord Jellicoe and Staff attended a tea party at the house of Mr. Franklin Roosevelt,¹ then Assistant Secretary to the U.S. Navy. A short visit was then paid to Admiral Mayo. Unfortunately President Wilson was seriously ill and unable to receive the mission. The Navy Academy at Annapolis was visited on the 6th, where Lord Jellicoe was received by Rear-Admiral Scales, commanding the Academy. Lord Jellicoe addressed the two thousand midshipmen for ten minutes in the large hall. They responded by giving three cheers for our Navy and three for Lord

¹ Afterwards President of the United States.

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Jellicoe. He and his Staff were greatly impressed by the new chapel recently built, in the crypt of which is the tomb containing the remains of Paul Jones. They felt that it was most inspiring to the lads to have the body of the American Naval hero lying in the precincts of the Academy.

The journey was then continued to Key West, where the *New Zealand* was once more boarded. At 2 a.m. she left for Havana. The leading officials called on Lord Jellicoe at 10 a.m. and at 11 a.m. he called on the President of the Cuban Republic and the British Chargé d'Affaires. The *New Zealand* next visited Port Royal ; and after a call had been made on H.E. the Governor, Sir Leslie Probyn, and some cordite charges ashore had been tested (for they had been subject to suspicion), the ships sailed for Port of Spain, Trinidad. Here the 8th Light Cruiser Squadron was met, under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Allan Everett, K.C.M.G., C.B. Lord Jellicoe then called on H.E. the Governor, Major Sir John Chancellor, K.C.M.G., D.S.O. ; and afterwards inspected the Girl Guides. In the evening a large dinner was given in honour of Lord Jellicoe and Sir Robert Borden ; speeches were made, and the Admiral of the Fleet received a wonderful ovation. The next day, Sunday, the whole party left for Balandra Bay. Here attempts at surf riding on boards were not successful, but the Attorney-General, Mr. Warner, gave a demonstration of surfing without a board—hands stretched forward and body stiff, a performance which Lord Jellicoe succeeded in imitating. On Wednesday, January 21, the *New Zealand* left for Portsmouth, a passage of 3,840 miles, which occupied twelve days. On February 2 she anchored at Spithead. On the following day Lady Jellicoe came on board and on the 4th the Admiral of the Fleet and Lady Jellicoe left the ship, and the Union Jack, Lord Jellicoe's personal flag, was struck for the last time.

The mission was at an end.

1919 TO 1920—THE WORLD CRUISE—PART II

POSTSCRIPT I

RECORD OF MOVEMENTS OF LORD JELlicoe AND H.M.S. *NEW ZEALAND*, AS FINALLY CARRIED OUT.

Place.	Arrived. 1919	Left. 1919	Remarks.	Distance.	
				Nautical Miles Steamed.	Statute Miles Overland.
London . . .	—	19 Feb.	By rail		76
Portsmouth . . .	19 Feb.	21 Feb.	In H.M.S. <i>New Zealand</i>	1,186	
Gibraltar . . .	24 Feb.	25 Feb.		1,913	
Port Said . . .	3 Mar.	3 Mar.			146
Cairo . . .	3 Mar.	5 Mar.			146
Suez . . .	5 Mar.	5 Mar.		2,957	
Bombay . . .	14 Mar.		Delhi 16. 21 March		957
			Agra 21. 22 March		122
			Cawnpore 22. 23 March		150
			Lucknow 24. 24 March		46
			Bombay 26 March		880
		29 Mar.		501	
Karachi . . .	31 Mar.	1 Apr.		501	
Bombay . . .	3 Apr.		Gwalior 18. 22 April		763
			Simla 23. 28 April		410
			Bombay 30 April		1,173
		30 Apr.		889	
Colombo . . .	3 May	5 May		1,539	
Cocos Islands . . .	9 May	9 May		1,863	
Albany . . .	15 May	21 May	Perth 16. 20 May	950	680
Port Lincoln . . .	24 May	24 May		182	
Adelaide . . .	25 May	28 May		514	
Melbourne . . .	30 May	14 June		470	
Hobart . . .	16 June	17 June		555	
Jervis Bay . . .	19 June	22 June		90	
Sydney . . .	23 June	2 July	By rail		725
Brisbane . . .	3 July	5 July	} In H.M.A.S. <i>Suva</i>	1,211	
Solomon Islands . . .	10 July	13 July		648	
Rabaul (New Brit)	14 July	16 July		565	
(Visited Duke of York Island in H.M.A.S. <i>Una</i> , late German Gunboat <i>Komet</i>)			Movements of H.M.S. <i>New Zealand</i> : Sydney 23 June. 8 July		
			Jervis Bay 8. 18 July		
			Sydney 18. 22 July		
			Jervis Bay 23. 30 July (360 miles)		
Samarai (Papua)	20 July	20 July		294	
P. Moeresby (Papua)	21 July	22 July		348	
Thursday Island	24 July	25 July		1,046	
Gladstone . . .	31 July	1 Aug.	} By rail		954
Newcastle . . .	2 Aug.	3 Aug.			104
Sydney . . .	4 Aug.	12 Aug.			582
Melbourne . . .	13 Aug.	13 Aug.			582
Sydney . . .	14 Aug.	16 Aug.		1,233	
Wellington . . .	20 Aug.	31 Aug.		174	
			Carried forward	19,629	8,496

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RECORD OF MOVEMENTS OF LORD JELlicoe AND H.M.S. *NEW ZEALAND*, AS FINALLY CARRIED OUT—*continued*.

Place.	Arrived. 1919	Left. 1919	Remarks.	Distance.	
				Nautical Miles Steamed.	Statute Miles Overland.
			<i>Brought forward</i>	19,629	8,496
Lyttelton . . .	1 Sept.	1 Sept.	By rail		8
Christchurch . .	1 Sept.	7 Sept.	} By motor-car		112
Timaru . . .	8 Sept.	8 Sept.			110
Dunedin . . .	8 Sept.	11 Sept.			110
Timaru . . .	11 Sept.	12 Sept.			112
Christchurch . .	12 Sept.	12 Sept.	By rail		8
Lyttelton . . .	12 Sept.	12 Sept.	Re-embarked	200	
Pictou . . .	13 Sept.	15 Sept.		65	
Wellington . . .	15 Sept.	20 Sept.	Ship stopped off Napier and Gisborne on 21 Sept., Rotorua 26 Sept.. 1 Oct.	600	
Auckland . . .	22 Sept.	3 Oct.		1,140	356
Suva (Fiji Islands)	7 Oct.	11 Oct.		60	
Levuka (Fiji Islands)	11 Oct.	12 Oct.		590	
Apia (Samoa) . .	13 Oct.	15 Oct.		1,252	
Christmas Island)	19 Oct.	19 Oct.		160	
Fanning Island . .	20 Oct.	20 Oct.		1,054	
Honolulu . . .	24 Oct.	31 Oct.		200	
Hilo (Hawaii) . .	1 Nov.	1 Nov.		2,343	
Esquimalt . . .	8 Nov.	12 Nov.		185	
Duncan Bay . . .	12 Nov.	15 Nov.		103	
(Visited Port McNeil and Malcolm Island in H.M.C.S. <i>Stadacona</i>)				240	
Vancouver . . .	15 Nov.	19 Nov.	} Movements of <i>Stadacona</i> : Vancouver 19 Nov. Prince Rupert 21 Nov. (520 miles)		647
Calgary . . .	21 Nov.	22 Nov.			476
Regina . . .	22 Nov.	23 Nov.			357
Winnipeg . . .	23 Nov.	25 Nov.			1,300
Ottawa . . .	27 Nov.	5 Dec.			256
Toronto . . .	6 Dec.	8 Dec.			333
Montreal . . .	9 Dec.	10 Dec.			482
St. John . . .	11 Dec.	11 Dec.	By rail		461
Halifax . . .	12 Dec.	14 Dec.			674
Quebec . . .	15 Dec.	15 Dec.			285
		1920	} Movements of <i>New Zealand</i> : Vancouver 19. 19 Nov. Esquimalt 19. 25 Nov. San Diego 29 Nov.. 3 Dec. Balboa 13. 16 Dec. Colon 16. 18 Dec. Kingston 20. 30 Dec. Havana 4. 8 Jan. (5,462 miles)		463
Ottawa . . .	16 Dec.	1 Jan.			
	1920				
New York . . .	2 Jan.	4 Jan.			226
Washington, D.C.	4 Jan.	6 Jan.			1,317
Key West . . .	8 Jan.	9 Jan.		92	
Havana (Cuba) . .	9 Jan.	11 Jan.		753	
			<i>Carried forward</i>	28,666	16,589

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RECORD OF MOVEMENTS OF LORD JELlicOE AND H.M.S. *NEW ZEALAND*, AS FINALLY
CARRIED OUT—*continued*.

Place.	Arrived. 1920	Left. 1920	Remarks.	Distance.	
				Nautical Miles Steamed.	Statute Miles Overland.
Kingston (Jamaica) Port of Spain (Trinidad) Portsmouth . .	13 Jan.	14 Jan.	<i>Brought forward</i>	28,666 998	16,589
	17 Jan.	21 Jan.		3,850	
	3 Feb.				
			33,514 nautical miles is equivalent in statute miles to	33,514	16,589
			Total distance travelled in statute miles		38,592 55,181

POSTSCRIPT II

The Admiralty Memorandum of October, 1919

THIS Memorandum which, as stated in the narrative, was received by Lord Jellicoe in Canada on December 5, was, in effect, a revised proposal for Empire co-operation in Naval defence, drawn up in consequence of the non-acceptance by the Dominion Ministers of the scheme for a single Imperial Navy put forward in May, 1918. The Memorandum summarized Admiralty conclusions thus :

Firstly, as regards the nature of Empire co-operation :

(i) In view of their decision on the Admiralty Memorandum of May, 1918, the Dominions can now best contribute to the Naval defence of the Empire by building up their own Navies.

(ii) The primary rôle of Dominion Navies may be defined as to assist in the control of Imperial communications in distant seas and the protection of their own coastal trade. The requirements of sound strategy can, however, only be met if every ship is available for war service in any part of the world, and the general plan of campaign is directed by one central authority.

(iii) Each Dominion must decide its naval programme on its own responsibility. Initial financial difficulties and delay in starting may be overcome by taking over British ships and temporarily enlisting British personnel ; but the root of the problem is to

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organize the entry and training of officers and men as soon as possible.

(iv) The particular requirements of Dominions in numbers and types of ships should be under the continual consideration of the Admiralty Naval Staff in consultation with their own representatives. A start should be made in all cases with light cruisers and submarines.

Secondly, as regards the system of command and direction in war, the Admiralty recommended :

(i) The creation of an Imperial Council to consider questions of policy.

(ii) The representation of the Dominions on the Admiralty Naval Staff, with a view to co-ordinating the higher strategy of Imperial Naval Defence, and the institution of a definite system of co-operation between the Naval, General and Air Staffs.

(iii) The appointment of Dominion Naval officers to the Naval Staff College so that selected British and Dominion officers may be given uniform staff training ; also, the adoption of common operational and technical text-books.

(iv) Dominion officers to exercise complete disciplinary and administrative command over their own ships and squadrons, but to carry out the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief or Senior Naval officer in all operational matters.

POSTSCRIPT III

Lord Jellicoe's Australian Report

THE Report was addressed to the Governor-General, and covered four volumes. It was presented to both Houses of Parliament of the Commonwealth on October 21. Copies were sent to the Admiralty with a covering letter from Lord Jellicoe dated August 21. The following quotations from this letter show the lines on which he approached the problem. After referring to the undoubted strategical advantages of an Imperial Navy, maintained by monetary contributions from the Dominions, he said :

“ I am, of course, in complete agreement with the above quoted view which is still held by Their Lordships ; but the people of Australia, who are a sturdy and determined race, hold very strong opinions in favour of an Australian Navy which they can look upon as their own direct contribution to the Naval defence of the Empire. Attempts to persuade them otherwise have no prospect of success.

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. . . I am certain Their Lordships will be well advised to accept the inevitable and make the best of it.

I should add that no one in Australia ever questioned the fact that the Royal Australian Navy would be one with the Royal Navy, under Admiralty control in war.

All my efforts, therefore, in Australia, have been directed to laying down principles, and a line of action, intended to make the Royal Australian Navy an efficient fighting force, capable of working as one with the ships of the Royal Navy, imbued with the same traditions, and working on absolutely the same lines.

It was quite impossible to suggest any definite standard of future Naval strength to Australia without considering the whole Pacific problem. It seemed reasonable to assume that the British Fleet in the Far East would shortly be strengthened by the addition of capital ships, and the only method of bringing home to Australia and New Zealand their dependence on Sea Power, is to indicate the strength of the fleet necessary and the contributions they should fairly make to that fleet. I trust that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty will agree with my line of argument."

Lord Jellicoe clearly felt that it would be useless to approach the problems except on these broad lines, and, so far as Australia was concerned, he was specially requested in a letter from the Acting Prime Minister of the Commonwealth, dated May 2, 1919, to advise under the following headings :

(a) Naval strategical problems affecting Australian waters and the Pacific.

(b) Future composition of the Australian Navy.

(c) Naval Base and supply requirements in the Pacific and East Indian waters.

(d) General organization of the Naval Forces and Administration.

The Acting Prime Minister also specifically asked him to advise on policy in the event of possible outbreak of hostilities with any of the Pacific Powers, and to forecast the probable composition of the post-War Imperial Fleet in the Pacific.

Upon these assumptions the Report stated the necessity for a Far Eastern Fleet consisting of 8 battleships, 8 battle cruisers and complementary smaller craft—also vessels for trade protection and the provision of Dockyard Repair and Fuelling Bases. He called attention to the strategic importance of Singapore, and strongly recommended that a great Naval Base should be constructed there—capable of maintaining, repairing and docking a fleet of the

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largest size—for use in connection with the defence of Australia, New Zealand, the Malay States and other possessions in the Indian Ocean. The provision and maintenance of this fleet was to fall thus on the partner nations, in proportion to their trade and population :

Great Britain, 75 per cent.

Australia, 20 per cent.

New Zealand, 5 per cent.

Money contributions were also proposed from other parts of the Empire for the maintenance of convoy and other forces in the Indian Ocean and Pacific.

In conformity with this general conception of Pacific strategy, the Report laid down an Australian Naval Programme of ships and facilities, to be completed by 1926, the chief part of which was a fleet of 2 battle cruisers, 8 light cruisers and corresponding smaller ships.

Lord Jellicoe also made large administrative proposals and, at the special request of the Australian Authorities, he remarked very fully on the question of discipline.

He believed in, and recommended in his Report the early entry of officers and men and the provision on loan of the best type—*and the best type only*—of R.N. officers and petty officers.

Among other things, he especially stressed the importance of accumulating adequate supplies of fuel in the Pacific.

The years since 1919 have proved that Lord Jellicoe's conception of the strategical requirements of the Pacific, and of the part that Australia should play, were correct. The great Naval Base at Singapore which he strongly recommended has been constructed in the old Strait on the north-east side of Singapore Island. Australia still maintains a "unit" Navy, but politics and finance have kept its size, and the facilities required for it, far below what is admittedly desirable. Otherwise the recommendations were adopted, including the suggestion that a battle squadron or battle cruiser squadron should visit Australasia for the benefit of the young Navies of the Dominions. This proposal bore fruit in the highly successful cruise of the Special Service Squadron in 1924, consisting of H.M. Ships *Hood*, flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Field, and *Repulse* and a light cruiser squadron, under the command of Rear-Admiral the Hon. Sir Hubert Brand.

POSTSCRIPT IV

Lord Jellicoe's New Zealand Report

THE Report was addressed to the Governor-General and covered three volumes. Copies were sent to the Admiralty under a covering letter from Lord Jellicoe, dated October 24.

The Report was built up from the same strategical conception of a Far Eastern Fleet as that on which the Australian Report was based, and the general principles underlying the two reports are common to both. To this there was one important exception, namely that the New Zealand Naval Defence Act, 1913, *automatically* placed the New Zealand Naval Forces under British control in war, or, on the request of the British Government in time of strained relations. Lord Jellicoe recommended that this Act should remain in force, that the vessels maintained by New Zealand should be termed the "New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy" and that the Division should be administered by a Naval Board consisting of the Minister of Defence and an officer holding the rank of Commodore. These proposals were adopted.

The Report proposed that the ships to be maintained should consist of 3 light cruisers, 6 submarines and a submarine parent ship (to be provided by 1926) as well as a number of old light craft for harbour defence. He further proposed that the *Philomel* should be fitted out as a training ship and recruiting commenced forthwith. No special Naval dockyards required; reliance to be placed on commercial ports.

All these proposals were adopted, except that for financial reasons the sea-going fleet has never exceeded 2 light cruisers.

In his covering letter to the Admiralty Lord Jellicoe spoke well of the discipline of the New Zealanders, and eulogized the general outlook of the Dominion.

"It is not possible [he wrote] to speak too highly of the patriotic attitude of mind of these people. There can be no doubt that in this far distant Dominion they are keenly alive to the importance to their existence of a powerful and efficient Navy, and are particularly anxious to see a strong Far Eastern Fleet developed as soon as possible. It is the smallness of their population alone which prevents their contributing a greater quota to this fleet than that proposed."

It is probable that Lord Jellicoe's return to New Zealand in

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1920 as Governor-General, and his great personal prestige in the Dominion, were largely responsible for the enthusiasm with which his proposals were adopted. However that may be, it is certain that the mission achieved a complete success in New Zealand.

POSTSCRIPT V

Lord Jellicoe's Canadian Report

THE Report was addressed to the Governor-General and covered three volumes. Copies were forwarded to the Admiralty with a covering letter from Lord Jellicoe, dated January 1, 1920.

As in the other reports, Lord Jellicoe began with a statement of his terms of reference from the Home Government, as amplified by the special local instructions he had received from the Government of Canada.

He stated that

“the question of the Naval forces required by Canada may be viewed in two ways ; first in the light of Canada's own requirements and Canada's own safety ; and secondly in the broader light of the security and safety of the Empire as a whole.”

Under the first heading he suggested that Canada should possess 3 light cruisers, a destroyer flotilla and a submarine flotilla. Under the second heading he drew up comparative tables showing the Canadian fleet which would be most valuable to the Empire if the Naval Estimates of Canada eventually reached totals of £5 million, £3½ million, £2 million or less than £1 million per annum. He suggested that a start should be made by adopting the £2 million scheme.

On the administrative side, Lord Jellicoe proposed the formation of a Naval Board, analogous to the Admiralty at home, and run on similar lines, which was described in some detail.

As in the Indian, Australian and New Zealand Reports, he stressed the indirect value (for minesweeping) of a Trawler Fishing Industry, if this could be fostered. And, as in these reports, he included his admirable chapter on Discipline.¹

In his letter to the Admiralty, Lord Jellicoe said :

“While there is a very considerable section of the population which is fully alive to the vital importance of Sea Power, there is another section which does not consider it necessary for Canada

¹ For extracts, see page 511.

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to take any part in Naval defence, and yet a third section which looks with the greatest suspicion upon any such steps being taken in the direction of Canada's participation in Naval defence, as it might draw the Dominion into war.

A recent statement in the House of Commons to the effect that the Home Government has not as yet been able to decide upon a future Naval policy, has been seized upon in Canada by those who are opposed to taking a share in Naval defence as a good argument for delaying matters."

Political rather than financial difficulties prevented the adoption of the Report to any considerable extent. Neither at that time, nor since, has Canada taken any serious share in Imperial Naval Defence, her present sea-going fleet being limited to four destroyers.

POSTSCRIPT VI

Lord Jellicoe's Final Report to the Admiralty

THE following extracts are taken from Lord Jellicoe's final Report to the Admiralty dated on board H.M.S. *New Zealand* at Portsmouth, February 3, 1920.

"The main objects of the mission appeared to me to fall under two headings :

The First was the endeavour to induce the Dominions to co-operate in the Naval defence of the Empire.

The Second was to formulate if possible some scheme of co-operation.

Before any successful effort could be made under the first heading it was obviously necessary to persuade the Government and people of the Dominions that their co-operation in Naval defence was necessary."

He then referred to certain forms of propaganda with which he had been faced and continued :

"I formed the opinion that if a commencement was not made now with a Naval policy, whilst the memory of the late War was fresh in the minds of the people, a great opportunity would be lost, and that co-operation in Naval defence by the Dominions would perhaps never be realized. In any case it was clear that no definite suggestion as to the strength of the co-operation of the various Dominions could be put forward by me without some knowledge of the strength of the future navy that was needed for the whole

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Empire. For this reason I endeavoured both before leaving England, and also subsequently, to obtain from the Admiralty some information on the subject. I did not succeed even so late as in December, 1919, in this endeavour. No reply was ever received to my telegram No. 76 of 30th November, 1919, from Ottawa. No doubt there were very good reasons which prevented me from obtaining the desired information, but it left me with only one alternative, viz. to form my own opinion as to the future necessary Naval strength of the Empire, and to base my recommendations on this opinion. I formulated my proposals to the various Dominion Governments, commencing with Australia, proposals in which a contribution of a certain definite strength was suggested to each Dominion, the strength indicated being that which appeared to bear a fair and just relation to the Navy that it was assumed the Government of the United Kingdom would find it necessary to maintain.

* * * * *

So far as the second heading was concerned, when I left England the declared Admiralty policy was that stated in the Admiralty Memorandum to the Cabinet dated 17th May, 1918, in which the whole Naval force of the Empire was to form one navy, the units being under the control of an Imperial Naval Authority both in peace and war, with local Navy Boards administering local establishments. I stated at the time that I did not imagine that such a policy would be acceptable, and indeed the Dominion Premiers had already rejected it. A short experience in each Dominion convinced me that this supposition was correct, and being without further guidance from the Admiralty on this point, it became necessary to make such suggestions as it was considered would induce the Government and people of each Dominion to bear cheerfully and willingly a just share of the burden of Naval defence."

He then described the manner in which the various Dominions had reacted to this method of approach, and referring to his work in Canada, he concluded :

"Whilst in Canada I was informed of the change in Admiralty policy as stated in their Memorandum on Imperial Defence, forwarded with Admiralty letter dated 3rd November, 1919. As I had already ascertained that the policy therein indicated is one which now appeals more to the Canadian Government and people than does the idea of a contribution to the Royal Navy, my course was clear. I have dealt with the question of Naval strength at considerable length in order to show . . . that the procedure followed was inevitable."

There can be no doubt that throughout his mission, Lord Jellicoe was hampered by the fact that the Home Government had not arrived at any clear decision as to future Naval policy, nor as to the share which the Dominions should be invited to take in the Naval defences of the Empire. Not until the Washington Conference was held some years later would it have been possible to furnish him with the information really necessary for his guidance.

To this extent it must be admitted that Lord Jellicoe's mission took place prematurely.

On the other hand, as he himself stated in the passage just quoted, the moral and potential value of the mission, occurring when it did whilst the memory of the Great War was fresh in mind everywhere, was very great. As stated in the narrative, the First Lord accepted full responsibility for the omission to provide Lord Jellicoe with the information which he frequently and urgently requested. Lord Long's letter on the subject, dated February 7, 1920, concluded with these words :

“Now as to all the work you have done. Here again, the difficulty is that we have gone through a complete change since you left, and nobody quite knows at this moment where we stand, but I am quite sure that your work will be of immense value.”

This last remark has been fully borne out, for much was in reality achieved by the mission. The most salient features are :

(i) The building of the great Naval Base at Singapore capable of maintaining, repairing and docking a large fleet, including ships of the largest size.

(ii) The Royal Indian Navy has been formed as well as the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy.

(iii) The Dominions are now in full possession of an appreciation of their own Naval needs, so far as their share in Empire defence is concerned.

(iv) They have also received suggestions for organizing and training a local Naval Force, and for the development and protection of their harbours and dockyards, and generally for the defence of their coast and local shipping in wartime.

Naturally conditions change as years go on, but the information compiled under the master mind of Lord Jellicoe cannot fail to continue to be of value for many years to come.

CHAPTER XXVI

1919 to 1926 The Harper Record and Admiralty Narrative

The truth shall be thy warrant.

WALTER RALEIGH.

I am not so much struck by the diversity of evidence as by the many-sidedness of truth.

LORD SHAW.

THE method of dealing with the story of the Admiralty narrative of the Battle of Jutland that would be most congenial to a Naval officer would be to avoid all mention of this unfortunate publication, which, when issued, did not have a covering-note to the effect that it had the authority of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. But it is impossible to do this in writing a biography of Lord Jellicoe because, owing to the way this matter was handled at the Admiralty, he was for nearly four years subjected to incessant worry and vexation ; and as copies of the Admiralty narrative still exist broadcast throughout the country and 'also abroad, it is desirable that the public should understand the extent to which Lord Jellicoe was consulted and how his opinions were treated. Moreover, if it had not been for his insistence, a totally incorrect account of the Battle of Jutland would have been published by the Admiralty, and considerable injustice done to the officers and men who served under him in the battlefleet.

The next most satisfactory method would be to tell the " truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth " concerning the reasons that led to the publishing of the narrative ; but, unfortunately, the Official Secrets Act prevents any such action. To take so obviously just a course would be infallibly to court a term of imprisonment. There is no doubt that the clause that permitted the Government Department to indict any person who published any matter however trivial that originated in a Department deprived the country of opportunities of obtaining information to which the nation was justly entitled. If, in these days, a biographer stated

THE HARPER RECORD AND ADMIRALTY NARRATIVE

that Lord Jellicoe complained that his coal-scuttle was indifferently filled in the Admiralty he would be liable to a term of imprisonment. The Law still allows a biographer to state the truth and nothing but the truth ; but, even in the most trivial matters, the Law debars him from giving the whole truth ; he must therefore be continually skating over very thin ice. It is as well to state at once that nothing in this chapter has been derived from official sources but merely from private letters and the knowledge of Admiralty doings that became the public property of the London Clubs.

THE ADMIRALTY REPORT

Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, while First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff, caused a record of the Battle of Jutland to be drawn up, so as to be able to publish, and also to leave to posterity, an authoritative account of the tactics carried out in that battle. The work of compilation was entrusted to Captain J. E. T. Harper, an officer of great ability and thoroughly competent to execute the duty assigned to him. He was then a capable post-Captain, an expert in navigation, and an officer who had not served on either Lord Jellicoe's or Lord Beatty's Staff.

He was provided with a competent Staff, and every paper, every log, every despatch, every gunnery return was placed at his disposal. His work was perfectly simple and straightforward, requiring only scrupulous care and accuracy. He had nothing to do with verbatim accounts or personal opinions. The range-finders and gunnery records provided the positions of the ships relative to the enemy ; the signal logs provided the times of altering to various courses ; the engine-room registers gave the speeds. His instructions laid down that his report was not to contain expression of opinion, judgments or suppositions, only bare scientific facts. His report with its charts was submitted by him to the Chief of the Naval Staff, i.e., the First Sea Lord, in 1919 ; but, unfortunately, Sir Rosslyn Wemyss was in Paris, so it passed into the hands of the Deputy Chief of the Staff, Admiral Sir Osmond de B. Brock. This officer, acting from the very best possible motives, decided that as Lord Beatty was shortly coming to the Admiralty as First Sea Lord, it would be better to keep back the Report ¹ so that it could be published under his ægis.

Meanwhile, Lord Jellicoe had been communicated with and

¹ This Report was officially known as the Harper Record.

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asked if he wished to see the Report before it was published. He most properly replied that he preferred not to do so. He knew that the Report was being prepared by competent men from the official records only, and naturally was convinced that an accurate account of the battle would emerge. Moreover, if the Report happened to be at variance with his recollection, he was prepared to find that it was his memory, and not the Report, that was at fault. His refusal destroyed any grounds for suspicion that he had in any way influenced the Report or had caused it to be biased in his favour.

Lord Beatty assumed the office of Chief of the Naval Staff and First Sea Lord on November 1, 1919. When he heard of the Report he did not view the question of its perusal in the same light as Lord Jellicoe had done. There were two courses open for him to follow. He could either have acted like Lord Jellicoe and refused to see the Report, and allowed it to be published under the authority of the late Chief of the Staff, Lord Wester Wemyss ; or he could reasonably have taken the line that, as the Report had not been published before he came to the Admiralty, it would have to be issued under his ægis, in which case it was obviously his duty to read it. He quite reasonably chose this latter course, but by so doing he technically assumed responsibility for the form in which it was ultimately published. On reading the Report he found himself in disagreement with certain of the facts recorded therein. The chief of these was that Captain Harper and his co-workers, in plotting the positions of the ships during the battle, had, from the records, placed the battle cruisers during the "second blow" on the offside of the battlefleet and so far from the enemy that they were practically entirely out of that period of the action. Since it was during the "second blow" that the majority of the damage was inflicted on the German Fleet, the matter of the participation, or not, of the battle cruisers was one of considerable importance, and, as already pointed out, the position of the battle cruisers at the time did not agree with what Lord Beatty and some of his officers remembered of the fight.

It is well for human beings to bear in mind that the human memory is a feeble reed on which to lean. Insensibly the mind does not always receive and record complete pictures of events that are taking place, but incorrect views are not infrequently impressed on the brain even though the scenes have taken place actually before the eyes of the beholder. This is brought out in

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a picturesque manner in the old story of the reason for Sir Walter Raleigh's destroying part of his history of the world, his faith in ocular evidence having been shaken on finding that an impression his mind had registered was not the true account of an occurrence he had witnessed only a few minutes earlier. The story, like most other historical anecdotes, hitherto accepted as veracious, is probably untrue, but it is *ben trovato* in that it emphasizes what is common knowledge, namely that ocular evidence is not always correct. Moreover, there is little doubt that recollections alter as time passes, and inaccuracies creep into and vitiate remembrance ; and, amid such weird scenic effects as those which are exhibited in a naval action, when mist, smoke, movement, and intense excitement are intermingled, any conceptions formed are liable to be hurried, incomplete and, not improbably, incorrect. When, therefore, the Chief of the Staff found that his recollections were at variance with unimpeachable records he should have recognized that extreme caution was desirable before arriving at the conclusion that the records were at fault. There were three courses then open to him : to accept the record ; to appoint an unbiassed committee to revise the record and the memories of those who differed from it ; or lastly, to act on the assumption that memories were more true than the written record.

A considered decision on this matter was all the more important because Lord Beatty had commanded the battle cruisers at the times in question. It was, therefore, obligatory that his adjudication, as First Sea Lord, should be free of any breath of a suspicion of bias. For, if any grounds for such a suspicion existed, his decision would infallibly reflect adversely on the Admiralty of which he was the Naval head. Unfortunately, as events turned out, the last of these courses was chosen.

The first step to be regretted was the holding up of Captain Harper's Report. All who were interested in the technique of the Battle of Jutland were eagerly awaiting the publication of the official version—which had been promised in reply to questions in the House of Commons. Naturally when it was known that the Report was ready for issue and yet held up, rumour became busy—especially in the Service Clubs, which are the centres of Service gossip, and generally it must be owned of inspired gossip. No secret in the Admiralty, or elsewhere, that is known to three people can remain for long unknown to the world at large. Moreover, the vicissitudes that the Report encountered during its stormy exist-

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ence at the Admiralty, although confidential (as everything that goes on at the Admiralty is confidential), yet were by no means secret. But, whether correct or incorrect, rumour passed from mouth to mouth that the battle cruiser people newly arrived at the Admiralty disagreed with the Report and refused to allow it to be published unless altered ; that the compilers had stuck to their guns and insisted that their version was scientifically correct as proved by log books and ranges and had refused to make any alteration. One section of the Press actually had the audacity to start the libel that it was out of consideration for Lord Jellicoe's reputation that the Report had been hung up !

Such was the position when Lord Jellicoe was due to sail to take up his post as Governor-General of New Zealand. He recognized that if one-half of the rumours that were circulating in the clubs was correct, the report when issued would be alarmingly inaccurate. He further gathered that the Naval Staff were bent on quashing the Harper Report, although it was based on unimpeachable records, and intended to issue one which, for its authority, relied on the unstable basis of personal opinion and recollections. He also learned enough to know that his conduct in handling the fleet would obtain scant justice. Naturally he viewed the matter as being most serious ; for, when once he had arrived at the antipodes and assumed the office of Governor-General, he would have no means of rebutting any attack on his professional conduct of the battle, nor of defending the reputations of those who had served under him. Moreover, a section of the Press was distinctly hostile to him and would, he knew, make the most of any criticisms of his actions that the Admiralty might make. Furthermore, it would be distinctly derogatory to the office of Governor-General should a Press campaign in England decry his reputation as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, when he was, by distance, debarred from putting matters in a true light, and obtaining justice, not only for himself but for the officers and men who served under him. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary that before he left England he should ensure that the Report when issued should be unbiassed and impartial. The situation was rather well put to him by a correspondent who had an aptitude for imaginative hyperbole. "The Admiralty," he said, "are bent on proving that Jutland was fought by the *Lion* and the battle cruisers somewhat impeded by the presence of some battleships in a moderately remote vicinity." This, naturally, was an exaggeration, but Sir John had

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heard enough to make him fear that the Report might not be free from bias. After the foregoing explanatory remarks we are in a position to trace the history of the Admiralty Narrative.

In 1920 Mr. Walter Long definitely promised Lord Jellicoe that the Harper Report would be published without alteration, and offered to let him see the Report. This offer Lord Jellicoe declined. On hearing that the promise was about to be broken Lord Jellicoe again called on Mr. Walter Long, who acknowledged that certain amendments and deletions were proposed, and that a preface would be written with the authority of the Board of Admiralty. Mr. Long then requested Lord Jellicoe to see the modifications of the Report and to give his views as to their accuracy. This he did, and after perusal pointed out that the great majority of the changes and modifications had the effect of altering the facts as given by the Harper Committee, and that they were entirely inadmissible. He further took strong objection to the preface on account of its inaccuracy.

This is what the Naval Staff proposed to issue as a brief account of the Battle of Jutland, and which Lord Jellicoe was just in time to prevent being sent to the printer :

“The following narrative of events amplified by detailed proceedings of each Squadron and Flotilla, shows that the enemy’s advanced forces were reinforced by their Main Fleet some hours before the British Main Fleet was able to reach the scene of action.

During this period, therefore, the British were in greatly inferior force.

*On learning of the approach of the British Main Fleet the Germans avoided further action and returned to Base.*¹

Our losses in ships sunk were greater than those of the enemy, but a comparison of the rounds fired and hits received by capital ships shows that the percentage of hits to rounds fired by British ships was nearly double that of the enemy. This is inclusive of hits made on ships sunk. It is estimated that only 13 hits were made on the three battle cruisers, *Queen Mary*, *Indefatigable*, and *Invincible*, whereas *Lützow* received about 40 hits, but did not sink for some hours.

The enemy has acknowledged that the 1st Scouting Group was unfit for further action on 1st June as a result of the battle cruiser action, whereas the efficiency of the British ships to which they had been opposed was not seriously impaired.

A comparison of the dates on which the repairs to damaged

¹ The italics were not in the original.

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ships were completed, also points to the fact that the enemy received more severe punishment than our ships.

The result of the battle was that the German High Sea Fleet retired into its protected waters. It made a short excursion in August, 1916, but with this exception it only emerged to surrender to the Grand Fleet in November, 1918."

No wonder that Lord Jellicoe wrote that the Admiralty preface appeared to have been written by a lunatic. Lord Jellicoe also stated to Mr. Long, when he had examined the diagrams at the Admiralty, that he had been told that it was proposed to alter some of them in so far as they gave the position of the battle cruisers at certain periods of the action, and to suppress others. The official records showed the original diagrams to be accurate, and he strongly protested against the alterations.

Surely here was a case for a civilian First Lord to intervene. A Committee had reported on questions of fact. The Naval Staff at the Admiralty, which from its constitution was open to the charge of being biassed, had disagreed and proposed to alter the Report and diagrams to conform with their views. Lord Jellicoe as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet had protested that these alterations were not in accordance with fact. If the First Lord considered the matter in doubt, as from the conflict of opinion he was obliged to do, surely he should have appointed an unbiassed Committee to review the Report and the proposed alterations, and have abided by their report? It was the obvious and fair course to take. Unfortunately he did not do so.

In view of all the facts Lord Jellicoe informed Mr. Walter Long that he could not leave England for New Zealand until the form in which the Report would be issued had been decided. As Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet he desired to see an accurate account of the battle issued. He told Mr. Walter Long that he had informed the Secretary of State for the Colonies to this effect.

A few days before Lord Jellicoe was due to leave for New Zealand Mr. Walter Long again sent for him and told him that it was impossible to arrive at a decision before his departure, as it had been decided to re-examine the Report of Captain Harper's Committee, but he gave Lord Jellicoe a verbal assurance—afterwards repeated in writing—that before the Report was published it would be communicated to him in its amended form *with such reasons for changes as would enable him to judge of the effect and accuracy of the alterations*. He added that until the Board had Lord Jellicoe's assur-

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ance that he approved and was satisfied no publication should take place. Two very full, fair, and satisfactory promises, on the strength of which Lord Jellicoe left England for New Zealand. Both of these promises, like the previous one, were broken, at least broken to the extent that when Lord Jellicoe received the revised Report that part of the promise printed in italics was not complied with ; no reasons for any of the changes were sent as promised ; and Lord Jellicoe never approved of the form in which the narrative was eventually published.

Rear-Admiral Sir Rudolf Bentinck was at the time Naval Secretary to the First Lord, and it is only fair to state that throughout the whole time that he held this appointment, and in all matters connected with the Harper Report and in the advice tendered by him to the First Lord, he was scrupulously impartial.

It may well be asked, by whom was the Harper Report re-examined? It is well known now that the examination was made by the Naval Staff at the Admiralty, who unfortunately could not be considered to be free from the handicap of bias. It may be asked, why was not a properly constituted Committee appointed? Why not, indeed? The only answer is that the Admiralty were being pushed by the Naval Staff down a very slippery slope. And here perhaps it may be pointed out, that just as it is impossible to alter the shape of one or two pieces of a jig-saw puzzle and make the whole fit, so it is impossible to alter the positions of a few ships on a complicated chart, showing some one hundred ships or more and their courses, without creating discrepancies. Facts are facts, and have an inconvenient way of asserting themselves.

So there the matter must for the present rest.

In the meantime, Lord Jellicoe had arrived in New Zealand. In October, 1920, he received a cable message saying that it was decided not to issue the Harper Report. The pieces of the jig-saw as amended had, apparently, failed to fit. He was, however, informed that it was proposed to turn over all the papers to Sir Julian Corbett, who was writing the Official History of the War. This was an eminently satisfactory solution. The Report presumably would be incorporated in the History of the Naval Operations of the Great War based on official documents, or if issued separately would have been compiled by an unbiassed writer of unique ability. Lord Jellicoe replied suggesting the inclusion of certain gunnery records, and a little further cable correspondence went on with the First Lord regarding the publication of certain charts.

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The sad and most unfortunate death of Sir Julian Corbett took place a few weeks prior to the publication of Volume III of the Official History, which contained a full account of the Battle of Jutland from his pen. This account was both full and accurate and was fully approved of by Lord Jellicoe when he saw it after publication—in fact he expressed astonishment at the extraordinary insight Sir Julian had into the motives that governed his actions in that battle.

Sir Julian's work might have been accepted by the Admiralty as their official account of the battle ; but the Naval Staff had other views.

At the end of July, 1922, Lord Jellicoe received a proposed Narrative drawn up by the Naval Staff. He was extremely annoyed and disappointed, and complained to the First Lord that Lord Long's promises had been departed from ; that criticisms had been made by the writers as to what should have been clear, or what was assumed not to be clear in the minds of the Commander-in-Chief and other officers, at different periods, in regard to the position and movement of the enemy ; and it was implied that incorrect action was taken on some of these occasions. He maintained that the question whether the statements were inaccurate or not did not affect the vital point that the Narrative had become critical, which it should have been, and that this was distinctly against the promise given him by Lord Long by which he was induced to leave England. He declared that the narrative, by presenting the courses of the ships on both sides, naturally led to the assumption on the part of the average reader that the Commander-in-Chief could see what the enemy's ships were doing when, in reality, they were totally invisible to him ; and for the Naval Staff to have compiled the narrative in this manner was against his previously outspoken objection. He further pointed out that the reasons justifying a departure from the Harper Report had not been sent as promised by the First Lord, and this failure had greatly increased his labour in investigating the alterations. He proceeded :

“ Perhaps you will let me point out the position in which I am now placed. I cannot possibly allow the Admiralty Narrative to be issued to the world in its present form without commenting on it if it is so issued. I shall not see the publication in New Zealand until two or three months later, and my criticism on it could not be published in England until a further two or three months have elapsed, by which time the point would be lost. As you well know

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it is impossible to catch up an inaccuracy (which in my opinion, and with all respect, is the correct description of the Admiralty account). Were I in England I could take effective action at once ; but accepting Lord Long's assurances, I took up my appointment in New Zealand and have so debarred myself from immediate comment."

He therefore asked that his remarks should be published at the same time as the narrative, and that if this were not done he would be obliged to take steps to have his remarks published separately. He remarked that such action would be extremely distasteful to him, that he knew quite well the authorship of the document, but he could not believe that it had been examined by the Board or by the Chief of the Naval Staff. Lord Jellicoe was ever most punctilious in his statements, and nothing can show his disgust at the publication more than by his saying that he could not believe that it had been examined by the Board or by the Chief of the Naval Staff, or in other words he could not believe that either of these could have sanctioned such a publication.

I must now leave my pedestal as biographer and state my connection with the unfortunate episode. Lord Jellicoe, disgusted with and disbelieving in Admiralty promises, and in accordance with his expressed intention to publish his remarks should the Admiralty not do so, wrote and asked me to undertake to do this for him. I willingly consented, for, if rumours were true, he had been most shamefully treated by the Admiralty. But I thought it only right that I should inform the First Lord of my consent. This I did, and afterwards wrote the following letter to Lord Jellicoe.

18.2.23.

"I received a copy of your wire from Mr. Hunter¹ and the papers from McKenna.² It seemed to me to be a good thing to see the First Lord and suggest turning the Harper and Admiralty charts over to a committee composed of the three last retired Hydrographers, so I consulted McKenna and Madden, who agreed. I then went to the Admiralty and had a long talk with Amery,³ pointing out among other things that the Navy and Country looked to the First Lord to keep the scales of justice even on all matters regarding the Navy. I also told him there would be a very big row if the Admiralty published their report *without* your remarks,

¹ Secretary to the Clan Line Steamers, Ltd.

² The Rt. Hon. Reginald McKenna, an Ex First Lord of the Admiralty.

³ The Rt. Hon. Leopold Amery.

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as then I, on your behalf, would publish the correspondence. If they published it *with* your remarks its value as an Admiralty authoritative statement would be destroyed; especially coming out just after Corbett's book, and, in the background, there was always the Harper scandal. It therefore seemed to me best to publish the truth—or to publish nothing at all—since if the Admiralty published a biased report it would be for ever an ulcer on their necks.

I also said that the verdict of the three Hydrographers would be accepted by everyone as a final and authoritative statement. I also sketched the Harper business for his benefit, as much of that appeared to be new to him. In the end he promised to think the whole matter well over.

Whatever he may do, he is fully warned and cannot plead ignorance. Moreover, if he takes a weak line there is always my interview to place before the public showing how he had a chance of ascertaining the truth. I expect it will end in no report being published and probably the blame being indirectly thrown on you. If this is the case I shall be up and at them. The Government is none too strong in the House and I do not think would thank Amery for letting them in for a scandal. . . .”

I wrote also to Admiral Sir Charles Madden telling him what I had done, and he spoke to the First Lord much in the same sense. However, it was useless. The First Lord seemed powerless to avert the disaster, and the Admiralty Narrative was issued. It was not exactly stillborn, it breathed spasmodically for some twenty-four hours, or so, and then expired and was buried—well, hardly in oblivion, for it brought for some years discredit on a Department of State that hitherto had been above suspicion. I did not publish Lord Jellicoe's remarks, as they were included in the publication. No one in the Navy, or even outside the Navy, who read the Narrative could fail to observe that it was so unfortunately worded that it appeared to attempt to eulogize Lord Beatty and discredit Lord Jellicoe. To Lord Jellicoe this publication was little short of an official insult. His remarks as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet had been relegated to footnotes and appendices, and not included in the main account; also some of his corrections had received scant courtesy.

The Navy had always, up to then, looked on the Admiralty as a body above suspicion. To apply the schoolboy's well-known comment, it was perhaps a “beast,” but at all events “a just beast.” This belief was now somewhat shattered. There was,

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however, one saving point in favour of the Admiralty ; the Report had not been published as is usual " By the authority of the Board." This customary notice was missing from the fly-leaf. On whose authority, then, was it issued ? Had the Board refused their authorization ? Had the Naval Staff not dared to put it before the Board ? By what back exit had the Report been sent to the Stationery Office for printing ? Who had signed the authorization ? Perhaps the Naval Staff. We know not. But it appears most certain that the Board of Admiralty were not anxious to own its parentage. So the British Public had palmed off on it, four years overdue, this five-shilling changeling that no one was anxious to own, in lieu of the properly prepared and scientific Report of the Harper committee, which in all its main features is in accord with the Official History and undoubtedly the most accurate document on the battle that has so far been produced.

One of the main objections to the Narrative, on Lord Jellicoe's part, was the unfair treatment accorded to Admiral Sir Hugh Evan-Thomas, who commanded the 5th Battle Squadron. In his Jutland despatch Sir David Beatty reported on him in terms that were richly deserved.

" Led by Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, M.V.O., in *Barham*, the [5th Battle] Squadron supported us brilliantly and effectively."

Again :

" I have already made mention of the brilliant support afforded by Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, M.V.O., and the 5th Battle Squadron."

Such was the impression made on Sir David Beatty fresh from the action. But subsequently, when the charting of the battle cruiser actions was examined by the Naval Staff, two grave errors became apparent ; first, that the 5th Battle Squadron had not been closed up to the battle cruisers, and, secondly, mistakes were made whereby the 5th Battle Squadron came unnecessarily under the fire of the German battleships. The Naval Staff lifted the blame for the bulk of these mistakes on to the shoulders of Admiral Evan-Thomas.

It is unnecessary to enter into further detail. Suffice it to say that Admiral Evan-Thomas was deeply wounded by the unfair treatment accorded to him. Lord Jellicoe was also greatly angered, and promised to write his views for publication after his death. However, circumstances have unfortunately arisen which render such publication at present undesirable. Otherwise Lord Jellicoe's

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complete vindication of Admiral Evan-Thomas would have been inserted in this chapter.

Poor Evan-Thomas ! The worry brought on a paralytic stroke. After much correspondence he wrote to Lord Jellicoe on July 24, 1923 :

“I went to see the First Lord yesterday and he is having the appreciation altered so as not to suggest any blame, and he is going to send me the proposed wording before it goes out. He said he was trying to meet your views in every possible way—but of course I didn't see the various points.”

On October 23 he telegraphed to say the wording had not been improved. So the Admiralty allowed a stigma, that was wholly false, to remain uncorrected.

POSTSCRIPT I

THESE extracts from a couple of letters from distinguished Flag-officers will show how the Admiralty Narrative scandal was viewed by the senior officers of the Navy.

From Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman Bridgeman, who had commanded the Home Fleet and had served at the Admiralty both as First and Second Sea Lord :

“We had a long talk about the existing Board of Admiralty and the 5/- book they are trying to sell on their views of the Jutland operation. I am thankful to think that during my service in the British Navy the good name of the old profession was never blemished by such a production as that. . . .

I was not surprised to hear that Evan-Thomas felt deeply the calumny about his movement . . . but a more impudent misreading of the signal to him never could have been conceived, and right throughout Beatty's operations the weakness of his signal department was quite extraordinary.”

From Admiral of the Fleet Lord Wester Wemyss ; as First Sea Lord he had appointed the “Harper Committee” :

“I rejoice to see that you had taken certain steps in case Harper's Report were published with Beatty's alterations¹ and now I see that it is not to be included in the papers that are to be published. The whole conduct of the matter is disgusting and can only be viewed by the public in general and the Service in particular with disgust.”

¹ The responsibility for alterations was bound to attach to Lord Beatty as Chief of the Naval Staff.

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POSTSCRIPT II

THE following letter was written by Lord Jellicoe to Lord Long (after the latter had left the Admiralty).

The reason for Lord Jellicoe writing to Lord Long was to obtain his confirmation of the accuracy of the statements contained in a letter he was sending to the First Lord of the Admiralty.

Lord Long, in reply, confirmed the accuracy of the details and expressed regret that Lord Jellicoe had been put to inconvenience in the matter. So the following account given by Lord Jellicoe can be accepted as agreed to and confirmed.

22nd November, 1922.

"I am taking the liberty of enclosing a copy of a letter I have addressed to the First Lord of the Admiralty on the subject of the new record of the Jutland action which has been sent to me for my observations in accordance with the assurance you kindly gave me before I left England.

It is right that you should know what has passed, since I have quoted from correspondence with which you favoured me.

I cannot, as Commander-in-Chief, allow this record to go out to the world uncontradicted—if that is the Admiralty decision—and I shall publish my comments as soon as I can, but you will realize that it is difficult to do this at once, although I shall send a copy of my observations home, because they are based on certain numbered pages and lines of the Record as it is in manuscript, and these numbers will be altered when printed. Therefore, my absence from England will place me in a difficult position. I foresaw this when I asked you for the assurance which you gave me, but unless the Admiralty either amend the Record or carry out my request as to publishing my observations with the Record, I see no way out of it.

I do not want to trouble you, who have already shown me so much courtesy in this matter, but if you could see your way to emphasizing to the First Lord the situation in which I am placed, it might cause him to carry out my request for publication of my remarks, unless of course the Record is amended. I should be greatly obliged if you did take such action.

I may tell you—if you do not already know it—that Sir Julian Corbett's account is totally different from the Record which I am criticizing so freely. It was completed before his untimely death and is a production entirely worthy of his great reputation. The manner in which he had read into my intentions, by study of the reports, despatches, signals, etc., is really wonderful, and his accuracy

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in detail is in striking contrast to the inaccuracy of the Admiralty effort. Of course there is no comparison between the two as a literary effort.

I trust that you will forgive me for troubling you in this matter, but I am impelled to do so by my recollection of your kindly attitude in the past, by my desire that the Record when published shall be true, and that justice shall be done to all units of the fleet under my command."

Below are extracts from the enclosure. (*Note.*—The italics do not appear in the original.)

"Prior to my leaving England to take up my post in New Zealand, I had a considerable correspondence with Lord Long, then First Lord of the Admiralty, on the subject of the issue of the narrative drawn up by Captain Harper's Committee. The fact that such a document was in existence was brought to my notice shortly after my return to England in H.M.S. *New Zealand* in February, 1920, when I learned also that there was a proposal on the part of the Board of Admiralty to modify the original document by deleting some parts and altering others. I told the First Lord of what I had heard, said that I had no desire to see the report, but asked if I might be told how far the rumour was correct. In an interview then given me by Lord Long, he assured me that the report would be published, *and that no alterations would be sanctioned that were not agreed to by Captain Harper*. He also kindly suggested that I should read the report, but I was quite satisfied with any report drawn up after examination of the records by such a competent Committee, and asked permission to decline the offer. Later, however, I was told that certain amendments and deletions were proposed, and that a preface to the report would also be written by the Board of Admiralty. I had still not then seen the report. The First Lord, however, sent for me, and after discussion requested me to examine the report with the alterations proposed and then to give my views as to their accuracy in the original form. I reiterated, in a letter to the First Lord, dated July 5th, 1920, my view that the proper course was to publish the report as it stood without alteration, that I should have preferred not to have seen it, but that I had carried out his directions as to examining it. I pointed out that the few slight alterations proposed with a view to increased accuracy, or for the purpose of making the narrative clearer, were unobjectionable and indeed would probably be agreed to by Captain Harper's Committee, but that as the great majority of the alterations had the effect of altering the facts as given by the Committee, they were entirely inadmissible. I took strong objection

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to the proposed preface on account of its inaccuracy. In a further letter to the First Lord, dated July 16th, 1920, I informed him that whilst examining the diagrams of the action on the previous day at the Admiralty, as requested by him, I had learned that it was now proposed to alter some of them—so far as they gave the positions of our battle cruisers at certain periods of the action—and to suppress others. The evidence of official reports showed the accuracy of the diagrams and I protested against such action. I once more stated my view that the report should be published in its original form as soon as possible. In the same letter, I told the First Lord that I did not feel that I ought to leave England for New Zealand until the form in which the report would be issued was decided—in view of my position as Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet at the time of the action and my desire that the work of each part of the fleet should be accurately described—and that I had so informed Lord Milner, the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Lord Milner, when I told him of this decision which I had felt to be necessary, expressed concern, as it was very desirable that my arrival in the Dominion should not be delayed. I informed Lord Long of this. A few days before I was due to leave, the First Lord again sent for me and informed me that it was impossible to give a decision as to publication before my departure as it had been decided to re-examine the whole report of Captain Harper's Committee, but he gave me a verbal assurance—afterwards repeated in writing in a letter of August 15th—that before the record was published it would be communicated to me in its amended form, *with such reasons for changes as would enable me to judge of the effect and accuracy of the alterations. He added that until the Board had my assurance that I approved and was satisfied, no publication would take place.*

On this assurance I felt that I could leave England, and I did so on August 19th, 1920.

Nothing further occurred until October 29th, 1920, when, in a cable message of that date, the Secretary of State for the Colonies transmitted to me a message from the First Lord of the Admiralty in which I was informed that for various reasons *it had been decided not to publish the Harper Report at all*, one reason given being that Sir Julian Corbett's publishers had objected to such publication as being damaging to them. In my reply, dated November 1st, 1920, I once more urged publication, pointing out the effect of non-publication in view of the repeated promises of publication made in Parliament.

In a cable message dated November 6th, I was then informed of the intention to publish the Jutland Despatches in full, and Lord Long stated that it was considered best that any further account

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or appreciation should be made by Sir Julian Corbett, who had been supplied with all the material of the Harper Report. In reply, I made some suggestions as to including gunnery records, etc., in the Official Despatches, and in a cable dated November 15th, I was informed of the exact nature of the intended publication.

Some cable messages were then exchanged between the First Lord and myself as to the exact charts to be published. There was no further correspondence, beyond a letter and cable message from me on the subject of certain statements in the House which gave rise to false impressions, until my receipt of the Admiralty narrative and diagrams at the end of July, 1922, which I am now returning with my observations.

It appears that the intentions of the Board, as stated by Lord Long in his letter of August 15th, 1920, and in the cable message from the Secretary of State to me dated October 29th, 1920, *have been departed from*. In the letter it is stated that 'the record to be published was a statement merely of facts and not a criticism or history.' In the cable message, objections were pointed out to 'expanding the official record into a narrative presenting the course of the action as seen from both sides.' The present Admiralty narrative is critical in so far that statements are frequently made in it as to what should have been clear or what was assumed to be clear to the mind of the Commander-in-Chief and other officers at different periods in regard to the position and movements of the enemy, and it is implied that incorrect action was taken on some of these occasions. The fact that the statements in question are inaccurate, as pointed out in detail in my observations, does not affect the position in regard to the narrative as being in this respect critical. Again, the narrative presents the course of the action as seen from both sides, and the objections pointed out to this course in the cable message of October 29th, 1920, as affecting Sir Julian Corbett's History, have presumably been ignored.

As pointed out in my observations on the narrative and diagrams, evidence to justify departure from the original Harper record and charts has not been sent to me. The First Lord, in his letter of August 15th, 1920, promised that reasons should be given for any such changes. The failure to carry out this undertaking has greatly increased the labour of examining the diagrams and has necessitated a close examination of all available records in each case. Consequently I have been unable to send my observations at an earlier date."

The original Harper Report and charts were published in 1929.

CHAPTER XXVII

1919 to 1924

Governor-General of New Zealand—Part I

LORD AND LADY JELlicoe and their family sailed from England in the *Corinthic* on a perfect August day, in Cowes Week, 1920, for New Zealand via the Panama Canal. On arriving at Colon, the Admiral commanding the United States vessels lying at that port sent his barge to convey the party ashore. It had never struck Lady Jellicoe what effect coal-black faces might have on the younger children. They were, therefore, quite unprepared for the dusky crew of the Admiral's barge, and no attempt at first succeeded in inducing the small Prudence and the still younger George to enter the boat. At last tears were dried and the boat arrived at the jetty. There again black faces awaited them and once more trouble ; and, to put a finish on this introduction to niggerland, at the hotel the chambermaids also were of the same dusky colour. A bit severe on the young people, for a first introduction to foreign parts.

Altogether, Lord Jellicoe took out with him to New Zealand a party of twenty-six, not counting the A.D.C.s and family. On the way out he wrote : " My small boy enjoyed the trip and was full of life. I have really enjoyed the quiet life and the *rest* of the voyage. I have been able to do some reading for the first time for many years."

Lord and Lady Jellicoe arrived at Wellington in September and he remained as Governor-General for a little more than four years. He was offered a year's extension, but felt obliged to refuse on account of his family, who were fast growing up and required European education. Everywhere he and Lady Jellicoe were received with acclamation. To the respect and popularity which his fame as the great Naval commander of the Grand Fleet had gained for him, was added a personal affection which, starting with his visit a year earlier in H.M.S. *New Zealand*, grew yearly and was, eventually, felt for him by everybody in the Dominion.

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As a well-known mayor picturesquely put it, "We greet you not only as the King's representative, but also as our great Naval Leader in the War. For us you junction both functions."

In the words of one of his Staff :

"To the office of Governor-General he brought not only his great organizing and administrative gifts, but, what was perhaps of even greater account, he possessed a simplicity of character, a human sympathy and understanding, and an absolute selflessness, which alone could secure the affection of an entire people."

New Zealand, the youngest of the self-governing Dominions, has had a queer history. It was the last of the larger islands of the world to be populated. It never had aboriginal inhabitants. According to legend its first invaders came from Tahiti in the fourteenth century, sailing through the intervening stormy seas in frail double catamarans or canoes, barely surviving, and arriving at their new home in a starving and emaciated condition. These settlers were the progenitors of the Maoris, a virile hardy race of cannibals, who continued to occupy the island unknown to the world until it was first discovered by Tasman, the famous Dutch navigator, in 1642. He merely called and passed on, considering that the island was in reality a part of Australia, and gave his name to the smaller island of Tasmania. It was not until Captain Cook re-discovered, surveyed, and circumnavigated New Zealand, in 1769, that its geography was definitely settled, and it was ascertained that there were in reality two main islands with no connection whatever with Australia, a continent some 1,200 miles distant. The founding of a colony in Australia, in 1788, did not lead at once to the incorporation of New Zealand into the British Empire. Sixty years were to elapse before that happy event took place, in spite of the fact that the Treaty of Paris in 1815 had acknowledged the islands to be British possessions. But the old Duke of Wellington, when Prime Minister, considered the British Empire to be large enough, and refused to allow any further additions ! It was not until 1840 that a treaty with the natives was signed on behalf of Queen Victoria, called the Treaty of Waitangi. Very much in favour of the natives was this treaty, for it practically acknowledged their proprietorship over all the land of the islands, and ousted any settlers who had acquired land at any but fair prices. It formed, in fact, the Magna Carta of the Maoris.

The subsequent history of the islands is one of more or less



Accompanied by Mr. Massey, the new Governor-General leaves the wharf.



Presentation of the Address of Welcome.

**THE ARRIVAL OF VISCOUNT JELLCOE OF SCAPA AT
WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND**

continual progress. Rather serious riots amounting to war broke out in 1863-4, but these were quelled, and no British soldier has been quartered in the islands since 1869; after that date the islands supplied their own defence.

The white population is one almost entirely descended from settlers or emigrants from the old country. In fact, a New Zealander born on the island will still talk of England as "home." Very independent, very democratic, yet tremendously loyal Imperialists are these islanders, and very keen on anything to do with the old country. It has been said that the best Governor-General is a man whose instincts are those of a cultured and enlightened English country gentleman, for the islands are mainly agricultural and the sympathy engendered by the fellowship of land pursuits is a great bond between all classes.

Soon after Lord Jellicoe's arrival his personality began to assert itself in small ways. Almost imperceptibly the regime at Government House changed and became modernized; in fact, as it has been well put by one of his Staff¹:

"He was the herald of a modernizing influence which has since made the office of Governor-General in that Dominion so useful and popular an institution in the body politic of the country. He had not been in New Zealand long before he jettisoned unostentatiously many of the old prescriptive customs and usages which, while appropriate enough in the earlier life of the Colony and later when it first became a Dominion, had outlived their usefulness as Vice-Regal appendages, and had built up around the Representative of the Sovereign a barrier of exclusiveness between him and the majority of the inhabitants. Only a comparatively small section of the community had hitherto been admitted to Government House; outside this small circle, whose loyalty to the Crown was in any case assured, few people had an opportunity of knowing their Governor-General well, and of appreciating his personal qualities, for the knowledge gained by the majority had been acquired only by their view of him at such public gatherings as he chose to address in the cities and towns, and in his journeyings through the country districts.

This barrier Lord Jellicoe was peculiarly fitted to break down. Break it down he did, as it seemed, by almost imperceptible degrees, and without conscious effort through that cheerful human genius peculiar to him. His temperament was a mixture of humility and dignity, the complete absence of make-believe or vanity, a special

¹ Sir Cecil Day.

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brand of sane optimism, and a complete human understanding which had the rare quality of imparting to others the conviction that he both understood and sympathized with them in their difficulties. He thus established a bond of personal affection between himself and the people over whose destinies he ruled which had the extremely important result of placing the office which he filled upon a pinnacle of public esteem such as never before had been reached, and which, before the Great War, could not perhaps have been reached even by him.

New Zealanders had been unaccustomed to mixing in close company with the great figures in public life outside their own sea borders, and considered themselves pleasantly flattered when the former Commander-in-Chief of the mighty Grand Fleet was chosen by the King as their Governor-General. Some of them, of course, had had their minds somewhat poisoned by an ill-informed section of the English press, and the scurrilous attack made on him in connection with his conduct of the battle of Jutland. This was inevitable; but there was always the overriding fact that, after that battle, the Germans had never ventured a second engagement, and, whatever men might say, their Governor-General had borne a responsibility greater than had fallen on the shoulders of any other man during the War. Although Lord Jellicoe never attempted by a single word to vindicate his action, or publicly to answer the attack made on him and his tactics at Jutland, yet so great was the homage and affection of the people for him at the end of his term of office that few New Zealanders, if any, would have questioned the assertion that the course which he took on that eventful day was the best one that could possibly have been pursued.

The majority of the population expected, before he arrived (and some of his photographs seemed to justify the speculation), to see a man stern of expression, staccato of voice and sharp of command, whose will was law, and who would naturally be rather unapproachable. But, when he came amongst them, here was this little man with eyes tired yet kind and wise in expression, to which a twinkle of humour came readily, who was dignified but entirely free from pompousness, who told them good stories, was more approachable than their own democratic neighbours, but seemed to inspire a deep personal attachment, without encouraging familiarity. Yet with all his patient kindness, comparative freedom of access and naturalness of bearing, no single instance during his four years' stay in New Zealand is known of any attempt to take a liberty with him, so great was the personal and affectionate respect which he commanded.

Is it any wonder that such a man quickly captured the hearts of a warm-hearted people, in the same way that the tactful and democratic Prince of Wales had captured them but a short time previously ? ”

The office of Governor-General was no sinecure, and Lord Jellicoe entered into his duties with a wholeheartedness and devotion that were remarkable. He took only a fortnight's holiday every year—one week for trout-fishing and one week for deer-stalking. For half of the year he was hard at work, either at Wellington during the Parliamentary season, or the remainder of the year travelling and visiting all parts of the islands.

In April, 1921, he wrote :

“ We are touring the West coast for a fortnight and having a very interesting time over the mining districts where the scenery is simply grand, and the minefields are full of interest. We are enjoying our time in New Zealand although we feel rather cut off from home. The people are very kind in their welcome and so loyal and true to the Empire that it is a real pleasure to be among them. Nine speeches to-day, eight yesterday, and I don't know how many to-morrow.”

In fact, while touring he made daily an overwhelming number of speeches.

Like all who visited the Dominion, he was greatly struck with the scenery. He wrote years afterwards :

“ The scenery is lovely in most parts of New Zealand. The beauty of the snow-clad mountains has to be seen to be appreciated and remembered. The country districts have a wild sort of scenery which contrasts oddly with the more settled vista of the English countryside. In New Zealand one sees what may be termed the natural country scenery, as compared with the more artificial type met with in England, New Zealand being perhaps more akin to the Highlands of Scotland in its wilder aspects. No one can visit New Zealand without being impressed with the beauty of the country.”

Then of the climate :

“ The climate as a whole is wonderful ; the annual amount of sunshine approaches that of Italy, and this advantage that New Zealand has over Great Britain is one of the factors which assists the farmers so much. It is true that in some parts there are occasional heavy floods due to excessive rainfall, which do much damage, but

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the same trouble exists in Great Britain to a lesser extent ; and, as New Zealand develops, drainage systems will naturally be introduced with beneficial results. The climate varies a great deal in different parts of the islands. In the north of the North Island it is somewhat sultry in summer and very pleasant in the winter. In the south of the South Island it is not particularly pleasant in the winter but good in the summer. In the rest of the South Island it is pleasant for most of the year. In the south of the North Island it is nice in summer but is apt to be variable with the rapid alteration of temperature in winter."

The routine of his life as Governor-General was, broadly, to spend from the end of June till November in residence at Wellington, the capital, for the Parliamentary Session. After that the Vice-regal household moved just before Christmas to Government House at Auckland, and there it remained until June.

During the stay at Wellington the Governor-General at least one day in each week presided at a meeting of the Executive Council that was held at Parliament buildings, some two miles from Government House, instead of at Government House. This was done to suit the convenience of the Ministers. During the session these meetings were more frequent. If at Auckland, he would travel to Wellington occasionally to preside at the meetings. During the Auckland stay he and Lady Jellicoe undertook tours to outlying towns and country districts. This often involved strenuous travelling and many speeches. Special attention was paid to gatherings of schoolchildren, which were wisely encouraged by both Lord and Lady Jellicoe. He always had an eye on the children because in a few years they would be the recruits of the grown-up population. A correspondent wrote : "The little Admiral was held in affectionate regard by the people of New Zealand and especially so by the children. His lovable smile, with at times just a touch of roguishness, never failed to bring a ready response from young people."¹ During his period of office he and Lady Jellicoe visited practically every district, and some more than once, and met those who lived in remote back-blocks and out-of-the-way places. In this way he became personally acquainted with the conditions and problems of every class of the community, and the inhabitants also came to know their Governor-General.

Although during these tours Lord Jellicoe never spared himself,

¹ Mr. H. D. Grocott of Wellington.

he thoroughly enjoyed the close contacts which he was able to make with young and old. Moreover, whereas in the larger cities in which the two Government Houses were situated he refrained, with wise impartiality, from singling out special friends, he was under no such restrictions when visiting the rural areas. In consequence, he often stayed in private houses in the country districts where many friends were made and an intimate knowledge of rural problems was obtained. His friendliness and that of Lady Jellicoe towards people of all classes met with a ready response, and did much to ensure the complete success of those widespread visits. At one of the country houses where Lord and Lady Jellicoe stayed the family of small children were much intrigued by the visit. The car duly arrived with the Governor-General in white, with a white cap-cover, the chauffeur in somewhat similar attire. After the departure of the guests the small boy was asked what he thought of the Governor-General. He replied without hesitation, "I liked the Governor-General very much, but I liked the Governor-General who washed the car best."

Here is an account of a typical country visit.

"Lord Jellicoe had come to Hawera to keep his promise to open a winter show which was featuring 'British Goods for British People,' and Hawera had the privilege of staging the first of such exhibitions, before any other part of the Empire. He and his Staff had come by train, and he came into Town about an hour before the opening ceremony. An exhibition by means of window displays had been arranged in Hawera that featured British goods of all descriptions and for which prizes were given. We were somewhat concerned as to what we should do during that hour, but we need not have worried, for the Governor-General at once solved the questions by suggesting we should take him round the shops and let him see what had been brought out from England by the local traders. He was so friendly and informal in his treatment of us that we were at ease immediately. He was full of fun and thoroughly entered into the spirit of 'the little adventure.' He joked with us and his A.D.C.s and evinced the liveliest interest in the whole displays and made comparisons one with another, and actually seemed to enjoy the freedom from officialdom. We who had already a very high regard for the Admiral as a seaman achieved as high an opinion of him as a man ; and we have always looked back on that hour as a real privilege, a unique opportunity of realizing that he was as great and good a man as he was a sailor. We should like to pay ungrudging tribute

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to the late Admiral, and would esteem it a great favour if you can spare a tiny space in your biography ; it will serve to show what plain citizens thought of him.”¹

Among the many places visited were the Chatham Islands. Lord Jellicoe was the first Governor-General to visit this possession, and with him of course went Lady Jellicoe. The passage on H.M.S. *Chatham* was very stormy and Lady Jellicoe had to be accommodated with a hammock, as being more comfortable than a bed. But “going to bed” presented difficulties, as all who have slept in hammocks are fully aware. It is said that she, like all novices, went over the far side in her earliest attempt, and required more than one assistant before she could be safely tucked up.

The landing was effected from a small boat, and all the party had to be carried ashore. It was feared that the weather would compel H.M.S. *Chatham* to go to sea without the party. But she held on to her anchors.

Lady Jellicoe’s chief recollection of the day was a lunch of sardines washed down by Grand Marnier, and the subsequent discomfort caused by a long ride on a brand-new saddle !

At Government House the routine was somewhat Spartan.

Family breakfast at 8.15 a.m. summer and winter alike ; from conclusion of breakfast to luncheon-time Lord Jellicoe was continuously occupied with State and official business and correspondence, interrupted, occasionally, by one or more audiences or courtesy calls and, on at least one day of the week, usually Monday, by a meeting of the Executive Council at which he presided. Apart from these diversions and some specially important public functions which could only appropriately be held in the forenoon, Lord Jellicoe’s rule was to devote the whole of the morning to the official requirements of his office.

Afternoon engagements were not infrequent, but in their absence, he played a round, or part of a round of golf on the delightfully situated Miramar Golf Links, $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Government House, which faced the south and afforded a fine view across the straits from Lyall Bay to the South Island.

Back to afternoon tea, and then to work again until 5.45 or 6 p.m., when the children’s half-hour commenced ; a time of terrific battles on the staircases and in the main corridors with rolled-up socks as lethal weapons. In these engagements, in which

¹ From Mr. R. Page, Hawera.

George, the youngest, was usually declared the winner, not only were Lord Jellicoe and the children participants, but also the Staff and any guests who happened to be staying in the house at the time. The war over, Lord Jellicoe usually resumed his work until 7.30 or 7.45, when it was time to dress for dinner.

But this programme was much broken by evening engagements, sometimes as many as five in a week and seldom less than three. During the winter, at Wellington, one or two dinner parties of twenty to thirty guests were given at Government House, and luncheon-parties of varying size were not infrequent. Then, of course, there were balls, evening receptions, and evening and morning investitures, garden parties in the afternoons, during the late spring and in the summer, and race meetings, as well as occasional less formal gatherings for which there were often guests in the house, besides numbers of young folk to dine or dance.

But when not committed to evening functions, Lord and Lady Jellicoe usually played a game of bridge after dinner, after which Lord Jellicoe went back to his office to work until bedtime, when, so it is rumoured, he retired to his room armed with the latest "thriller."

He was fond of a game of snooker, and on dinner-party nights at Government House, Wellington, he joined in this pastime with such of his male guests as were not engaged at the bridge tables, and he usually played a pretty good average game.

On Sunday nights singing hymns was indulged in with the Staff. It is only fair to say that after a few hymns the singing ended with more tuneful songs, such as "Every lass loves a sailor," "For they all love Jack," etc.

While in residence at Government House at Auckland, the largest of New Zealand's cities, having a population of over 200,000 inhabitants, Lord Jellicoe's morning routine was much the same as at Wellington, except for the omission of meetings of the Executive Council. In the afternoons, whenever public engagements permitted, there was a round of golf at the Middlemore or Titirangi Links or a sail on the harbour.

Mr. Massey was Prime Minister of New Zealand throughout Lord Jellicoe's term of office, and their relations were of the happiest nature. Each had the warmest regard and respect for the other, and Mr. Massey took pride in, and made no secret of his claim to have "secured" Lord Jellicoe for New Zealand. They resembled each other in being men of great simplicity, with the

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welfare of the country and the Empire as their first thought. Mr. Massey was a lifelong agriculturist, and it is fitting to recall that he received his first invitation to stand for Parliament handed up to him on the prong of a pitchfork while on the top of one of his own hayricks. He had been born in Ulster and was a great Imperialist.

The Singapore Base and our Naval future in the Pacific were prominent questions at the time, problems that Lord Jellicoe had closely studied and reported on during his world tour in H.M.S. *New Zealand*. There is no doubt that Mr. Massey consulted Lord Jellicoe and placed great reliance on his judgment in these matters. He was debarred by serious illness from taking part in the last Session of Parliament before Lord Jellicoe left New Zealand, and he died shortly after, to the great grief of all sections of the people.

From 1920 to 1924 was a calm period in the political life of New Zealand, although, economically, the country suffered severely from the collapse of the high prices paid for her primary products during the War. Mr. Massey's Reform Party, the party of the Right, which represented especially the farming and country interest, was largely composed of farmers. He retained for the whole of that period a majority, although at times a precarious one, over the Liberal Party, led for a time by Mr. (now Sir Thomas) Wilford, and the Labour Party with Mr. H. E. Holland as its leader.

Lord Jellicoe was on the best of terms not only with all his Ministers but with the Opposition leaders and the members of all parties, who always made a point of being in their constituencies when the Governor-General paid a visit.

The following is Lord Jellicoe's tribute to some of the eminent New Zealanders. Of Mr. Massey he wrote :

"He was a man of intense loyalty to the Empire, with a strong personality. He left North Ireland at the age of 14 to join his parents, who had emigrated to New Zealand, where he took up farming. He soon was in touch with local Government affairs and politics, and became a prolific speaker, possibly too lengthy in his speeches, and a very hard worker. During my time in New Zealand the Prime Minister was kept far too busy receiving deputations and dealing with many minor matters which should have been left to members of the Cabinet. I fear that overwork was one of the causes which led to his death at 68.

I never, as Governor-General, offered advice to Mr. Massey,

and this possibly led to his frequently asking for my views on various subjects and especially defence, and relations with the Home Government. He was always anxious to do all in his power to strengthen Imperial ties and help the Mother Country ; indeed, so were all the members of his Cabinet.

A typical instance of this occurred when the trouble arose with Turkey after the War, as the result of Mr. Lloyd George's action concerning Greece. When the prospect of war with Turkey was imminent the British Government telegraphed to the Governors-General of the Dominions asking whether the Dominions were prepared to send troops to co-operate with the British forces. The telegram reached me shortly before 8 p.m., was decoded by 9 p.m., at which time I was giving a Ball and reception at Government House, Wellington, at which I knew that the members of the Cabinet would be present. When Mr. Massey arrived I showed him the cable and said that I felt sure that the Government would like to send the earliest possible reply, and I recalled to him the action of New Zealand in sending troops to the Boer War. I suggested a Cabinet meeting there and then. This was held and a cable was sent home that evening stating that New Zealand would certainly send troops as required. I was later informed that New Zealand replied some 48 hours before any other Dominion. This pleased Mr. Massey greatly. During most of my period in New Zealand Mr. Massey's Government had a majority in Parliament of only one to three, so that his position was very difficult. On two occasions he suggested a dissolution, but when I pointed out that the elections had taken place only comparatively recently, the objections to incurring the expense, and other difficulties involved in another election, he at once withdrew the suggestion. On occasions of this sort I consulted the Attorney-General, Sir Francis Bell, whose advice, when given, was invaluable. Sir Francis was a fine scholar, a man of wide knowledge, and great experience in legal affairs. He was also a man of the world, exceedingly well read, and with a long Parliamentary experience."

Other personalities were constantly in touch with the Governor-General, and shortly before his death he was asked to write his remembrances of them and their work, so as to have them on record in his biography. These were the notes he left :

"Sir James Parr was Minister of Education under Mr. Massey's Government ; I saw a good deal of him owing to frequent visits to educational establishments in New Zealand. He was always most helpful to me and his work was of great value.

Sir Mani Pomare, the Maori Minister, was another personality

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with whom I was frequently in contact. He was, as so many Maoris are, a most eloquent speaker, and he and Lady Pomare were a great power amongst the Maoris and indeed among the Pakehas.¹ On one occasion when he was speaking at a lunch given to me in Parliament House, when I was visiting New Zealand during my world tour after the War, he mentioned that, since in his grandfather's time the Maoris had not lost their cannibal habits, he had undoubtedly some English blood in his veins.

Sir James Allen was Minister of Defence during my period of office and was a very able Minister."

Here Lord Jellicoe evidently was disturbed and broke off. It is pathetic to see the tribute unfinished ; but it is pleasant to think, and there is no doubt that he would have willed it so, that the last words that he wrote for his biography should have been in praise of the men who worked with him in New Zealand and for whom he ever had the greatest regard.

The mention of the Maori Minister makes it necessary here to say a few words about the Maoris, the most interesting and advanced of all the native races.

The Maoris were originally divided into some twenty or thirty tribes, each tribe consisting of several different "Hapu" (or clans), numbering in olden times about a thousand warriors. The highest chief (or "Ariki") was omnipotent in tribal government, and his *mana* (prestige) was much venerated.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Maoris numbered probably nearly a quarter of a million persons ; they owned, on a communal basis, the whole of the land of New Zealand, and they were, in spite of cannibalism, a proud, dignified and accomplished people. In the days of Lord Jellicoe's Governor-Generalship their numbers did not exceed some 70,000 (including a fairly large percentage of those having European blood in their veins), and they owned probably not more than one-eighth of the land. Originally they lived in villages protected, as a rule, by a fortified position near by, and when not engaged in inter-tribal warfare their domestic life was simple. Fighting was their chief occupation—almost their chief pastime—for the smallest personal or tribal slight provided an excuse for engaging in a war.

It was in consequence of the lawlessness and immorality of European emigrants, chiefly whalers, sealers and timbermen, and their exploitation of the natives in respect of their land and its

¹ The white population.

produce, that in 1840 New Zealand became a part of the British Empire under the Treaty of Waitangi—a treaty signed by Captain William Hobson, R.N., the first Governor, on behalf of Queen Victoria, and by the majority of the paramount chiefs of the leading Maori tribes throughout the North and South Islands. The English missionaries, who alone knew the language and understood the mental outlook and enjoyed the confidence of the native race, were the main agents in persuading the Maori people to cede the sovereignty of their country to the British Crown. Queen Victoria, on her part, guaranteed to the Maoris “the full, exclusive and undisturbed possession” of their lands, except in so far as the Crown might wish to purchase them, and extended to them “*all the rights and privileges of British subjects.*”

The main results of the Treaty were that it saved the Maoris from being robbed of their land at the inception of British colonization, and prevented their racial extermination by inter-tribal warfare—a process which had been accelerated considerably by the introduction of firearms. By this time, due mainly to the invaluable influence of the missionaries, cannibalism had almost entirely ceased.

Well endowed by nature with brains, the Maori people are perhaps the most cultured, law-abiding, picturesque and lovable native people of the world. They work side by side, on a basis of equality, with their European brethren, and although his mental outlook naturally differs from that of the white man, there is probably no native in the world who enjoys so much of the confidence and respect of the European as does the Maori. It is frequently and truly said of New Zealand that, although there may be a colour consciousness, there is no native problem. There was much inter-marriage between the two races in the middle of the nineteenth century, but no social stigma attached to such marriages.

The Maori race is represented in the House of Representatives, which corresponds to the English House of Commons, by four Native Members ; it is also usually represented in the Legislative Council, the higher revising Chamber, a sort of Senate, to which the members are nominated. There is always a Maori Member in the Cabinet, and one Maori Minister, the late Sir James Carroll, was for a time during the early part of the present century Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand.

Lord Jellicoe clearly recognized the value of strengthening the

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harmonious relations which existed between the older Maoris and the Europeans and of fostering an amicable spirit between the younger generation and their white compatriots. He therefore availed himself of every opportunity during his frequent tours in the North Island, in which all but a small number of these copper-coloured people reside, of meeting and addressing them, of commending their loyal assistance during the Great War, in which a Maori battalion fought overseas, of encouraging their pride of race and of referring appreciatively to their unwavering loyalty to the British Crown. His renown as an "Ariki" (High Chief) in the land from which he came invested him and his utterances, in the eyes of the natives, with a special influence and significance. His exhortations to be loyal to the best traditions of their ancestors, to be industrious in the preservation and pursuit of their ancient arts and crafts, and to co-operate in a friendly spirit with their Pakeha (European) fellow-countrymen for the good of themselves and of the country in which they live, were always listened to with every mark of close attention and respect. At centres of native population, and notably at Rotorua, in the middle of the North Island, large numbers of the Maoris assembled to greet him ceremoniously with their "hakas," forms of Maori welcome and other picturesque tribal dances and really beautiful singing of native songs, and to present him with gracefully phrased addresses of welcome, accompanied, on special occasions, by some gift much valued by the tribe. On such occasions Lord Jellicoe never failed to take the opportunity of fostering their loyalty to the Crown and their peaceful collaboration with their white compatriots in the economic welfare of the Dominion, and at the same time of emphasizing the virtues of the gospel of work.

The following incident shows his innate understanding and appreciation of the Maori loyalty.¹

"When the Viceregal party were leaving Te Awamutu after the Governor-General had fulfilled a public engagement, the streets were very crowded, and the police cleared a road for the cars to pass along. Lord Jellicoe was seated in the front seat of the leading car. Suddenly a Maori woman, an old princess, ran in front of the car and commenced a *haka*, or war dance, holding up the advance of the party as she walked backwards, her tongue doing great work swinging from ear to ear. The police rushed at her to take her away, but the great Jellicoe was quick to order them to

¹ Contributed by Mr. James Millen of Te Awamutu.

leave her alone. He knew that she was a leader of the Maori race, doing honour to the great man who led the ships in the War (the Maoris love a good seaman). This woman continued along two main streets with the crowd cheering the great advance. At the same function a Maori man complained to Lord Jellicoe that they would not put him on the platform to speak unless he (the Maori) paid £5 towards the funds. Lord Jellicoe jokingly replied that it would indeed be a good rule if we all had to do the same."

Cannibalism was still a memory with the older inhabitants. When visiting a Maori settlement Sir James Carroll asked Lady Jellicoe to shake hands with a very ancient Maori ; the latter, to her dismay, calmly said, "Please tell Queen Mary that we no longer eat white babies."

Maori customs are rather surprising to the novice. Poor Lady Jellicoe received the shock of her life when first introduced to the Maori equivalent of shaking hands, which consisted of rubbing noses. The near approach of the native face in order to complete the ceremony was at first unexpected and somewhat alarming. Never during the whole time of her stay in New Zealand did she become thoroughly accustomed to this mode of salutation.

CHAPTER XXVIII

Governor-General of New Zealand—Part II

OF Lord Jellicoe's official work in New Zealand it would be difficult to make an adequate summary. Even in those days the Governor-General was hedged about by increasing constitutional restrictions, and under the post-War demand on the part of some of the British Self-Governing Dominions for a greater measure of what was known then as "self-determination," his executive and administrative functions were becoming more and more curtailed. This had the effect of bringing his position as regards public affairs in the Dominion more in line with that of the relations of the King with his Ministers in the United Kingdom.

Nevertheless, the influence of a Governor-General possessing consummate tact and other qualities of greatness was then, as it is now, more powerful than many people suppose ; and the advice and counsel of such a man is not infrequently sought informally, and welcomed by a government. At all events, it is common knowledge in New Zealand that not only did his Ministers keep Lord Jellicoe informed, as was their duty, of all important developments of policy, but they also sought his counsel in unofficial conversations and placed much value and respect upon his mature judgment, recognizing that he had been accustomed to deal with big things. It was natural that in the establishment of the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy, which was based on the recommendations made in the New Zealand section of his report on the co-ordination of the Naval forces of the Empire, his advice, in conjunction with that of the Dominion's Naval advisers on the spot, should have been sought by his Ministers at each stage of development ; and it is no secret that his influence, which was always exercised with tact and perfect constitutional propriety, was of more than ordinary value to a government who, while responsible for the policy which they had formulated largely on the recommendations of his report, were nevertheless inexperienced in the perplexities of Naval administration.

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But in matters of public policy other than those concerned with the Navy, his Ministers, who had not been slow to recognize his marked aptitude for divesting a problem of its external trappings and going straight to its root, freely conferred with Lord Jellicoe, and throughout the whole of his term of office his relations with his Government were harmonious. There was no acerbity even when, as was sometimes the case, conflict of views on constitutional points arose.

One extremely distasteful duty of the Governor-General was the signing of death warrants. This disturbed Lord Jellicoe greatly. On the first occasion he refused, but was informed that it was in accordance with the Constitution that he should do so. There was a slight delay and, just as he was taking up his pen to sign, a wire came asking him not to sign, since further evidence had come to light. But alas! it only still further confirmed the sentence, so the warrant was signed.

The Executive Council, over which the Governor-General presides, is analogous to the Privy Council in England, and at the meetings of this Council the formal acts of Government—the issue of Proclamations, Orders in Council, and the like—are authorized. Each such instrument bears the signature of the Governor-General, who may, and frequently does, at the Council discuss with his Ministers, all of whom are members of the Executive Council, the reasons for any Order in Council or Proclamation. But in the execution of the powers and authorities vested in him by Royal Letters Patent constituting the Office of Governor-General, he must be guided, just as the King is in relation to the Privy Council, by the advice of the Executive Council.

Lord Jellicoe possessed to a marvellous degree the Royal gift of memory for faces and names, and nothing pleases a democrat more than, by face and name, to be recognized and remembered by the Great. This was one of the gifts which made him so popular a figure at the larger gatherings.

He was a keen supporter of religious, philanthropic and charitable organizations, especially such as alleviated privation and poverty. Also it always pleased him to mingle with and talk to returned soldiers and sailors and hear their experiences in the War. As was not unnatural, having himself a young family, he was never happier than in the society of children, and paid special attention to the schoolchildren of the places he visited, and in turn became their idol. He would appear disturbed when confronted

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with appeals by letter from persons who were out of employment, or through illness were obviously suffering from privation or impoverishment. Such cases were always inquired into and, while recognizing the imprudence of attempting to exercise any influence in official quarters, he would nevertheless go to a great deal of trouble to endeavour to alleviate their lot ; and, by means of representations to various organizations engaged in philanthropic or social welfare work, was instrumental in bringing help to many necessitous cases. Here is a typical act, small in itself, yet remembered to this day.

At Otaio in South Canterbury there is a beautiful stone memorial church, which serves for a small congregation gathered from the scattered farms. The Governor-General heard of this little church and visited it one Sunday morning. This is how the officiating clergyman ¹ wrote of the visit :

“Never shall I forget our joy one Sunday morning when we found ourselves joined by Admiral Jellicoe, his aide-de-camp and two of his family. He was residing for some weeks at the Holme Station ; and, on this morning, had motored some miles over rough roads and river-beds to come and join our little congregation of ten persons in worshipping at the altar of the God whom he loved and served. What a privilege it was to have the honour of kneeling with him in that little church, with England’s great Admiral at whose feet the German people had sunk their mighty fleet, the humble God-fearing man whom we all in New Zealand loved.”

Many a man has left a trail of good stories or witty and clever sayings behind him. Not so Lord Jellicoe ; his trail was one of small, kind, thoughtful acts which have been treasured by the humble and which for many years will not be forgotten.

Lord Jellicoe joined the order of Freemasons, accepting office as Grand Master of the Grand Lodge of Freemasons of New Zealand in 1922-3 and 1923-4. During his occupancy of the office the membership of the Order greatly increased in numerical strength. Indeed, he seemed to absorb deeply the ideals of Freemasonry and developed a lively interest in its activities, attending and addressing Lodge meetings in all parts of the Dominion.

“He was the Supreme Head over 260 lodges and about 23,000 Masons. During this time he worked most assiduously, visiting lodges at their ordinary meetings, their installations, and perform-

¹ The Rev. Edmund K. Mules.



S. P. Andrew

**VISCOUNT JELlicOE OF SCAPA, GRAND MASTER OF THE
GRAND LODGE OF NEW ZEALAND**

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ing the ceremony of Dedication and Consecration when new lodges were constituted ; at these various meetings he was always punctual to the minute, memorized his work perfectly and was beloved by every member of the Craft under our Grand Lodge.

He became the first Master of a newly-constituted Lodge, Island Bay No. 243 (one of the suburbs of Wellington), and his crest beautifully carved in New Zealand woods is above the door of the lodge room. This was the gift and work of one of the brethren and will, we hope, remain in position for all time as a reminder of their first Master and to the memory of a great man.

A little human touch to his year of office as Master and afterwards, was the fact that at each monthly meeting our late brother sent a supper dish for the refectory from Government House ; this he never omitted, whether present or absent.

Our late brother was initiated in Lodge Renown No. 218, Wellington, in 1922, the presiding officer being the late Right Hon. William Ferguson Massey, Premier (afterwards Grand Master). Viscount Jellicoe received the second portion of the ceremony at the hands of M.W. Bro. J. Dougall, Past Grand Master (since passed away) in Civic Lodge, and received the third portion of the ceremony in Ara Lodge No. 1 Auckland at the hands of M.W. Bro. Oliver Nicholson, so our distinguished brother came into the Masonic world under the very best tutors.”¹

As the head of the Boy Scouts in New Zealand he undoubtedly exercised a beneficent influence on the growth of that movement, which owes a great deal to his active encouragement. He was Patron of the Savage and Orphans Clubs of Wellington and Auckland, and when attending their periodical social gatherings was generally prepared with a stock of stories which, told with a dry humour, rapidly earned for him a wide reputation as a raconteur. As his stock became exhausted, this reputation caused him real embarrassment, and he was occasionally forced to rely upon the repertoire of his Staff.

He also took great interest in the starting of Flock House, which had its origin in a fund started during the War by New Zealand sheepowners, out of gratitude to British seamen whose courage and devotion enabled New Zealand produce to be marketed in England. The fund amounted to £250,000, and was entitled “New Zealand Sheepowners’ acknowledgment of debt to British Seamen.” Flock House was established as a farm school with the object of bringing out the orphan children of British seamen

¹ Supplied by Herbert H. Seaton, Esq., J.P., of Wellington.

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
to New Zealand, educating them in farming matters, and later placing them on the land. The scheme has met with great success, but since the supply of orphan children has now, by the lapse of time, become exhausted, the orphans of New Zealand soldiers are now trained there.

For a man who disliked making speeches as much as did Lord Jellicoe, the office that he occupied was at first rather a trial, for in the course of his duties and his tours a Governor-General is called upon to deliver frequent addresses. But he was looked upon throughout New Zealand as a speaker who, without claim to be considered a great orator, never failed to strike the right note, and at no time was he ever accused of saying either publicly or in private anything that was tactless.

His interest in the sports and games of the people will remain a living memory. In most of them he actively participated. Soon after his arrival in the country he ordered, at Auckland, a 14-foot boat which he announced his intention of sailing himself. He chose a boat of this size rather than one larger and more comfortable because, as he said, he wanted to foster in the younger men a love for the sea and for sailing, and he knew that the cost of any larger craft would be beyond their means. He sailed his 14-footer, which he named *Iron Duke*, frequently in races, and as a consequence of his example yachting became more popular than it had been for many years past. He was by no means a fine-weather yachtsman and his boat was always out, himself at the tiller, whenever the other boats were able to sail. Let a keen New Zealand yachtsman¹ tell an anecdote in his own words :

“ One Saturday afternoon in Auckland the Admiral came along in his boat to start in a race during a strong blow from the East ; with the ebb tide running there was a nasty joggle in the harbour and the earlier arrivals had got in under the lee of the railway wharf. When the Admiral came along the boys pulled out to give him a comfortable berth under the wall. But he would have none of it ; he made them all resume their positions while he and his crew held on to whatever shelter there was on the outside ; and even before the start of the race they had a good dusting, as there was a short curling sea, and during the race it was occasionally difficult to see the boats in the flying spray. As the *Iron Duke* was possibly not so fast as some of the others it was additionally ‘ sporty ’ of his Lordship to race, especially as the 14-footers are essentially

¹ Mr. F. H. Cooper.



RACING AT AUCKLAND
The Iron Duke is on the extreme right.

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a young man's job, as they are so quick in stays. I need hardly state how much the fact of the Admiral's joining the smallest class was appreciated, when he might have owned the largest keel yacht in Auckland and sailed in comfort.

I could relate several other incidents showing how much we esteemed the English gentleman who relinquished all the advantages of living in England to come to a remote British colony."

This is what Lord Jellicoe wrote about the *Iron Duke* :

"I had a 14-foot dinghy built shortly after I arrived in New Zealand as Governor-General, and a class of 14-foot dinghies for rowing was instituted at Auckland, Wellington, Lyttelton, Dunedin and Stewart Island ; and an annual competition for the Sanders Cup arranged, at which one dinghy selected from each port competed. The cup was in memory of Sanders, the New Zealand V.C. who commanded the *Prize*, a Q-boat, during the War, and whom it was my privilege to recommend for the V.C. in 1917. My dinghy was named *Iron Duke* after my old flagship, and she represented Auckland in the first series of 5 races for the Sanders Cup. I was beaten by the Stewart Island dinghy in 3 races out of 5. When I left New Zealand I gave the *Iron Duke* to Mr. Carnahan, who had always sailed in her with me, and she was still running in 1934."

In after years a keen observer wrote :

"Realizing the tremendous value to New Zealand of developing a sea sense among the young men of the Dominion, Lord Jellicoe did all he could to foster the sport, and a keener and more efficient yachtsman it would have been hard to find at that time. As a skipper of small sailing boats Lord Jellicoe was not long in showing the yachtsmen of Auckland and Wellington particularly that he was equal to most of the helmsmen of these two centres, and while in New Zealand his record of successes at the tiller of his 14-footer *Iron Duke*, which he named after his famous flagship, was one to be envied."

But it was not his love of the sea and his ability as a yachtsman which endeared him to the sailing enthusiasts of the Dominion so much as his readiness to assist with his advice and give his personal attention to any problem with which the administrators found themselves faced on many occasions. Lord Jellicoe was Patron of practically every Yacht Club in the Dominion.

Any move to encourage the "Young Fry" always received the utmost attention of the Admiral, and it is recorded that he never missed a sailing race for juniors if he could possibly help it.

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Although he was often invited to participate in races for the larger-class yachts in Auckland, it was the small sailing boats that gained his greatest interest, and during his four years in New Zealand he was a familiar figure on the waterfront, more particularly at Wellington and Auckland. Clad in a pullover that had once been white, and old duck trousers, with his feet encased in a pair of ancient-looking canvas shoes, and with a salt-stained cap on his head, he would frequently arrive at the yacht basin on a Saturday afternoon keen for a sail. After a race he was always ready to help with the stowing before sculling ashore, and on more than one occasion, though soaked to the skin, he was observed at Wellington helping some other yachtsman to haul his dinghy up the skidway.

He frequently played tennis and cricket, being about the average at both games, and always made a point of attending the principal race meetings. He was greatly struck by the beauty of the lay-out of the Auckland and Wellington race-courses and the keenness of the New Zealanders in these events. Lady Jellicoe's colours were frequently seen on several race-courses in New Zealand—she ran a horse which did quite well but won no major events.

During 1922 Lord Jellicoe expressed his determination to go stalking in Otago or Westland in the 1923 season, and try to obtain a good Scotch-type head from the herd there (which was descended from deer sent out from Lord Dalhousie's forest), and asked Major R. Wilson, D.S.O., of Lethenty, to recommend a stalking-block.¹

"The Otago Acclimatization Society generously waived the requirements of balloting, and Lord Jellicoe, with Captain Curtis (now Sir Arthur Curtis) and Captain Mundy, were given the licences for block No. 35. A difficulty arose as to the main camp, as the usual place of camping at the mouth of the Young River was very low lying and infested with sand flies, and was indeed known as 'Sand fly flat.' Mr. Dunning, however, arranged a camp on higher ground (always an advantage in sand-fly country), but it was across the main river (the Makarora) from block 35, so he overcame this difficulty by providing horses to cross the river morning and evening. An assistant was provided by the Postal Department to deal with the Governor-General's mail at Makarora, and an experienced guide, Jim Buckley, was sent by the Acclimatization Society for Lord Jellicoe, with Captain Cowie in charge of the party.

After going into camp Lord Jellicoe stalked some of the high

¹ Major R. A. Wilson also supplied this account of the stalk.

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ground in his block and obtained a fair 14-point head ; but, as the stalking was between 4,000 and 5,000 feet and the camp at about 1,000 feet above sea level, he found the climbing each day very strenuous ; and, after about a week decided to leave the high ground to Captain Curtis and Captain Mundy, and to finish his time in camp fishing the Makarora.

He obtained some very good sport fishing ; but Buckley was not satisfied with the 14-point head, and spent his time in the thick beech forest which came down close to the main camp trying to locate a good stag among those roaring in the bush.

On the morning arranged for the breaking of the camp Buckley came back to the camp and said he thought he had located a big stag in the bush, by his continued roaring in the same spot, and persuaded Lord Jellicoe to go out for a last chance. Stalking in the bush is a lottery at the best of times, since, apart from the hinds who give the alarm, there are generally out-lying stags to get past before getting near the master stag with the hinds ; also one must shoot on sight without waiting to see what sort of head the animal you are firing at carries. If you wait to see what the antlers are the alarm is generally given and the animal vanishes.

However, Buckley very capably managed to get Lord Jellicoe into a position for a shot at the stag. At the shot, the stag, though hit, rushed off into the thick bush ; Buckley, following as fast as he could on the tracks, came up to the dying stag while Lord Jellicoe was still struggling some distance behind.

‘ Here he is, sir,’ called out Buckley.

‘ What head has he ? ’ anxiously asked the Governor.

‘ I have only seen one better in my life, sir,’ was Buckley’s triumphant reply.

It was a truly magnificent 13-pointer, 44 inches long with an outside spread of $47\frac{3}{4}$ inches and a spread inside the beam of $37\frac{3}{4}$ inches. An exhibition of New Zealand deer-heads was held at Wembley the following year and, as head No. 1, Lord Jellicoe’s head attracted much attention. It was illustrated as No. 1 in the catalogue published by the New Zealand Government under the title, ‘ The New Zealand Deer-heads,’ with the following remarks :

‘ This head is a fitting one to be the centre piece of the exhibition. It was of true Scotch type, the measurements are magnificent ; it was the best head shot in New Zealand in 1933 and it fell to the Governor-General’s rifle in the Makarora Valley. It has that beautiful wide sweep portrayed by Landseer which so enhances the appearance of every good head.’ ”

Needless to say, Lord Jellicoe was very proud of his trophy and was very satisfied with his trip.

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This is what Lord Jellicoe wrote regarding sport in New Zealand :

“ The principal forms of sport are fishing and stalking. Trout fishing is unequalled even now, although the size of the fish now does not compare with that of fish taken with the rod and fly 10 years ago.

As regards stalking, one got very fine sport indeed with stag and wapiti during my time in New Zealand. I enjoyed my annual stalking-camp more than any other holiday in New Zealand. The fact that the stalker is dependent on his own efforts adds greatly to this attraction and his camp is far removed from civilization and this life is quite wild.”

One rather amusing story owes its origin to the fine head already mentioned. Lord Jellicoe had given instructions for it to be sent to Government House ; unfortunately the box containing it was detained, by mistake, at some local station or railway siding, although it arrived eventually after an interval of some days. During the interim he attended some big dinner at which the chairman—who had heard of the incident—remarked : “ Gentlemen, this is a unique occasion, for it is the only time on record that His Excellency Lord Jellicoe has ever been known to lose his head ! ”

Lord Jellicoe was extremely keen on golf and a steadily-improving player. Golf was his chief form of exercise in New Zealand, and he played a daily round whenever possible at Miramar or Middlemore when in residence at Wellington or at Auckland. A great sporting tribute to Lord Jellicoe took place at Miramar when, towards the end of his term, golfers came to Wellington from all parts of the Dominion to take part in a competition and later in a gathering in his honour. In the course of his tours Lord Jellicoe played on all the leading golf-courses of New Zealand.

Shortly before his departure from New Zealand, on the occasion of a lunch given to him as a farewell by the Rotary Club at Wellington, the President observed that Lord Jellicoe had left his mark on the deer forests, the rivers, and it was even rumoured on the golf links, of New Zealand ! He understood His Excellency had recently been presented with a billiard cue at Auckland and hoped he would take this as a sign that, if ever he returned to New Zealand, no spot would be barred to him !

Lord Jellicoe, who always appreciated a humorous speech, in



MEET OF THE PAPARANGHA HOUNDS

Mr. Bullock-Webster was still hunting them in 1936, though well over 80 years of age. The Government House contingent are on the right.

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responding to the toast of his health, remarked, that he noticed—after an excellent lunch—that a Representative of the Department of Internal Affairs was present (there is a Minister of Internal Affairs in New Zealand), which he thought was most appropriate. But he hoped the Representative would take note that there were onions in the soup, and onions always disagreed with him !

He had always been a keen cricketer and frequently played in New Zealand, getting up sides to play clubs in the centres, and, especially when on tour, captaining sides against local boys' colleges. These were most popular and enabled him to get into touch with the younger element.

Although Lord Jellicoe rode to hounds but seldom, Lady Jellicoe and her children were very keen, and she regularly hunted with the harriers in various parts of New Zealand, but especially with the Pakuranga pack at Auckland. The farmers were filled with admiration and alarm at seeing her flying over the wire fences. The general view was perhaps reflected by her doctor, who, when she was being treated for a damaged knee, advised her giving up so dangerous an amusement, and suggested croquet as an alternative ! The idea of such an alternative must, indeed, create a feeling of amusement in all who know the amazing energy and vitality of Lady Jellicoe.

The whole family hunted ; usually Government House provided eight of the riders, including Prudence and George, the latter at times having his pony lifted for him over the walls by one of the A.D.C.s. Prudence, aged eleven, had several adventures. Once she persuaded an A.D.C. to let her have Myrtle's large pony. One lady, not noticing that it was Prudence, called out to her to follow, and took her over gorse hedges and wire fences. Fortunately the venture ended without disaster. Another time she took a bad toss racing a motor-car up the drive of Government House at Wellington.

For nearly the whole of the period of his stay in New Zealand Lord Jellicoe was worried by the action of the Admiralty over the Narrative of Jutland. This has been dealt with elsewhere, but the correction of the Narrative and correspondence therewith occupied much of his time and was, moreover, very distasteful to him. He kept guard over his tongue, he never inspired a single article in the press nor any book written by a friend. Only once or twice in his private correspondence does he show something of the contempt that the Narrative and certain statements in Mr. Churchill's

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World Crisis inspired in him. From New Zealand he wrote to a friend¹—"As you say, the Admiralty Narrative teems with mis-statements. If you had seen it when it first came to me you would have said it was the work of a lunatic."


He had to correct the Narrative himself, as he had no assistant with sufficient knowledge, which involved an immense amount of labour. Mr. Walter Long had promised that the reasons for the changes in Captain Harper's Report would be sent with the Admiralty proposals; this was not done, hence hours had to be spent over the charts checking and counter-checking the courses and speeds of the various ships, ranges, etc. It was most unfair to so busy a man, and to many men it would have proved to be an impossible task. He never seemed to worry about it, however, except perhaps when there was an attempt to put any of his officers in what he considered to be an unjustly unfavourable light.

"One particular case was that of Admiral Evan-Thomas, for whose reputation he fought hard. He seemed quite unperturbed about criticisms of himself, and when on one occasion a member of his Staff noticed in the Admiralty proofs a very obvious contradiction on the part of the Admiralty compilers themselves, which seemed to vindicate his action, the Staff officer was all in favour of letting it stand and said so. Lord Jellicoe's reply was: 'But it's not true to the facts,' and then proceeded to put the Admiralty Account right, earning, I have no doubt, their gratitude! That is so typically illustrative of his absolute fairness and truthfulness. Of the attacks upon himself he was wont to say: 'I'm not going to attempt any defence of myself. I am still convinced that I was right, and I'm content to let posterity judge.'"²

Lord Jellicoe's aversion from publicity was proverbial and in these modern days almost amounted to a fault. But in avoiding it, he was never unkind to those whose livelihood it was to obtain "copy." If, for instance, a photographer had been sent to obtain for his journal a photograph of Lord Jellicoe disembarking from a ship or arriving at some place, or taking part in some function, and Lord Jellicoe, as he seldom failed to do, noticed that the man had difficulty in getting him at a suitable angle, he would at once help him by standing clear, in order that he might be able to take his "snap" and so be assisted in the pursuit of his livelihood. He did the same thing for schoolchildren. The Governor-General was distinctly human, for at a dinner given in his honour, when long-

¹ Admiral Sir Percy Grant.

² Sir Cecil Day.



LADY JELlicoe JUMPING WIRE
The alternative to croquet !

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winded speeches were being made, a reporter—insufferably bored by the whole affair and anxious to get back to the more liquid stage of the ceremony—leaned across to the Governor-General and said confidentially: “Doesn’t Your Excellency ever get tired of all this speechifying?” His Excellency looked up. He did not speak, but for a moment one eye closed and opened again, and he was again apparently carefully following the lengthy speech.

There is one aspect of the life at Government House that must not be overlooked, since it was of the utmost importance, namely, the high tone that existed on all occasions. This had a decidedly beneficial effect in the Dominion. There was nothing puritanical in either Lord or Lady Jellicoe, yet the standard set by them pleased even the most puritanical of the New Zealanders, and this was saying a good deal, for many were of Scotch descent and of Calvinistic ideas. But the whole tone of the family life and the entertainments at Government House were distinctly on a high level. Then, again, a great asset lay in their having a young family. Indeed, a great pleasure it was to the people to have a Governor-General with a large family at Government House. Children’s dances, to which hundreds of young guests were invited, were perhaps the most popular features of the Season at both Wellington and Auckland. Another very popular act was that of sending two of their daughters to a boarding-school at Hawke Bay instead of having the more exclusive form of education by means of a governess. It was easy for all to see that Lord and Lady Jellicoe were a devoted couple, and that their family life was a happy one.

The old saying that no man is a hero to his valet contains a modicum of truth. Nor is a man always a hero to his immediate Staff. It is interesting, therefore, to note the experience of one of those most constantly associated with him.¹

“He was an early riser and a cheerful (but not uncomfortably cheerful!) occupant of the breakfast-room. He got through a vast amount of work without ever appearing to be hurried, and in his processes of thought was invariably calm and collected with absolute self-control. Never idle, never a time-waster, he knew perfectly how and when to relax, and when playing golf never talked ‘shop.’

He ruled by the pure force of his own example. During my

¹ Sir Cecil Day.

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
four years' daily association with him I never heard him give a curt order—he was rather of the 'would you mind' type ; and yet there was not a single person in that household from the scullery-maid upwards who would not have worked themselves to the bone for him had it been necessary. Such rare differences as occurred among the members of his Staff and household were always settled amongst themselves—no one ever thought of giving him the bother of listening to and arbitrating upon them. His wishes were law, and nobody questioned them.

It was my duty, as also it was that of other members of the Staff, to offer at times suggestions to him. Some of mine, in the light of subsequent reflection, appear to have been far from brilliant or even sound. But he always managed to give me the impression that he was really grateful that I should have gone to him with them. He did not in a single instance pooh-pooh them, and it was only by his subsequent action or inaction concerning them that one realized his opinion of their merits or demerits."

The Commodore commanding the New Zealand Division¹ wrote :

"To us in the Royal Navy, it was indeed a privilege and inspiration to serve under Lord Jellicoe as Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief, for he took a keen interest in the welfare of the New Zealand Squadron, not only during his term of office as Governor-General, but also after his return to England. He visited both the *Chatham* and *Dunedin* (which relieved the former as Flagship of the Squadron in 1924) on several occasions. On the 15th November, 1923, the day he had planned to visit the *Chatham*, it was blowing hard and pouring with rain, which quite spoilt the appearance of the ship. Lord Jellicoe most considerately offered to postpone his visit until the following day. His Excellency arrived at 9.45, and the whole programme arranged for him passed off without a hitch. He stopped and talked to many of the petty officers and men during his inspection of the ship's company, and took the greatest interest in everything. He made an excellent speech, pointing out the absolute necessity for the highest state of efficiency and discipline. He congratulated the guard of honour on their smart appearance and bearing, and the ship's company on their excellent behaviour during the island cruise. He also pointed out the immense importance which he attached to the behaviour of the men whilst they were on shore, telling them that they were emissaries of the British Empire. He was most complimentary on the appearance of the ship, yet not a thing escaped

¹ Afterwards Vice-Admiral A. F. Beal.



ENTRANCE TO THE JELICOE WARD, NAPIER HOSPITAL, AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE, 1931

GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF NEW ZEALAND—PART II

his eye. It was generally felt that his visit would do a vast amount of good to the Division.”

One of the events which gave Lord Jellicoe much pleasure during his term of office as Governor-General was the visit to New Zealand of the Special Service Squadron, which was commanded by Vice-Admiral ¹ Sir Frederick Field, an old friend from the Boxer Expedition, with Admiral the Hon. Hubert Brand ² in command of the Light Cruiser Squadron. The Squadron spent from April 24 to May 18 in New Zealand waters. The people of New Zealand are warmly attached to the Royal Navy and appreciate most thoroughly all that the Navy means to the Dominion. The Navy League is exceedingly strong and active in all parts of the Dominion, and His Majesty's ships are invariably received with enthusiasm. Lord Jellicoe fostered this feeling warmly, and made a point of attending any of the Navy League entertainments, whenever it was possible for him to do so. The visit of the Special Service Squadron was, therefore, an event which was eagerly looked forward to, and thoroughly enjoyed by the people of New Zealand.

The Government and the Navy League, as well as many of the residents, arranged extensive entertainments for both officers and men of the Squadron, and His Excellency also gave several dinners and other entertainments at Government House. He was keenly interested in their programme and proceedings, and took passage as the guest of Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Field on board the *Hood* from Wellington to Auckland, calling at Hawke Bay *en route*. Little did he think that years later Lady Norah, his third daughter, would barely escape death at that spot, during the terrible earthquake in February, 1931.

On two occasions, once at Wellington, and again at Auckland, the officers and men of the Squadron took part in a route-march through the streets, and on both occasions His Excellency took the salute. The fine bearing and drill of the men were noted with great admiration by all who witnessed these route marches. The exemplary behaviour of the liberty men was also a subject of the most favourable comment, and there was not a single case of leave-breaking or misbehaviour on shore amongst the thousands of liberty men landed during the stay of the Squadron in New Zealand waters. It was a matter of the greatest regret to all when the time came for the Squadron to depart.

¹ Afterwards Admiral of the Fleet and First Sea Lord.

² Afterwards Admiral the Hon. Sir Hubert Brand, G.C.B.


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In order that the New Zealand Squadron should not feel neglected during the display by the Special Service Squadron's men, His Excellency very kindly permitted a personal guard of honour to be provided for him, consisting of 100 New Zealand Division ratings with their complement of officers, when he took the salute, and a guard of honour also of New Zealand ratings to be provided for Sir Frederick Field when he paid his official visit to Government House. Naturally the New Zealand Division appreciated these privileges greatly. Lord Jellicoe's unfailing interest in the squadron was a source of the greatest encouragement to officers and men. He was particularly keen about the men entered into the New Zealand Division and that they should come in all respects up to the same standard as that of the ratings lent from the Royal Navy. The former were entered and trained on board the *Philomel* at Auckland, and, after the completion of their preliminary training, were sent to sea in the cruisers. After some experience in sea-going ships, the best of the New Zealand entry were selected to go to England in order to qualify in the Gunnery, Torpedo and Signal Schools, or Mechanical Training Establishment, for higher non-substantive rating. On completion of their courses and examinations, and after a brief period of service in the Home Fleet, they rejoined the New Zealand Squadron.

On the very day that Lord Jellicoe left New Zealand it happened that a batch of 16 New Zealand ratings had just returned from England, all of whom had done extremely well and had passed examinations excellently. Although every moment of his time was occupied, His Excellency directed the Commodore to bring them to Government House in order that he might see them and congratulate them personally. He inspected them and gave them a short address.

Lord and Lady Jellicoe, with their family, left New Zealand on board R.M.S. *Tahiti* on November 26, 1924.

The Commodore had asked His Excellency's permission, and that of the New Zealand Government, to take to sea the two ships of the New Zealand Squadron which were at Wellington at the time, in order to give him a Naval send-off. As many of the New Zealand Ministers as could come were embarked on board the *Dunedin*, in order that they might take part in the last phase of the farewell to their Governor-General. The R.M.S. *Tahiti*, with Their Excellencies on board, sailed at 1.15 p.m. H.M.S. *Dunedin* followed. The wharves and shores were thronged with people, one



DEPARTURE OF VISCOUNT JELICOE OF SCAPA FROM NEW ZEALAND

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of the largest crowds ever seen in Wellington. When clear of the Heads, the *Dunedin* increased to 22 knots, took station 3 cables ahead of the *Veronica*, which was 5 cables ahead of the *Tahiti*, fired a salute of 19 guns ; then the two ships turned 16 points to port in succession, cheered ship, and returned to harbour. The following message was sent by the Commodore :

“New Zealand Squadron deeply regrets the departure of Your Excellencies and send their respectful and hearty good wishes for a pleasant passage, and safe return home.”

Lord Jellicoe replied :

“I am very grateful for the message sent us from the New Zealand Squadron. The keenness and efficiency of the squadron will always be in my memory.

I bid you a most regretful farewell, and send you, the officers and men of the squadron warmest good wishes which are shared by Lady Jellicoe and my children.

JELlicoe.”

POSTSCRIPT

Two letters received subsequent to Lord Jellicoe's return to Europe :

From the Maori Colony

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

Great is our sorrow that to-morrow you will turn your face from us and from this land.

Depart, oh Governor ! since it has been decreed that you must leave our land and return to your own far land, from which you came to wear awhile the mantle of our Lord, the King. Depart in honour, having borne that sign of Majesty as befitted a great Chief and a warrior of fame.

Farewell.

Go then in peace, you who were bred to the mightiest adventures of the great ocean of Kiwa, bearing with you the enduring regard and loving respect of this young Nation. With our pakeha brethren we have shared in the honour and good fortune that placed you over our land during the troublous years since the Great War.

Farewell.

Return then with your wife and your children to your own land, to your own people, there to enjoy yet many years of well-being

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and happiness. Bear to His Majesty the King our message of loyalty, our hope and trust in the Empire, to which we are proud to belong may always remain great and wise.

For the Maori race of New Zealand, we its representatives in Parliament bid you and yours a regretful farewell.

Haere ra ! E hoki-ki-tou whenua kura.

We have the honour to be

Your Excellency's

Most obedient Servants,

(signed by)

J. G. COATES.	[In 1925—three months after Mr. Massey's death—Mr. Coates became Prime Minister. (He is now the Right Hon. J. G. Coates, M.C., M.P.) A European.]
M. POMARE.	[The late Sir Maui Pomare. A Maori who was Native Minister in Mr. Massey's Administration.]
JAS. CARROLL.	[(Ariki.) The late Sir James Carroll, at one time Acting Prime Minister. A Maori.]
A. T. NGATA.	[Sir Apirana Ngata, M.P., Native Minister for several years, until 1934. A Maori.]
TAU HENARE.	[One of the four Maori M.P.s representing the Native Race in the House of Representatives.]
WIREMU RIKIHANA.	[A prominent Maori.]

WELLINGTON,

17th November, 1924.

DEAR MR. COATES,

The message of farewell with which the Representatives of the Maori Race in the New Zealand Parliament have honoured me touches me deeply. Will you be kind enough to convey to Sir Maui Pomare, Sir James Carroll, Messrs. Ngata, Henare and Rikihana, my most grateful thanks for the honour done me.

The kindly sentiments expressed in the poetic and eloquent language which is so typical of the Maori Race, bring home to me once again how great will be my loss on the day that sees my departure from these shores.

Her Excellency and I, ever mindful of the warm welcome given us by the Maori people all over the Dominion, will feel a great void in our hearts when separated from them by so many thousands

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of miles of ocean, but no distance will ever efface from our memories the loyalty, charm, and goodwill for which the Race is famous and of which we have had so much experience.

We bid them farewell, with the earnest hope that the future holds out for them much happiness and prosperity.

E Noho Ra I to koutou whenua tupu—whenua atahua !

Yours sincerely,

JELlicoe,

Governor-General.

THE HONOURABLE J. G. COATES, M.C., M.P.,

NATIVE MINISTER,

PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS,

WELLINGTON.

*Letter received from the Boys and Girls of New Zealand during Lord Jellicoe's
Illness in 1932*

26 April, 1932.

DEAR LORD JELlicoe,

It is with the greatest regret that we, the boys and girls of New Zealand, learn of your recent illness, and we earnestly hope that you will soon be well again.

Although it is several years since you were last with us, and the memory of school-children is often very short, yet the elder boys and girls at least still recall you with the greatest pleasure. No event in any school was looked forward to with keener anticipation than a visit from you. No speech was listened to with more attention than your addresses ; and though as a rule speeches are dull affairs to young children, yours was always the bright exception. Indeed, so much attention did you pay to us that it seemed to our young minds that you were *our* Governor-General and ours alone. Your State duties seemed far-away things, forgotten for a moment while you gave us an opportunity of seeing and hearing a real Admiral of the Fleet.

The History lessons that showed us the glory of the Fleet in the days of Sir Francis Drake, Robert Blake and Nelson were made real to us by your presence. There was no child that did not respect you as a worthy successor to the long line of great Admirals of the past. Greater honour could not have been done to our country than for His Majesty the King to appoint the Admiral of the Fleet as its Governor-General. For does not New Zealand owe its discovery to the Navy ? Did not the Fleet's command of the seas make colonization possible, and even now do we not owe our posi-

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tion as a member of the British Empire, and our overseas trade, to the British Navy ?

But it was not your fame alone that endeared you to our hearts. You showed that you possessed a kindly and loving nature which made an appeal to every one of us. In the midst of the cares of State, you were able to sympathise with our relatively small and unimportant activities. You and Lady Jellicoe, your constant companion in these expeditions into our midst, made an unforgettable impression on us all ; and left behind a memory that we have handed down to our younger brothers and sisters.

Among the vivid memories of your sojourn in New Zealand is the keen interest you took in that greatest of all Summer games—cricket. Indeed, we know that you frequently engaged in matches and practices on the grounds of Wellington College adjoining the Vice-regal residence ; and we know you have played the game of life and taken reverses like a true sportsman. We are therefore confident that you will display the same cricketing spirit and come out victorious in the best sense in the match you are now contesting with ill-health.

We can only hope that you enjoyed your stay among us half as much as we did. We all pray to God to grant you a speedy recovery to the best of health, and the enjoyment of many more years of happiness.

Perhaps when you are well again you will be able to pay us another visit, even if only a short one. We all, and all the people of the Dominion, extend you a cordial invitation to visit our shores again. If you can accept, you may be sure of an enthusiastic reception from the boys and girls of New Zealand.

Yours faithfully,
THE BOYS AND GIRLS OF NEW ZEALAND.

CHAPTER XXIX

1924 to 1935 Later Years

WHEN Lord Jellicoe left the Admiralty he held himself ready for any work he might be offered, provided that it was directly in connection with the War.

His chivalrous nature is well shown by the following extracts from correspondence he had with Admiral the Hon. Sir Alexander E. Bethell, Commander-in-Chief, Plymouth.

From Lord Jellicoe :

5.4.18.

"I have been told by the First Lord that you are 'relinquishing' your appointment on June 1st and the command is offered to me. Before I reply will you tell me whether you are going of your own free will and at *your own wish*, as it is very far from my desire that a change in an important command should be made at such a critical period merely so that a command may be found for me in order that further questions in the House may be avoided."

Sir Alexander replied, sending copies of his correspondence with Sir Eric Geddes.

"Of course I am not going willingly [he wrote]. No man who is active as I am could wish to surrender his command ; but as you see I have placed it at the disposal of the First Lord. I considered the matter well and came to the conclusion that I could not do otherwise. . . .

If I may venture to give you advice, which I hope you will not resent, I say, accept the First Lord's offer ; it is of course made to quiet the agitation which has been caused by your relief as First Sea Lord and which is sure to be pressed still further by those who recognize that a mistake has been made—but the Government have cleared their yardarm by offering you what they will call the most important command at their disposal, and your refusal of it will be represented to your disadvantage and people will say you are sulking at a time that your country is in danger. In any case, the

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command is likely to be offered to someone else, to save the face of the First Lord, but I know some of the Board do not want a change of command at so critical a period. But no one would think the change to you would be disadvantageous."

From Lord Jellicoe :

10.4.18.

"I have *not* taken your advice, but have written to the First Lord to say that I cannot accept an appointment which involved depriving a brother officer of his command prematurely.

There has been a little delay, as I inquired of the First Lord why you were going. He replied to-day saying that in war-time he did not think the usual procedure need necessarily be followed, and that you had had three years as Admiral commanding the Reserve Fleet and Plymouth combined. That argument does not appeal to me and so I have asked permission to decline."

This attempted change was arranged in spite of the fact that in the Great War fixity of tenure by an Admiral of an appointment was highly desirable—provided he was doing good work. The First Lord had in Lord Jellicoe's opinion joined two appointments which had nothing to do with each other into one single period of service. Without doubt the acceptance of the appointment would have been gratifying to the Admiralty as it would, to a certain extent, have quieted the anxiety that had been aroused by his supersession and helped to stifle the disgust that had been created ; but Lord Jellicoe was too generous to accept employment under what seemed to him to be unfair conditions.

His services, however, were too valuable to be lost to the country and in May, 1918, he was asked by the First Lord if he would accept the post of Admiralissimo in the Mediterranean, could such an appointment be arranged. He agreed ; but, as Lady Jellicoe was dangerously ill, he pointed out that he would not be able to leave her for a month, after which the doctors informed him matters would be decided one way or the other. Eventually he went to Paris to discuss the idea with the French and Italian representatives, but the day he arrived the Italian delegate left ! It then transpired that the French Government, represented by Admiral de Bon, were in favour of the appointment, but that the Italians, represented by Admiral Thaon di Revel (Chief of Italian Naval Staff), did not approve of the control of their ships passing out of Italian hands, nor of any foreign officer being accorded the power of ordering them to sea. The idea was therefore abandoned.



Lord and Lady Jellicoe skating at St. Moritz.



Skating with Mr. Edgar Simon.

EARL JELLCOE AT WINTER SPORTS

1924 TO 1935—LATER YEARS

In June the First Lord asked him to represent the Admiralty on a committee appointed to consider the organization of the Royal Ordnance Factories. Having ascertained, however, that the proposals to be discussed had nothing whatever to do with the War, he refused. Then followed the World Cruise when he flew his flag in H.M.S. *New Zealand*, which occupied Lord Jellicoe's time until he was offered the appointment of Governor-General of New Zealand. This he held until the end of 1924. Then once more he returned to England.

On December 9, 1924, the time had arrived for Lord Jellicoe automatically to retire and he received the following letter from the Admiralty :

"In forwarding this intimation of your retirement, I am desired by their Lordships to convey to you an expression of their high appreciation of the distinguished services which you have rendered to the Royal Navy and the Empire during a career on the active list extending over more than half a century.

My Lords more especially call to mind on this occasion your services before and during the War in your successive appointments on the Board of Admiralty, as Third Sea Lord and Controller, as Second Sea Lord, and as First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff and above all your services as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet from the outbreak of the War until late in 1916, by virtue of which your name remains inseparably associated with the achievements of the Navy during the War.

My Lords are confident that the whole of the Naval Service will join with them in regret that the time has come for your name to be removed from the list of Flag Officers of H.M. Fleet."

From the moment of his arrival in New Zealand to take over the position of Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief, Lord Jellicoe had taken an active interest in all that concerned the Returned Soldiers and Sailors League and informed himself fully on the various problems confronting the Imperial ex-Service Settlers, while making the welfare of these men and their families his very special care.

On his return to England he identified himself with the ex-Service cause in this country. His first visit to the British Legion was at the Annual Conference in the Queen's Hall at Whitsuntide, 1925, when he made an impromptu address to the delegates. It was an occasion which will long be remembered by all who were present. The magnetism of his personality and his evident sincerity com-

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pletely captured the imagination of his great audience, and it was clear to all that his services would be claimed by the Legion. Lord Jellicoe allowed his name to go forward to the Annual Conference of 1926 (proposed by the Yorkshire Area and seconded by the Coventry No. 1 Branch) for nomination as one of the National Vice-Presidents of the Legion, to which office he was duly elected at Whitsuntide of that year.

On the death of the Founder President of the Legion, Field-Marshal Earl Haig, in 1928, Lord Jellicoe was approached with a view to taking over the Presidency. The following account of his acceptance of the office is given by Lieutenant-Colonel George Crosfield, C.B., who at the time was chairman of the Executive Council.


"I happened to be the National Chairman of the British Legion and it fell to my lot to persuade Lord Jellicoe to accept the Presidency. He was diffident about accepting, because he did not feel that he could follow in Haig's footsteps successfully. Eventually he said, 'If you can convince me that the men of the Legion really want me as President, then I shall feel it my duty to accept.' He asked how this would be done and I said his name would be proposed at each of the 13 Area Conferences which were shortly taking place and would be spread over the months of February and March. He asked me to send the result to him on the Riviera, where he was going. When eight of the Area Conferences had taken place and his name had been acclaimed at all of them, I wired to him asking if he would now accept. He wired back, 'Shall wait until all 13 conferences have taken place.' The result of the remaining five was the same as the others and Lord Jellicoe thereupon accepted the Presidency, which office, as of course you will no doubt know, he filled to the joy and delight of every member of the Legion."

Lord Jellicoe himself wrote : ¹

"I am in the south of France, and have time for correspondence while here. When I am at home it is very difficult to find time, and it will be even more so, I fear, in the future, as I am afraid I am bound to take over the Presidency of the British Legion in place of Lord Haig.

All the men seem to have voted for me, and though, in my opinion, a soldier should be President, I cannot very well refuse it, particularly as both the King and Prince of Wales are pressing me to take the post. Haig's death was very sudden indeed. The

¹ Mr. Hope Gibbon.



Sport and General

THE ADMIRALS' TEAM AT BISLEY, 1928

Left to right : Rear-Admiral F. C. Dreyer, Rear-Admiral the Hon. Matthew Best, Admiral Sir Lionel Halsey, Admiral of the Fleet Earl Jellicoe, Rear-Admiral Eric Fullerton.

funeral a wonderful ceremony, particularly the tribute paid by ex-service men. I was a pall bearer."

From the moment of taking over the Presidency Lord Jellicoe threw himself whole-heartedly into the work of the Legion and took infinite pains to make himself familiar with every aspect of its activities. During the first Autumn of his Presidency he made a tour of all the Areas of the Legion, visiting many of the Branches and meeting countless members in order to see for himself the work being carried out for ex-Service men and their dependants throughout the country.

One of the first things Lord Jellicoe had to tackle on becoming President was an unfair attack that had been made on the Legion's administration and organization by a certain section of the Press. He at once saw the serious nature—not of the allegations themselves, for he knew that they were gross exaggerations—but of the evil that would result from a report being spread throughout the country that all was not well with the Institution. The Legion depended for its very existence on public support, which support would be fatally undermined if suspicion were allowed to persist that the funds were not being economically and equitably administered. Lord Jellicoe was ever a man of action, moreover one of quick action ; he therefore determined to enlist the help of a committee of independent men, in whom the nation would have complete confidence, to carry out a thorough investigation of the affairs of the Legion. The Committee was composed of Viscount Bridgeman (as Chairman), Sir Stephen Demetriadi, K.B.E. (nominated by the President of the London Chamber of Commerce), Mr. H. G. Howett, D.S.O., M.C., F.C.A. (nominated by the President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants), and Paymaster-Captain A. M. Cree, R.N. (retired), secretary. The terms of reference were :

"To investigate the methods of administration in use at the Headquarters of the British Legion and the manner in which the various funds are raised and allocated by the Legion and to make any recommendation for improvement that may be considered advisable."

The report of the Committee published May 2, 1930, completely vindicated the administration of the Legion. It stated :

"It is satisfactory for us to be able to say that the fullest inquiry has failed to discover any serious blemish in the British Legion.

EARL JELlicoe

That there have been errors of judgment is inevitable—that shortcomings may here and there be detected is not more than anyone acquainted with great organizations would anticipate. But, regarded as a whole, the history of the Legion constitutes a record of successful achievement and tends to confirm our confidence in this remarkable channel of public sympathy and appreciation.”


The work of this Committee was most useful in restoring public confidence and causing the ripples of criticism and dissatisfaction to fade away. In addition, its members made a number of useful suggestions for increasing the efficiency of the organization.

In his covering letter to the published Report Lord Jellicoe thanked the Committee for their suggestions, and added that the National Executive Council of the Legion was giving earnest consideration to the recommendations, many of which had already been adopted. He further added: “I am deeply sensible of the great debt which the Legion and the public owe to Lord Bridgeman and his colleagues, who so generously devoted three months to their investigations and deliberations.”

As President, Lord Jellicoe was also Chairman of the Benevolent Committee of the Legion, a Committee composed of members of the National Executive Council, with the Honorary Officials, and prominent business men from outside the organization. This Committee is responsible for allocating to its various purposes the vast sums of money collected on November 11 and by other Appeals of the Legion.

As a rule, Lord Jellicoe purchased his own railway tickets. The secretary¹ tried very hard to make him travel first-class and was in the habit of sending someone to the station to meet him with first-class tickets, but he strongly objected to this and said that he would travel third-class and save the Legion expense. Generally he used to fix up visits himself and pay his expenses out of his own pocket. One day, while travelling on Legion work, he entered a first-class carriage, where he found a friend, Mr. Cummings Butler. Lord Jellicoe laughingly remarked, “I have no right in here, as I have only a third-class ticket, but the station-master insisted upon putting me in this compartment.” His friend was so impressed at the incongruity of Lord Jellicoe travelling third-class to save Legion expenses that he approached the directors of the railway company and suggested that he might be given a free pass. To this they could not agree, but arranged that in

¹ Colonel E. C. Heath, C.V.O., D.S.O.



Fox

EARL JELICOE INSPECTING BOY SCOUTS

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future he should be allowed to travel first-class with a third-class ticket.

The following tribute is paid by the Secretariat of the League :

“The Navy had long known, and the Legion had discovered, the immense worth of this singularly lovable man, and consequently, when failing health and advancing years compelled Lord Jellicoe to relinquish the Presidency, they were determined to retain if possible, his active interest, and made for him the position of Vice-Patron, which he held until his death. This office, created at the spontaneous and unanimous wish of the Legion as a signal expression of their devotion for their beloved Chief, lapsed with his passing.

The office of Vice-Patron, as was intended, did not call for so full a strain of active participation in all the Legion's work as did that of President. Nevertheless, Lord Jellicoe's interest was unflagging and continued up to the very end. He made a point of attending all meetings of the Benevolent Committee and of the Prince of Wales' Pensions Fund Trustees, and frequently called at Legion Headquarters to consult with the General Secretary on important matters affecting the welfare of ex-service men.

The attributes which had caused Lord Jellicoe to be trusted in the Navy, and to be loved by all ranks—his thoroughness and efficiency, the simplicity and kindliness of his nature, his unbounded sympathy and thought for others—won for him a secure place in the hearts of members of the British Legion.”

Another activity which occupied much of his time was the Boy Scout Movement. Lord Jellicoe was appointed County Commissioner for London Boy Scouts in the autumn of 1925. It was realized that his other engagements would prevent his giving more than a limited amount of time to Scout work in London, but there is no doubt that he did give the Movement all possible time that lay in his power. As is well known, he lived for the greater part of the year out of London, but he never came up to Town, even for the day, without devoting some time either to consultations or with correspondence concerning the Scout Movement. His many engagements rendered it necessary for correspondence at times to be undertaken in circumstances of some difficulty, and his Scout Secretary, Mr. G. W. May, records having a vivid recollection of a strenuous half hour spent in the boat train at Victoria, when Lord Jellicoe was leaving to attend a Naval Conference in Paris.

As Commissioner for London Scouts he took a prominent part in the financial appeal that was launched in 1927, and it was

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largely due to the great personal interest that he took in this scheme, and the success of his Broadcast message on the subject, that successful results accrued. Another important scheme that he initiated and saw carried into effect was the decentralization of responsibility of some of the County Commissioners, by the Division of London into Areas to each of which a special Advisory Assistant was appointed. It is safe to say that Lord Jellicoe's foresight in working out such a scheme has had far-reaching and beneficial effects; for, although the final stage was not reached until after he had left London Scouting, the scheme was developed to its logical conclusion entirely on the lines originally suggested by him.

Lord Jellicoe attended a number of Scout gatherings in different parts of London, and was always particularly anxious on such occasions to establish personal contact with the Scout workers themselves, and also, whenever possible, with the boys. His talks to Scout workers on such occasions were always interesting, very much to the point, and invariably provided something that was well worth remembering. He had a peculiarly happy manner when brought in touch with the boys themselves. Two instances are worth recording in this respect.

The first was on the top of an omnibus whilst Lord Jellicoe was returning from a Scout gathering in East London. The bus was nearly full of Wolf Cubs who had been at the Rally. At Shoreditch Church some of the boys were due to alight. As one, aged ten, passed Lord Jellicoe, he saluted and in typical Cockney tones said, "Good night, Sir." Lord Jellicoe put out his hand and grasped the little lad's hand in a Scout clasp. It was difficult to draw back after that, and he made no attempt to do so, but willingly shook hands with all the remaining boys, some twenty in number, as they filed past.

The second occasion was a big Rally at Leyton, in September, 1927, which was to be attended by the Chief Scout, then Sir Robert Baden-Powell. Lord Jellicoe, the Mayor, and other officials were waiting at the entrance of the ground for the arrival of the Chief. Lord Jellicoe left all the dignitaries and went across to the side of the road to talk to a number of lads who were eager spectators of what was really a great event in that part of London.

In his talk to the Scouts and the public assembled, the Chief Scout, referring to the work of Lord Jellicoe, described him as the greatest Admiral since Nelson.

At a large Camp Fire, which was held in Hackney, in 1927,

1924 TO 1935—LATER YEARS

Lord Jellicoe told several amusing stories to the boys ; two of these are well worthy of record.

He said that the greeting he had received reminded him of four very happy years in New Zealand, and he congratulated Hackney upon their reproduction of the Maori welcome.

He then told a story of a trip he took in Western Australia, during which, at a wayside station, an old lady who had ridden in some 80 miles made a great row at his sleeping-cabin window at two o'clock in the morning. It did not wake him, but later in the morning his wife, who had awakened, told him that the lady wanted him to come out so that she could see him in his full-dress uniform. Lady Jellicoe informed her that he was in bed and not in full dress, and the old lady retorted that he ought to be, adding that when she called to see a French General at that time in the morning he came out of his berth in full uniform.

In exhorting the Scouts to keep the Scouts' Promise, obey the Scout Law, and always do their best, Lord Jellicoe recalled an incident of the Battle of Jutland. The Destroyer *Ardent* was sunk in the attack on the German Fleet, and the crew, who were hanging on to the rafts and other supports that floated, one by one dropped off during the night and were drowned, to the total of some ninety-five men. The only survivor of the ship's company was the Captain,¹ and he told Lord Jellicoe afterwards that during the whole of that night there was not one single word of complaint, but he heard constantly the remark, "Well, at any rate, the *Ardent* has done her best." He added that if and when they went West they could go as did the ship's company of the *Ardent*, proud of having done their best, they would be all right.

In May, 1926, Lord Jellicoe addressed 6,000 Rover Scouts at the Albert Hall. Throughout his address Lord Jellicoe displayed that kindly humour which was characteristic of him. He always had some story ready to enliven the proceedings.

In June, 1928, he attended a meeting of the London Scout Council for the purpose of bidding farewell to the members. In addressing the Council Lord Jellicoe said that it was with intense regret that he felt it incumbent on himself to give up his appointment as Commissioner for London, when taking over the Presidency of the British Legion, but he could not continue to carry out the duties of both offices. He felt that there was so much in the Scout Movement that appealed to him, and that, after all, the

¹ Commander A. Marsden.

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work of the British Legion, important as it was, did not go into the future so much as Scouting. Nobody could give up work like the Scout work on which he had been engaged and in which he had taken such great interest, without great regret, and he wanted to give the London Scout Council, and all the scouting fraternity in London, his most grateful thanks for all the help given him during his term of office. He felt that London Scouting was in the safest possible hands, and, in saying farewell, he wished them all the best of happiness and the best of success in their labours for the youth of the Empire.

At this meeting tributes were paid by members of the Council in their appreciation of the wonderful example and interest that Lord Jellicoe had shown whilst Commissioner for London. Having briefly replied, Lord Jellicoe shook hands with all members of the Council, numbering over 100.

On his retirement from active Scout work Lord Jellicoe was appointed a Vice-President of the London Scout Council, and in this capacity he still maintained contact, and showed his continued interest in the work of the Movement.

On two occasions, of which the second was in October, 1935, he visited as the Guest of Honour, one of the Boy Scout dramatic performances at the Scala Theatre, and on each of these visits he spoke to the boys behind the scenes after the curtain had fallen and told them how much he had enjoyed and appreciated their efforts.

He was exceedingly scrupulous about his private correspondence, answering every letter in his own handwriting, it mattered not what the age or social standing might be of the correspondent to whom he was replying. One boy sixteen years old sent the following account of Lord Jellicoe's interest and kindness :

"I am a medal collector and wanted to form a group of Earl Jellicoe's decorations, and as *Who's Who* did not give them all I wrote to ask him for a completed list. I expected, if anything, a typewritten reply, but to my surprise he had taken the trouble to write the whole thing himself. Since then I have always written to him on his birthday, and he has always replied."¹

A few extracts from letters written about this time show his many preoccupations, and provide an insight into his views on matters of general interest.

¹ T. Y. Flews Davis.



Sport and General

**H.M. KING GEORGE V, THE DUCHESS OF YORK, AND
EARL JELlicoe ON THE *BRITANNIA*, AT COWES REGATTA, 1935**

1924 TO 1935—LATER YEARS

Written from R.M.S. *Tahiti*, on the way to England :

“We left Wellington yesterday. The people were very kind indeed in their send off and it was a wonderful sight which touched us very deeply. Indeed I could hardly bear it, and the thought of leaving my beloved New Zealanders.”

Letter to Mr. Hope Gibbon :

“I have been even busier since our return to England than I was in New Zealand and writing has been difficult. My correspondence has been colossal and every sort of society and organization has been seeking my service some way or another, and believe it, all my visions of a restful time have completely disappeared. We held an At Home here last week (London) and asked all the New Zealanders we could get hold of to meet the Duke and Duchess of York.¹ She charmed them all I know. She is so very sweet and pretty. I wish you had been in England to come to the meeting. We must have had 100 New Zealanders here and I shall meet them again at the New Zealand Club dinner shortly.

The death of Mr. Massey gave us great pain, it was very, very sad for New Zealand and the Empire. A splendid character with the true interests of the Dominion and the Empire at heart. I cannot bear to think of poor Mrs. Massey in her bereavement.”

In March, 1926, he wrote :

“I am far busier than I want to be and Lady Jellicoe says I ought to take on *paid* and not *unpaid* work, but you know well how things are forced on me. I am Scout Commissioner in London, Chairman of the National Rifle Association and the Church of England National Settlement Association, on the Council of the Colonial Institute, the O.M.S. (plenty of work there) all the Sailor Societies, British Legion, Life and Local Institutions. However, work is good for anyone anyhow.”

In June, 1927, from Geneva, where the Naval Conference was taking place, he wrote :

“The American programme has only one object in view, viz. Equality with Great Britain on the sea. We cannot help it if they build up to our required standard, but we can avoid lowering our standard to suit them, and we shall of course take this line. Japan is likely to fall in with our proposals to a much greater extent than America I think. The Japanese Delegation numbers 38. The

¹ Just prior to the Royal visit to Australia and New Zealand.

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British Empire delegates number about 20. The Japanese, too, bring in addition some 7 wives. Great Britain produces only one ! Not Lady Jellicoe, who has had to take over some of my engagements at home.

In my view we ought to be able to settle this business in a week, but I understand that America and Japan expect it to last some six weeks. I cannot stay at any rate, as I have to go back for the Bisley Rifle meeting of which I am Chairman, but Admiral Beal will take my place in my absence. It is pleasant to work with him and he holds sound views. Lady Parr did not come over. I am glad to say that she is much better.

I thank you so much for sending the photos and account of the Royal visit to Wanganui. I expected that the Duchess would captivate all hearts and she evidently did, both in New Zealand and in Australia. The Duke seems to have done excellently too. I have just had a long letter from Captain Curtis, my late Private Secretary, now with Lord Stonehaven, and he tells me of the great success of the Duke and Duchess in Australia.

It is obvious that these visits do an immense amount of good. I am sorry to hear of the continued depression in New Zealand, and, too, of the unemployment there."

During the General Strike in the year 1926 Lord Jellicoe turned up at headquarters and asked for a job. There was really no post of importance that he could fill at the moment, so Sir Henry Curtis-Bennett asked him :

"Do you know what we really want ?"

"That," said the Admiral, "is what I have come to find out."

"We are still short of special policemen."

"Open air and a walk," said Lord Jellicoe. "Just what I want."

So for the remainder of the General Strike the late Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet took his spell of duty with an armlet and truncheon guarding a suburban gas works.

Lord Jellicoe's sporting attitude served Curtis-Bennett in good stead. Whenever a distinguished personage arrived, expecting to be given one of the high commands, Curtis-Bennett would casually remark that Lord Jellicoe was watching over a gas container, and that there were plenty more round about that needed guarding.

When his boy, George, went to Winchester he was much perturbed to learn that they did not play Rugby football at that school but a hybrid game of their own. He much regretted this, as he hoped George would turn out to be a good half-back.

His interest in his boy's football was typical of the general interest that he took in all forms of sport. He played cricket, in a mild form of course, up to the last year of his life, and annually got up a team of admirals to play the cadets both at Dartmouth College and Pangbourne, the college for training cadets for the Merchant Navy, a fixture naturally looked on as a great event at both these places. He also was immensely pleased at being given the "Freedom" of I Zingari, as this letter to Lord Dartmouth, the Governor of that cricket club, written in his usual charming style bears evidence :

27.9.18.

"I am indeed grateful for the great honour paid me by I Zingari in asking me to accept the 'Freedom.' I can conceive of no higher honour than to be thought worthy of admission into the ranks of the splendid company of sportsmen who are included under the name of I Zingari, whose principles are so fine and whose performances during the War have so fully acted up to those principles.

I accept the invitation with great gratitude both for the honour paid me and for the very kind letter which brings the invitation, and I feel that through me I Zingari is honouring the great service to which I have the honour to belong and which I love so much."

A letter which Lord Dartmouth characterizes as one "which is to me and to I Zingari most valuable."

Golf, of course, was his chief form of exercise in the latter part of his life. He did not take up the Royal and Ancient game until he was over forty years of age and had not much leisure for steady practice, so it is not astonishing that his handicap was not less than fifteen. He had one peculiarity in playing and that was the speed at which he travelled between the strokes. One man who had a casual round never forgot this same peculiarity :

"His stature was not great, while I am six foot in my shoes. Though I keep myself pretty fit, I confess without shame that in spite of an advantage of some two years Lord Jellicoe walked me off my legs." And he ends his letter : "I have always felt that my slight contact with this great man has been one of the greatest privileges of my life."

Another of Lord Jellicoe's activities was his chairmanship of the National Rifle Association. Of his work in this connection Lord Cottesloe, who was his vice-chairman, gave in the *British Legion Journal* a very graphic and sympathetic account of that association :

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"It will ever remain a cause of pride and thankfulness to the Members of the National Rifle Association that Earl Jellicoe in his later years took, in spite of many other calls upon his time, a prominent and active part in its affairs. It was natural that an officer who showed outstanding capacity in all that he undertook, and who in his younger days (1885) had become a gunnery officer, should have retained his interest in the rifle all through a long and distinguished career, and should, on the invitation of Lord Cheylesmore, Chairman of the Council of the National Rifle Association, have identified himself with that body. He became a Vice-President in 1918 and was elected a member of the Council in 1925. In that year he presented the prizes at the conclusion of the Rifle Meeting at Bisley, and took occasion to emphasize the importance of marksmanship with the rifle as the foundation of all shooting, including Naval gunnery.

On the very day of that prizegiving there occurred the fatal motor accident to Lord Cheylesmore, which deprived the Association of a Chairman who had been its leading spirit for twenty-three years. The Council, faced with the difficulty of finding a suitable successor to him, turned to Lord Jellicoe and were fortunate enough to be able to persuade him to occupy the vacant chair. The Association enjoyed the great advantage of his services in this capacity for the following five years, until in 1930 the state of his health obliged him to reduce the volume of his work, and he resigned the chair, to the general regret, still remaining a member of the Council.

Lord Jellicoe, whose varied interests and busy life had left him little leisure for such matters, turned with interest to an old love, that of marksmanship, when circumstances led him to attend the Bisley Meeting as Chairman of the Council. He was a very steady and reliable shot with the Service rifle."

His connection with the National Rifle Association began in 1918. At the Imperial Rifle Meeting in July, 1925, he made a speech which admirably expressed his views upon the objects and work of an Association whose destinies he was so shortly to control. Lord Jellicoe said :

"Everyone who has the interests of the Empire at heart must realize the value of this Imperial Rifle Meeting held every year at Bisley. I personally feel the warmest interest in all that is done by the N.R.A. : it not only encourages rifle shooting as a sport, but it helps to train the youth and manhood of the nation for any emergency. In the Navy it has long been realized that rifle shooting is the foundation of all shooting."

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Earlier in the year Lord Jellicoe had presented his sword, as also had Field-Marshal Earl Haig, as a special prize for units in connection with H.M. The King's Trophy and Imperial Challenge Shields Competitions, conducted by the Association for the Youth of the Empire, in which no less than 169,000 boys competed during the five years of his chairmanship. That sword has become, and will remain, one of the most highly-prized trophies in the Association's awards.

There was no more popular figure upon Bisley Common during the fortnight of the Imperial Meeting than the Association's distinguished chairman. In spite of the many calls upon his time he could be seen almost daily upon the ranges passing up and down the firing-points, exchanging greetings with competitors from home and overseas, congratulating those who had made good scores, and condoling with those who had not, and many such doubtless derived inspiration to persevere from "the Admiral's" cheery encouragement. The contest in which he took the greatest interest was that for the Ashburton Shield, competed for by teams from over eighty of the great public schools, and no competitors in his opinion were more warmly welcomed or afforded him greater satisfaction than the boys. Teams from the Services, and naturally those from the Royal Navy and the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, whose successes were very frequent during his chairmanship, were always assured of his special commendation.

Lord Jellicoe was a man who practised what he preached, and, being himself a marksman of no small skill, he was frequently seen "getting his eye in" for the two matches in which he often took part: the Lords *v.* the Commons, and the Public Schools Veterans. In the former he fired on three occasions for the Lords' team in 1925-6 and 1928. In 1927 he was unable to shoot, being called to Geneva on urgent national affairs.

This particular match for the Vizianagram Cup consists of seven shots at each of three ranges, 200, 500 and 600 yards. The highest possible score is 105 points, and the following were Lord Jellicoe's very creditable scores:

					200	500	600	Total
1925	.	.	.	.	32	30	30	92
1926	.	.	.	.	30	33	28	91
1928	.	.	.	.	28	32	28	88

1928 is the last year in which the match was held.

In the same year H.M.S. *Britannia* was admitted as a public

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school for the purposes of the Public Schools Veterans' Match, and schools were allowed to enter "A," "B" and "C" teams, graded according to their reputed skill. Lord Jellicoe at once undertook to enter a team of admirals to compete in the "B" category, and the following officers of Flag Rank have fired in this match under his captaincy or since :

Admirals Best, Fullerton, Dreyer, Halsey, Fuller, Thesiger, Fairbairn, Brownrigg, Sells, Swabey, Astley-Rushton, Austin and Hamilton.

It was hoped that a team of generals would follow their example, but whether prevented by the exigencies of the training season, or other duties, their representation failed to materialize. The match consists of ten shots at 500 yards, highest possible score 50, and Lord Jellicoe's scores were :

In 1928, 40 ; in 1929, 34 ; in 1930, 42 ; and in 1931, 46.

In 1929 occurred one of those unfortunate incidents to which even the most careful and experienced competitors are liable to fall victims. There are, on the Century Butt at Bisley, where the match is fired, 100 targets ; and, though numbered on the butt behind, they are only 8 feet apart. It is quite easy to pick a wrong target when as far away as 500 yards. Lord Jellicoe fired but there was no response from the butts ; being certain it was a good shot he deposited the recognized fee of 2s. 6d. and challenged the target ; no hit was found, so under N.R.A. rules he forfeited the deposit and was credited with a miss. No competitor of the team alongside had fired at the next target but suddenly a bullseye was signalled upon it ; a very diligent Range Officer insisted on the payment of a further half-crown, the fine for hitting the wrong target, which the chairman (under the rules) had no option but to pay. This he did with smiling equanimity, though the mistake had ruined his own score.

It was in 1933 that Lord Jellicoe's efforts to put H.M.S. *Britannia* at the top came to full fruition, though he himself was unfortunately unable to take part in the match. That year the admirals' team—composed of Thesiger, Fairbairn, Hamilton, Sells and Fullerton—won the bronze medals awarded to the winning team in "B" category with the fine average of 46.2 : and the *Britannia's* "A" team won the trophy and silver medals given to the winning team of the whole match, which is competed for annually by some of the finest shots of old boys from Eton, Winchester, Harrow and other public schools.

To obtain practice for the above-mentioned two matches Lord Jellicoe could frequently be seen firing in sweepstakes and other unlimited competitions. On these occasions a small crowd of marksmen and visitors would often assemble in rear of the firing-point to watch his performance. He was invariably accompanied by an old shipmate, a commissioned gunner, whose duties were to carry the Admiral's ammunition and shooting accessories. Being an old marksman of repute, the gunner used to offer advice and generally nurse (as he imagined) his superior officer into making a good score. On one such occasion the register keeper was a young seaman whose duty it was to call out the result of each shot and record it upon the scoring board. The young A.B. was so overcome with the importance of the occasion that he failed, in the opinion of the gunner, to call out sufficiently loudly to do justice to "Admiral of the Fleet Earl Jellicoe—a bullseye—five." So the worthy commissioned gunner decided to assist him, and for the benefit of the assembled crowd, himself called out the result of each shot, "My Lord—a bullseye—five," "My Lord—a bullseye—five," and next in a distressed howl, "My God!—a magpie—three." Lord Jellicoe, who was a little deaf, may not have heard this unusual announcement, or if he did his kindly sense of humour prevented him from adding to the gunner's embarrassment, for quite unperturbed he quietly fired again and found the bullseye.

It was in 1930 that Miss Foster, a member of the Women's Legion of Motor Drivers, the only lady to win the King's Prize, astonished the assembled thousands by her success. Lord Jellicoe was the first to congratulate her, and posed with her for a photograph on the firing-point. In the subsequent discussions as to the propriety of admitting female members of the Forces to compete he most strongly upheld their claims.

Lord Cottesloe sums up Lord Jellicoe's association thus :

"Seldom can such outstanding ability have been combined with such delightful modesty. At the deliberations of the Council, he was ever tactful and sagacious, patient and unhurried, taking care that all views were stated before a decision was taken. Never failing in courtesy and consideration, with an unassuming personality that radiated friendliness and sympathy, he quickly commanded personal attachment, trust and affection from all with whom he came in contact.

His last appearance in connection with the work of the National

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Rifle Association was a recent one. Accompanied by Lady Jellicoe, he attended on the final day of the Imperial meeting at Bisley, July 20th, 1935, saw the last stage of the shooting for the King's Prize, and pinned the coveted badge on the breast of the winner, Armourer-Sergeant F. S. French. He afterwards gave the prizes in the great tent always used for that ceremony, and spoke encouraging words on the importance of marksmanship to the country and to the Empire. The writer of these lines was, to his lasting regret, prevented from being present, but he received delightful accounts of the pleasure which Lord and Lady Jellicoe's reappearance at Bisley inspired on that occasion, and of the geniality with which they greeted their old friends.

It is indeed a great thing for the Association that it should for a long period have enjoyed personal help in its affairs from a man of such exceptional distinction, one who during the War bore on his shoulders a burden of responsibility at least as great as that of any other Commander. His work for the N.R.A. was in a sphere smaller than many in which he served the interests of his countrymen after the War, and in which his unsparing sacrifice of time and energy benefited others to the detriment of his own health. But the marksmen of the Empire will never forget either the help which he so readily gave them or the great example of unselfish labour which he set to his fellow countrymen."

In the autumn of 1931 he visited Canada, together with Lady Jellicoe, Lady Gwendoline, and young George, to take part in the Biennial Conference of the British Empire Service League, of which he was Grand President, for he knew that it was the wish of all member organizations that he should be present. He was not at all anxious to leave England. He felt that he was in reality in need of a rest, and he saw that he would have to forgo his autumn holiday in Scotland, to which he had been much looking forward, and once more become immersed in official functions and speech-making. As he had no intention that the expenses in connection with his visit should fall on the funds of the Legion he foresaw that the visit would be an expensive one.

On the way over, Lady Gwendoline was taken very seriously ill—so ill, in fact, that an immediate operation became advisable. A major operation on board ship was an impossibility, but on arrival in Canada she had to be rushed to hospital, and her condition gave rise to anxiety for the remainder of his stay.

Lord Jellicoe himself was not really well, and on his return to England developed an illness that laid him up for practically



GROUP AT ST. LAWRENCE, TAKEN DURING COWES WEEK, 1935

Seated (left to right) : Lady Myrtle Balfour with Christopher; Countess Jellicoe, H.M. Queen Mary.
 Standing : Countess of Shaftesbury, Viscount Brocas, Lady Gwendoline Latham, Viscountess Bridport,
 Mr. Lionel Balfour, Miss Ann Chilton, Viscount Bridport, Prince Frederick of Prussia, Earl Jellicoe
 Major E. Latham, Lady Edward Spencer Churchill.

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a year, and nearly ended fatally. For months he endured pain and exhaustion. His deafness, from which he had suffered for years, was increased, and a weariness of spirit came over him at being dissociated from his many interests in life. But he fought a brave fight, although at times it seemed to be a losing one. His convalescence was protracted and often disappointing, but at last the indomitable spirit of the man won through, nobly helped by the care and nursing of Miss Bennett. All through his illness he retained the same pleasure that he had when well, of listening to hymns, and singing them when his strength permitted. On Sundays his wireless was always tuned in to one of the Church services, and when his deafness was acute he would hang out of bed the better to hear the service. All his life he retained a decided *penchant* for sardines—a perennial family joke. He seemed to have imbibed the taste as a midshipman, though the two other gun-room adjuncts, gin and onions, were abhorred by him. However, on the two former predilections, hymns and sardines hangs a tale. One Sunday his eldest daughter, Lady Gwendoline, brought up to his bedroom a dish of sardines such as his soul loved, but on entering found him engaged in singing hymns in a feeble quavering voice. She hurriedly left, explaining to the nurse that, "It seemed sacrilegious to offer Daddy sardines when he was singing hymns."

Christmas, 1931, saw him still far from well, yet he insisted on choosing gifts and making up the parcels and addressing them; but he was really not up to doing so, for afterwards it leaked out that one elderly lady had received a dozen men's large handkerchiefs, and a male recipient a fluffy bedjacket!

His nurse, Miss Bennett, remarked: "His correspondence was colossal, and as varied as it was immense, and from almost every known type. One was struck with the number of letters from A.B.s—also from sailors' mothers, and with these latter he was particularly touched. He was sent recipes and cures innumerable, scriptural texts and much advice, but all had one thing in common, a very real love and admiration, and intense desire for his recovery, and who shall question the heartening effect of such? It was a real grief to him that he was not allowed to answer them personally, and when he was much better there was many a tussle as to how many he should be allowed to tackle himself."

In 1932 he went to Madeira to recuperate, and when there

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
regained much of his strength ; but on return to England again he had a relapse, and had to go once more to bed under the strict but kindly surveillance of Dr. Shaw, of Ventnor.

He was keenly interested from the first in King George's Fund for Sailors, and gave the proceeds of his book, *The Submarine Peril*, towards augmenting the funds of that society, and soon was able to forward a substantial cheque.

Southampton was a town in which he took a great interest, for he had many ties and associations with that old borough. He was born there and it was there that he first made the acquaintance of the sea. His father had been closely associated with the port, and was on the board of directors of the Southampton Master Mariners' Club, the object of which was to foster close and cordial relations between the Merchant Service and the Royal Navy officer personnel. An invitation was extended to Earl Jellicoe (under whose command many members of the club had served during the War) to associate himself with the "Cachalots" as it was now called. As the rules precluded the Admiral from becoming a full member, it was decided to enter him as a "Stowaway"—which was the name adopted by the club when admitting the late Bishop of Winchester (Dr. Theodore Woods).

"Admiral Jellicoe was very delighted to be associated with a body of Merchant Master Mariners and especially in the novel rating of 'Stowaway.' He attended the club's first annual banquet, where he was formally received 'on board' and his speech on that occasion contained many appreciative references to his close family connection with the Merchant Navy and with Southampton in particular.

He kept in close touch with the club, although his health just about that time gave rise to anxiety and he was unable regularly to visit the club. Through and because of the club's intimate contact with the Admiral, it was possible to maintain such cordial relationship with officers of the Royal Navy at Portsmouth that out of it arose a system whereby lectures on Naval topics are given by R.N. officers at functions held by the Master Mariners' Club at Southampton, whilst in return 'Cachalots' lecture on Merchant Service subjects, or upon the Merchant Naval aspect of Naval matters, to audiences of R.N. officers at Portsmouth. Successive Commanders-in-Chief at Portsmouth have done much to promote and foster the happy feeling which has resulted from these contacts—unique as they are, and solely due to the late Earl Jellicoe, the original 'Stowaway,' whose constant interest in and care for



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ADMIRALS v. CADETS : EARL JELlicoe LEADING OUT A TEAM OF ADMIRALS AGAINST CADETS OF THE NAUTICAL COLLEGE, PANGBOURNE

Left to right : Surgeon Rear-Admiral A. H. Skey, Vice-Admiral F. Clifton Brown, Major-General A. G. Little (R. Marines),
Vice-Admiral A. G. Hotham, Rear-Admiral L. R. Oliphant, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Jellicoe, Rear-Admiral W. Tomlinson,
Admiral Sir R. Bentinck.

the Merchant Service of our country was one of the outstanding sides of his character.”¹

Another very honourable link was forged in the ties which bound Lord Jellicoe to the great port of Southampton when, ten years after the War, the city determined to confer on him its highest honour—the freedom of the Borough—in recognition of his great services to the country when in command of the Grand Fleet in the Battle of Jutland, and afterwards at the Admiralty, where he struck the blow that broke up the submarine campaign against our merchant shipping—a very fitting port to acknowledge the work done for, and in co-operation with, our Merchant Navy. On March 26, Lord Jellicoe was met at Cowes by the Mayor of Southampton, in his capacity of Admiral of the Port of Southampton, and was brought by him up Southampton Water in the Port Admiral’s barge. A right royal welcome was accorded Lord Jellicoe from the sirens and whistles of the merchant fleet. On landing he was entertained at lunch on board the *Olympic*, then one of the largest of our ocean liners, and subsequently was drawn by men of the Mercantile Marine through beflagged streets to the Empire Theatre, where a special meeting of the Town Council had been summoned. There in the presence of a large and enthusiastic throng of his fellow-townsmen the freedom of the borough was conferred upon him.

Lord Jellicoe wrote three books. The first, *The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916*, is the standard work on the training and development of the greatest fleet the world has ever seen. It was written too soon after the War for him to deal with the influence that the political situation in the United States had on the strategical position at the time of the Battle of Jutland. It is certain that this strengthened his view that anything like gambling tactics had to be eschewed. This he has, in later writings, carefully pointed out. The difficulties in dealing with the question of search of vessels carrying American cargo, and the rigid enforcement of the seizure of contraband, had produced a coolness which might at any moment have burst into a violent conflagration. In fact, in the War Memoirs of Robert Lansing (Secretary of State, U.S.A.) it is recorded that: “The British have only the stupidity of the Germans to thank for saving them from having a very serious

¹ From Captain W. V. J. Clarke, sometime Boatsteerer/Storekeeper of the “Cachalots.”

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situation develop in their relations with this country (U.S.A.) in the spring of 1916."

That is at the time that Jutland was fought.

In the book, Lord Jellicoe did not write so much for the general public as to leave on record a plain unvarnished record of those two years of waiting and national anxiety. It is a record that appeals more to the student than the general public, and the same may be said of his second book, *The Crisis of the Great War*; a telling book teeming with facts relative to his period of service at the Admiralty. This was supplemented later by a shorter publication, *The Submarine Peril*, which dealt specifically with the crushing of the submarine offensive and the institution of the convoy system. He wrote to a correspondent explaining the genesis of the book :

"I have been remiss in not writing to you earlier. My only excuse is that for the last few months I have been very much occupied with the British Legion work and over a book on the Submarine Peril of 1917 which I have written, and which will be published, I imagine, in October. I was pressed to write it by many Naval officers because of Lloyd George's attack on the Admiralty over this matter in his memoirs, Vol. III.

It was freely stated, before the extracts appeared in the *Daily Telegraph*, that he was going to attack the Admiralty. I started the book a year ago and did not get far with it, as I dislike so much ideas of publicity, but finally decided to go ahead.

I am not in any way replying to Lloyd George but merely giving the history of the Admiralty attitude. Ll. G. abuses all soldiers and sailors so roundly that I doubt, and certainly don't feel, that he is worth a real reply. His abuse is so general that people don't pay much attention to him nowadays."

In all his writings he avoided the very semblance of recrimination. Nor were they in any way an answer to criticisms, for he hated both publicity and all public controversy. This did not, however, prevent him from writing full answers to the various criticisms advanced by responsible writers. As Lord Jellicoe particularly desired that his biography should be kept as free as possible from controversial issues, very full replies cannot be published at present nor until the shadows of recent events have been lifted from the public mind. However, there they are on record, ready to be given to the world by some future historian. He felt some of the criticism deeply, especially that which came from critics

whose writings could hardly be excused on the plea of ignorance, but his refutations are singularly free from any traces of bitterness.

The following extracts from a letter on current events, written within two months of his death, are of interest, and as one would expect, he held distinctly common-sense views regarding the League of Nations.

22.8.35.

"You will have seen that we are going to increase the Air Force, and I hope that we shall not tie our hands in regard to the Navy when the 1936 Naval Conference takes place. Our position at present is lamentable.

The Jubilee Celebrations were really wonderful, and the hearts of Their Majesties were most deeply touched by the demonstrations of loyalty and affection with which they were received whenever they appeared in public. I sailed in the *Britannia* with the King at Cowes and he spoke to me about it and said what an immense impression it all made on his mind. He is very well indeed, I am glad to say, and so is Her Majesty, who danced for an hour or more after dinner one night aboard the Royal Yacht!!

At this moment one does not know what will happen about Italy and Abyssinia. The position is very difficult indeed, but it is of course the natural outcome of the formation of the League of Nations; and those who believe in it are to my mind bound to look favourably on action to prevent the war, and the resultant bitter feelings that will arise between Italy, ourselves and France, as we should have to take the necessary action. Personally I have never believed in the League for this very reason.

At any rate if action is not taken the League will, I presume, come to an end. It is a very expensive business, and it is not worth keeping up if it fails whenever the situation demands action.

I am off to Scotland to-morrow morning for shooting and shall be away until October. I am glad to say that we are all very well."

Thus the few remaining years of his life passed on, during which he was ever working for the good of the Navy and the country in great organizations and in many little-known activities. Little rest was accorded to him, his main recreation being golf, and shooting in the autumn; but much of his time for these enjoyments was curtailed by his work on councils and committees. And then after busy days in London or in Legion work in distant parts of England, he would return in the evening to St. Lawrence Hall, in the Isle of Wight, to find his table crowded with letters and communications from all parts of the country and the colonies.

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These he would tackle ; so that late into the night the light in his room could be seen burning, as with his own hand he answered appeals for assistance or wrote letters that never failed to carry aid to all those who sought his help, sympathy and advice.

These labours, without doubt, tried his physical strength too greatly and shortened the span of years which otherwise would have been allotted to him.



London News Agency

EARL JELLCOE IN THE PROCESSION OF KNIGHTS GRAND CROSS OF THE BATH, MAY, 1928

CHAPTER XXX

The Man

History and literature furnish many instances of men who have made their mark in virtue of striking personality, whose reputation rests not on any visible tokens, not on kingdoms conquered, institutions founded, books written, or inventions perfected, or anything else that they did, but mainly on what they were. Their merely having passed along a course on earth, and lived and talked and acted with others, has left lasting effects on mankind.

Extract from Lord Jellicoe's Report on Naval Mission to Canada.

The weatherwise face that shewed no ageing sign
But only grew in kindness, year by year,
The shrewd brown twinkling eyes, the gentle heart,
The resolute truth in judgment and in act
And those clenched lips no enemy could unlock
To answer what the grave could answer best,
These can return no more.

ALFRED NOYES.

IN the preceding chapters the career of Lord Jellicoe has been sketched, briefly, perforce, as must ever be the case in a biography. Although an outline of the services he rendered to the country has been given, only occasionally have glimpses of his character flashed from the details of his official duties and other actions. Now, in this final chapter, it is fitting to attempt to depict the character of the man in his relations to those around him.

Lord Jellicoe is in one respect the despair of a biographer who, in the attempt to depict his character, finds himself confronted by a grave difficulty—he had no faults : at least none that has been recorded. Having read several hundred letters, reports, and other documents, I have found no single instance where the slightest blame can be imputed to him. On the other hand, letter after letter records some kind action on his part or some lovable trait. This to a biographer is most embarrassing—shade as well as light is required to depict a personality, otherwise the result is apt to appear insipid or even mawkish.

It has been already pointed out that he had a great objection

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to publicity and dealings with the Press. This may perhaps be accounted a matter for regret rather than a fault—some might even hold it a virtue ; but, if a fault, it is, as one correspondent termed it, a very lovable fault. But neither in his public nor his private life is there aught which can legitimately be cavilled at. He was not perfect—no man can be.

He did not, of course, attain perfection in his work. He passed into the *Britannia* second and out first—he took three prizes but not all, yet these were more than were usually earned by a single cadet. As a midshipman he twice received the congratulations of the strictest and smartest Admiral of his day. In his seaman-ship examination he obtained fifty marks over his first class. Similarly at Greenwich and in his gunnery examination at Portsmouth he easily obtained first class. At sea as a sub-lieutenant he made his mark. In the *Monarch* he earned a life-saving medal and incidentally gained a useful piece of experience. It was owing to his initiative that the boat was sent to the wreck and he in it. He pictured success, he did the right thing, tackled the attempt in a sensible and seamanlike manner, and then ran right up against the unexpected—capsized his boat, which meant an utter failure of his attempt. So he laid up this and other varied experiences in his retentive memory, and gradually evolved, by rumination out of experience, a fund of knowledge which built up his service education, and created an ability to act correctly on the spur of the moment.

Heredity had equipped him with a charming disposition and firmness of character ; and, between these two somewhat opposing tendencies, he developed a wonderfully balanced judgment. He could steer a middle course between undue optimism and pessimism ; he avoided the lures of hero-worship yet contracted firm friendships ; and all the while the middle course was a straight course. That is the wonderful part. To most of those not blessed with a meticulously balanced judgment, that which may appear to be a straight course is, in the end, often proved to have been biased and drawn over to one side or the other. The straightness of the course he steered was due to the fact that he never allowed personal inclination or advantage to weigh against right, nor to cause him to neglect doing a kind act to others. His success was largely founded on this stability of character. He was truly religious ; but in a practical way. His religion was personal to himself. He read his Bible daily, but made no parade of so doing.

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He attended a Church service every Sunday, yet if the weather was fine he would play a round of golf in the morning and go to church in the evening. Undoubtedly he owed a good deal to his mother and her teaching, for his natural tenacity caused him to adhere all his life to the principles she had instilled into him. His life was a life of discipline. No man ever kept better guard over his tongue. If a subject was broached which he disliked, his mouth shut with a snap, and he would neither discuss nor argue. It is said of him that he never made a remark about a person which he would not have repeated in his or her presence. This is in itself a wonderful tribute to character and self-control. The discipline of his life is somewhat reflected in his ideals of Naval discipline. It is well worth quoting a short portion of the principles of discipline, which he included in his Naval report to the Government of Canada, for the benefit of the Naval service of that Dominion.

“In a consideration of the question of discipline, one is, in these days, at once brought face to face with the difficulty presented by the prevailing spirit of the times. This spirit is usually roughly described as ‘Democracy’; but to a large extent it means a disinclination to accept any form of restraint, and a desire for unrestricted freedom of life and action.

From the point of view of the State this attitude of mind is regrettable and may be dangerous. In the Naval Service such an attitude to discipline is quite incompatible, either with efficiency in general or with the happiness or well-being of any particular unit.

In a human society so complex and so crowded together as that of a ship-of-war, friction and misunderstanding are bound to arise when there is any doubt as to who is to command and who obey, or where there is any hesitation or doubt as to the force of orders or their binding nature. Thus it is generally agreed by all ranks that an undisciplined ship is nearly always a discontented and unhappy one.

Maintenance of Discipline.

In approaching this matter it should be remembered that man has not only a body but also a spirit; and that therefore mere bodily or mechanical discipline, the discipline secured by precision of drill and the performance of evolutions is far from being wholly sufficient. The discipline of the German Forces was largely of that type; and, in their Navy at least, it failed to stand the final test. What is needed is something less obvious and tangible, but more real and more deeply ingrained; not only the practice of discipline

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but, still more, the habit and spirit of discipline. The question therefore presents itself in this form :

How the spirit of discipline can be infused and maintained.

The spirit of discipline can further be infused by leading men to take a real pride in the service to which they belong ; and, conversely, a pride in themselves as belonging to that service. Indeed, pride of service is essential to the true spirit of discipline. These are days when men reason and think for themselves, and it is necessary that they should realize the nobility of their profession and the importance of all that makes for its efficiency.

When the spirit of discipline has once been infused, it is no less important to pay careful attention to its maintenance.

It engenders a spirit of calmness in emergency. The same spirit which keeps a disciplined man at his post when all his comrades have fallen, will keep a man brave and cool in the midst of emergency, panic and disaster. In other words, discipline renders a man more capable of facing the changes and chances of human existence.

It produces a certain determination and firmness of character. A disciplined man, who has been given a difficult task to accomplish, is more likely to carry it through to a successful conclusion than the undisciplined man who may be turned aside at the first obstacle. The man of discipline has learnt to resist, bear up, hold on, in spite of all difficulties.

It teaches sentiments of confidence and self-respect, for having learnt to obey he has gone a long way towards learning to command.

In a word, the object and the result of true discipline is to inspire men with bravery, firmness, patience, and with sentiment of honour. A service so disciplined is less expensive to the State ; and, at the same time, provides the State with citizens, who, on their return to civil life, will be a real strength to the community.

The great fact which is often lost sight of, is that in a well-disciplined force the officers as well as the men are disciplined ; that is to say, *each officer and man has conquered himself* and is therefore in a fit condition to subordinate his own wishes and desires in carrying out the orders given to him, which, as he knows, are meant to forward the cause for which they stand.

Very briefly the following are the most essential rules for teaching and maintaining discipline :

1. All officers must be thoroughly disciplined and must be as efficient as possible so as to win the respect of their men.
2. *Justice* must always be given, infinite pains being taken in hearing defaulters.
3. *Unkindness* (including sarcasm, i.e. unkind words) must never be allowed.

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4. *Courtesy* must always be practised.
5. *Reproof must always be impersonal*, for it is administered because the offender has not acted up to the high standard of the Navy.
6. *Kindness* from a superior must never be mistaken for weakness.
7. *Discipline must be maintained*. Nothing is more injurious to discipline than to give way to insubordinate demands, or refusals to carry out legitimate orders.

It should always be remembered that the best officers are those who possess powers of observation, and having those powers *know how to use them*. It is the smart, quick, and, if possible, cheery voice that gets the work well done. Nothing is too trifling to take notice of ; for, although a small thing may signify but little in itself, it is the accumulation of such, when left unchecked, that goes so quickly to show the want of supervision which spells a slack ship.”

With these principles translated into everyday life, there is little wonder that Jellicoe had a character universally loved, and one which upheld him in the dark days of misunderstanding. His remarks about the bearing of discipline on calmness in emergency are interesting, for he had a well-earned reputation of possessing extreme imperturbability in cases of emergency.

His straightforward conduct is shown by his action over the Admiralty Narrative when he might have allowed a contradiction to stand which could have been subsequently used against the Admiralty ; but, since one statement was untrue, he refused to take advantage of it and struck it out.¹

His insistence on discipline is shown by his action as Second Sea Lord, when he withstood the First Lord up to the point of threatening to resign.

His chivalry is shown in refusing the Plymouth Command rather than take an appointment away from a brother officer.

Thoughtfulness of others is shown in many incidents that have been treasured up in the minds of a variety of people. His W.R.N.S. motor-driver wrote recalling

“ the thoughtfulness and consideration that he showed to everybody whatever their position. One day I drove him to a conference that was to take place on the fifth floor of a building, he went up, found out how long the conference was likely to last, and then came all the way down again to let me know so that I might pass the time as I pleased . . . I regret to admit that we were treated with scant courtesy by *some* of the young officers. . . . I always

¹ See page 476.

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wondered why the younger men could not follow such a wonderful example of an English gentleman as they had before them in Lord Jellicoe.”¹

The following few examples of kindness are taken from dozens of a similar nature. One Scout Commissioner recalls how after making an address, while Lord Jellicoe was giving away the prizes, one boy brought his autograph book to be signed. The local Scout Commissioner told him to take it away, but Lord Jellicoe intervened and said, “Let him bring it afterwards.” At the end of the meeting, as the Admiral was being escorted to his car, he stopped and said, “Now I want that autograph-book,” and signed it and some twelve others. A small thing, perhaps; still, some men might have forgotten the boy and his book, but it pleased Lord Jellicoe to give pleasure to others.

On another occasion, when a party of Scouts had been sent from a distance to act as a guard of honour for him, Lord Jellicoe inspected them, and then began to ascend the steps to the Town Hall. Half-way up, with unexpected courtesy, he stopped and turning, thanked the boys for coming and gave them a short address of encouragement and advice.²

He took a great interest in the Church of England Settlement and was the first chairman of the Council until he resigned in 1932 owing to ill-health. This from the Secretary to the Council:

“It is probable that, next to his interest for ex-service men, Lord Jellicoe was concerned most about the question of the Empire Settlement Scheme, and during the period of his Chairmanship he was intensely interested in the work. If he was anywhere near London he would never fail to attend the departure of any parties of boys we were sending to the Dominions, particularly to the Dominion of which he had been Governor-General—New Zealand. No matter what early hour this meant in the morning, he never failed to turn up and give a word of kindly advice to these lads on the commencement of their great adventure.

One special incident stands out as typical of his kindly nature. This was on the occasion of seeing one of these parties of boys away. There was a widow, a cripple woman, seeing her only son off to New Zealand, working-class type, and the mother was naturally distressed at the parting. It was so typical of Lord Jellicoe's interest that, having inquired into the circumstances of all the lads, and

¹ Mrs. Margaret Hunt.

² Mr. E. Nott, late Hon. Lieutenant, R.N.V.R., Mersey.

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learning about this particular lad and his mother, he specially engaged the latter in conversation ; and, after the departure of the boat-train, attached himself to that good woman in an effort to comfort her at the parting, and drove her to her home in his car."

Another testimony to his solicitude for those in distress comes from Mr. A. E. Spry :

"The Preston Ex-Sailors Association were assisting me in visiting Preston on the morning of Lord Jellicoe's visit to Blackpool. The Chairman was in considerable distress as he had been out of employment for some time ; he had a wife and several children, so he proposed to sell his furniture and go to New Zealand.

As Lord Jellicoe had recently returned from New Zealand, where he had been Governor-General, the Chairman asked if it would be possible for him to see Lord Jellicoe and ask for his help and advice. I mentioned that the Admiral had a very full programme but would see what I could do.

I met Lord Jellicoe at Preston and on the way over in the car told him that we had the Preston Ex-Naval Men helping, and he was at once interested to know all about them. I then mentioned the case referred to and Lord Jellicoe said, 'This man must be careful. I should like to see him, in fact, I *must* see him.' He was pleased that I had made arrangements for him to do so.

At the hour arranged Lord Jellicoe was in the Mayor's Parlour talking to the Mayor and other bigwigs when the Mayor's Sergeant came to me and told me that the man was waiting. I told Lord Jellicoe, and he asked the Mayor to excuse him at once and then asked me if I could find him a private room. This was quickly arranged and the man ushered in. The interview took some twenty minutes and eventually Lord Jellicoe and the man emerged, the latter with face beaming. He told me that Lord Jellicoe was not only giving him several letters of introduction to the right people in New Zealand, but that he had practically secured him a good job before he sailed. I have since heard that prosperity and happiness have returned to this family in the Dominion, where they are doing very well and will always bless the name of Lord Jellicoe who was responsible for this happy change in the family's fortunes."

On another occasion the Lord Mayor and sheriffs, also the mayors of all the North London boroughs had been invited to luncheon to meet Lord Jellicoe, on the occasion of the opening of the Empire Exhibition, May 12, 1928. On his arrival at the south door he was received by the Mayor of Hornsey and the other mayors. On the arrival of his car, he immediately asked that his chauffeur

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might be given some lunch, else he feared he might not get any ! He then produced a letter from his pocket which he said he had received from a woman that morning who was a member of the Women's Branch of the British Legion. The letter stated that this woman, who was a widow, had three sons who served at Jutland, two of whom lost their lives then, and she stated that it would be a very proud moment in her life if she might speak to Lord Jellicoe. He asked the organizing Secretary if he would take great trouble to try and find her so that her wish should be gratified. This was done and subsequently the Admiral was photographed with this lady.

"On taking him to the cloakroom the woman in charge told him that her husband had served on the *Iron Duke* at Jutland and that he had since died. She was apparently in some distress, so Lord Jellicoe with his usual kindliness asked her to tell him all about her troubles and then requested me to take copious notes for his information. As these proceedings were becoming protracted, he was reminded that the distinguished guests were awaiting their lunch. But he replied, 'They must wait, as this is a most important matter, as the poor woman needs my urgent help.' Only after considerable difficulty and the exercise of some tact was the interview terminated, else the august company would have been famished !"

He obtained for an ex-footman the post of valet to Captain Curtis, when the latter accompanied Their Royal Highnesses the Duke and Duchess of York on their visit to Australia and New Zealand. Prior to their return to England he obtained passes for the father and mother of the valet to enable them to be on the platform at Victoria to greet their son. A kindly act of which few would have thought.

When his butler, George Pulley, lost his life in a gallant attempt to save two women who were in danger of being drowned, he raised a fund for the maintenance of his widow, and obtained for her the Carnegie medal and a grant. Although he was far from strong it was with difficulty that he was dissuaded from going to Esher to attend the funeral. He was only prevented from doing so on condition that a special service was held at St. Lawrence, which he attended.

On the first day that he was allowed to go out of doors after his bad illness there was the usual demand from photographers to be allowed to take his photograph for the Press. With characteristic thoughtfulness he decreed that all should be taken by the local

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photographer "as it might do him a little good," and he arranged for his transport to and from St. Lawrence Hall.

The Navy Club of 1765 and 1785 is a dining-club; dinners are held on dates commemorative of the great Naval battles. On one occasion the date for a dinner fell in Easter week and also on a night when another Naval dinner was being held. The guest of the evening had been arranged, but great difficulty was experienced in providing a chairman. This was overcome; but the number of members notifying their attendance was so small that it looked as if the meeting would prove a fiasco. Several Admirals were approached but all had engagements and could not attend. At last Lord Jellicoe was told of the difficulty. He at once wrote: "I hear your dinner is likely to be a frost. I certainly will come." Although it may be remarked that this entailed his coming up from the Isle of Wight.

The result was that the thirty-odd attendances rose at once to seventy.

Such are a few of the many acts of kindness which have been recorded in the dozens of letters received in response to an appeal for anecdotes about Lord Jellicoe. It is impossible to record them all. The above must suffice. If judged hastily they may be considered as trivial, but trivial they were not, for they most certainly show a wonderful fellow-feeling and rare thoughtfulness for all in distress or in need of his assistance. This is but one facet of a very fine character.

Perhaps one of the most extraordinary of his many qualities was his self-control. As an example let us try to imagine his feelings on Christmas morning, 1917. That morning he had been proclaimed throughout England as a failure. His dismissal from the Admiralty—"sacked" he called it—was capable of one explanation only, and that was, that in the opinion of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet he was not fitted for the post. The official excuses advanced were contradictory and unsatisfactory, obviously only put forward to hide the facts. He had been succeeded by a man unknown to the country and so far untried in administrative capacity. The people of the country could not conceive that so drastic a step as summary dismissal could have been taken unless he had failed and failed badly. That portion of the Press that had been attacking him maliciously had triumphed. He knew the reasons for that Press campaign, he knew the instigators and the motives which governed their actions, he knew well the conspirators behind

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the scenes who had pulled the strings and spread disparaging reports and whispered in all too willing ears. But above all this he knew that he had succeeded in his work, that the back of the submarine campaign had been broken by the labours of the officers he had brought to the Admiralty, and whose duties he had organized and whose work he had encouraged. He knew that for months he had foiled the attempts of those who would have seized the helm from his grasp, and who would have wrecked the country through undue haste and unwarranted optimism. He knew all this, yet he kept silence. He never complained. He never tried to justify himself in the eyes of the nation. He merely accepted the decision of the Prime Minister loyally and held himself ready for any further war service that might be offered him. He was satisfied that one day the truth would prevail; but he had no conception how soon, or how complete that vindication would be.

On the day after his dismissal he happened to meet the Bishop of London and walked up the Embankment with him. His Lordship records "that he was much impressed by the spirit in which he took it. He was clearly deeply hurt, but turned it off with a joke, 'this is the first time, Bishop,' he said, 'that I have ever been sacked in my life.'"

Throughout these dark days he kept silence; his self-discipline prevented him from retorting. In 1920 he wrote his second book, *The Crisis of the Naval War*, in which he put down plainly the work done by him at the Admiralty, but no word of criticism or complaint can be found on any of its pages. He wrote another book in 1934, called *The Submarine Peril*, so as to place before the public in a condensed form the anti-submarine work done at the Admiralty and the initiation of the Convoy scheme in 1917—still no word of controversy. He was content for the facts to be known; and he was confident that in time the froth of ignorance would be dissipated by facts like the spume of the sea on the rocky coast of the Pentland Firth.

And here it is necessary to call attention to a most important fact. Writers of the sensational fraternity have scribbled about the "Jellicoe faction" and the "Beatty faction." Neither of these two Admirals has ever written a word, or spoken publicly a word in criticism one of the other. Whether Lord Beatty ever checked his too-clamorous partisans I know not—but Lord Jellicoe constantly urged moderation on his, perhaps, too ardent supporters.

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He had more than one account of the Battle of Jutland sent to him for his remarks, and in each case he earnestly suggested moderation of criticism. To one correspondent who had sent him an appreciation of Jutland he wrote : " I hope you will forgive me for saying that I think you are a little hard on Beatty . . ." and again : " I certainly am of opinion that your work should be published, after a bit of toning down, especially in regard to Beatty . . . with all his faults he had some very good qualities." Of another he wrote : " I think the book is spoiled by his severe criticism of Beatty."

Like everyone else he recognized of course that mistakes had been made, but he was strongly adverse from these being unduly emphasized. If any split in the Navy in the shape of a " Beatty " or " Jellicoe " faction existed, such a split was due entirely to overzealous partisans, who rushed into print ignorant of the truth, and thereby impelled answers no less intemperate than their own. But the two leaders kept silence.

Lord Jellicoe disliked controversy intensely. He wrote full answers to the criticisms published by Mr. Churchill, for he looked on him as a responsible writer, but the smaller fry he treated with the contempt their rashness deserved. His answer to Mr. Churchill is on record should it be required, but he refrained from publishing it, as he was confident that truth would vindicate itself without his help. But attacks on his officers, like that on Admiral Sir Hugh Evan-Thomas, upset him considerably. In this respect he found himself in a dilemma ; he wished to defend them but could not bring himself to write to the Press. He chose rather to leave his defence of them to be published after his death. Tragedy has intervened, and the defence remains as yet unpublished.

He was right in his belief in ultimate vindication for, indeed, it came in the wonderful tributes paid to his memory after his death. He never lived to see how triumphant that righting would be ; he foretold it, but it was not vouchsafed to him to live to see how the breath of slander triumphant had acted merely on his reputation like vapour on shining metal—dulled it for a short span—but under the cleansing hand of time caused the surface to shine brighter, and with a finer polish, for the cloud which had passed over its surface. He, like King George, would have styled himself a very ordinary man. His monarch lived to see his Jubilee and to have brought home to him the intense love and admiration of the nation. Lord Jellicoe had not this tardy satisfaction. On his

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death-bed his visions were of duty done, he felt he had been to "the end faithful" ; but he had no inkling of the love and respect that would be shown to him by thousands in his last sad journey to his grave in St. Paul's, of the wonderful eulogies in the Press, the loving words of his many friends, or of the number who in humble circumstances had treasured small acts of thoughtfulness and kindness and who paid tribute in the only way that lay in their power by words of memory and gratitude.

"What manner of man was this?" Physically the following description from a clever writer makes a good pen portrait :

"A man below middle height, alert, confident in himself, not the confidence of the oversure, but that of a real leader of men, a man whose features would have been unpleasantly hard but for the lurking humour of the eyes and for certain humorous lines about the mouth, that on occasions could make the likeness of a steel trap, a man to trust instinctively and one to like from the beginning."

A glimpse from another pen :

"I remember sitting with him over a breakfast table in Oxford in the summer of 1933, trying to persuade him to talk of his days at sea during the War. But they were not what he wanted to discuss.

'It's past and finished with,' he said. 'What matters is what you of the present think. We have had our innings.' As I watched him there, sitting in the morning sunshine, his hands folded neatly—for he retained a sailor's air of neatness throughout his life—it was hard to believe that this short, easy voiced man had once held in his hands the destiny of the British Fleet and the British Empire."

Let us turn to what has been written of him by the Archbishop of Canterbury :

"In the early summer of 1915 the Commander-in-Chief invited me to pay a visit to the Grand Fleet. There may be some interest in the impression of him as he was in the midst of his fleet, made from the mind and memory of an independent observer.

Let me first put the impression of his quiet and cheerful confidence. He was master of the whole technique of his craft. He had complete trust in his officers and men. He could not help knowing that they had complete trust in him. He knew that he could rely on their efficiency and loyalty. Deep in his heart there was always an intense eagerness to meet the German Fleet. But he could wait for any testing time without worrying. He had indeed a very deep and constant sense of his immense responsibility. But he never let the thought of it dwell long on his mind or be in

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any way an oppression. It lay so light on him that he could easily throw it off; and the quiet cheerful smile was always brightening his face. He helped this steadiness of mind and nerve by resolutely keeping his body fit. I can see his slight agile figure springing about the deck in an odd game called 'medicine ball,' played with a huge sort of a football, or clad in the familiar yellow jumper, leaping over the rocks of the island which made shift for a golf course.

It was when night fell, and all was quiet, that I had the most vivid impression of his quiet unhurried way of work. The picture of him which will always be printed on my memory I tried to sketch in a sentence when I spoke about him at his funeral in St. Paul's Cathedral. Night after night, sitting with him in his cabin, I watched him at his task. A large map and a block of writing-paper lay before him. Every few minutes an orderly would enter with some question or message sent mainly through the wireless from the Admiralty or elsewhere, the disposition of the fleet, or the location of mines or submarines in any part of the high sea or the coast. He would read the message, consult the map, tear off a sheet of paper, write his answer, hand it to the orderly and wait for the next—all without words or fuss or without any sign of worry. Late at night, when I left him to turn in to sleep, he would still be at work. Yet he was up early and I could hear his steps above my cabin as he paced up and down the deck with Sir Charles Madden, his brother-in-law and Chief-of-Staff, discussing all the problems of his great command.

I speak of what I know when I say that the secret of this unhurried work, of this steadfast confidence, lay deeper than his own disciplined character. It lay in his constant inner remembrance of God. Sunday after Sunday he was fortified by the Holy Sacrament. He trusted in God for strength and guidance as each need might arise and when 'the day' might come. It was this unflinching reserve of trust that kept his judgment clear, his nerves steady and his heart free from apprehension or fear.

Another impression left on my memory is that of his own modesty and simplicity. He had indeed a great pride but it was pride of the fleet he had done so much to create. He never spoke of himself, and there was no trace of self-consciousness about him. Life in his flagship was studiously simple. There was no thought of luxury either in the appointments of his own cabin or in the fare which he provided when he entertained his brother officers of the fleet. The spirit of discipline was all-pervading.

Lastly I must record the unforgettable impression of the confidence felt in him personally by every officer and man in the fleet.

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Moving about as I did from ship to ship I had abundant opportunities of realizing how great this confidence was. It was unquestioned. At Scapa under his influence, the old phrase, sometimes perhaps too hackneyed, 'a band of brothers,' expressed a reality which could be felt. I have rarely been so deeply moved as when I said 'Good-bye' to the Commander-in-Chief and went over the side of the *Iron Duke* while the band played 'Will ye no come back again?' for I felt that I was leaving there among the mists of these Northern Seas not only this quiet steadfast man with his burden of solitary responsibility but a great fellowship of service united in loyalty to each other and to their Chief.

There are three words which sum up better than any others the spirit which bound them together—they were eager; they were expectant; and they were ready."

Here is a tribute from General Smuts, a man great in war, politics and literature, a close observer, and one who was both in front of and behind the scenes in the most important years of the War, and who therefore writes with an authority that none can challenge :

"I knew Earl Jellicoe very well and I counted him among one of my closest friends. When I went to London in 1917, after I had left the campaign in East Africa, I came in close touch with him. There are very few men that I have met in my life for whom I had a greater respect and affection than I had for Earl Jellicoe. He was one of the most simple and modest men I ever came across, a man of sterling character and great ability of a type of which you meet very few in this world.

You have heard the claims made as to who won the War—I have heard it from one continent to another. We have even heard the point raised as to what man won the War, but when we reflect on the men who made the greatest contribution to the final victory, I am not sure that the verdict of history will not be that the man who really won the Great War was Earl Jellicoe.

The issue of the great conflict depended on the British Navy. We landsmen and soldiers think a great deal of our own contribution; but, make no mistake about it, the decisive factor, the factor which settled everything then and may settle it again if ever we are to have war again, is the British Navy.

Lord Jellicoe fought one action in the Battle of Jutland. There has been a great deal of writing about it, and a great deal of difference of opinion. But the proof of the pudding is in the eating of it. He fought that one action and never again. That action was enough. It was final.

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When the German Fleet came out next time, it was to surrender to him. People do not know how near to equality those great navies were. We had been taught to think that the British Navy was immensely superior in every respect to every other navy. In our patriotism, in all the propaganda going on, we came under the impression that the British Navy was so immensely preponderant that there was no question as to the issue. It was not so.

I know, because I went right through it all. And you may take it from me that these two navies were nearer to equality than most people know or think. But in spite of that, owing to his faultless leadership, and owing to his great wisdom and caution combined with great daring, he made that one action final ; and, if there is one point where the Great War was won more than in any other action, it was in the Battle of Jutland.

People have sometimes blamed Lord Jellicoe for not having the Nelson touch, for not being more daring and more pushing. Lord Jellicoe's attitude was this : We often discussed these questions, and he took the view that in his hands had been put the most powerful and the most dangerous weapon in the Great War, and on the manner in which he handled that weapon depended the issue.

If he made a mistake and the British Navy went under, everything was lost. No great victory on land could save us if Lord Jellicoe lost, and knowing that this was his responsibility, the most awful responsibility that could rest on any man, he acted with wisdom and caution and restraint.

He did not show the Nelson touch ; he showed something far greater, he showed self-abnegation. He showed that he could hold his hand, that he could wait on his strength, instead of venturing the instrument which should not be lightly ventured, and the result justified him. And if the question were put in a few years by the historian—'Who won the War?' very likely the answer will be that it was not won by a great soldier, it was not won by Foch, or anyone like that ; it was won by Lord Jellicoe."

These words uttered by a man of the calibre of General Smuts give testimony to a character unique in its simplicity, efficiency and strength.

Yet Lord Wakefield supplies another kind of tribute, one describing the effect on him when as Lord Mayor of London he met Sir John Jellicoe at Scapa when in command of the Grand Fleet :

"Fogs and rough seas surrounded our physical presence, but Jellicoe himself was a beacon of hope and confidence. I look back upon those days at Scapa Flow, pacing the deck and talking with him, as an outstanding memory in a long life. Lord Jellicoe's clear

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and undismayed outlook, evading no whit of his immense responsibility ; his courage and calm faith ; his stern fighting qualities and chivalrous regard both for his men and for the foe ; these qualities displayed so sincerely and unaffectedly made the deepest impression upon me. I turned homewards, not only with renewed confidence as regards our part in the War, but a better man for my communion with a fine Christian character, a leader of men, pure and single-minded in his devotion to duty."

Character is the mosaic formed of a man's deeds which, intermingled and cemented together, form the pattern of his life. Let us gather some of the small stones culled from scores of letters which will give some idea of the richness of the character of Lord Jellicoe.

"The strongest and most lovable character I ever knew or have read of."—"He had a complete understanding of the hearts of men and born of that unlimited patience and power to forgive."—"Although seeking counsel with his firmest friends he would never accept any which involved the derogation of authority or adverse criticisms of a brother officer."—"His brain was particularly well ordered ; he could decide promptly and always correctly, for which a complete single-mindedness of purpose and absence of all thought of his own advantage was responsible."—"He was ever ready to make allowances for subordinates, even those who served him badly, and stood up for those under his command implacably against authority if he considered that they were in the right."—"He defended their good names, whereas he did not deign to answer the cruel and lying attacks that were made on his own reputation."—"He possessed a singularly attractive mixture of confidential modesty."—"With rising fame he never forgot a friend, however humble."—"He had amazing energy and endurance, nothing was ever too much trouble."—"He was ever self-reliant, being supported in all his work and all his trials by his faith in his God and his love of his Country."—"Security was the basis of his handling of his fleet. There was to be no risk to the British Empire."—"His methods were the result of years of study and it mattered nothing to him if they brought odium on him or even upon the profession which he loved and of which he had made himself absolute master, for his confidence was supreme that truth would in the end prevail."—"His conscience was clear and he was content to leave the verdict to history."—"As Governor-General he brought that clear insight and vision which rapidly earned the respect and confidence of his ministers. He endeared

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himself to all classes in New Zealand, for he moved freely among the people who loved him, as few men have ever been loved. Yet he combined with the freedom a dignity which upraised the prestige of his great office. He never gave a curt order. He ruled purely through the force of his own fine example and self-control, calm judgment and tactful leadership.”—“He was very lovable and very firm, very forgiving, very sensitive but a nature free from bitterness, very dignified, very simple, very straight, with the highest sense of duty.”—“Even his death happened as he would have had it, no long ineffectiveness, no burden on others. His death like his life was calm, peaceful and well ordered.”—“Self-centred but never self-absorbed, silent but never sullen, he gave the impression of strength, sagacity and self-confidence.”—“Calm, strong and immensely dependable. His heart was a heart of gold.”—“He was a conservative strategist on the field of war in which conservatism was the highest wisdom.”—“His reasoned daring, his lucid intelligence and his great heart as a chief, he led his squadrons to victory and remained for all sailors the very model of honour.”—“One of the most simple and modest men, a man of sterling character and great ability of a type of which you meet very few in this world.”—“It is difficult to write of Lord Jellicoe in terms of moderation.”—“Owing to his faultless leadership and owing to his great wisdom and caution combined with great daring he made the one action he fought final.”—“The memory of his period of office [Governor-General of New Zealand] lingers in a glad retrospect of gratitude.”—“An associated naturalness of bearing, a charming simplicity in the root meaning of the word bore testimony to a gracious spirit, a splendour of character none the less splendid because it was possessed in native quietness.”—“A great sailor and a great Englishman. A great Christian.”—“The trust between him and his command was the great secret of his strength.”—“Indomitable courage. A firm friend. A tower of strength to anyone who had anything to do with him.”—“Because he remained calm and steadfast all was safe.”—“In addition to being a profound thinker of exceptional judgment, he was *par excellence* a man of action.”—“He *was* the Grand Fleet.”—“Exceptional self-control. When angry he became silent.”—“Greatly beloved and trusted because of his high character and great competence.”—“An excellent ship and fleet handler, he had the all-important quality of a clear cool head and the power of rapidly taking in a situation and dealing with it with judgment and balance.”—

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"It was all of a piece with his cool calculating competence, that he refused to make the convoy system general a day before he was ready to apply it."—"The more than superb sailor, the commander who could win confidence, the civic ruler who could ably represent the Crown of a great Empire, the public orator whose very simplicity was compelling."—"It was the good fortune of England that she found such a man when men are tried, in her time of need, and she will be wise to keep in mind both his good counsel and his great example."

Then finally we will add a more personal tribute coming from one who nursed him for months through his nearly fatal illness in 1931.

"It seems almost incredible that the alert quick figure will never be seen again, dashing off to play golf, or shoot with the dog sitting happily beside him in the car, sitting at his desk, writing replies to endless letters or rattling his deaf instruments in church.

That the kindly face and quizzical eyes will be seen no more, nor heard no more the charming voice. Yet he has left such an example of single hearted service to his King, Country and the Navy, and such a store of memories of personal kindnesses to so many whom he called friends, such a wealth of love and gratitude, as is given to rare and choice personalities only to leave as a legacy to those who lived in close personal contact with him."¹

Lord Jellicoe probably caught a slight chill planting poppies on November 9—a ceremony at which the first man who had been wounded planted a poppy in memory of the first man killed. Then, on the morning of November 11, with the seeds of his illness already sown, he visited the Foch Memorial at Victoria to place a wreath as a tribute from British ex-Service men; thence, hurrying on, he took his place at the head of the ex-Service parade at the Cenotaph. His last public appearance was at Euston, on November 12, when he named the *British Legion* Engine of the London, Midland and Scottish Railway. The chill was apparently not dangerous; one lung was slightly affected and all went well until November 19, when it became apparent that his heart was feeling the strain. He died peacefully on the evening of November 20.

Then the country suddenly woke up, and with a shock appreciated the true worth of the man they had lost. Tributes from all quarters of the globe, from high and low, poured in; from the Colonies; from the Allies; from his old antagonists; all combined to pay homage to his great qualities.

¹ Miss Bennett.

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On November 25 he was buried in St. Paul's Cathedral, a mausoleum that has been reserved as a Valhalla for the greatest of our soldiers and sailors. The morning of November 25 broke in a fitting manner—mist and damp, recalling May 31, 1916. So Lord Jellicoe went to his rest in the weather in which he had fought and been foiled all but twenty years before. He would have been the first to have appreciated, with twinkling eyes, the grim compliment paid him by the presence of his old enemy—the North Sea weather.

As is customary the pall-bearers were officers of corresponding rank in the Navy, Army and Air Force, but conspicuous among these was Lord Beatty, who with a worthy but imprudent chivalry rose, against medical advice, from a bed of sickness to pay a last token of respect to his old Commander-in-Chief, whom he had esteemed so greatly in the early years of the War, and whom he was soon to be called to join in the great unknown. Two foreign countries were also represented—France, our old ally, sent Vice-Admiral Durand-Viel ; and Germany, our old foe, was represented by Vice-Admiral Foerster, and the ex-Kaiser was represented in the procession by Prince Frederick of Prussia. So were old enmities wiped out in the last solemn rites of this great Commander.

It is not necessary to dwell on the pomp and solemnity of that funeral—the moving music, the silence, the Last Post in the Cathedral. It is not on the vast crowds gathered largely out of curiosity to see the pageant that we need look—but among those present were officers and men—some active, some retired—who had served with and under him and well knew his worth, and their own and the country's loss. Many an old pensioner travelled far to attend and pay a last tribute. The British Legion, whose men owed more to Lord Jellicoe's firm and guiding hand than they knew, lined a goodly portion of the route, over 500 branches being represented, each man feeling that he had lost a friend. It was with genuine sorrow that they saw their 500 banners lowered in salute as the gun-carriage hauled by seamen passed slowly on its way. The tribute by the Archbishop of Canterbury will long be remembered, recalling as he spoke his visit to the Grand Fleet and the admiration that he then formed of its great Commander.

These are the words he spoke to listening crowds in the Cathedral:

“To no man could the thought of a funeral oration pronounced over him have been more distasteful than to the great and single-hearted sailor whom to-day the whole nation holds in honour. Yet it has been deemed fitting that some voice should try to express

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in a few sentences some at least of the thoughts, the memories, the emotions which are rising to-day in the hearts of his comrades and of his fellow-countrymen. This most difficult task has been entrusted to me, and I shall try to fulfil it with a simplicity like his own. It might have been more fitting that the task and the honour should have been given to one of his comrades in the great Service to which it was his life-long pride and joy to belong. Yet at this moment it is of the man himself rather than of his achievements that we think ; and of the man himself I can dare speak with the knowledge and affection of a friend.

In the early days of the Great War, when the Grand Fleet which he laboured to create, and which it was the crowning joy of his life to command, lay hidden among the rocks and mists of the northern isles, it was my privilege to be his guest for many days on board his flagship. Night after night, sharing his room with him, I watched him at work. I seem to see him now, sitting at his desk, with nothing but a great map before him, receiving messages from all parts of the high seas and quietly writing and sending forth his short decisive answers. The experience left on me the ineffable impression of a man of steady courage, of imperturbable self-control, and of quiet and steadfast confidence. As day by day I went among the ships in his command there was one unbroken testimony given ; that he had made his comrades of all ranks, from the highest to the lowest, a band of brothers, bound together by an absolute confidence in his leadership and by a loyalty to him which had the warmth of love.

This was the man on whom was laid a vaster and more momentous responsibility than had ever been laid upon any Commander-in-Chief at any time in the long history of this nation. But his whole life had been a preparation for it. His courage had been tested by many trials. By diligent study he had mastered every detail of his seaman's craft. He had pondered over all the problems of naval warfare. So when the awful moment came to which Heaven had joined these great issues he was ready—as a man who

‘ Through the heat of conflict keeps the law
In calmness made and sees what he foresaw.’

He accepted this tremendous responsibility simply as a trust committed to him by his King, his country and his God, with no disturbing thought of self, but with the one single aim of doing his best to be faithful to it. The secret of this quiet and unselfconscious confidence was, I know, his simple and manly faith in God, Who was ever in his remembrance, to Whom day by day he turned in prayer, and in Whom he found his strength and stay.

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So he passes from our sight. In a few moments his body will be very fittingly laid to rest within a few paces of the tomb of Nelson. Here, in the very heart of the Empire which he served and saved, there will remain an abiding memorial of a great sailor, a great Englishman, a great Christian. As for his spirit, can we doubt that it has passed to that higher service in the eternal world where he will see God's face Whom here he valiantly and humbly served ? ”

So the Archbishop ended ; and the spirit of his closing words was caught up and amplified by the voices that sang the hymn, “ I vow to thee, my country.” Led by his kinsman, the Bishop of Sheffield, the clergy moved from the chancel and gathered round the narrow opening in front of the catafalque which communicates with the crypt and bearers laid the coffin on the platform now filling this opening. The words of committal were spoken by the Bishop of Sheffield ; a few crumbs of earth were let fall on the coffin, which slowly passed below.

So passed from sight a great figure in the history of this country. The great little man, of the great heart, very dignified, very forgiving, of sterling chivalry and great wisdom and great tenderness, a civic ruler and one of the greatest of our sailors.

Those who visit Lord Jellicoe's tomb will do so with varying emotions. Those of the present generation who knew and loved him, will bring with them memories, ever green, of his personality and comradeship. But many there will be who never knew him. These and others of generations to come, will do well to recall that the ashes tombed below are those of the man, who twice, on the misty evening of May 31, 1916, held the fate of the Empire in his hand, and who in a few fateful seconds gauged fate, and determined action that ensured the victorious termination of the War and the lasting freedom of our Country.

Body and soul for his Service, his life for his Country's Cause,
Eschewing the pleasant byeways and the cheaply won applause ;
Ever for those who faltered, the smile and the helping hand,
A true commander proven in the school of self-command.

Enduring, in faith and patience, a yoke he might share with none,
His meed the respect unchallenged that may not be lightly won,
Which grew through trust and friendship to the guerdon yet more rare,
The crown of a deep affection which none but the masters wear.

The Master Mariner, by ADMIRAL RONALD A. HOPWOOD.

APPENDIX I

JOHN RUSHWORTH, First EARL JELlicoe and Viscount Brocas of Southampton (1925) and Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa (1918), came of a family whose roots had sunk deep in English soil. It can be traced for many generations and many of his ancestors were connected with the sea. Jellicoe's second name, Rushworth, was given him after his grandfather, John Rushworth Keele, who in his turn was named after his mother, Elizabeth Rushworth, Jellicoe's great-grandmother. The Rushworth family produced two captains in the Royal Navy in three generations. The first was Captain John Rushworth, born in 1721, who was Elizabeth's father. He died in 1780 and is buried at Northwood, near Cowes, in the Isle of Wight. The second was Edward Rushworth, Captain John's grandson and Elizabeth's nephew. He served with distinction during the Napoleonic War and died on active service in the West Indies in 1812. His father, Elizabeth Rushworth's brother, was Edward Rushworth, Member of Parliament for the Isle of Wight for seventeen years. Yet another Rushworth, Henry, Edward's brother, and the only other male Rushworth of that generation, was also in the Navy and died in India. The Rushworth ancestry alone was enough to account for a young man who bore their name giving to the sea his life's work and his life's interest.

However, the matter does not end there. Putting aside for the moment Jellicoe's father's profession and the obvious connection with the sea which resulted from it, there are many other indications of a seafaring strain in his ancestry.

Keele.

On the Keele side of the family, there was Henry Keele, a brother of Jellicoe's grandfather (John Rushworth Keele) who was a surgeon in the Navy. Another brother of John Rushworth Keele, Charles Keele, rose to the rank of admiral. He came into prominence when, as a young man, he led an expedition with great success against Martaban during the Burmese War of 1824.

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Yet another brother, Edward Keele, was killed at the age of thirteen when serving as a midshipman in H.M.S. *Java* on the occasion of her historic engagement with the United States frigate *Constitution* off the coast of Brazil on December 29, 1812.

Patton.

Jellicoe's grandfather, John Rushworth Keele, himself married the daughter of an admiral, Admiral Philip Patton, who was a distinguished sailor. When he died, at Fareham, a contemporary wrote of him :

. "Ah ! Patton, o'er thy urn
Will every British sailor mourn
And shed a grateful tear."

The words are not inapt as Patton was a great advocate of better conditions for sailors. He was in command of the *Prince George* on January 16, 1779, when a mutiny broke out. This he quelled with exemplary firmness, but the incident must have made a great impression on him because in later years he used all his influence to get some of the more serious of the sailors' grievances remedied. He was second-in-command of the Channel Fleet under Lord Keith in the Downs at the time of Napoleon's threatened invasion. Shortly afterwards, probably at the instance of Pitt, whose friend he was, he was made Second Sea Lord. This position he was filling at the time of the Battle of Trafalgar ¹ and was consequently closely connected with Nelson, Collingwood, and the other admirals who were serving at sea. His nephew, Robert, afterwards an admiral, was a midshipman in the *Bellerophon* at the Battle of Trafalgar. Another nephew, Hugh, also became an admiral. Philip Patton's two brothers, Robert and Charles, were both in the Navy and both attained the rank of captain. A direct ancestor of theirs served at the Battle of La Hogue, where his life was saved by a silver tobacco box which stopped a musket ball.

Gardiner.

To the student of genealogy, probably the most interesting of all Jellicoe's ancestors is his grandmother, Elizabeth Gardiner of Roche Court. The Gardiners were the representatives of the

¹ By a curious coincidence Earl Jellicoe was himself Second Sea Lord to within a few days of the outbreak of the Great War in 1914.

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remarkable family of Brocas, of Beaurepaire and Roche Court. The Brocases and their successors in title, the Gardiners, held the two Hampshire estates of Beaurepaire and Roche Court for close on six hundred years. Beaurepaire passed out of the possession of the Brocases in 1873, but Roche Court is still in the possession of a branch of the family. The tenaciousness with which this particular stock clung to these estates has been rarely equalled. Brocas of Beaurepaire is a name worthy to rank with Weld of Lulworth or Throckmorton of Coughton. Those who are anxious to find a strain showing a long tradition of public service in the veins of one who proved himself such a great servant of his country may certainly find it here. That Jellicoe himself was not unappreciative of the greatness of this family was shown when, on his elevation to the dignity of earl, he chose as his second title Viscount Brocas.

Unlike so many families the record of the owners of Roche Court is both tolerably complete and easy of access. This is mainly due to the fortunate discovery, towards the end of the nineteenth century, of a chest containing some six hundred deeds and other papers dealing with the estates of the families of de Roche, Brocas and Gardiner between the years 1271 and 1782. These were collected and edited by the late Sir Montagu Burrows, Captain R.N., retired, then Chichele Professor of Modern History at Oxford, who himself married a Gardiner.¹ It is only possible here to touch lightly upon their history.

De Brocas.

The Brocases were a Gascon family, whose fortunes in this country may be traced back to the early fourteenth century when Edward II intervened and placed under his special care the children of one Arnald de Brocas who had been killed defending his country "*in partibus Scotiae*," almost certainly at Bannockburn. The eldest of these children, John de Brocas, may be said to have been the founder of the English branch of the family.² For it was his third son who was the famous Sir Bernard de Brocas, the first of the Hereditary Masters of the Royal Buckhounds, an office held by the family until their virtual extinction in the male line in 1663. Sir Bernard de Brocas was one of the favourite Knights of the

¹ *The Family of Brocas of Beaurepaire and Roche Court*, by Sir Montagu Burrows.

² Sir John de Brocas, when Governor of Southampton, repulsed the French in 1300.

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Black Prince, with whom he was certainly at Poitiers and almost certainly at Crécy and Najara. He was also the friend of William of Wykeham,¹ who made him Chief Surveyor and Warden of all the Parks in his bishopric. Under Sir Bernard, the fortunes of the house of Brocas rose with amazing rapidity. In 1353 he acquired the estate of Beaurepaire from one John Peeche, and in 1361, on his second marriage to Mary, the daughter and heiress of Sir John de Roches, he acquired the other family estate of Roche Court. These estates passed through a long line of Brocas until the death of Thomas Brocas in 1663. Thomas Brocas, the last of the Hereditary Masters of the Royal Buckhounds, was succeeded by his granddaughter Jane, who, in 1661, had married Sir William Gardiner. Thus it was that the Gardiners acquired Roche Court. Beaurepaire, after threatened litigation, was sold by Sir William Gardiner to his wife's cousin, also called Thomas Brocas.

Sir Bernard de Brocas was buried in Westminster Abbey, where his tomb may still be seen in St. Edmund's Chapel.² After the death of Sir Bernard de Brocas, the family suffered a severe setback. Sir Bernard's son by his second wife Mary de Roches, who was also called Sir Bernard de Brocas, indulged in a luckless conspiracy to put Richard II back on his throne. In Shakespeare's *Richard II*, Act V, Scene 6, Fitzwater says :

. . . My lord I have from Oxford sent
The heads of Brocas and Sir Bennet Seely
Two of the dangerous consorted traitors
That sought at Oxford thy dire overthrow. . . .

Shakespeare was not strictly accurate, as the unfortunate Sir Bernard was arrested at Cirencester, brought to London, tried, and executed at Tyburn. But the result has naturally been to immortalize Sir Bernard the Second. Sir Bernard's example of loyalty to his sovereign was typical of the Brocas, who were practically ruined as a result of their devotion to King Charles I in the Civil War. It is not without interest to note that the Brocas Meadow at Eton, well known to generations of Etonians, derived its name from the fact that the land originally belonged to the Brocas. The origin of Brocas Street in Windsor is the same.

¹ William of Wykeham was the founder of Winchester School as well as of New College, Oxford, and the benefactor of Winchester Cathedral.

² Nearly seven hundred years later Earl Jellicoe was brought there to lie on his way to his last resting-place in St. Paul's.

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JOHN JELLCOE BA

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Gardiner.

Jellicoe's grandmother, Elizabeth Whalley Smythe Gardiner, to give her her full name, was the eldest daughter of Sir James Whalley Smythe Gardiner. As his many names suggest he was the representative of three distinct families—Whalley, Smythe and Gardiner and, through the Gardiners, of Brocas. His father was Robert Whalley of Clerk Hill, Lancashire, and his mother Grace Gardiner, the granddaughter of Sir William Gardiner and Jane Brocas, the heiress of the Brocas. Grace Gardiner's father, Bernard Gardiner, was Sir William Gardiner's third son. He was Warden of All Souls' College, Oxford, and Vice-Chancellor of the University from 1712 to 1715. Sir William Gardiner, the first of the Gardiners of Roche Court, was succeeded by his eldest son, Bernard's brother, Sir Brocas Gardiner, who died in 1740. Sir Brocas's son, William, then acquired the estates, but he died without issue in 1779, and, old Sir William Gardiner's second son having died in infancy, they passed to Grace Gardiner's eldest son, John Whalley. He thereupon assumed the name of Gardiner. Grace Gardiner herself had died two years previously.

The Gardiner baronetcy, acquired by the first Sir William Gardiner, became extinct on the death of the second baronet. However, in 1783, John Whalley Gardiner, as he was now called, was himself created a baronet. Four years later he inherited the properties of Tackley Park and Cuddesdon, Oxfordshire, as heir at law of the Smythes, Grace Gardiner's mother's family, and he added the name of Smythe to that of Whalley and Gardiner. Sir John Whalley Smythe Gardiner died without issue in 1797 and all his property passed to his brother James, who became the second baronet of the new creation. It is this Sir James Whalley Smythe Gardiner who was the father of Elizabeth Gardiner, Jellicoe's grandmother. She married Samuel Jellicoe, the grandfather of Earl Jellicoe. There must have been something of romance in their courtship as the property of Samuel Jellicoe's father's adjoined that of Roche Court.

It is interesting to note that, in accordance with the wishes of the late Lady de Salis, the family pictures at Roche Court, the seat of the Gardiner-Brocas family, have been presented by their present owner to the second Earl Jellicoe.

A curious feature of Jellicoe's forbears is their close connection with Hampshire, and with the Isle of Wight in particular. This

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certainly had its influence on him, as all his life he was devoted to the county and latterly made his home on the Island. The Jellicoes, the Rushworths, the Keeles, the Gardiners and the Pattons all had strong Hampshire connections. In fact, it is hard to find an ancestor of Jellicoe's who was not connected with this county in some way or another. In one of her letters, his mother wrote to him in later years :

" . . . I remember going over to Bonchurch with Aunt Helen [Helen Keele, Mrs. Jellicoe's sister, who died unmarried in 1900] to see Miss Margaret Rushworth, an old lady of 77 years of age [this makes the visit in 1879], but she was so slender and upright in figure, it was difficult to believe her age. You were at that time a midshipman and she was so interested in hearing about you. There are monuments to the Rushworth family in Northwood Church, Cowes. Farringford Hall, built by Mrs. Edward Rushworth, was afterwards the home of Lord Tennyson. It is curious our coming to live in the Island as my grandmother was an Isle of Wight lady. She lived at Hythe, Southampton, after she married my grandfather, Dr. John Keele."

Mrs. Jellicoe's grandmother was Elizabeth Rushworth, of whom we have already heard as the daughter and aunt of two Naval captains. She married John Keele at Lyndhurst Parish Church on March 30, 1875. Their son, John Rushworth Keele, was three times Mayor of Southampton, where he practised as a doctor.

Rushworth.

The Rushworths were closely connected with the Isle of Wight. The most famous was Elizabeth's brother, Edward Rushworth, to whom reference has already been made. He married Catherine, second daughter and co-heiress of the second Lord Holmes, representative of another great Isle of Wight family. Elected Member of Parliament for Newport in 1784, his election was objected to, on the grounds that he was in Holy Orders. A petition to unseat him was referred to a Committee of the House which found in Rushworth's favour. In actual fact, he had been ordained Deacon in 1780 and had preached in Newport Parish Church and elsewhere. After two months he had, however, ceased to exercise clerical functions and had adopted a layman's dress. Altogether, he sat continuously in Parliament for either Newport or Yarmouth from 1780 to 1797. He was also Recorder of Newport from 1795 till 1816. It was his wife, Catherine, who built Farringford Hall and

APPENDIX I

is the Mrs. Edward Rushworth referred to in Mrs. Jellicoe's letter. Curiously enough, his great-grandson, also called Edward Rushworth, was a cadet in the *Britannia* with Jellicoe, and was drowned in Besika Bay on December 21, 1877, in a gallant attempt to rescue a comrade. At the time he was serving as a midshipman in H.M.S. *Agincourt*.

Both the Keeles and the Rushworths are connected with Hampshire at any rate as far back as the early eighteenth century and probably (in one or two cases certainly) for a considerable period before that. The Gardiners and their predecessors in title, the Brocases, were, as we have seen, in continuous possession of estates in Hampshire since 1353. The Brocases and Gardiners continually appear as sheriffs of Hampshire. The great Sir Bernard de Brocas was Constable of Corfe Castle and a member of the Royal Commission set up to guard the ports and coasts of Hampshire. He represented Hampshire in Parliament almost continuously from 1369 to 1395, except in the Parliament of 1391 when he sat for Wiltshire, for which he was qualified by his wife's estates and his own Wardenship of the King's manor at Compton Bassett. Thereafter, the Brocases provided Hampshire with several other members of Parliament.

Admiral Philip Patton married a Hampshire girl and was himself buried at Fareham. The Jellicoes themselves are to be found at Uplands, Fareham, as early as the middle of the eighteenth century. Indeed, one would go far to find a person whose ancestors were all, almost without exception, so closely allied to one county as were those of Jellicoe.

The following list of ships at the capture of which Philip Patton, Lord Jellicoe's great-grandfather, was present is worth placing on record. There is a fine old sea flavour in the names, reminiscent of the lines written by Admiral Ronald Hopwood.

Then a courtly voice and stately from a tall Two-decker came,
She'd the manners of a monarch and a story in her name
"We'd a winter gale at even, and my shrouds are aching yet,
It was more than time for reefing when the upper sails were set,
So we chased in woful weather till we closed in failing light,
Then we fought them as we caught them just as Hawke had bid
us fight.

And we swept the sea by sunrise clear and free beyond a doubt
Was it thus the matter ended when the enemy was out?"

ADMIRAL RONALD HOPWOOD, *The Old Way*.

EARL JELlicoe

A LIST OF SHIPS OF WAR, TAKEN OR DESTROYED, BELONGING TO FRANCE AND SPAIN, IN ACTIONS AT WHICH LORD JELlicoe's GREAT-GRANDFATHER, PHILIP PATTON, WAS PRESENT, IN THE WAR WHICH BEGAN IN THE YEAR 1755.

	Ships' Names.	Ships of the Line. Guns.	Frigates. Guns.	When and Where the Actions were, and Names of the Chief Commanders, and their Flagships.
French	<i>Alcide</i>	64	—	} Taken { June 10, 1755, off Newfoundland, by <i>Admiral Boscawen</i> , in the <i>Torbay</i> . —P. Patton was in the <i>Torbay</i> .
	<i>Lys</i>	64	—	
	<i>Prudent</i>	74	—	} Burnt {
	<i>Entreprenant</i>	74	—	
	<i>Capricieux</i>	64	—	
	<i>Célèbre</i>	64	—	} Taken { In the month of July, 1758, at Cape Breton, by <i>Admiral Boscawen</i> , in the <i>Namur</i> .—P. Patton was in the <i>Namur</i> .
	<i>Bienfaisant</i>	64	—	
	<i>Apollon</i>	50	—	} Sunk {
	<i>Fidelle</i>	—	26	
	<i>Biche</i>	—	16	} Sunk {
	<i>Chèvre</i>	—	16	
	<i>Echo</i>	—	26	} Taken {
	<i>L'Océan</i>	80	—	
	<i>Redoutable</i>	74	—	} Burnt { In August, 1759, near Lagos, by <i>Admiral Boscawen</i> , in the <i>Namur</i> .—P. P. was in the <i>Namur</i> .
	<i>Centaure</i>	74	—	
	<i>Téméraire</i>	74	—	} Taken {
	<i>Modeste</i>	64	—	
	<i>Soleil Royal</i>	80	—	} Burnt { In November, 1759, on the French Coast, in Quiberon Bay, by <i>Admiral Hawke</i> , in the <i>Royal George</i> .—P. P. was in the <i>Namur</i> .
	<i>Héros</i>	74	—	
Spanish	<i>Formidable</i>	80	—	} Taken {
	<i>Thésée</i>	74	—	
	<i>Superbe</i>	70	—	} Sunk {
	<i>Juste</i>	70	—	
	<i>Tigre</i>	70	—	} Taken { In August, 1762, at the Havanna, by <i>Admiral Pocock</i> in the <i>Namur</i> .—P. P. was in the <i>Namur</i> . Omitted here 3 Frigates, taken by <i>Admiral Pocock</i> , viz. : <i>Thetis</i> , 22. <i>Venganza</i> , 24. <i>Marte</i> , 18. All 64 Guns.
	<i>Reina</i>	70	—	
	<i>Soverano</i>	70	—	
	<i>Infante</i>	70	—	
	<i>Aquilon</i>	70	—	
	<i>America</i>	60	—	
	<i>Conquistador</i>	60	—	
	<i>San Genaro</i>	60	—	
	<i>San Antonio</i>	60	—	
	<i>Neptuno</i>	70	—	} Sunk {
	<i>Asia</i>	64	—	
	<i>Europa</i>	60	—	
	Sum	2,116	84	In 31 Ships of the Line and 4 Frigates.
	The 3 Frigates omitted		64	
			148	

APPENDIX I

A LIST OF SHIPS OF WAR, TAKEN OR DESTROYED, BELONGING TO FRANCE, SPAIN, AND HOLLAND, IN ACTIONS AT WHICH PHILIP PATTON WAS PRESENT, IN THE WAR WHICH BEGAN IN THE YEAR 1778.

	Ships' Names.	Ships of the Line. Guns.	Frigates. Guns.	When and Where the Actions were, and Names of the Chief Commanders and their Flagships.
Spanish	<i>Guipuscoano</i> , now the <i>Prince William</i> . . .	64	—	January 8, 1780, about the latitude of Vigo, by <i>Admiral Rodney</i>, in the <i>Sandwich</i>. N.B. 15 loaded store ships were taken at same time.—P. Patton was Captain of Rear-Admiral Digby's ship, the <i>Prince George</i>. Commanded the <i>Prince George</i>, in which ship His (late) Majesty, William the Fourth, went to sea.
	<i>San Carlos</i> . . .	—	32	
	<i>San Rafael</i> . . .	—	30	
	<i>Santa Teresa</i> . . .	—	28	
	<i>San Bruno</i> . . .	—	26	
	<i>San Firmin</i> . . .	—	16	
	<i>San Vincente</i> . . .	—	10	
	<i>Fenix</i> , now called the <i>Gibraltar</i> . . .	80	—	January 16, 1780, near Cadiz, by the above-mentioned <i>Admiral Rodney</i>, in the <i>Sandwich</i>.—P. P. Captain of the "<i>Prince George</i>" as above.
	<i>Monarca</i> . . .	70	—	
	<i>Princesa</i> . . .	70	—	
	<i>Diligente</i> . . .	70	—	
	<i>San Eugenio</i> . . .	70	—	
French	<i>San Domingo</i> . . .	70	—	February 23, 1780, off Cape Finisterre, with £60,000 sterling on board in specie, by <i>Admiral Digby</i>, in the <i>Prince George</i>.—P. P. Captain of the "<i>Prince George</i>."
	<i>Protée</i> . . .	64	—	August 3, 1781, by <i>Admiral Hyde Parker</i>, in the <i>Fortitude</i>, at the Dogger Bank.—P. P. was Captain of the "<i>Belle Poule</i>."¹
Dutch	<i>Hollandia</i> . . .	64	—	Sunk
		622	142	In 9 Ships of the Line and 6 Frigates.

Note.—Small ships omitted.

¹ Bligh of the *Bounty* was master of the *Belle Poule*.

EARL JELlicoe

TOTAL OF THESE TWO LISTS MADE OUT OCTOBER 15, 1781.

	Of the Line.		Frigates.		Both together.	
	Ships.	Guns.	Ships.	Guns.	Ships.	Guns.
French	20	1,396	4	84	24	1,480
Spanish	19	1,278	9	206	28	1,484
Dutch.	1	64	—	—	1	64
Totals	40	2,738	13	290	53	3,028

Madam

With deep emotion I read your kind letter I received from
Eintre yesterday. How very kind of you to take this trouble
on a day full of so many mournful duties & impressions &
I beg to be allowed to thank you for this kind thought.

I am glad that my dear grandson was enabled to represent me
at Lord Jellicoe's funeral & in my name as Chief of my old
Imperial Navy & of the officers & men still living who once
belonged to it, to present our last respects to the illustrious
Admiral, whose sterling qualities, as gallant leader,
splendid sailor, chivalrous antagonist & British gentleman
will for ever be treasured in our hearts.

I shall all my life gratefully remember the Command given
by the Admiral to Capt. v. Heiden leader of the detachment
of the German sailors who had the honour of being placed
under his orders during the Chinese Campaign: "Germans
to the front!" --- Your appreciation of Tirpitz's work for the
better understanding between our two countries has given me
deepest satisfaction; indeed it is high time that the "two great
Nations" as British naval officers often say, should close in
friendship to save the peace of the world.
Believe me, Madam, with deep respect

Yours faithfully

William

7 A

FACSIMILE OF LETTER FROM THE EX-KAISER OF GERMANY
TO LADY JELlicoe

APPENDIX II

NAVAL SERVICE OF ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET EARL JELlicoe

<i>Britannia</i>	NAVAL CADET	15.7.72 to	16.7.74
<i>Newcastle</i>	MIDSHIPMAN	17.7.74 to	1.6.77
<i>Agincourt</i>	do.	2.6.77 to	4.12.78
do.	SUB-LIEUTENANT	5.12.78 to	10.2.79
<i>Excellent</i> (for College Exam.)	do.	11.2.79 to	2.10.79
<i>Excellent</i> (for Gunnery Exam.)	do.	3.10.79 to	23.1.80
<i>Inconstant</i>	do.	24.1.80 to	11.3.80
<i>Alexandra</i>	do.	12.3.80 to	31.8.80
do. (passage)	do.	1.9.80 to	5.9.80
<i>Agincourt</i>	LIEUTENANT	3.2.81 to	25.9.82
<i>Excellent</i> (to qualify for Gunnery)	do.	30.9.82 to	18.5.84
<i>Excellent</i> (as Junior Staff Officer)	do.	19.5.84 to	3.9.85
<i>Monarch</i>	do.	4.9.85 to	15.4.86
<i>Colossus</i>	do.	16.4.86 to	9.12.86
<i>Excellent</i> (Experimental Staff)	do.	10.12.86 to	4.7.87
<i>Mercury</i> (for Jubilee Review)	do.	5.7.87 to	25.8.87
<i>Excellent</i> (Experimental Staff)	do.	26.8.87 to	13.5.88
do. (Staff Officer)	do.	14.5.88 to	14.9.89
do. (for Service at Admiralty)	do.	15.9.89 to	11.2.90
PRESIDENT do. do.	do.	12.2.90 to	29.6.91
do. do. do.	COMMANDER	30.6.91 to	8.2.92
<i>Sans Pareil</i>	do.	9.2.92 to	1.3.93
<i>Achilles</i>	do.	2.3.93 to	31.3.93
<i>Victoria</i>	do.	1.4.93 to	12.8.93
<i>Victory II</i> (for <i>Ramillies</i>)	do.	13.8.93 to	16.10.93
<i>Ramillies</i>	do.	17.10.93 to	15.12.96
ORDNANCE COMMITTEE	CAPTAIN	9.1.97 to	30.12.97
<i>Centurion</i>	do.	31.12.97 to	31.3.99
do.	do.	1.4.99 to	19.9.01
<i>Duke of Wellington I</i> (leave)	do.	20.9.01 to	7.11.01
PRESIDENT (for Service at Admiralty)	do.	8.11.01 to	19.3.02
NAVAL ASSISTANT TO CONTROLLER	do.	20.3.02 to	11.8.03
<i>Drake</i>	do.	12.8.03 to	21.11.04

EARL JELLICOE

DIRECTOR OF NAVAL ORD- NANCE	REAR-ADMIRAL	24.2.05 to 24.8.07
<i>Albemarle</i> (as R.A., Atlantic Fleet)	do.	25.8.07 to 25.8.08 (hoisted flag)
CONTROLLER OF NAVY	do.	16.10.08 to 19.12.10
<i>Prince of Wales</i> (Cmdg. Atlantic Fleet)	ACT. VICE-ADMIRAL and VICE-ADMIRAL	20.12.10 to 18.12.11
<i>Hercules</i> (Cmdg. 2nd Divi- sion of Home Fleet)	VICE-ADMIRAL	19.12.11 to 9.12.12
2ND SEA LORD	do.	10.12.12 to 13.7.13
<i>Thunderer</i> (as C.-in-C., Red Fleet—manœuvres)	do.	14.7.13 to 7.8.13
2ND SEA LORD	do.	8.8.13 to 30.7.14
<i>Iron Duke</i> (2nd in Command, Home Fleet)	do.	31.7.14 to 3.8.14
<i>Iron Duke</i> (C.-in-C., Grand Fleet)	ACT. ADMIRAL and ADMIRAL	4.8.14 to 28.11.16
PRESIDENT (for Service at Admiralty)	ADMIRAL	29.11.16 to 3.12.16
1ST SEA LORD	do.	4.12.16 to 9.1.18
PRESIDENT (for Special Ser- vice)	do.	10.1.18 to 14.2.18
H.M.S. <i>New Zealand</i>	ADMIRAL and ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET	20.2.19 to 4.2.20
<i>Victory</i> (leave)	ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET RETIRED, 5.12.24	5.2.20 to 29.2.20

HONOURS CONFERRED.

K.C.V.O.		1907
K.C.B.		1911
G.C.B.		1915
G.C.V.O.		1916
O.M.		1916
Freedom of City of London		1920
LL.D.		1920
D.C.L.		1925

FOREIGN ORDERS.

St. George of Russia, 3rd Class.
 Grand Cross Legion of Honour.
 Grand Cordon Order of Rising Sun with Paulourna.
 Grand Cordon Order of Leopold.
 Grand Cross Military Order of Savoy.

APPENDIX III

THE general chart of the Battle of Jutland shows the three blows. In the first the Grand Fleet and High Sea Fleet battleships are shown in skeleton. The actual time of the plotting was after the van of the High Sea Fleet had been some ten minutes under the fire of our ships, and when the whole High Sea Fleet turned away together and ran away from our ships along the track BCDE.

The second blow is shown (the ships on both sides are filled in with full colour) at E. Here the ships of the High Sea Fleet at F ran right into our fleet and found it again ahead of them. Admiral Scheer then turned and ran away ; this time following the course GHKL.

At F the German battle cruisers Z were told to cover a destroyer attack which they did, the battleships retreating behind the smoke. It was at this moment that our battleships turned four points away from the torpedo attack.

The third blow is shown inside the square ; when darkness was falling the battle cruisers fired a few shots at the pre-War Dreadnoughts.

The two fleets had been steering on rapidly converging courses, and another two hours of daylight would have seen a more or less decisive end to the action.

For the sake of clearness the tracks of all except the leading battleships or battle cruisers have been omitted.

APPENDIX IV

GLOSSARY

- G. 1. Composite ship, a ship built partly of steel and partly of wood.
- G. 2. "Wearing," passing to another tack by the ship passing stern to, instead of bow to, the wind, as in tacking.
- G. 3. Mizzen chains : a platform outside the ship to which the mizzen-rigging, which supported the mizzen-mast in a sideway direction, was set up.
- G. 4. "To distress ships for men " an old-time term meaning to reduce the efficiency of ships by removing men.
- G. 5. One cable equals 200 yards. Ten cables make one sea mile.
- G. 6. A Squadron is a number of ships, but too few to deserve the name Fleet. The number is indefinite, but in the case of the Grand Fleet the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Squadrons were each composed of eight ships, each commanded by a Vice-Admiral. The 5th was composed of four ships only, commanded by a Rear-Admiral. The reason for this disparity was that the 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons were made up of ships of more or less equal speed, but the ships of the 5th Battle Squadron were much faster and could be used for purposes for which the other battleships had not sufficient speed. The 3rd Battle Squadron was composed of pre-Dreadnought battleships and the original *Dreadnought* ; these were not present at the Battle of Jutland.
- G. 7. The Battle Cruisers were armed with guns up to 13.5-in. but had a far greater speed than the Battleships. To obtain this they had to have fewer guns and thinner armour.
The *Armoured* Cruisers were smaller, less heavily armed, and slower than the Battle Cruisers.
- G. 8. A Division was made up of an arbitrary number of ships, but in the case of the Grand Fleet consisted of four ships. Each Battle Squadron, therefore, was composed of two Divisions. Each Division was commanded by a Rear-Admiral.

APPENDIX IV : GLOSSARY

A Sub-Division was half of a Division, or two ships.

Prior to the 1st of May 1902 the Home Fleet had been organized in four Divisions. It was then re-constituted as follows :

1st Fleet, comprised the previous 1st and 2nd Divisions of the Home Fleet plus the Atlantic Fleet. This new Fleet was divided into three parts each of which was christened a " Squadron," and subsequently a fourth Squadron was added.

2nd Fleet comprised the old 3rd Division of the Home Fleet and was formed into the 5th and 6th Squadrons.

3rd Fleet, comprised the old 4th Division of the Home Fleet and was formed into the 7th and 8th Squadrons and the 9th, 10th and 11th Cruiser Squadrons.

At the Battle of Jutland there were present three Battle Squadrons of two Divisions each and the 5th Battle Squadron of one Division. The only time when Squadron formation was used at Jutland, as distinct from Divisional formation, was during the night.

- G. 9. The Light Cruisers were fast, rather lightly armed and lightly protected ships, chiefly of use for scouting, and work with and against destroyers.

The Light Cruiser Squadrons were composed of either four or five Light Cruisers.

- G. 10. The destroyers were small fast vessels, carrying both a gun and torpedo armament. They were of use for attacking the large ships with torpedoes, helping to repel a torpedo attack by the enemy destroyers on our large ships, and forming screens to protect the fleet against the attack of submarines.

A submarine had to keep its periscope above the water during the last phase of an attack. The destroyers were therefore stationed at the places at which the submarines would wish to fire their torpedoes—and therefore at the places most suitable to flurry a submarine and render it liable to be rammed.


- G. 11. The destroyers were organized in flotillas from 16 to 20 vessels with a larger destroyer called a " Flotilla leader " in company.

- G. 12. " Plotting " is recording the movements or positions of ships on a chart. By plotting the course and speed of

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a ship it is possible to forecast the position it will occupy after an interval of time.

- G. 13. The German Scouting Groups were analogous to our Cruiser Squadrons.
- G. 14. The Spotting Officers watch the fall of shot on the water, or the burst of shells on the enemy, and therefrom estimate whether the range of the guns is correct or what alteration is required. The Director Officer works the instrument by means of which the guns are fired at the exact moment.
- G. 15. The peculiar formation of the Grand Fleet shown in Fig. 13 was due to Sir John Jellicoe (when sweeping the fleet round after the first blow to regain touch with the enemy) using the quickest method of altering the course of the whole fleet. Instead of altering in "Follow the leader"




APPENDIX IV : GLOSSARY

fashion by each ship following its next ahead for the whole length of the line, he altered the leader of each Division simultaneously to the new course, the other three ships of each Division then following its leader. This brought the fleet to the new course in a couple of minutes instead of occupying some quarter of an hour, but it also brought the Divisions in echelon. A similar turn back again would have once more brought the fleet into line ahead.

The diagram on the opposite page shows the manœuvre for 4 Divisions.

- G. 16. "The turn away" from the torpedo attack was made even quicker than by the method explained in G. 15. The leaders of *Sub-Divisions* were turned simultaneously, the single ship astern of each leader of a Sub-Division followed its leader.

The diagram shows the manœuvre for 4 Divisions.



EARL JELLICOE

- G. 17. Incessant jamming churned up the ether and made the reception of W/T messages very difficult ; especially those of the destroyers, none of which got through to the Flag-ship. All Admiralty messages were sent in cypher. Some groups came through mutilated which caused delay in the decoding rooms, and therefore at times the Commander-in-Chief received the messages only after a considerable lapse of time.
- G. 18. The handing- (a contraction of handling) room is a compartment outside and adjoining the magazine in which the gun charges are received and placed in the ammunition hoists. The handing-room is separated from the magazine by a water-tight door with a scuttle through which the charges are passed. The scuttle, in turn, can be closed by a water-tight flap.
- G. 19. Otter gear. Gear to cut the mooring-ropes of mines, or alternatively to explode them clear of a ship. It consisted essentially of a wire rope with an inclined float at the end. The other end of the wire was taken to the bow of the ship. When steaming ahead, the pressure of the water against the inclined float forced it outwards and away from the ship, thereby stretching the wire and forming a protective sweep which fouled the mooring-ropes of mines in the vicinity of the ship. The floats were kept at a desired distance below the water—which varied according to the draught of water of the vessel using the gear.

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The names of all ships which have been merely mentioned in the text, but which were not involved in any action of interest, have been omitted.

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